Papers presented by the African National Congress at United Nations Conferences

The apartheid system is particularly vulnerable to an effective oil embargo, for until this year only four per cent of the country's liquid fuel needs have been locally produced.

Sensitive to the possibility of an oil embargo, the Pretoria regime has pursued policies over a number of years that have tried to dampen the rate at which the consumption of oil has expanded. Combined with the ready availability of cheap coal, the result has been that in South Africa there is a proportionately smaller use of oil than in other industrialized countries. But simultaneously, this proportion effectively represents an irreducible minimum, with little room for further economies or reduction in consumption without severe recession. Thus the regime has to find alternate or substitute fuels, or expand still further its oil-from-coal production. Both options require considerable expenditure.

The apartheid economy is fuelled in large measure by coal, of which there are vast resources. Due to the starvation wages paid to black miners, the pithead price for coal in South Africa is between one-half and one-third of the price in Europe and the United States of America. Hence this fuel has been favoured.

Large-scale projects are being planned and launched to increase domestic sources. Yet even when one takes into account these massive efforts to reduce the dependence on oil imports, the fact remains that for the foreseeable future both the apartheid economy and the repressive apparatus will remain dependent on external supplies for nearly half the present needs and to a greater extent when one allows for an expansion in consumption.

As already indicated, there is little scope for reducing the quantity of oil consumed. Furthermore, in particular sectors there can be no substitutes.

The Pretoria regime's military and repressive machine is highly mechanized. Its operations are dependent upon its mobility which in turn depends upon the availability of oil products to move the trucks and gun carriers, the ships and helicopters, the bombers and transporters.

As the journal of the racist armed forces has admitted "mobile warfare ... has made petrol a crucial item in the time of operations".

There can be no question that the illegal occupation of Namibia could not be maintained without a highly mobile army and air force. The repeated acts of aggression perpetrated against South Africa's neighbours have been possible only because of oil imported into South Africa: the planes that have bombed Angola, Botswana and Zambia have used aviation fuel, imported or produced from imported crude; the racist troops that make incursions into Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia are transported with the aid of fuel supplied in defiance of the wishes of the oil producers; the vehicles used by Pretoria's police and other agents who have kidnapped militants of the African National Congress (ANC) and refugees from neighbouring countries have been fuelled by imported oil. And it is imported fuel that moves the "hippos" and other instruments of terror in the black townships and rural areas of South Africa.

As the challenge to the repressive regime grows, the consumption of oil in this sector is expanding dramatically. The regime has already introduced legislation compelling companies to sell oil to the military. If foreign supplies are cut off, the regime will be able to maintain its military operations only at the cost of severe curtailments in the economy.

The sectors of the economy most dependent on oil and in which there is little prospect of substitution are transport and agriculture.

In 1975/76 the transport sector used 54.3 per cent of the total refined petroleum in the country. Road transport uses the major part of this.

Economies have been made by increase in price, the imposition of speed limits and restrictions on hours of sale of petrol. Proposals for production of additives are being considered. There is no viable alternative as a source of fuel.

Attempts are being made to shift from road transport, and South Africa Railways is embarking on large-scale electrification but the cost is phenomenal. A recent report on rail passenger services found that to meet the need for modernization and expansion, as well as reducing the consumption of oil-based liquid fuels by the railways would require an expenditure of more than R15,000 million before 1989. (Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 1 July 1979).

In 1975/76 the agricultural sector used 7.9 per cent of the country's refined petroleum, including 25 per cent of the total diesel supply. (Rand Daily Mail, 24 July 1979). Here again there is no substitute.

The proportion of oil used in industry has increased from 17 per cent in 1974 to 21.5 per cent in 1975/76. Oil is used as a fuel, but it is also a vital raw material in the chemical industry, providing a base for production of fertilizer, asphalt and plastics. Oil is further used as a lubricant, without which the wheels of all industry would grind to a stop.

Estimates of the amount of oil used in mining vary, but are in the region of two to four per cent of South Africa's liquid fuel. Some indication of the crucial role of oil in the mining industry is provided by the following reports.

In 1977, the gold and coal mining sectors used R28 million worth of fuel and oil-based lubricants and grease in addition to diesel and other fuels. (Rand Daily Mail, June 1979).

It was reported that the cost of fuel per ton of copper produced rose from R58 in 1978 to R215 in August 1979. (Rand Daily Mail, 9 August 1979).

Following the decision of Arab oil producers to embargo the supply of their oil to South Africa in October 1973 a number of measures were taken both to reduce consumption of oil and to intensify the search for indigenous sources. The impact of the Arab producers' embargo was nullified however, by the Shah of Iran's decision to make up the deficit with Iranian oil. But the revolution in Iran and the decision of the new Government to join the embargo has led to renewed and feverish attempts to impose economy on use of oil and to expand domestic production.

The search for oil in South Africa was sporadic until the establishment of the Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (Soekor) in 1965 by Sasol and the Industrial Development Corporation. Neither the efforts of Soekor nor those of major oil companies have met with success. Most of the international oil companies have withdrawn and exploration on land has largely been abandoned. Efforts are being concentrated on the search for off-shore oil.

A subsidiary of Soekor, the South West African Oil Corporation, has been prospecting in Namibia.

Since the embargo by Iran the search has intensified. While R214 million was spent by all the companies involved in the years up to 1979, Soekor alone plans to spend R105 million over the next two years and at a similar rate thereafter. A third drill is to be introduced this year resulting in an increase in the drilling rate from 8/9 boreholes per annum to between 12 and l4 per annum. A number of overseas companies tendered to operate the third off-shore rig.

There have been a small number of gas finds, but there is no market for natural gas in South Africa.

The most promising find of gas was made by Soekor off the mouth of the Orange River and extending over the South Africa/Namibia border. This is considered a "politically sensitive area" in view of the United Nations Decree for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia and the Namibian war of liberation led by South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). The gas find is not being exploited at the moment. The prospect of significant oil in Namibia would only increase the determination of the Pretoria regime to continue its illegal annexation and occupation of the country.

It has been suggested that any major gas finds should be exploited for the production of methanol. A feasibility study is under way for a scheme to anchor a semi-submersible platform over an off-shore gas deposit and mount a plant upon it for the conversion of gas to methanol.

Since 1955, a plant using the Fischer-Tropsch method has been operating at Sasolburg, 50 kilometre south of Johannesburg. A second plant with a tenfold increase in capacity - SASOL II – is being constructed at Secunda 80 miles southeast of Johannesburg. Originally scheduled to come into full production in 1982 construction was expedited and it is expected to begin production later this year.

Last year, in the wake of the Iranian revolution, the regime decided to build another plant on the same site, which will double the original capacity of SASOL II. The extension will require an additional R3,276 million ($3,900 million), bringing the total cost of the project to over R6 billion, making it the most expensive industrial project in the world.

The production and capacity of the various SASOL plants are secret, and appear to be exaggerated for propaganda purposes. SASOL I production has generally been reported at 4,000 - 4,500 barrels per day; however, recent reports of the same plant give it a capacity of 18,000 barrels per day. (Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 29 June 1979).

According to the American firm M. W. Kellogg, which was responsible for the construction of SASOL I, the design capacity of the plant was about 55 million imperial gallons per annum, which could suggest the maximum production of the plant to be near 4,227 barrels per day. (Chemical Engineering Progress, 1957, Vol. 53, No. 12).

Similarly the capacities of SASOL II and the extension are variously reported in order to counter fears of the consequences of an oil embargo.

However, the regime’s own most optimistic figures show that even after the two plants are in full production, South Africa will still have to depend on imported crude for over 50 per cent of its liquid fuel needs. Independent assessments place the SASOL output lower. Hence notwithstanding the SASOL plants, an oil embargo will have a significant impact on the economy and the regime remains vulnerable. The scale of the resources being allocated to SASOL bear witness to this vulnerability.

The use of alcohol fuels to extend petrol supplies has been considered in many countries, either for use on their own or mixed with petrol and diesel.

In Brazil, urban transport is already using a mixture of petrol with 16 per cent ethanol. Ethanol is derived from vegetable matter - sources suggested in South Africa have been chiefly sugar and maize, and also cassava and sunflower seeds. Ethanol has the advantage of being able to mix with petrol and diesel without the need for adaptation of vehicles.

Methanol is derived from coal or gas, and it cannot be mixed with diesel without adaptations.

Initially South Africa has concentrated on the production of oil from coal rather than production of either ethanol or methanol. Early in 1979, a specialist committee was appointed to make recommendations to maximize the production of fuel products from local sources. The committee considered that establishment of ethanol and methanol installations did not at this stage present a solution and recommended instead that the most economic step to improve the liquid fuel position was to expand the productive capacity of oil-from-coal plants. It was on this basis that the decision to expand SASOL II was taken.

However, there have been continuous pressures from private interests, particularly agriculture, for Government assistance for the production of ethanol and methanol, as well as sunflower oil, which has also been suggested as a new miracle fuel. Plans have been announced for plants in the Transkei and in Kwazulu.

Due in part at least to the bonanza from the high gold price, the regime now feels able to offer incentives for production of alcohol fuels, and these were announced in early February. It has been suggested that 15 to 20 per cent of the country's liquid fuel needs could be derived from alcohol fuel. (Argus, 8 February 1980).

The agricultural products that would be useful for the production of ethanol, namely sugar and maize, are already being used as part of the political strategy of the regime in seeking to impose its hegemony on independent African States in the region. To provide 10 per cent of the annual consumption of petrol and diesel would require the entire current cane crop or at least 2.5 million tons of maize, an amount which equals the total natural surplus in a good year. Similarly coal which is required for the production of methanol is being used as part of the regime's international strategy to offset its growing isolation. Methanol could be produced from gas, and the pressure to exploit gas finds off the Namibian coast will grow.

For the regime to continue to use its agricultural products and coal for its political interests and at the same time produce enough for making alcohol fuel in significant quantities would require raising the production on a massive scale, and in the case of cane doubling it.

It is therefore more likely that the plans for alternatives are for use only when the regime is "pressed against the wall" as its Minister for Industries, Commerce and Consumer Affairs expressed it last July. He explained then that there were alternate sources available should the oil supply deteriorate to a critical level. "If ever we get into dire straits, into a hopeless position, we will be able at short notice to make available alternate sources". It is not without significance that it has now been considered necessary to begin implementing these last-ditch plans. (Rand Daily Mail, 26 July 1979).

In the panic created by the Iranian embargo a variety of schemes for other alternate energy sources were mooted. They included a 'miracle' discovery that sunflower oil could replace fuel without any adaptation; and proposals for harnessing wave and wind power and solar energy. Surveying these schemes, the Financial Mail came to the conclusion that "the problem with most energy sources that are unconventional is not engineering ... but the economics". Free energy is not free at all, because of the huge capital investment that has to be made to capture, intensify and store it. (Financial Mail, Energy Survey, June 1979).

South Africa has been building an oil stockpile since 1966. It has required oil companies to expand their storage capacity and hold large stocks. The regime has established underground storage facilities, mainly but not exclusively in disused coal mines in the Transvaal. Additional storage facilities are now being constructed in the Cape.

Propaganda has inflated the size of the stockpile, on occasions placing it as high as 60 million tons. More realistic assessments consider that between 12 and 18 months' supplies were stockpiled, before 1979. In view of the reduced oil imports in 1979, the statement that the stockpiles have not been touched must be regarded as more propaganda.

The Pretoria regime has not been slow to exploit the world energy requirements for its own survival. For many years its allies and collaborators have stressed the role of the racist regime in ensuring the supply of strategic minerals to the imperialist Powers.

In recent years the regime has tried to project itself as a "safe and secure" source for the energy needs of not only its imperialist allies but also smaller countries.

South Africa has abundant reserves of coal and uranium. The apartheid policy, with its exploitation of cheap labour, enables the highly profitable export of these fuels. Many countries have ignored the brutality of the apartheid labour system and attracted by cheap South African imports have bound themselves into long-term contracts for their purchase, thus enmeshing themselves further into the apartheid economy, supporting it and making their energy needs dependent upon the continuation of the apartheid system.

The regime has not only used the country's energy resources to buy friends and create dependents, but it has also used the anxiety of the prospective purchasers to secure supplies in order to meet its own requirements for foreign investment. Thus many uranium contracts provide either for investment or "substantial development loans from dedicated customers tethered by long-term contracts".

Until the revolution in 1979, Iran stood out as the chief source of oil for the apartheid economy. The Shah had established an expanding network of relations with Pretoria covering economic, military and nuclear links. The State-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) had taken up 17 per cent of the equity in the National Petroleum Refinery (NATREF) in South Africa, and Iranian personnel came to South Africa to work on the construction. Four hundred Iranian skilled workers were brought to South Africa and were given honorary white status. NIOC was supplying 70 per cent of the crude for the refinery and was represented on the NATREF operations committee.

When the Arab oil producers first imposed their embargo in 1973, Iran was supplying 20 to 30 per cent of oil imports. After the embargo Iran increased its exports and prior to the revolution 90 per cent of South Africa's crude imports originated in Iran. Oil from Bahrein, Brunei, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates made up the balance.

Immediately after the cancellation of the Iranian contracts, South African imports of oil dropped dramatically. In the first quarter of 1979, there was a 40-per-cent reduction in the volume of imports compared to imports during the last quarter of 1978. In the middle of the year imports were still declining and were believed to be in the region of only 150,000 barrels per day. South Africa was buying oil mostly on the spot markets paying around $35 to $40 at a time when the oil price was under $20. However negotiations were reported to be in progress for long-term contracts. (Financial Mail, 15 June 1979).

In the year since the Iranian embargo of oil to South Africa, it has become evident that oil is reaching South Africa through a number of channels, some known and some as yet unknown. In its efforts to secure oil supplies, the apartheid regime has secured the collaboration of some Governments, the major oil companies and international criminals.

Since these countries announced embargoes against sales of oil to South Africa, their oil was apparently diverted by trading companies. United Kingdom, the regime's long-standing ally, has assisted by providing direct oil supplies and by facilitating indirect supplies. Currently, about 25,000 barrels per day are being exported to South Africa from a British colony, the Sultanate of Brunei, whose external relations are still controlled by the British. The oil is supplied under a contract between the London-based Shell International Petroleum and SASOL. Shell International Petroleum is a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell.

At the Guadeloupe Summit Conference, attended in early 1979 by the Heads of Government of South Africa's main protectors (the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany), it was agreed that "the United Kingdom and the United States would guarantee South Africa's annual oil imports of 15 million tons for an indefinite period. In return, Pretoria could resume full diplomatic pressure on Salisbury to bring about a peaceful solution there". (Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 9 February 1979).

In June 1979, shortly after coming to power, the British Conservative Government announced a reversal of policy and allowed deals in which North Sea oil would be made available for European Economic Community (EEC) and International Energy Agency (lEA) markets in exchange for crude oil supplied to South Africa. By this swap arrangement the Thatcher Government facilitated the supply of oil to the British Petroleum subsidiary in South Africa via Conoco.

The impression has been created that the British change of policy merely applied to permitting a swap arrangement. However South African reports have stated that the Conservative Government had ended the ban on the export "direct or indirect" of North Sea oil to South Africa. The regime’s Minister of Industry, Trade and Consumer Affairs, Dr. Schalk van der Merwe, said that a number of new oil sources were being investigated and therefore the British decision did not come as a complete surprise. (The Citizen, Johannesburg, 30 June 1979).

Senator Horwood, the regime’s Minister of Finance, returned to South Africa from a European tour just after the British announcement, and told the Rand Daily Mail that the possibility of purchasing North Sea oil was one of the topics canvassed by him, and top level discussions and oil negotiations had been conducted. (Rand Daily Mail, 17 July 1979).

There have been few other confirmed reports of governmental connivance in supplying oil to South Africa but numerous press reports of deals. There are however, a number of oil producers which are neither members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries nor OPEC and which have made no policy commitment on the supply of oil to the apartheid regime. Pretoria has shown interest in obtaining oil from Mexico and from China, and consideration is being given to assisting new producers to develop their resources in exchange for long-term contracts.

Petroleum products are however being openly exported to South Africa from Italy, United States of America, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, Greece, Australia, Japan, Spain, France, Switzerland, Denmark, Canada, Sweden. The products include lubricating oils and greases, pitch and resin, motor spirit and light oils, lamp oil and white spirit, distillate fuels and residual fuel oil.

Apartheid's collaborators frequently try and shield themselves behind the activities of "independent" companies. Breaches of the arms embargo and nuclear collaboration are all too frequently blamed on companies over which Western Governments claim they have no control, though often they own these same companies. Similarly the breach of oil sanctions against Southern Rhodesia has been laid at the door of "companies", notwithstanding the evidence of the knowledge and connivance of Ministers in the successive British Governments, and the absolution now conferred by the British Government on the companies for their nefarious and illegal activities.

In like manner the main channels used in ensuring the continued flow of oil to the apartheid regime are the major oil companies. Appreciation of their role in evading the embargo imposed by the Arab oil producers in 1973 has often been expressed in South Africa. Thus in December 1973, the Financial Mail commented:

"There can be no greater blessing for South Africa .... apart from the fact that Iran is well disposed ... than that the oil business is still largely in the hands of international companies with no discernible leanings of excessive patriotism."

"... the fact is that southern Africa appears to be riding out the siege with very little discomfort on the supply side. This is due at least as much to the ability of the oil majors to maintain flows by a series of complex logistic acrobatics, as to the good offices of Iran."

As we have noted in the case of British Petroleum's swap deal, the logistic acrobatics of oil companies are usually accomplished with the permission of Governments supporting apartheid in South Africa.

The Governments of France and the United Kingdom have substantial shareholdings and exercise ultimate control over two of the major oil companies operating in South Africa: British Petroleum (BP) and Total. The British Government has a majority 51 per cent shareholding in BP and the two Directors it appoints to the Board have the right to veto any decision concerned with foreign relations. Through its 40-per-cent shareholding, the French Government controls the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP) which in turn has a majority 65.83 per cent shareholding in Total South Africa.

The three other international companies operating in South Africa - Shell, Caltex and Mobil - are subsidiaries of transnational corporations with their metropolitan bases in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for Shell and the United States for Caltex and Mobil.

These five companies together supply nearly 85 per cent of the regional demand for petroleum products. All of South Africa's refineries have been established and are being operated by consortia of these international companies and the South African owned SASOL. These companies are responsible for all the crude oil imported into South Africa.

The Pretoria regime has integrated the oil companies into its plans to counter an oil embargo. Since 1967, it has introduced a series of regulations covering the operation of oil companies, which have been periodically extended and strengthened. These include the following:

(1) The companies are required to make available excess capacity in refineries for refining crude from any source;

(2) As required for strategic and logistic reasons, specialized petroleum and oil products must be produced regardless of commercial considerations;

(3 ) The construction or expansion of refineries and associated plants requires the prior approval of the Secretary for Industries, who has the power also to control location, capacity and products. This power can be exercised against any company that does not co-operate ;

(4 ) A minimum of three months' supply of oil products including fuel must be stored by the oil companies and a minimum of 12 months' supply of the chemicals and lubricants needed for the refineries and other plants must be kept in stock;

(5 ) Companies are prohibited from setting any conditions on sale of their products and certain percentages must be reserved for purchase by sections of the State apparatus including military.

These regulations serve to mobilize the oil companies into the strategic planning for the survival of apartheid. They were not introduced because of any reluctance by the oil companies to co-operate fully with the regime, but they provide an umbrella under which the companies can shelter and continue actively to buttress the apartheid system. The regulations have been used as alibis and have been quoted in boardrooms and shareholders' meetings as alleged justification for continuing to fuel the repressive machinery of the apartheid regime.

The companies have been richly rewarded by the regime for their cooperation, by setting fuel prices at a level providing highly profitable returns and by permitting expansion into the most profitable areas of the economy. Thus in addition to their involvement in prospecting and coal mining, nearly half the highly profitable coal export quotas have been given to BP, Shell and Total. The State-owned Industrial Development Corporation has gone into partnership with BP in Sentrachem, the country's largest chemical company. Shell has been given concessions for base metal prospecting and Esso and Total are involved in uranium mining and prospecting.

BP, through its interest in Sentrachem, is to be involved in a fourth oil-from-coal plant. A joint project between Sentrachem and General Mining was announced last month. A different process from that used in SASOL is under investigation. Overseas interests besides BP are probably involved in the technology for it has been announced that "testing of several hundred tons of the Springbok Flats coal is to be undertaken in overseas pilot plants". (The Citizen, Johannesburg, 14 February 1980).

To protect their profits the companies have embarked with enthusiasm on programmes that will serve to evade an oil embargo. It is known that the oil companies connived with the Smith regime, building up oil stocks in Rhodesia and running them down in Zambia just prior to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).

In South Africa they have expanded their refining capacity, in some cases doubling it and setting up plants for the production of specialized products previously imported into South Africa. Investment funds and technology have flowed in freely for oil exploration, refining, oil pipelines, the petrochemical industry, and mining and transport of minerals. Most important of all, they have ensured that crude oil has continued to come to South Africa notwithstanding embargoes of producer countries.

There is little doubt that the major part of the oil still flowing into South Africa is doing so through the "logistic acrobatics" of the oil majors. Shortly after the Iran embargo, the Financial Mail reported on 9 February 1979:

"The base load of South Africa's crude oil requirements is probably carried by sources to which the oil majors have access with a reasonable prospect of medium to long term on a contractual basis. In addition to these limited sources, the oil companies and SASOL will probably negotiate term contracts with brokers and take their chances on the spot market".

Given the record of the oil companies in Rhodesia, it can be assumed that some at least of the oil now fuelling apartheid has been brought to South Africa in defiance of the wishes of producer countries which have imposed an embargo. There have been various reports of such oil shipments.

The case of the tanker Salem, which off-loaded 193,000 tons of Kuwaiti oil in Durban, came to light because of South African connivance with international criminals and allegations of fraud. The oil cargo was discharged in Durban at facilities operated by Shell South Africa.

The Pretoria regime's energy programme is receiving large-scale financial assistance from companies, banks and Governments. The Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) regularly raises loans on the international financial market. Various companies have poured investments into prospecting and mining of coal and uranium. Governments have given export credits freely for the construction and equipping of the uranium enrichment plant, SASOL, the Koeberg nuclear reactors, the Maatla and Duvla and other power stations, and the petrochemical industry.

Equipment for the various projects continues to be provided by large companies from Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and technology flows from the companies, from universities and from State-financed research institutes.

Thus the collaboration in ensuring the energy needs of the apartheid system extends well beyond the oil companies alone, and the oil embargo needs to be placed within the context of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against the regime.

The expenditure of so much time and resources on ensuring domestic energy needs is testimony to the vulnerability of the apartheid system to an effective oil embargo.

Recognition of the strategic significance of oil and the vulnerability to an embargo has led to the imposition of a cloak of secrecy enforced by penal sanction. After 1973 official statistics on oil imports and exports were no longer published. Apart from more general legislative provisions, new legislation was introduced in April 1979 to prevent information about oil as well as other strategic industries being made public. Provision has been made for sentences of up to seven years or fines of R5,000 for publishing information about the "source, manufacture, transportation, destination, storage, quantity of stock level of any petroleum product" acquired or manufactured in South Africa.

The result has been a paucity of official information and exploitation of the situation by the regime for its own propaganda purposes. The secrecy legislation has also provided a convenient shelter for oil companies, anxious to conceal their activities and their violation of United Nations sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and their support for the apartheid system.

However, reliable calculations of imports of crude oil vary between an annual rate of 330,000 barrels per day in 1978 (Martin Bailey and Bernard Rivers, "Oil Sanctions against South Africa", UN Centre against Apartheid Notes and Documents No. 12/78, June 1978) and a post-Iranian revolution figure of 305,000 barrels per day (Financial Mail, June 1979). Both these figures exclude what the Financial Mail refers to as "spasmodic purchases for the stockpile". There also seems to be general agreement that the amount of oil required for present consumption by the apartheid economy is in the region of 240,000 barrels per day.

The regime's own estimates,which are inflated, indicate that after SASOL II and III are in full production, they would be able to meet about 50 per cent of the country's 1978 consumption of oil. (Minister of Economic Affairs Heunis in The Citizen, Johannesburg, 23 February 1979). This figure does not take into account any increases in demand either from the economy or from the military. None of the schemes for alternatives, or further economies in consumption, whether planned or mooted, are on a scale that can bring any significant improvement.

The scale of the necessary programme to achieve self-sufficiency and security from an oil embargo, can be gauged by proposals formulated by the Energy Adviser to the Anglo American Corporation, Raymond Cohen. A year ago he explained that to be self-sufficient by the turn of the century, South Africa would need 10 more SASOL oil-from-coal plants, each the size of SASOL II. It would require the biggest investment programme ever undertaken in the country with an expenditure of R1,000 million per annum over the next 20 years i.e., investment would amount to 22 per cent of current Gross National Product (GNP). He estimated that the country's oil requirements would grow from a present consumption of 270,000 barrels per day to 500,000 barrels per day by the year 2000. (To the Point, 20 April 1979).

In addition, ESCOM and South African Railways planners and executives have estimated that at least R25 - 30,000 million capital expenditure will be required to keep abreast of power and transport demands as the country moves away from oil to electricity. (Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 1 July 1979).

Were the regime to embark on plans on this scale it would have to be still further dependent upon external financial support. Even with the rise in the gold price, expenditure on such a scale from domestic resources is impossible. The more so, as the apartheid economy will have to cope with further increases in the expenditure on arms, police and military as the regime faces the escalating challenge of the liberation forces inside South Africa, and its growing isolation internationally.

Thus to reduce any further its vulnerability to an oil embargo, the regime will have to raise massive loans and (international) credits.

Given even a modest reduction in the supply of oil, the regime will be forced to make a choice. An expansion in consumption by the military will have to be accompanied by reductions in the economy.

The ability of the regime to maintain its aggressive actions against its neighbours, and use its repressive apparatus against the oppressed majority in South Africa, is and will continue to be related directly to the quantity of oil the regime is able to obtain from outside South Africa. Quite literally, the wheels of apartheid are lubricated and its engines fuelled by imported oil. Deprived of this vital commodity the economic, police and military arms of the apartheid regime would be forced to slow down.

The participants at this International Seminar on an Oil Embargo against South Africa, individually and collectively, can make a singular contribution towards the destruction of the predator racist regime by uniting efforts towards stopping all Governments and companies from providing oil to the apartheid system.

The African National Congress, recognizing that the threat to international peace and security can only be met by the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions by the United Nations Security Council against the Pretoria regime, calls for the immediate imposition of mandatory oil embargo and further calls upon all Governments, non-governmental organizations, and international and national solidarity organizations to support this demand.

We call all producer countries and others exporting petroleum products to take unilateral action to impose an embargo on the supply of their oil and products to apartheid South Africa.

We call upon all producer countries which have applied oil sanctions against the racist regime to strengthen their control of the final destination of their oil, and through the incorporation of end user clauses in the initial contracts of sale ensure that their oil does not reach the apartheid regime through resale or the agency of any other company, or organization, or Government.

We call upon the mass movements in the base areas of the oil monopolies - the student, youth, workers, church and trade union organizations - to force Governments and monopolies to stop supplies of oil and petroleum products to the racist regime, and in addition to expose the criminal nature of such support.

We call upon the workers in the refineries, in the oil fields and ports, and those who sail the tankers, to take action that would prevent the supplies of oil to the regime of white domination.

We call upon all countries with tanker fleets to stop the transport to South Africa of all oil and oil products wherever they originate.

We call upon all countries to seize any tanker that has touched South African ports.

We call upon all countries to take immediate action against any company or individuals who supply or transport oil or oil products, or facilitate such supply or transport, to South Africa.

We call for an end to all assistance, by way of finance, export credits, and guarantees, technology transfer and training, and supply of machinery and equipment to any project concerned with securing fuel and energy resources for the racist regime and the apartheid economy. In particular we call for an end to any form of assistance or international involvement in the uranium enrichment plant, and coal and uranium mining.

This paper was submitted by the ANC to the International Seminar on an Oil Embargo against South Africa, held in Amsterdam from 14 to 16 March 1980. The Seminar was organized by the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and the Working Group Kairos, in co-operation with the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid.

The case for mandatory sanctions against South Africa: Paper submitted to the International NGO Conference for Sanctions against South Africa1

The case for mandatory sanctions against South Africa: Paper submitted to the International NGO Conference for Sanctions against South Africa¹