[Soon after I was appointed Principal Secretary of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid in 1963, I began writing personal and confidential letters on plain paper to Oliver Tambo to inform him of what we were doing at the United Nations and the possibilities of further action, and to seek his advice on what the liberation movement would like us to do. They were mailed outside the United Nations or sent through my colleagues. There were fewer letters from the middle of 1970s, as an ANC representative was stationed in New York. Moreover, as Oliver and I travelled often, we were able to meet many times in Europe and Africa so that letters were not necessary. This compilation includes the letters I could find; several others have been destroyed for security reasons or lost. I hope that these letters would provide some information on the support of the United Nations, especially the Special Committee against Apartheid and the Centre against Apartheid, to the liberation movement and the problems we faced.]
Letter, 1 May 1963
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
I am today sending a formal letter to the A.N.C. office to convey the decision of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa to grant a hearing to the A.N.C. delegation. I thought the following additional information may be useful to you in making your travel plans.
The Committee has decided to submit an interim report emphasizing the recent repressive measures and military build-up in South Africa. The report is due to be approved on or shortly after 6 May.
A number of African ambassadors may be leaving soon after for Addis Ababa. Ambassador Quaison-Sachey is leaving shortly after the opening of the General Assembly on 14 May. Ambassador Diallo Telli, the Chairman, may leave earlier. Ambassador Chanderli of Algeria may also go to Addis Ababa.
The Committee, however, can meet in their absence and the Chairman wants it to meet if an A.N.C. delegation arrives or other developments call for a meeting. However, there are far too many meetings at Headquarters these days and it is difficult to schedule a meeting at short notice. We may need three or four days to make the arrangements. The week of 13 May may be particularly difficult because of the special session of the General Assembly. The week after may be easier if the Assembly decides to go slow because of the absence of many ambassadors who may be away at Addis Ababa. We will certainly do our best to convene a meeting whenever you arrive.
I do not know whether you are going to Addis Ababa, and whether you want a hearing before or after the Addis Ababa Conference. Whatever your preference, it may be useful if you can send a representative here to act as Liaison between the Committee and the London office.
If I can be of any assistance, please let me know. You can send me a telegram (care United Nations, New York, or 150-43 Village Road, Jamaica, New York) or phone me person-to-person (office: PL 4-1234, extn. 2447; home JA 3-4745).
I hope you are feeling better now.
Yours sincerely,
E.S. Reddy
Principal Secretary
Mr. Oliver Tambo
9a, Cholmeley Park
London, N. 6
England
Letter, 21 January 1964
Dear Oliver,
Nice to hear all the good news from you. I hope you are not overworking yourself and that your health is fine.
Now I am also Secretary of the Expert Group. The members are first-rate and I haven't had to develop any split personality. The only problem is to keep up with their pace and take care of all the other work.
Ambassador Diallo Telli left for Guinea on the 10th. He will probably stay on until after the Lagos Conference and return at the end of February. The Special Committee has scheduled meetings for the week of 9 March, but will meet earlier if there are any developments on the trials, which have the highest priority. It also plans to go into the question of foreign investments.
I myself expect to be in London about the 10th of February-for just a day and a half-on the way to an ILO meeting in Geneva. I would, of course, be delighted if I can see you-that is, if you haven't left London. I would like to see all other friends-Bishop Reeves, May, Dadoo, etc.,--but I am most anxious to meet Ronald Segal. I will drop a note to your office as soon as my reservations are made, and I would appreciate it if you can tell your office to inform the other friends.
Mrs. Myrdal, as you know, is the Chairman of the Expert Group. She is also leader of the Swedish delegation to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva. She will be in Geneva from 21 January to perhaps 10 February. I think it would be useful if you can meet her, on the way to Africa, or making a special trip to Geneva. (You can use that visit also to get in touch with the International Red Cross and the High Commissioner for Refugees about the relief programme. Action on that was rather delayed at this end, but now it is in hand.) You can contact Mrs. Myrdal through the Swedish Mission in Geneva. But please be discreet and not talk about it.
I will appreciate hearing from you soon. Please note that all this is entirely personal and confidential.
Sincerely yours,
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
9a, Cholmeley Park
London, N. 6
England
P.S. I was sorry to hear from Cora1 that your wife was sick. I hope she is better. Please keep me posted on your travel plans as some of us may be passing through London.
Letter, 4 February 1964
Personal
Dear Oliver,
I have received your letter of 30 January concerning the relief2 and other matters. It would be most useful if you can be in London on 9 and 10 February. You can contact me at Bailey's Hotel, 140 Gloucester Road, London S.W.7, on the 9th of February. I have arranged a tentative meeting for you with Sir Hugh Foot and Sir Edward Asafu-Adjaye3 on the 10th at 10.30 a.m. in the United Nations Information Centre. They can, of course, meet your colleagues, but I am most anxious that they should have the views of the authoritative spokesman of the African National Congress in order to avoid any confusion.
I would request you to withhold comments on the new Group as far as possible until you have had a chance to meet them. I am sure the question of relief can be settled in a satisfactory way, except for the unfortunate delay which has taken place. It may be that we will have a reply from the International Committee of the Red Cross before I leave for London.
With best regards,
Yours sincerely,
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
9a, Cholmeley Park
London, N. 6
England
Letter, 19 February 1964
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
I wish to acknowledge your letter of 14 February, and to thank you for all your assistance. I will attempt to supply your office with the United Nations documents as far as possible.
I have been able to contact the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva. He is very favourably disposed towards assisting the refugees. He thinks it will be useful if Mrs. Legum4 will keep in contact with his representative in London, Mr. Kelly, who is in the same building as the United Nations Information Centre.
The contact with the International Red Cross is disappointing, as you may have heard from Mr. Benenson5. We are pursuing the matter further and perhaps, if necessary, will encourage contributions to existing relief organizations. Some form of cooperative arrangement, such as a coordinating committee, may be helpful. Perhaps Professor Mathews can assist in promoting such cooperation. Unfortunately I was not able to meet him in Geneva as he was away for a conference.
The Secretary-General has received a letter from Mr. Nokwe expressing indignation with the refusal of South Africa to cooperate with the Expert Group and urging expulsion of South Africa. This letter is of course not unusual, but, thinking of the future, I feel that it would be useful if all communications to the United Nations were to emanate from one of your offices. Otherwise there may be unnecessary confusion and conflict.
Sincerely yours
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
African National Congress
Letter, 1 May 1964
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Oliver,
I suppose you have received the report of the Expert Group from the Information Centre. Yesterday, the Asian-African Group submitted a formal request for a meeting of the Security Council. The exact date will presumably depend on the Foreign Ministers,6 but May 15th is being mentioned as the likely date.
I hope that it will be possible for you to come to New York in time as the discussions will be crucial.
As I see it, the issue will be sharply posed. The Sanctions Conference papers are being widely circulated among the delegates. The Special Committee is producing a report on that Conference. We are issuing the full text of Mandela speech as a Special Committee document. (It will, of course, come out in French and you can perhaps get it printed in Paris or elsewhere.) Newspapers here are finally showing greater interest in the Rivonia trial. The report of the Expert Group has had a better reaction than I had expected.
I do not expect that the Security Council itself will take a big step or that the Great Powers will change their policies radically. But I think that the sharper posing of issues and private discussions would be important.
There is reason to believe that the Security Council will not only endorse the proposal for a Convention (which I personally feel would be politically useful),7 but may decide on a study of the economic and strategic implications of sanctions. Though no action would be involved, it would have significance in that the Great Powers are for the first time willing to look into sanctions. The United States may perhaps favour this, not as an immediate issue but as a preparation for possible action two years later on South West Africa.
There may be reservations that this procedural decision would not represent any commitment. Also, an effort to delay the study until British and American elections in the fall.
I feel that some compromise formula can be worked out and may be useful if there is a promise from the Great Powers that they will put sufficient pressure, discreetly and privately, to save the lives of the Rivonia accused. I have some hope that this can be obtained-and for that your presence would be necessary.
If executions can be averted, there will be time. If the study of sanctions proceeds well and if public opinion is aroused, perhaps Britain can come around to an arms embargo at the end of the year and further steps may be feasible next year. The retreat of the South African Government on the Odendaal Commission report,8 and the apparent realization that world pressure is increasing, are perhaps hopeful signs.
Frankly I am somewhat worried about the African group here. They have a tendency to take positions without any consultation with the national movements. Pressures merely for "strong" resolutions may be useless at this stage. Any jealousies, etc., giving an appearance of divisions in the African group, would cause serious damage.
I feel that it would be desirable to deal with the situation at a higher level with the four African Foreign Ministers. It would be useful to bring in Nigeria and India because of their possible influence on the major British parties. I think you should also plan to meet the highest officials of the State Department. The Secretary-General is, of course, likely to play a key role from now on.
May I suggest, therefore, that you should get in touch with Mr. Mongi Slim9 and plan to arrive here with him? Please cable me soon about your plans.
You have now two energetic and dedicated converts to your cause: Mrs. Myrdal and Sir Hugh. Mrs. Myrdal is now in Stockholm and plans to write and speak. Sir Hugh is returning to London on 4 May and is ready to do whatever he can. I must confess I have developed the greatest respect for him after the four months with the Expert Group.
Sincerely yours
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
C/o Mr. A. Faryar
Director UNIC
Dar es Salaam
Letter, 9 October 1964
Dear Oliver,
I have received your cables on Mini10 and others yesterday. The cables from your London office and the World Campaign came two days ago. The Special Committee and the African Group are meeting today on this issue.
I have been thinking of writing to you about some of the broader aspects of the role of the U.N. on this question. The Special Committee can take action on particular cases, but it has to prepare for the long range as well.
I am somewhat less pessimistic than a couple of months ago, but I still feel that the situation is going to get worse and that there will not be very "effective" international action for quite some time to come. Even an arms ban will not be effective enough. That is where the longer-range "constructive" aspects come in.
The way is at last clear about the appeal for relief and legal assistance. It will go from the Special Committee to Member States by the end of this month, with memoranda from Amnesty, Defence and Aid and the Joint Committee annexed to it. I think it is crucial that some donations should immediately come in and that they are reported to the Special Committee so that we can press for others. I have in mind 10,000 pounds from ten Asian-African States. We will do here all we can, but some action by your offices can help. Also Canon Collins may perhaps approach some embassies on the strength of the appeal.
I received a message that Canon Collins is ready to come to the General Assembly in December. I am not anxious that he should spend money and time for that unless there is reason to believe that it will help fund-raising. The trip may be useful for publicity, etc., but that has to be decided in a political context. You may think of something like last year-and Canon Collins may be useful here as a good speaker and a new "petitioner".
We are struggling with an enormous report which will emphasize (a) repression and (b) highlight that some States are increasing trade and investment. The section on repression may form the basis for a request for priority in the General Assembly. A debate may come at the beginning of December or latest by beginning of January and it should be interesting.
There will be resistance on the ground that the Security Council has the item on its agenda. Also, the atmosphere in the U.N. may be confused by the financing problem. But the real problem is what to propose.
One idea is to propose a high-level international investigation into prison conditions. That will keep the issue alive. South Africa will refuse, but I suppose there is plenty of documentation, and many exiles, to provide evidence. Another is to invite all States to promote publicity against apartheid, including publicity on struggle against apartheid.
The other matter I have been thinking about for some time is the educational and training programme. I was not very enthusiastic about it until I read again the testimony in the Rivonia trial where Mandela and Sisulu spoke about plans for higher education. This is an area in which the U.N. can certainly help, but only if South Africans take a positive attitude. I have spoken about this to your people in Cario, Algiers and London: they were extremely friendly, but now I have a feeling that they have not thought of the possibilities seriously.
I think we can have a really large-scale programme. There is the moral obligation to look after the children of prisoners and the problem of young refugees. Beyond that, like defence and aid, this is a program which helps keep the morale which, in my view, is crucial in this long drawn-out situation.
Mr. George Ivan Smith, U.N. representative in Lusaka, is investigating the matter to prepare a programme. I would strongly urge that your people should give him all cooperation and encouragement. Think big and make us think in large terms-not of ten or twenty scholarships-but of helping hundreds of boys and girls (say fifty refugees and fifty from South Africa to start with). I am anxious that this programme should be in operation early next year and should be on a large scale.
There is no need to worry that this will create an exodus of good people. It should be viewed in a non-partisan way. Many of the applicants probably will not be politically active persons: there is no danger of their making up with apartheid after higher education, or training as doctors, nurses, agronomists, etc.
Ronny11 is coming here next week and will appear before the Special Committee and meet several people.
Are you planning to come over this year? Please write to me soon about your plans.
Sincerely yours
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo,
African National Congress of South Africa
P.O. Box 2239
Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika
Letter, 21 October 1964
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
Thank you for your letter of 15 October. The third paragraph was read to the Special Committee yesterday.
As to the time-table of the General Assembly, I cannot say anything with certainty, but I will give you my impressions.
The question of apartheid is on the agenda of the General Assembly and will almost certainly be taken up by it well before the submission of the Expert Committee's report in February.12
The Special Committee itself will present a voluminous report about 10 November with full details on repression, economic and military aspects, etc., and perhaps a number of concrete recommendations-including one that the report be considered urgently.
Some of the African delegates, including our Chairman, Ambassador Marof, feel that apartheid should be taken up as the first item on the agenda of the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly. This view has perhaps been strengthened by the appearance of Ronald Segal here: he felt that with the change of government in London, the matter should be pressed urgently.
I have little doubt that apartheid will get priority if the African group wants it: there is little competition.
If the Assembly were to start on 10 November, apartheid can be taken up before the end of November and one or more resolutions passed before the Christmas recess around 20 December. The timing would be advantageous as several Foreign Ministers may still be here until early December.
But now there is talk of postponement of the Assembly until 24 November or 1 December. That leaves little time before Christmas recess. Apartheid can be taken up before the recess if the African group presses it as a matter of urgency and has a concrete and urgent proposal. I would say that the latest date for starting the debate is early January.
Ambassador Marof and others feel that there should be no waiting for the Expert Committee's report. There should be pressure on the Powers from the General Assembly and perhaps pressure, through Morocco and Ivory Coast, that the Expert Committee should work faster and advance its report.
As you can see, there are some uncertainties involved.13 But as apartheid is likely to be prominent in any case, it would be desirable for you to have some senior representative here. I would suggest that you or Robby should count on coming here before the end of November-after contacts with O.A.U. and people in London. You may be able to return by Christmas, but more likely in the second half of January.
I will write to you as soon as the situation is clearer.
Sincerely,
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
African National Congress of South Africa
P.O. Box 2239
Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika
Letter, 27 October 1964
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
I am sending, under separate cover, a copy of the appeal adopted by the Special Committee, at its last meeting on 26 October, for assistance to families of persons persecuted in South Africa. It will be sent to the Permanent Representatives of Member States in the next few days. I hope it will prove helpful.
In answer to the letter from your Office, may I add that there is no U.N. fund for refugees. The High Commissioner for Refugees has offered to help, mainly with travel documents, etc. It is up to your colleagues in need to approach the offices of the High Commissioner in the area. Also, he may, if approached, be able to help in encouraging donations for the Joint Committee.
I hope that the present appeal will attract sufficient interest in the Joint Committee.
Sincerely yours,
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
African National Congress of South Africa
P.O. Box 2239
Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika
Letter, 22 January 1965
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
I am herewith enclosing a note on recent economic developments in South Africa. It may be of interest to you. Please note that this paper is a confidential document although all the material in it is from publications.
Sincerely yours,
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
Letter, 2 February 1965
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
Thank you for the Christmas card. Better late than never. It was moving.
You acted wisely in not coming over here. We have been able to do little-with the Congo debate and the crisis in the Assembly. But I hope we can do more soon. I am enclosing a copy of a personal letter to Diallo Telli which will give you an idea of my thinking.
The response to our appeal on relief has been disappointing in that the only contribution to Defence and Aid has been from India. Many other countries have shown interest and will contribute, I am sure, but they are waiting to see the results. Five or six token contributions will help. I have written to Canon Collins to do some lobbying through embassies in London. May be you can help.
Meanwhile, Sweden has announced a contribution of $200,000 and Norway, I understand, has voted $75,000. Apparently, they are giving the money to organizations connected with the refugee council in Lusaka.14 I don't know how that fits in with your priorities. If you feel Defence and Aid is desperately in need of funds, may be you can contact Sweden and Norway to allocate a share, as Canon Collins seems to have little influence on them.
Our education programme has got delayed. I hope we can set it up soon. I have been speaking to Ambassador Marof about this and we feel that a high priority should be given to children of prisoners. Mary Benson had mentioned to me that the sons of Mandela, Sisulu and Mbeki are due for college. Can you send me the particulars? May be they should go ahead with admission etc., and grants can be made to them by U.N. I am not promising, but it is possible.
You might have seen the reply to Ambassador Marof to the South African Foreign Minister which I mailed to you. (Both speeches were at the same meeting). He quoted a line from Mini's song-with a lot of emotion. I wish we had the whole song-we had only the first lines from your Freedom News. Can you send us the full texts of songs and translations? We may be able to use them later.
We have done little recently except to put out documents. I hope you are receiving them.
I am hoping to be able to take a trip through Europe, Addis and Dar, and I hope I will be able to meet you soon.
Meanwhile, my main concern is to plan for bigger publicity on the apartheid issue. Perhaps we can set up a large mailing list for our documents or even start a bulletin. Is it possible for you to send me the mailing list of Spotlight? It should cover most addresses we are interested in.
Best regards,
Sincerely yours
E.S. Reddy
P.S.: I haven't heard from Robbie for a long time…But I understand that mail addressed to him is going to Pat Duncan.
Letter, 10 February 1965
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
I hear from George Houser that you have been invited to their conference in Washington on 21 March. I hope you can come and that you can inform me as soon as possible. Ambassador Marof will also address the opening meeting. He is thinking of holding a Special Committee meeting on 19 March-on the eve of Sharpeville anniversary-and it would, of course, be worthwhile if you can appear. Not only to review the past five years, but to comment on the Security Council Committee's report which should be ready early in March and to make concrete suggestions to help the Committee plan its work.
You were wise in not coming here earlier. The General Assembly was paralyzed and the atmosphere was such that nothing could have been achieved. But there is need to re-think plans and strategy in March. The Special Committee is likely to reconvene on 1 March for this purpose. Either it will find ways and means to keep the issue alive and do more, or the whole problem will stay in cold storage.
I have been complaining all over the place that you are not pushing your own issue, but leaving it to others. We do find Spotlight useful but there should be occasional memoranda from the organizations with proposals specifically directed to U.N.
We certainly appreciate the complement to the Special Committee in your New Year's message to the Secretary-General. Parts of the Committee's last report are due to be published soon in pamphlet form.
Sincerely
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
African National Congress
P.O. Box 2239
Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika
Letter, 1 April 1965
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
I haven't yet received information you promised about candidates for scholarships. I am expecting that in about two weeks we may be able to start the scheme. It will be on a modest scale for 1965-66 and expand greatly in 1966. It is rather late to get admissions for 1965-66 but we should be able to arrange grants for those already in higher secondary school or college.
Rev. Gladstone told me a few days ago that you had five or six candidates. Can you arrange to send me the information urgently?
We should have the application blanks in about a week or ten days and I will mail some to you. But I am anxious to get information as quickly as possible to arrange at least a few grants this year and set in motion fellowships for 1966-67.
Will write to you later on other aspects of our work.
With best regards,
Sincerely yours
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
African National Congress
P.O. Box 2239
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Letter, 17 May 1966
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
I suppose you have received the invitation to the U.N. International Seminar on Apartheid in August.15 (I enclose a press release on the seminar). I hope you will be able to attend. I will be away on home leave at that time and will count on the "experts" to take care of the Seminar which has the potentialities of a significant event.
I am spending much of my time now with the U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa. The banning of the Defence and Aid Committee has created serious practical problems. I was in Europe at the end of April and early May consulting with Canon Collins, Professor Matthews, Peter Benenson, Margaret Legum and many others concerned with this work. I will need all the help and advice. I hope you can take a more active interest in this matter and possibly assign someone like Joe Matthews (with whom I had two sessions) to maintain contact with the voluntary organizations, the U.N. and the donor governments. Canon Collins told me that he would be visiting you in June and I suggested that he should suggest this also-as I would like to get some sense of proportion from the plans of all the voluntary organizations. I am quite confident about obtaining the funds, but I am concerned that they should be utilized as best as possible.
The education programme has started well, but it soon needs an imaginative push to develop properly-some means to arrange for people inside South Africa to benefit legally, a solution to the problems of asylum and travel documents and a beginning on assistance in employment. I seem to have the imagination, but not all the push necessary. It is also hard to make concrete plans far away from the scene and I am not sure when I can travel again.
The Apartheid Committee has become paralyzed, temporarily I hope, because of a deadlock on enlargement. It has been unable to move, despite the Fischer trial and all the other happenings in and around South Africa. I hope it will revive, but unfortunately I can spare little time for the Committee and will be away on home leave this summer.
With best regards,
Yours sincerely
E.S. Reddy
Letter, 31 May 1966
31 May 1966
Dear Oliver,
I think I need to elaborate and add to my last letter. We need to get going on this problem of aid to prisoners and their families. We should not succumb to the ban, but fight back and expand, but that will need careful thinking, understanding among those concerned and utmost flexibility. I have been in touch with Canon Collins, Professor Matthews and others. Sweden is most concerned and, I am sure, it will do what it can to help. But we cannot go off on a tangent without your understanding and support, as the money will be given out of solidarity for those struggling against apartheid and not to set up some fancy operation. I wish we could talk to you personally, but there is little time.
I am afraid that the situation in South Africa will get worse and worse. The problem of prisoners will increase. We need to use all means to restrain the drift of the Government to naked terror and continue and expand relief.
As you know, I have always felt that Defence and Aid was crucial and did what I could to help. For the past year, I was expecting the ban and pushed the U.N. Trust Fund primarily to see that the operation will continue despite the ban. I left the Apartheid Committee work to take care of this Fund.
I fully agree with Canon Collins that Defence and Aid must continue. But I agree not so much because we cannot now provide aid through other channels, but because when the situation gets even worse, others may fall by the wayside and only Canon Collins will have the courage, imagination and perseverance to operate. Canon Collins and others are concerned, however, that unless Defence and Aid can raise enough funds, it might as well be dissolved. Also, there is a feeling that others cannot replace it and that some others may even do harm.
Taking these into consideration and also after consulting a number of people in Europe and some who have recently been in South Africa, as well as with some delegates, we are coming to a conclusion on the course to be followed at present. I have written about it to Canon Collins, and I am writing to you also so that you can soon discuss the matter thoroughly.
I think it is likely that through our efforts, Defence and Aid will receive at least $50,000 this year, outside the U.N. channels, so that it does not need to account to us openly. This should help it survive.
Defence and Aid can operate through two ways. It can send money to lawyers through solicitors in London. But unless there is a guarantee that the money has not come from Defence and Aid, the lawyers in South Africa will be persecuted. After speaking to several persons, I am afraid that Canon Collins is underestimating the risks. As for relief to dependants, he can send money directly by postal orders, but there is no need to switch fully to this way of operation so long as the Dependants Conference is in existence.
I am suggesting to Canon Collins that he should concentrate on publicity about trials, need, etc., and providing information from South Africa, etc., and providing funds mainly when that cannot be satisfactorily done through other channels. He should not worry if more money is going through other channels. He will perform a very useful political function for the present.
As for relief for dependants, we can send money for the present through the World Council of Churches. I have suggested that a new body might perhaps be created in London to channel funds to Dependants Conference.
Legal aid is a more complicated matter. I have spoken to Sean MacBride, secretary-general of the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, and asked him whether they could send a representative to investigate the situation in South Africa and, in cooperation with Defence and Aid, World Council of Churches and others, create a body abroad to channel funds. Mr. MacBride is a former Foreign Minister of Ireland. He recalled the difficulties during the Irish struggle and offered to pursue the matter. I suggested that I would speak to Joe Matthews to help contacts with Canon Collins and I did. But Joe had some doubts about going through "respectable" channels. I don't know if he followed up.
Mr. MacBride is also President of Amnesty International and Peter Benenson has been in touch with him. But MacBride agreed with me that there should be no restriction against legal aid to Communists or, as in Amnesty, to persons accused of violence. I have a suspicion that the enthusiasm of Peter Benenson might only have a negative effect on Canon Collins. I wish you can talk to all of them before July when the I.C.J. Executive meets. There is merit in broadening the effort and involving more elements abroad.
We understand that, following Vorster's statement that he had no objection to legal aid through the Bar Association, there are some efforts to induce the Bar Association to do something in this field. If that succeeds, funds can perhaps be sent through the American Bar Association (and the funds might be obtained from the United States Government).
I think the United States and the United Kingdom will not give money for Defence and Aid. Especially in view of the ban, it is best to provide financial support to Defence and Aid largely outside U.N. channels. (That does not prevent strong political support by U.N.). It is essential to press for contributions from United States and Britain, particularly as a means to exert pressure against South Africa to stop the present trend towards terror, even if we have to use very respectable channels. In fact, there is political advantage in involving groups like the American Bar Association in this matter. I am sure that money will be forthcoming and the needs will be covered better than in the past.
This, in general is my line of thinking. We cannot create or instigate new bodies or channels, but will leave that to those directly concerned. I hope you can look into this soon and advise. I am due to go on home leave on July 6 by boat to London. I would be in London around 12-15 July and will return in September when we will consider the situation again. I hope you can stop in New York on the way back from Brasilia.
I am also temporarily dealing with the Education Programme. I see the complexities and the serious human problems, and I am doing what I can to push hard toward bolder steps.
The Apartheid Committee has been paralyzed on the enlargement issue. I don't know how much I can do before my home leave to revive it.
I am also doing some work for the Seminar. The preparations are so far very inadequate, but it looks like it can be an important event with very high-level representation. It has the potentialities to create a significant impact, but I don't know if it will. My family has suffered my apartheid for so long that I find it hard to deprive them of this vacation with me.
With best regards,
Yours sincerely,
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
African National Congress
P.O. Box 2239
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Letter, 19 May 1967
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
I returned from my visit to London and Paris on the 9th and have been struggling with the Seminar16 and other things. The delays and indecisions are frustrating, but I think we will manage. I feel much better after meeting all the people in London, including three nights with Robbie. It is always inspiring to meet the latest arrivals like Albie and Stephanie.17
As usual, I was going around London trying to slave-drive everybody to work for the Seminar, etc. You have perhaps heard from Robbie but I thought I should also write to you.
I hope now to get a paper from Colin Legum on southern Africa and threat to peace. Ronnie is unfortunately not available. I asked Canon Collins for a paper-and also Dennis Brutus for a paper on prisoners in southern Africa. I have asked for various papers from others, but I am not quite sure yet what can be expected.
I do expect a very good paper in the name of the A.N.C. (All those invited are entitled to send a paper which will be circulated in the original language). It should be about 10-15 pages long. It is best if it can reach me by 15 June or soon thereafter so that I can first publish it in New York and circulate to participants in advance. I have to transfer headquarters to Dar early in July. You can, of course, supplement the paper during the Seminar if necessary. If you want the paper circulated in French also, you will have to provide the translation.
I would also appreciate it if you can encourage other liberation movements to submit papers. I expect that there may be confusion in Dar and papers received late may be delayed and may get little attention. The Foreign Offices would welcome papers early so that they can brief their delegates. I am hoping to arrange a paper by Ambassador Marof early in June to give an indication of what is likely to come up, but if there are more papers the better.
I thought I should mention some questions which concern me. Ambassador Marof will be dealing with some of these points.
Some of these questions are quite silly, but they seem to exist in people's minds.
After this impertinence, let me get back to time-tables. Ambassador Marof is leaving for Conakry around 13 June. He should be in Dar at the beginning of July, but will go up country until about 13 July. A sub-Committee of the Apartheid Committee, with five or six members, will arrive there around 13 July, after visiting London, Paris, Geneva and Addis. Mr. Pedanou will accompany it. The dates will be decided in a few days, but I expect they will want to see you on 16 July. The working group on prisoners is starting work on 22 May and is likely to visit London and perhaps Dar. It is also likely to take up allegations of violations of trade union rights.
I should be arriving in Dar sometime between 6 and 10 July. I hope to have a few sessions with you and your colleagues during the three weeks I will be there. I have a feeling that we agree that U.N. activity should enter a new phase. The transition will naturally involve practical difficulties which will need to be overcome.
Ambassador Malecela will soon be in Dar with the Committee on Decolonization. Perhaps you can discuss the Seminar with him as he should be playing a prominent role in it. All the members of that Committee are invited, but the delegates are likely to be different.
Well, I am anxiously waiting for the A.N.C. paper.
With best regards to all,
Yours sincerely,
E.S. Reddy
Letter, 1 June 1967
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
I have been sending to your office various messages and press releases concerning the Working Group of the Human Rights Commission set up to investigate the treatment of prisoners. I enclose some other press releases.
You will notice that the Working Group intends to visit Dar es Salaam from 21 to 27 June to hear former prisoners. If prisoners who are out of Dar es Salaam apply for hearings and are accepted, I believe the United Nations can arrange for the fares.
I am writing to you particularly because I think it would be useful to have a representative of the ANC appearing before the Group, in addition to ex-prisoners, to set the testimony in the political context.
I expect to arrive in Dar es Salaam on 8 July from London. I hope I can see you and other friends as soon as possible. Ambassador Marof will be in Dar about 1 July18. A Sub-Committee of the Apartheid Committee will arrive in Dar es Salaam on 12 July and will seek a meeting with the representatives of the ANC.
Sincerely yours,
E.S. Reddy
Letter, 6 September 1967
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
I was moved by the receipt of your letter of 31 August. I had not expected that you would spare time these days for such a letter.
Let me say that your visit to me and the success of the Kitwe Seminar - I believe it was a great success in relation to the very specific expectations I had - have tremendously helped to relieve me of the depression I suffered from this year. The problem now is to carry forward the recommendations of the Seminar through the General Assembly and into real implementation. The absence of Ambassador Marof, the general apathy at the U.N. this year and the very short time before the General Assembly pose serious difficulties. But I hope the difficulties can be surmounted with the active help of Ambassador Malecela, the Algerian delegation, etc. The news from Wankie poses a clear duty.19
For the past year, since I met Robbie on his way back from Brasilia, I have been trying to do what I could to prepare for this. We have not done half of what was possible, but I believe that we have made progress. In fact, my problem earlier this year was because I felt that our efforts were being frustrated by petty and unnecessary complications. But that is over, as far as my own mental state is concerned.
While I was always delighted to see you, I hope it will not be on a "begging" mission. I had hoped we could say that you need no more beg for help - that your friends in the delegations will see to it that you need only send messengers to various capitals to present the bills and collect. I had mentioned to Ambassador Marof several times that any resolutions on material aid were worthwhile only if he was determined to follow up and ensure that they would be implemented (not in the form of a U.N. fund, but directly). Unfortunately, the situation has not developed to that stage yet, but it must and soon. I need the optimism to function though I try to avoid giving false hopes.
If you do plan to come to the U.N., I hope you will make sure that the timing is such that you can accomplish your business most effectively in a short period. Perhaps early November would be best, though it is too soon to predict. I have in mind an appearance in the Assembly. (Robbie told me last year that he was not interested in hearings until action started). I have also in mind an opportunity for you to meet with a large group of delegates and others. (Ambassador Marof's party to Canon Collins in 1965 was worth a hundred thousand dollars). I think with some planning, a brief visit can be very useful. Perhaps, if someone like Robbie can come here in advance to look after General Assembly action, that would be best.
Thank you again for the letter. You can be sure that many others share the sorrow, pride and determination of your colleagues during these days. I myself feel a greater respect for the A.N.C. as I have seen over the past two years that what I had been told in Dar in the gloomy days of 1965 were statements of a responsible and mature leadership. Your people may not remember, but I do, very clearly.
With best regards,
Yours sincerely
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
P.O. Box 1791
Lusaka, Zambia.
Letter, 3 June 1968
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Oliver Tambo,
I thought I should write down some thoughts from my vantage point so that you and your colleagues can take them into account, especially in the next few days. I am naturally looking at the situation from my angle: I will not try to be balanced. In fact, this account will be highly personal - but I think that might convey my thoughts most accurately and thus be most useful.
I would appreciate any comments as they would help me in my work.
Reddy
I will go back to 1960 when I first met you in New York.
I believe you had difficulty in getting attention even from Asian-African delegates because nothing "dramatic" was happening in South Africa and because other issues were pressing. The General Assembly did not even consider apartheid in the fall of 1960 in spite of increased African membership. The Hammarskjold mission did not prove helpful and the Assembly resolution in the spring of 1961 was rather routine. You had difficulty in gaining access to senior officials in the Secretariat.
When I was somehow appointed secretary of the Apartheid Committee, I decided that I should do two things: (a) Attention on the issue should not depend on something dramatic happening in South Africa, like throwing of bombs and unplanned terrorism. As the Afro-Asian countries are now free, it was possible, and it was our duty to see to it to focus attention under any circumstances with all the imagination we have. (b) Leaders of liberation movement should not be treated as beggars but should be recognized (especially as the majority in U.N. was of newly-independent countries).
To me, to a large extent, the success of my efforts depended on how much I was able to achieve on these two aspects.
The situation in 1963, of course, proved rather favourable and I feel satisfied that we were able to do much on both counts, better than other U.N. committees, though we did not do well enough at certain times.
Let me first take the question of the status of the liberation movement. Soon after the committee was formed, it invited memoranda and requests for hearings from A.N.C. and P.A.C. Both were heard in July-August 1963. (These were the first hearings of South Africans in U.N.)
In October 1963, you were heard in the Assembly. This was the first time a petitioner was heard from a sovereign member state, against that state (except for the colonial situations).
What was completely unprecedented was the party given in your honour in October 1963 (even if along with Bishop Reeves and Miriam Makeba) by a U.N. Committee in the U.N. building. The Secretary-General himself came down to the party.
(No party to a petitioner or a leader of liberation movement has been held in the U.N. building to this day - except, again, for a party given by the Committee to Canon Collins and several smaller parties I gave to various people).
In March 1964, Tennyson and you were invited to New York for consultation with the Group of Experts. The fares were paid by the U.N. (I kept the arrangement rather quiet in order to avoid questions, etc.) No other leader of the liberation movement has ever been invited to U.N. and had his fares paid.
In 1966, several persons from the movement were invited to the Brasilia Seminar and offered fares and expenses - though it was necessary to compromise on calling them "experts".
At the Kitwe Seminar, for which I had some responsibility, on the suggestion of and with the strong support of Ambassador Malecela, it was arranged that Dr. Mondlane would be invited by the U.N. to write a paper and paid for it. He wrote a very good paper.
The invitation to you to write a paper, present it in Stockholm and participate in the meetings of the Special Committee on Apartheid is another big step in the same direction - in terms of U.N. precedents.20
(There have been some complaints by Ronald21 and others that U.N. should not treat representatives of liberation movements as "observers" who can only speak when invited. I do not agree with the complaint. There cannot but be a distinction between representatives of governments and others in a meeting of governments. I know that government representatives often act like individuals and make statements which are not regarded by governments as commitments: this is unfortunate and should not be encouraged).
While I am satisfied that much has been done in respect of recognition of liberation movements and their leaders, there have been some problems.
First of all, let me say that I have not done any "favour" to you or your colleagues. This is matter of principle. Also, I can only make suggestions and they need to be approved by delegates and the secretariat before they are acted upon.
I am concerned that, in these five years, no other U.N. committee has done such things to other liberation movements. In the Apartheid Committee, we managed to stress the importance of close relationship with the liberation movements. ( I tried, for a long time, even to avoid using the term "petitioner" until the Nigerian delegate forced it). But the Committee of Twenty-Four, and recently the Council for South West Africa, have not followed the example in the treatment of leaders of liberation movements.
As a result, there has been disenchantment with U.N. among leaders of other liberation movements. They show little enthusiasm for appearing before U.N. committees. Even when they come to New York, they do not pay much attention to U.N. They are disillusioned. I do not blame them. Their concrete proposals are rarely acted upon: even if resolutions are passed and speeches made, there is little concrete result. (Nothing has been done about defence and aid for them, for instance).
I feel, however, that disillusionment with the U.N. arises because of unrealistic hopes about U.N. or because the good people do not do enough (or well enough) to utilize the limited possibilities of the U.N.
I think it would be good if the liberation movements consult among themselves so that there can be a common and coordinated attitude to the U.N. (I am thinking of Z.A.P.U., for instance). You can then get much more.
I can think of a few small things right away, if only the movements will talk to a few delegates.
If you can speak to delegates in Stockholm22, that will help as a first step.
Let the other committees invite leaders of liberation movements for consultations etc. Let concrete assistance be provided in the context of their struggles - for defence and aid, civilian aid to liberated areas, etc., if not at a more political level. Let them even get U.N. documents by air and U.N. pamphlets in bulk.
One problem we have always faced was the fact that two South African organizations - ANC and PAC - are recognized by the O.A.U. I have always felt that my usefulness in the U.N. would be completely lost if I take a position on this matter and become subject to attack. That will be the end of my work on apartheid. The delegations have not been prepared to take a position, especially African delegations. The matter will need to be decided in the O.A.U. I have, in fact, tried to avoid any public controversy in the Committee on the ground that the matter should only be discussed in Africa and a dispute at U.N. would he harmful. It is for you and your colleagues to take it up with the delegates. I can only occasionally give personal advice to them.
(This problem does not arise as regards FRELIMO, but they have not fared better at the U.N.).
At Kitwe, I thought of the possibility of suggesting that liberation movements recognized by O.A.U. should be invited to participate as observers in all meetings of U.N. committees concerned with their problems, rather than being heard as petitioners. I did not press it because of some resistance. I myself had some doubts later. The move would have no meaningful result if the movements cannot maintain representatives in New York. Also, if the Apartheid Committee invites both A.N.C. and P.A.C., it may formalize and freeze the status of two rival organizations - and this may prove a disadvantage later.
When the Apartheid Committee was established in 1963, it started under various disadvantages. It was boycotted by the Western Powers. The composition was, in some respects, unfortunate. Apartheid had become a routine and unexciting item and everyone expected the Committee to be still-born. I was very junior in rank.
I decided that the Committee should use its one-sided composition to agitate more effectively than divided committees. At the same time, it should be careful so that it does not give an opportunity for others to denounce it. I was meticulous about research and in presenting the facts in the reports so that even the South African Government cannot dispute the facts. The conclusions were also carefully drafted at the beginning.
In the 1963 session, I did what I could to obtain widest support, even if the resolutions had to be somewhat weaker and to have the Committee praised. The 1962 resolution on sanctions had only Asian-African and Socialist support. I did what I could to get more and more substantive support so that we have had, for some time, support for sanctions by Scandinavian States, Ireland etc. (which voted against in 1962).
We had a favourable situation in 1963. There were important developments in South Africa. Diallo Telli's personality was very useful. The world-wide concern over the Rivonia Trial had an effect. Above all, there was a new African spirit after the Addis Ababa Conference. On my suggestion, Diallo Telli proposed taking the matter to the Security Council and all African Chiefs of State decided in favour of this move. The United States arms embargo was a direct result of the Addis Conference.
Soon, the Rivonia Trial became the first priority. I felt a personal sense of achievement with the adoption of the Assembly resolution by 106 votes to 1. For the next eight or nine months, we carried on a campaign which no other United Nations committee has ever done.
By June 1964, we reached the end of the road. The lives of the Rivonia accused were saved, but the enthusiasm of the campaign waned. In the United Nations, the last Security Council resolution on apartheid was passed and no more progress on sanctions, etc., was to be expected. In South Africa, resistance seemed to have been broken. Keeping the issue alive and recovering the initiative became the biggest problem since then. Even convening meetings of the Apartheid Committee was to become difficult.
I must confess that for the next two years, or more, I got very little advice from your people on what can usefully be done by the United Nations. I had to act on my own guesses, based on hints here and there.
I remember my visit to London late in 1964. Some people in Anti-Apartheid Movement were extremely depressed and felt that nothing could be done unless people threw bombs in Cape Town. They were in a worse state than I, and I had to try to boost their morale and advise them to follow the United Nations lead!
There were also many misfortunes. The United Nations was almost paralyzed for a year in 1964-65 by the crisis over the finances. Jealousies and resentment against Ambassador Marof developed in the Committee from 1965 and became much worse after the African coups in 1966 which had a disastrous effect on all African delegates for some time. The African group ceased to be a dynamic force. My plans to build up towards the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers and the O.A.U. Conference in Accra in 1965 fizzled. Algeria, with the best intentions, almost paralyzed the Committee for months in 1966 by insisting that expansion of the Committee was the priority. Above all, my own work increased greatly and I could not cope with it even with a steady 70-hour week.
But we kept the issue alive and survived somehow.
On the Mini case, we did some things but not too well. I think the fault was partly with the African National Congress which did not provide us the material which we could have used.
I did what I could to keep the issue of prisoners alive-by long reports giving all names, biographies etc. I thought this was important also to help keep the morale of the militants.
I think we did very well on defence and aid. As a result of our initiative in 1963 and later efforts, well over a million dollars has been contributed by governments for this purpose since the beginning of 1965, well over half of it to Canon Collins. I will try to have the figures soon.
After conversations in London in 1964, I thought we should take up some issues which can also be taken up by liberals in South Africa so that the small legal liberal opposition in South Africa can be encouraged and helped to survive. That is why I pressed on the matter of treatment of prisoners in South Africa-and it has now become a busy United Nations activity.
That was also one of the reasons why I arranged in 1965 for the UNESCO study on effect of apartheid on education.
We did a little on the education and training programme.
In 1965, I suggested that since there was little hope of a change in the attitude of Western Powers, we should encourage public opinion and non-governmental organizations to act. We should spread information to arouse public opinion and pressure Western governments. We did achieve some results. (The Brasilia Seminar was suggested by me as one of the projects under this programme). But the problem of publicity has become a headache recently and I will explain later.
I suggested that there would be a deadlock, and the issue will be forgotten, if the Committee limited itself to sanctions (as Ronald and others seem to feel). To keep the issue alive, and also as the right strategy, it should encourage all organizations to engage in greater activity at their own level and according to their own policies. Some may be purely humanitarian. Others may be pacifist or limited to specific aspects, etc. Action at any level is useful. It is only by involvement that people will learn and take the next step.
As a result of this, we now have greater activity on the humanitarian and human rights aspects. (In fact, there is a little too much sometimes). Some non-governmental groups were encouraged by United Nations.
We have not done much with trade unions, student groups, etc. We could have, if I had the time and staff.
Though it is difficult to distinguish between activity generated by United Nations encouragement and activity generated from elsewhere, I have an idea, from personal contacts, that our efforts have had substantial (though not fantastic) results.
I feel that the strategy is correct, though there are new problems. The activity on the human rights level should not be seen as diverting the issue and discouraged, because it appeals to large groups in the world.
Then, I come to the stage after the Brasilia Seminar in 1966 when I met Resha in New York and Nokwe in Addis and got some new ideas for action in the United Nations. I resumed secretaryship of the Committee, in spite of serious personal difficulties, to get the Apartheid Committee function much more effectively. What followed was a most painful year personally, but there were a few achievements. I would say: (a) the Paris speech of Ambassador Marof; (b) the Kitwe Seminar. I had great hopes about this. In spite of much bad luck, it did result in concrete recommendations. Though most of the recommendations could not be implemented soon, they are continuing to have a positive effect; (c) the work of the trust fund.
Now, suddenly, some of the problems have disappeared though some damage has been done, and the prospects are good but I find it hard to cope with the work that can be done. I am also a little wiser perhaps after the difficulties of last year. For the past many weeks I have concentrated on the meetings in Europe, especially as though this might be the end of my efforts on apartheid, and I am anxious to get the most out of them23. I will elaborate a number of problems that seem to me to need attention and some possibilities. I will also, as usual, make a lot of complaints.
Before that, in this rambling discourse, I will go back and ramble again.
In 1964, I paid my own way and went to Cairo and Algiers and in 1965 I obtained approval to go to Dar es Salaam, Cairo and Algiers to meet people from the liberation movement. I had found the atmosphere among people in London rather depressed and somewhat confusing. I was trying to formulate, for my own work, some definition of the role of the United Nations and some way out of the impasse. My own personal reactions had been somewhat different from those of others and I wanted to get some clarity.
I felt that, on economic sanctions, we had reached a dead-end for the time being. I thought, as many others did, that the underground had been largely smashed as a result of mistakes etc., though I was confident it would revive over a period of time. I did not see any prospect for the immediate future except terrorism (like that of John Harris) which would not serve any purpose. I saw frustration among people abroad who felt that the more they did against apartheid the worse the situation got: there was no sense of achievement and hope which could enthuse them to do more.
At that time I had a conversation with Joe Matthews who spoke quite freely, making it clear that it was not necessarily A.N.C. view. He felt that the movement, by emphasizing sabotage and sanctions as the only way, etc., had helped to undermine all the legal possibilities in South Africa. It was still possible to use legal means up to a point and money would not be a problem if only people in South Africa could be approached etc.
I had myself felt that the legal possibilities were not utilized to the maximum. The "liberals" either became scared or were regarded as worthless.
I felt also that armed "infiltration" cannot be the main force of liberation, though it can act as a catalyst or play a limited role. The infiltrators can only be few in number and unless the organization inside was well-based, they can do nothing. The underground itself can develop better when the legal activities are continued and developed: these help maintain contact with people, recruit militants, etc.
This was my own feeling from my own experience elsewhere. Naturally, it was not my business to become an armchair leader of a revolution in South Africa with little knowledge of the facts.
But the guess or assessment, in general, had an influence on my thinking. On the one hand, what was needed was to keep the flame, however small or flickery, alive inside South Africa. It is more precious than bigger demonstrations in London. Second, it was necessary for people abroad to see and know that their efforts have an effect-so that they will be encouraged to do more. Third was my view from the beginning that everything should be done to help keep the morale of militants and people under bans etc. because the bad days will last a long time and the militants are precious. Fourth, illusions should not be promoted: we should keep emphasizing that there are no miracles and that the struggle will be long and hard. Only small achievements can be expected in the meantime.
Appreciation to Chairman
On the whole, the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Marof, has done a very good job. His political attitude has been exceptionally good.
There have been jealousies and some personality conflicts in the Committee. Extraneous political differences have also affected relations in the Committee since the beginning of 1966. As a result, the Chairman does not have the authority he has had.
However, in view of his very positive contribution since October 1964, you may perhaps consider expressing special appreciation to him in public. That may improve his status and encourage him.
Frequently, Ambassador Marof and others refer to "liberation movements" in South Africa. This has come in resolutions too. I think this is unfortunate. Even if they have A.N.C. and P.A.C in their minds, they should refer to the movement in singular. A movement can have many wings.
Letter, 7 August 1969
PERSONAL
Dear Oliver,
I had planned to write to you some time ago about the visit of the Sub-Committee of the Special Committee on Apartheid, but delayed in expectation of your letter. It has not arrived yet.
The Sub-Committee will be arriving in Lusaka on Sunday, 17 August. Mr. Pedanou, now secretary of the Special Committee, whom you have met several times, will be with them. Also in the staff will be Mr. Zoubeidi from Algeria (who was in Kitwe with me); and Mr. Keith Beavan, the press officer who was with us in Stockholm. Also, Miss Florencia Witt, my secretary, whom you have met: unfortunately, she is leaving us after the mission. They can be reached at Rutledge Hotel.
The Sub-Committee hopes to have detailed consultations with you on all aspects of U.N. and apartheid. (Mr. Pedanou will keep some confidential minutes but they will not be published). It will also meet other liberation movements recognized by the O.A.U. to discuss the role of South Africa in southern Africa as a whole. It will have some appointments with the Governments, etc.
The programme in Dar would be similar.
It would be useful if you can give some thought to the role of the U.N. in relation to apartheid, as you see it, and advise them. Also, specific and concrete proposals for decision at the next session of the General Assembly.
I will try to write a detailed note to you on various aspects, as I see them, and send it with Mr. Pedanou or Mr. Zoubeidi. I would request that you arrange for them to be contacted at the Hotel on Sunday, 17 August. Meanwhile, here are a few points.
If you feel that what I have been doing in the name of the Unit on Apartheid is worthwhile, perhaps you might indicate that, so that we would have more support and encouragement.
Then, there is a proposal to set up U.N. radio unit in central Africa to beam programmes to southern Africa. The USSR is not happy with this because of the estimated cost ($130,000 a year). Also, there is a feeling that broadcasts by U.N. "civil service" would not be very effective. I feel that an alternative would be: (a) to recommend that States increase broadcasts to the people of southern Africa, and provide increased facilities to liberation movements, anti-apartheid movements etc. and (b) that the U.N. help the States by providing, say 10 or 20, packaged programmes a year on the U.N. aspect. This would be relatively inexpensive and, I believe, would be accepted by the Soviet Union also. Do you think this alternative would be useful?
There is also a suggestion that the U.N. should finance radio programmes to be operated by O.A.U. I am not sure that can work.
The Sub-Committee will find your views on this matter useful, as it will come up in the General Assembly in October for decision.
In the past four years, the Assembly has passed many strong (Afro-Asian) resolutions, but the results have not been impressive. In fact, there is less and less isolation of South Africa.
I feel it may be useful to get a near-unanimous resolution on a few crucial points:
It may be recalled that the 1963 resolution on prisoners and Rivonia trial, adopted by 106 votes to one, was impressive and showed isolation of South Africa. Since then, there has not been such a demonstration: all resolutions have had the standard abstentions from the Western Powers and there is no feeling of unanimity.
The points I mentioned above are points on which there has been unanimity. In 1967, all the big Powers voted for the clause recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle.
I feel that a resolution can be formulated to get a unanimous vote (not counting South Africa and Portugal). For best effect, it should be sponsored not only by Afro-Asians but also by others (e.g. Scandinavian States). In fact, the Scandinavians might take the initiative and make sure of positive, votes by U.S. and U.K.
In addition, there could be another Afro-Asian resolution on sanctions, etc.
The main argument against this procedure would be that the Western Powers would be happy: they will vote for one resolution and say they are good. I feel that this does not matter as the alternative is another routine resolution without any effect.
What do you feel? If you think that the course I suggest is good, the Special Committee may consider it. Also, understanding by Zambia, Tanzania and other African States would be necessary. The Scandinavian, or other non-African States, will not take any initiative unless they are assured of African support.
We had plenty of controversy and conflict after the Kitwe Seminar when it was suggested that the southern African problems are all inter-linked and should be considered in their inter-relationships instead of as isolated problems. There is growing understanding of this now and the Sub-Committee is very much interested in this aspect. I will elaborate in a later note.
After your contacts with the Committee, I would suggest that Mr. Nzo be advised so that there may not be any confusion between statements by A.N.C. in Lusaka and in Dar. Mr. Pedanou and Mr. Zoubeidi can help, as they will be going to Dar.
Mr. Resha will also need to be advised as he may be appearing before the Committee, in a public session in September.
I was disappointed about the delay in setting up the Lutuli memorial. I hope that it can be set up soon. Mr. Resha's arrival has been delayed: I am expecting him early in September.
Are you coming here for the General Assembly in October? I am looking forward to seeing you again.
Yours sincerely,
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
African National Congress of South Africa
P.O. Box 1791
Lusaka, Zambia
cc.Mr. Nzo, Dar es Salaam
Mr. Resha, London
Letter, 12 August 1969
Mr. Oliver,
I am sending a number of notes through my colleague, Mr. Zoubeidi. I may send some more through others. I hope they will be useful for discussions with the Sub-Committee of the Special Committee on Apartheid and for other purposes.
I would be grateful if you can help Mr. Zoubeidi in making arrangements for the Sub-Committee's programme in Lusaka. I think they should have consultations with you and your colleagues first - say, Monday morning.
They also wish to meet with the other liberation movements to discuss South Africa's role in southern Africa. Can you please help Mr. Zoubeidi to contact them (or some of them) and make tentative appointments? The consultations may be useful not only on apartheid, but also on other items in the U.N. agenda, as the delegates will be participating in other committees of the General Assembly as well.
The members also want to meet informally with some people from the press etc.
Perhaps you should have a second session with the Committee, or at least some members, before they leave - late Tuesday or Wednesday morning - to wind up.
Mr. Zoubeidi will be going to Dar es Salaam in advance of the Committee. I am sending to Mr. Nzo copies of some of the notes I am sending you. If you wish to send a message to Mr. Nzo so that the two A.N.C. presentations are coordinated, Mr. Zoubeidi will be happy to assist.
You might also wish to send a message to Robbie about consultations in Lusaka and Dar, as he is expected to appear before the Committee in an open session early in September. I have the impression that he is only thinking of the prisons. There is no reason why he should not take up other matters.
If you want to send me any message, Mr. Zoubeidi will be happy to bring them.
Mr. Pedanou will be going on home leave from Addis Ababa and Mr. Zoubeidi will be acting secretary of the Committee during the approval of the report of the Committee to the General Assembly.
I hope a number of concrete points for the conclusions and recommendations of the report will emerge from your consultations. Mr. Alo of Nigeria will be drafting them and you might stress to him any points you have in mind. Mr. Bensid from Algeria is generally very helpful and dependable when it comes to proposals by A.N.C.
I hope to take a few days leave during the Sub-Committee's absence and get back to work at the end of August.
I hope this will find you in good health and spirits as when I last saw you in London.
Yours sincerely,
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
African National Congress of South Africa
P.O. Box 1791
Lusaka, Zambia.
Letter, 12 August 1969
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
[This letter and enclosures were sent by hand through a colleague who was going to Lusaka and Dar es Salaam.]
Dear Oliver,
Just before I started writing this letter, which may well be endless, I was reading the evidence taken last year by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Prisoners24 - particularly the statements by Amilcar Cabral and Eduardo Mondlane. They are buried in a fat, mimeographed document - which came out a year after the statements and which hardly anyone else will read. They deserve to be read, understood and pondered by U.N. delegates and also by others.
The two statements were very different - but complementary. Amilcar was very positive about the U.N. as an institution. He told them he would not ask about sanctions as that was not now realistic. His whole statement reflected the confidence of the movement.
Eduardo started off by asking what was the use of appearing again and again before Committees which make reports and pass resolutions - but nothing happens. He ended by asking why the U.N. cannot even give the civilians - women and children - in liberated areas food, medicines and clothes. He was not asking for bombs and weapons.
Why cannot the U.N., I ask myself, let these statements be known all over the world - to governments and peoples? Why, indeed, cannot the U.N. give civilian aid to liberated areas?
Having served the U.N. for twenty years, and having spent most of my time with apartheid for six years, I know the answer is, "we can". We can - if the liberation movements try to get the most that can be obtained from the U.N., if the African and Asian delegates are really dedicated to support them in the ways they need support and if the secretariat acts with imagination instead of being bogged down in bureaucracy.
I have tried to do what I can in the past six years - I am afraid I might write a nostalgic testament instead of a business-like letter - and I know that more can be done. It is necessary to carry on a political battle against those who hinder decisive action, but at the same time the organization can and should be used to the maximum possible. There is no use merely complaining about those who are unfriendly and unhelpful.
When I wanted to publish pamphlets on apartheid - or pictures of spokesmen of the liberation movement - there was no precedent, but that was done.
When we proposed help for defence and aid, there was no precedent inside or outside the U.N. We now raise $250,000 through U.N. and much more outside.
The education programme was also an innovation. The U.N. programme alone gets $300,000 a year and it can get much more.
There are always ways to get around legal and procedural problems. We can do much more along these lines. I am quite confident that we can double the education programme. We can raise as much as can be effectively used for defence and aid. We can develop the information programme ten-fold. We could have obtained grants for the Mozambique Institute a year ago: I hope we will soon. There is no reason why we cannot raise some funds for liberated areas in Mozambique. We can help promote the Lutuli Fund and others to cover much of your non-military needs.
When we press on sanctions - and that should be continued - we face powerful interests, especially in a few countries and there is a deadlock. But the kind of positive things I have referred to can be promoted without these interests or countries.
If we see the struggle as between the oppressors and the oppressed, one should try to weaken the oppressors and to support the oppressed. The two lines of action should be simultaneous. In a material way - and I do not discount other factors - the world helped Algerians by supporting the F.L.N., not by sanctions against France.
The U.N. now spends millions of dollars in dealing with southern Africa - meetings, interpreters, records, travels etc. But the results are not commensurate with the cost.
For the cost of producing the record of one meeting of a committee, which may have no value, we can publish a pamphlet or give a scholarship. The present trip of the Sub-Committee has been made very economical ($16,500), but the recent trip of the Committee of Twenty-Four cost over $150,000.
I have been feeling frustrated now and then - the last three years or so - because the organization has not been used enough. The liberation movements tend to make strong political denunciations, feeling that proposals on realistic aid may brand them as moderate. The delegates show little interest in such practical action, or do not know how to overcome the procedural problems, and tend to feel that flowery speeches and resolutions get them attention. The secretariat tends to be bogged down in bureaucracy, particularly when it sees confusion in political organs.
When I started with the Apartheid Committee in 1963, I told Diallo Telli that I was only a minor official in the U.N. I would give my best to the committee but he will need to exert all his influence to get things done. I could be effective only if I could count on using his name in the secretariat. This worked very well and many things, including Addis Ababa resolutions, came from us. By 1965, apartheid became big enough in U.N. that it attracted bigger bureaucrats who saw opportunities. There were fights at highest level for control of the education programme which was expected to be a big operation.
In 1965, I managed to go to Dar and speak to Duma and others. I told them that my usefulness had perhaps reached its limit. There were two things which could be done. When U.N. gets into operations like education programme and trust fund, the person who directs it becomes very important. It was, therefore, necessary to find a high-level African, with a right attitude to the liberation movements, to be appointed in charge of southern African programmes in the U.N. (scholarships, refugee relief, etc.). Second, at an appropriate time, you should personally meet with U Thant and talk to him about the need for having the programmes administered by people who work in harmony with the movements. You may feel this was too much to ask, but we have had in U Thant a great friend who knows and likes you and who would not hesitate to do all he can to help.
I then left the secretaryship of the Apartheid Committee in order to make sure that I would have charge of the Trust Fund at its inception when it could go right or wrong. This did help greatly when Defence and Aid Fund was banned. But the political work of the Apartheid Committee lagged.
When Robbie came to New York from Brasilia in 1966, we discussed the situation. I agreed to go back to the Apartheid Committee and take on several different jobs-in spite of warnings from friends. I asked Robbie to get me a good researcher-writer to help me and followed his suggestion about Hutchinson.25 From the end of that year, I was to be not only chief of section (with all administrative work) but hoped, as secretary of the Apartheid Committee (itself a full-time job), to make it more dynamic. I continued to be in charge of the Trust Fund. I was to set up a new Unit on Apartheid for publicity and manage it. I also tried-especially after seeing a message from you to Duma in Addis-to develop a new approach and coordinated activity on southern Africa as a whole, and pushed the Kitwe Seminar which involved a great deal of work.
But a series of misfortunes happened that year, some of which you know. They are now past and I have survived. But if those misfortunes did not happen, I could have done much more in the U.N. I made several mistakes, but basically the causes of the incidents were much deeper.
My problem with Mr. X was basically on the attitude to the liberation movement. I told him that I would go by the opinion of the liberation movement in all problems that came up, but he was not interested. He knew better… He was in charge of the education programme and when I told him that the liberation movement should be consulted, he was utterly negative. He was against scholarships to any Whites, and generally unsympathetic to Indians. On all these matters, the sympathies of the Secretary-General would have been with my position, but the problem could not be taken up that high.
About that time, another serious problem came up. I managed a number of recommendations from the Kitwe Seminar-including defence and aid for southern Rhodesia, civilian aid to liberated areas in Mozambique etc.,-and hoped to get them through the General Assembly. The beginning of the armed struggle by the A.N.C. also created a new situation.
But one recommendation by Algeria about setting up a single U.N. committee on southern Africa created bureaucratic problems. The most senior African official suspected that he might lose part of his empire and that I was plotting against him. He got together some delegates and killed almost all action on those recommendations. I could do very little. Now, strangely, some of the delegations which joined with him (especially Nigeria) are vocal about treating southern Africa as a whole.
Although I have survived these problems and am quite comfortable, the incidents with two senior African officials affected my usefulness in the U.N. I manage to do quite a few things, but I feel disappointed when I think of what could have been done.
My attitude about the role of the U.N. was also affected. If the U.N. pays little attention to the liberation movement, it is better, for instance, that the U.N. does not get into too much information or other activity: some of the officials may do harm, rather than help.
I began this letter hoping to write some concrete points to discuss with the Sub-Committee of the Special Committee on Apartheid, but it has become something else. I will need to write another letter.
But I hope that your consultations with the Sub-Committee will help to get some meaningful movement in U.N. on concrete points. In suggesting that you should come to the U.N. this fall, I had in mind that you might get familiar with all the practical problems here and perhaps have a private and confidential discussion with the Secretary-General. (If you are going to Addis for the O.A.U. meeting, you may perhaps see him there).
I think several things are possible:
There are all possibilities. I have responsibility for only a couple of these matters, but I know I can do any of these if I have the responsibility. They need pushing through committees and the civil service.
With best regards.
Yours sincerely,
E.S. Reddy
Enclosure 1
ROLE OF U.N.
What does the liberation movement expect of the U.N. in relation to apartheid at this stage? A statement on this matter should be useful to clarify thinking and to guide further moves.
In June 1968, at my request, Joe26 made a statement on this matter to the Special Committee on Apartheid in London. (The statement is attached). He had only a few minutes notice and could not prepare a considered statement. However, it may perhaps be taken as a basis. Here are some of my own comments on that statement.
Legitimizing guerilla warfare: Already in 1967, the General Assembly (by 105 votes to 1) recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa. (This was as good as the clause on Rhodesia to which he referred). It does not refer to guerilla warfare as such, but the means of the struggle is a matter for the people concerned.
In 1968, the Assembly referred specifically to the liberation movement. It also called for treatment of freedom fighters as prisoners of war - and this involves recognition of guerilla warfare. That is why it would be useful to follow up on this matter with Red Cross etc.
Information: Joe referred to the tremendous contribution of UNESCO. Actually, they published only one study and one magazine - after a lot of pressure and complications. They can do more. The U.N. itself has done more and can do better. The I.L.O. has also been helpful.
Refugees in Botswana: The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has appointed a representative in Botswana. We have tried to do what we can to prevent refugees from being sent back. Travel documents is a more difficult problem. U.N. alone cannot solve this: it needs action by member states.
Peace-keeping: I am not quite clear about this.
Economic aid to Botswana etc.: I do not think that the liberation movement needs to be too much concerned about this now. They are independent states and are able to seek economic aid.
Assistance to liberation movements through U.N.: No comment.
I will add some more points in other notes.
STATEMENT BY MR. JOSEPH MATTHEWS BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON APARTHEID IN LONDON, JUNE 1968
I thought that it might be to the point to refer to our view of the general role that we believe the United Nations can and should play. The African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress originally appealed to the United Nations on the issue of apartheid in 1952, and they did so because they believed that the issue of race and apartheid was not an exclusive issue. But naturally in making their appeal to the United Nations, they had in mind what kind of role the international community could play in the solution of the problem of apartheid. Certainly at no time did we feel that this involved abdicating our right to determine the strategy and tactics of the South African struggle at all levels.
Now, Sir, the United Nations operates at very many levels and I think that the way in which it assists our struggle is a very complex on e which we obviously cannot deal with entirely in one day of discussion, but I would say that we have at the one level the political importance of the United Nations in our struggle, namely, the expressions of opinion, the resolutions at the level of the General Assembly and the Security Council. These political resolutions are of importance, we feel, in giving an international orientation to the work against apartheid. They are very often a form of record - important historical record - of what at any stage we consider to be the view that should be taken on apartheid.
At the present time, of vital importance to us politically, is the legitimizing of the guerilla struggle being conducted by our liberation movement. The recent resolution on Rhodesia by the Security Council contained a formulation on this question which may be of assistance in the future. But this is our main political aim, our main political desire in so far as the General Assembly and Security Council are concerned - that we are entitled to embark on and conduct our armed struggle, and we are entitled to international support in that legitimate struggle.
The other level at which the United Nations operates, in a manner that is of great assistance to us, is naturally on certain practical political resolutions such as the arms embargo. Now, here, we get a kind of opinion which is not merely of a general political character but directly affects the fortunes of our men in the field militarily. The more effective the arms embargo the more we are assisted practically in our liberation struggle and, therefore, we do feel that every possible action should be taken in this regard.
Then, there is the level of information and exposure of race and apartheid - a field in which your Committee, Sir, has played a very important role - together with other United Nations agencies, such as UNESCO, which have also made a tremendous contribution on the information side.
Then, I would say, we have the programmes dealing with refugees, students - dealing generally with victims of apartheid. Whether through the training programme for South Africans or in the High Commission for Refugees, certain steps have been taken which are of tremendous assistance. We are very interested in a suggestion that has been made that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should handle the question of refugees in Botswana, for example. This will be of assistance in having the United Nations presence and also saving the Botswana Government from embarrassment and problems which it sees in handling the question of refugees. This might be of great assistance to us, especially in the field of travel documents and matters of that kind.
Now, Sir, it seems that the document that was presented by the Anti-Apartheid Movement, in my view, contains a very good working basis for a lot of the future work that we might have to do, together with this Committee and other United Nations agencies in the work against apartheid. I do not myself agree with all the formulations in this document or for that matter with all the suggestions. I merely feel that it is a good working basis and a very comprehensive one for the future work in this field.
I would conclude by saying that as the struggle of our people in southern African develops and, it will develop at a very rapid rate, then an aspect of United Nations work which has not yet become relevant will become extremely important: the aspect of peace keeping, the whole question of the United Nations being involved in what we have always said will be a threat to peace of the whole of southern African and perhaps for Africa as a whole. This must constantly be kept in mind, I think, that as the situation develops, we will have to be thinking of what might be required to maintain the peace in the area.
The relationship between the struggle against apartheid and neighbouring States, States neighbouring on southern Africa, has been referred to many times, and in this regard we feel that the economic weakness of these neighbouring States should be taken into account and there should be a much more active interest in assisting these States to be less dependent on South Africa. The difficulties that some of them are meeting in complying with International Monetary Fund requirements, in complying with all sorts of requirements of financial institutions, make these States depend on the neighbouring country more than otherwise would be the case if there was an active international interest in making them economically viable.
The last point, Sir, which I should refer to is the suggestion for assistance to liberation movements or assistance to other organizations engaged in the anti-apartheid field. We are very much opposed to any sort of international agency being created as a kind of channel for giving assistance to liberation movements. We have had enough difficulty with our own agency in Africa - the Liberation Committee - not to want this repeated at an international level. We are perfectly happy with the United Nations calling on States to assist liberation movements in every way possible, materially and morally, but we do not agree with any suggestion which implies the creation of any kind of agency for this purpose. We think this could be politically and practically an incorrect step.
Enclosure 2
CONFIDENTIAL
U.N. EDUCATION PROGRAMME
Attached are a number of comments on the education programme, made by people who appeared before the Special Committee on Apartheid in Stockholm and London in June 1968. They have not led to adequate action and deserve to be re-considered and pressed. Following are my comments on the programme in general (and on the attached comments).
The Education Programme should not be considered as an aspect of material aid to the liberation movements. As a U.N. programme, depending on voluntary contributions, it can only function if it deals with candidates, irrespective of political affiliation.
At the same time, the programme is set up and receives support because of opposition to apartheid and colonialism, because of sympathy for the struggle against these evils, and because of the desire to lay the ground for the development of the territories after liberation.
In view of this, it is quite proper to expect that the programme should give adequate weight to the views of the liberation movement and to the sacrifices made by those who struggled against these evils.
Those who do not have a record of political action or imprisonment should not be denied aid. But those with such a record can be given special attention.
The programme has so far not functioned well enough - both as regards administration and as regards policy. Many of the criticisms are valid. Because it has not functioned well enough, it has not received sufficient contributions and this leads to a vicious circle.
The size of the programme itself is not as crucial as the policy and objectives. It need not give scholarships to all refugees who apply. Many of them may be educationally unqualified, and there are other programmes. But there should be a clear-cut policy and objectives.
There have been some developments which may lead to improvement in administration. Moreover, an advisory committee of seven members (including Tanzania, Zambia, Congo, India, Denmark, Canada) will also be set up to advise on policy. It can help solve some of the policy problems. (A bit of the responsibility for these problems rests with the liberation movement itself as it showed little interest when the programme was planned in 1964-65. They should now be solved).
The main problems are as follows:
I have opposed this approach (but failed) on various grounds:
Perhaps the best that can be achieved now is to get a much more flexible attitude on preference for study in Africa, especially if it is emphasized that this is not a refugee "relief" programme but a programme designed for the future of South Africa.
There are, however, certain points which the liberation movements might keep in mind:
Enclosure 3
CONFIDENTIAL
U.N. TRUST FUND FOR SOUTH AFRICA
I would suggest that discussion of the operation of the Trust Fund be avoided as the operation has to be confidential and as it is functioning in close consultation with you and Canon Collins. There will be danger to security if others get involved.
On the whole, the operation is going on quite well. Canon Collins has done and is doing a great job. I do have some difficulties with him because of delays and mistakes in accounts, reports etc. But these are not too serious. I am, however, concerned that the work has been too much of a strain on him, as he tries to do everything himself, and that he does not get sufficient recognition. I am afraid that if he ever gets sick, the operations may be disrupted.
Second, despite all precautions, the fact remains that we have really only one channel for legal aid. While steps are taken to prevent South Africa from being able to prove it, I think this is not enough security. (The U.N. Trust Fund has kept its grants confidential-with great difficulty, for security reasons). One or two small alternative channels-which can be activated whenever necessary-would seem to be desirable. I have spoken to Canon Collins about the desirability of such channels so long as they do not detract from Defence and Aid. He agrees-but in practice he is too jealous of his work and I can appreciate that.
Third, there has been very little public fund-raising since the ban. In the U.K., Canon Collins obtains about £20,000 a year through mailings. There is a small collection in Ireland. Most committees are not raising funds but merely lobbying for funds from their governments. Public fund-raising is important for publicity and also for encouraging governments to contribute. It does not detract at all from fund-raising for more directly political purposes.
These are some of my concerns which I have discussed with Canon Collins several times. I pass them on, but do not make any suggestions.
Enclosure 4
CONFIDENTIAL
Oliver,
I am flooding you with a mass of notes. Here are a few miscellaneous things which would be useful.
Also, the advisory committee which is being set up can help on re-orienting the programme on all policy matters. Zambia, Tanzania and Congo will be members. The Zambian ambassador is a good friend of Raymond and if Raymond will make proposals to him when he comes here in September, he can be very helpful.
The U.N. is starting a quarterly offset magazine on southern Africa in September. The first issue will have articles on Lenkoe case etc., on trade union rights, and on executions in South Africa, and a profile of Chief Lutuli. The December issue will be a special issue on apartheid-in which we will reprint the Freedom Charter.
On the Mayekiso and other cases you raised, I have issued Unit on Apartheid bulletins. The Special Committee on Apartheid referred to them. I have also arranged for hearings etc., by the Ad Hoc Working Group. More could have been done if I had the time. I hope to take the matter up again when Robbie comes-in time for the General Assembly.
There has been so much confusion on information activity. In 1967-68, several members tended to over-stress information. Decisions were made about a series of pamphlets on apartheid.
This year when I proposed titles for approval, they said they were not interested in pamphlets. They were only interested in one study on foreign economic involvement. This was embarrassing.
If they make a general decision that we should have more information, they can leave that to the Secretariat and let us do our best. Publications by Secretariat have, sometimes, more effect than Committee reports, as the Secretariat has some reputation for objectivity. While delegates come and go, the Secretariat carries on with greater continuity.
But what is the purpose and focus of publicity?
I am trying to do what I can to get publicity for the liberation movements and prisoners (rather than U.N. and delegates). In the September issue of the magazine, we will also have Mondlane's paper for Kitwe Seminar. We will publish the Freedom Charter in December. I intend to suggest publication of a statement by Amilcar Cabral. I will try to publish profiles of a number of prisoners etc.
Enclosure 5
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Nzo,
Under General Assembly resolutions on the education programme, there is provision for grants to institutions providing education to refugees from southern Africa (in addition to individual scholarships). Nothing has been done about this yet as the decisions were to be made by a committee which will be set up in a few days.
I think it may be possible to obtain a grant to the Mozambique Institute. Tanzania and Zambia will be members of that Committee and can help.
If I can get all possible information on the Mozambique Institute, I might be able to help. I spoke to Mrs. Janet Mondlane and Mr. Khan29 about this a long time ago but did not receive up-to-date information.
I would be grateful if you can talk to the people at FRELIMO (perhaps Marcelino whom I know) and send me all available literature on constitution, budget, needs etc.
This may prove to be a useful precedent for you later.
Letter, 13 August 1969
Dear Oliver,
I am sending some more notes in the hope that they might provoke some comments or concrete proposals. I have put in my thoughts. I have no strong feelings about them and, of course, I try to avoid initiatives until I am reasonably satisfied that they are in harmony with the policies of those directly concerned. Please read and destroy all the notes, as they are entirely personal.
I have not been getting Mayubiye which should be useful for my work. Can you please give the available back issues to Mr. Pedanou,30 who can pouch them to me, and arrange to send me future issues?
I would be interested to know any developments concerning the Lutuli Foundation. I might perhaps mention that while the Scandinavian States will support it, the situation would be even better if there was a greater interest in the Scandinavian public on apartheid. There has been relatively little interest recently. The concern of the youth is with Biafra etc. There is perhaps also some disillusion: when the Windhoek trial started, the Swedish Foreign Minister issued a statement. No other government did. How long can such a situation go on? I think you might consider giving some attention to publicity in Scandinavian countries, and not take them for granted. Even a few students there might help.
Yours sincerely
E.S. Reddy
Mr. Oliver Tambo
African National Congress of South Africa
P.O. Box 1791
Lusaka, Zambia
Enclosure 1
If you think that the detentions under terrorism act and the deaths during interrogation deserve very special attention this year, the best procedure may be to treat the matter somewhat like the Rivonia trial in 1963 and sponsor a separate resolution (separate from the usual Afro-Asian resolution on sanctions, condemnation of trading partners, etc.). If the African States agree, and consult with other groups of States in advance on the formulation, it is possible to get seventy sponsors and a nearly unanimous vote (except for South Africa and Portugal). The wording can be quite strong.
In fact, it should be possible to have more elements in such a resolution, without reducing the votes:
An appeal for support to the liberation movement will not obtain unanimity.
It is hoped that you will have discussion on procedural matters such as these.
When I first saw the communiqué of the Morogoro Conference in May, I felt that the organizational decision-that the S.A.I.C., C.P.C. etc., would work abroad under the leadership of the A.N.C.-was very significant. The fact that the struggle is not of black against white, but a multi-racial struggle, should have appeal in other countries where the U.N. can have useful influence. The fact that this is a struggle for the ideals of the trade union movements etc.-for social change-should appeal to specific groups abroad. The U.N. should perhaps emphasize this.
I mentioned this to some delegates and this seems to have attracted a little attention.
Subsequently, I circulated the document on the Morogoro Conference to the officers of the Special Committee on Apartheid.
There may be questions on this matter. In any case it may be useful to brief the Sub-Committee on the policy decisions.
Enclosure 2
SANCTIONS AND MATERIAL AID
Despite the resolutions in the General Assembly, there has been no progress on sanctions. In fact, South Africa is in some ways less isolated than a few years ago.
If this trend continues, even the sanctions which have been achieved may be undermined.
It was partly because breaches of sanctions and development of relations are not constantly exposed (and attacked by African States) that further breaches take place. If France can supply submarines, and African States ignore that, why should U.K. continue the arms embargo and lose trade? If nothing is done about Malawi and others, why should Latin American States worry about African opinion? It was soon after a U.N. Seminar in Brasilia that South Africa developed diplomatic and/or commercial relations with Latin American States (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay). This was hardly noticed.
It is necessary to document and publicize all developments concerning closer relations with South Africa-diplomatic, economic, military. This may have some deterrent effect.
For a long time, the tendency has been to concentrate on Western Powers and ignore the rest. It may be desirable to be more objective and refer to all countries.
Secondly, sanctions have been pressed for several years as the only peaceful solution to the South African problem. This is perhaps still valid-although South Africa is better able to withstand sanctions. Would it not, however, be better to stress that sanctions by themselves will not produce a solution, but only in the context of the liberation movement. Otherwise, there may be a tendency to envisage a purely external solution or, at least, to underrate the importance of the liberation movement.
At the same time, it seems desirable to recognize that sanctions are not realistic. (Though even limited sanctions are of value in inhibiting growth of vested interests abroad). The crucial thing now is assistance to the liberation movement-assistance of various kinds.
Assistance of the defence and aid type and direct material assistance to the liberation movement are not contradictory. They are not alternatives. Both are necessary. While the world has contributed substantially to humanitarian aid, it has done very little on aid to the liberation movement.
The United Nations has repeatedly appealed for material aid to the liberation movements. It has, however, done nothing to see that these appeals result in aid. Most Governments which have voted for these appeals have not given aid. This was, to a large extent, because the liberation movement itself decided that U.N. should not be a channel for aid to it. This matter perhaps deserves some rethinking.
Is it not possible to ensure that the U.N. does a little more than appeals in resolutions which are ignored, and engages in a certain amount of lobbying? Is it not possible to ask States to report to U.N. on purely civilian material aid-even in general terms-so that, without endangering security, they would be encouraged to take action because of publicity, rivalry etc.? If, for instance, States are requested merely to report to U.N. on whether they have provided material assistance to the liberation movement-without indicating the form, amount etc.-many may feel obliged to take some action.
Moreover, is U.N. an inappropriate channel for all types of aid to the liberation movements? Can it have a role in some types of non-military aid or in some types of funds associated with, though not of, liberation movements? Can there be a small, dependable committee in the U.N., with favourable composition, charged with promoting aid to liberation movements-to encourage governments to contribute?
All these questions involve serious policy matters, for the liberation movements, for Governments and for the U.N. Much depends on the administration: there is a danger of political interference etc., if the liberation movements are to be at the mercy of its favours or disfavours.
On the other hand, since the U.N. is committed deeply on this matter, a case can be made for effective implementation machinery. Ideally that might include one administration for all humanitarian and educational programmes and aid to liberation movements, and related publicity and contacts; and a political committee to advise or supervise that administration.
This may be the most effective way to generate adequate support outside the States already providing assistance-especially in the Western States and many Asian States-and thus make this a more universal effort. On the other hand, this may be a very risky move.
The main problem at this stage is not the amount of money available. The minimum needs of the liberation movements at this stage are modest, though they will grow. The problem is how to collect and channel the aid-especially when many governments and churches etc., remain reluctant, for various reasons, to give directly to liberation movements or for "non-humanitarian" purposes and when liberation movements do not have the resources to engage in mass public fund-raising campaigns abroad.
Enclosure 3
INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA ON APARTHEID
This is a matter which has come up frequently in U.N. Committees.
Mr. Tambo stressed in Stockholm in June 1968 that the best propaganda-especially so far as the Whites in South Africa are concerned-is action (sanctions). But what of propaganda abroad!
Some people think that the main need now is propaganda or public relations-in an imaginative way through T.V. etc. or by contacts with influential elements in the West. This may be politically dangerous and also unrealistic.
But some degree of information activity is essential, as supplement to political action. It is done by the liberation movements themselves, anti-apartheid movements, defence and aid fund, etc.
What is the best role of the U.N. in this area?
Should information or propaganda become an important activity of the U.N. or should it be a minor activity so that the main role in this area would be left to non-governmental organizations? Can the U.N., a mixed organization, be depended upon in this area?
Whatever the share of the U.N. in this effort, what should be the focus of U.N. information activity?
Should it be objective, factual material on apartheid and its effects? On violations of human rights? On breaches of U.N. resolutions and collaboration with South Africa? On prisoners? On the aspirations and activities of the liberation movements?
Since the U.N. does not have the machinery directly to reach millions around the world, and since the emphasis may have to vary with countries and social groups, should its role be that of providing authoritative, reference-type material which outside groups can use?
Should there be more attention to special groups-students, trade unionists etc?
It may be noted that there is not too much demand for U.N. publications (pamphlets). The anti-apartheid movements are not able to disseminate large numbers of copies, provided free to them, because of the general atmosphere. Distribution is becoming a more important problem than production.
Enclosure 4
CONVENING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Since 1965, the Special Committee on Apartheid and the General Assembly have often decided that the Security Council should consider apartheid again and take more effective action. But the Security Council has not considered the matter since 1964. The reason is that the Security Council will only meet at the request of one or more Member States. The African States-or the four foreign ministers-have not called for a meeting. (The O.A.U. has delegated the matter to four foreign ministers since 1963). If African States will not request a meeting, other States will not.
There may be good grounds for not convening the Security Council on apartheid. But the General Assembly resolutions, sponsored by Afro-Asian States, become silly if they are repeated and no one is prepared to take the simple procedural initiative.
There is very little prospect of more effective Security Council action-unless only a strong reaffirmation of an arms embargo is envisaged or unless some developments justify strong condemnation (even without any concrete action). Can a mere debate be useful?
Meanwhile, the Security Council has discussed other issues-Namibia, Southern Rhodesia etc. Several resolutions have been passed, but have not had great effect.
What should be done now? Stop inviting the Security Council to consider the matter again? Or, really call for meetings and have a debate?
Enclsoure 5
MISCELLANEOUS
1970 will be the tenth anniversary of Sharpeville Day-designated by the U.N. as International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. What kind of activity can be planned?
What about a joint meeting of the Special Committee on decolonization and the Special Committee on Apartheid in Lusaka around 21 March 1970?
1970 is designated by the UNESCO and U.N. as International Education Year. Can there be a proposal that the effect of apartheid on education should be given attention in connection with the activities for the year?
It is proposed that 1971 should be designated as International Year against Racism. The proposal originated from Defence and Aid Fund. Final decision will be by the General Assembly this year. Should the proposal be strongly pushed? What kind of activities can be suggested?
Enclosure 6
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
In June 1968, at the suggestion of Ambassador Marof, the Anti-Apartheid Movements of Britain, Ireland and France agreed to sponsor an international conference on the implementation of the arms embargo (and other U.N. decisions), in co-operation with the Special Committee on Apartheid. The idea was to focus on who is breaching the embargo etc., and also take up aid to liberation movement.
Subsequently, the U.K. Anti-Apartheid spoke to A.N.C. people in London. I understand that Joe was rather negative-on the ground that the question of who supplies arms to the liberation movement may come up etc.
The Special Committee on Apartheid also lost interest after Ambassador Marof left. The General Assembly, however, asked the Special Committee to give priority to a study on implementation of resolutions. That report has not yet been prepared.
Any suggestions on the conference or the study?
Enclosure 7
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Some time ago I happened to mention to Frank Judd-along the lines I wrote to you-that I felt it would be useful to promote a unanimous resolution in the U.N. to dramatize the universal abhorrence of apartheid and to reiterate the arms embargo.
I understand that he wrote personal letters to the Presidents of Zambia and Tanzania and I enclose a copy. Please read and destroy it.
If you think this would be useful, perhaps you might suggest to Zambia and Tanzania-and also to Algeria through Bensid etc.-to take it up at the O.A.U. Conference.
Letter, 8 September 1969
Dear Oliver,
I have received your very kind letters. I am looking forward to seeing Robbie on the 16th and to see you soon.
I have been studying the notes on the visit of the Apartheid Sub-Committee which has gone on quite well. I do not know yet what the practical results will be at the coming session of the General Assembly. I myself feel that, apart from the issue of prisoners, there should be concentration on all aspects of the question of assistance to the people in the struggle. It involves political problems, and also administrative arrangements which are equally crucial.
Looking through the A.N.C. presentations, I feel that I should raise some practical questions so that you might give thought to them urgently. I will discuss them with Robbie when he comes here.
Most of the proposals concern, in effect, "recognition" of the liberation movement-in relation to material aid, publicity, passports, employment etc. I have always pressed the recognition of the role of the liberation movement, as a matter of principle, as you might have noticed in statements by Marof and other documents. But, in U.N. practice, what does "recognition" mean and how can it be defined? The Special Committee on apartheid has, for all practical purposes, recognized the movements recognized by the O.A.U.-the A.N.C. and P.A.C. If it has to encourage aid to them and publicize their documents etc., more actively than now, how can this be done without publicizing divisions and