JULY 15, 1992
Mr. President,
...That the Security Council is once again seized with the question of South Africa, is a sign of the times we live in and the grave concern with which the international community views the political developments in that country. In the course of your deliberations on this subject, you will hear of the significant developments that have taken place in South Africa since February 1990. But such developments, welcome and laudable as they may be, are now being undermined by the persisting political violence in South Africa.
Certainly, Mr. President, despite the temptation for the international community and South Africans, in particular, to pause and acclaim these positive developments, and in fact, indulge in self-congratulations, we can ill-afford to do so, for several reasons:
First, it cannot be over-emphasized, that the continuing political violence in South Africa, has put in jeopardy the peaceful negotiation process and transition to a non-racial democracy;
Second, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that, while key apartheid legislation has been repealed, legacies of apartheid and institutions that long sustained that institutionalized racial system remain intact; and
Third, the conditions set out by the international community within the framework of the 1989 United Nations Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa are yet to be fulfilled in their entirety.
May I remind the distinguished members of the Council that the consensus Declaration adopted at the Sixteenth Special Session of the General Assembly, set down guidelines for the process of negotiations in South Africa. These guidelines were categorical in expressing the views of the entire membership of this Organization on the necessary criteria for a successful process of peaceful transition to a democratic non-racial society.
For avoidance of doubt, Mr. President, permit me to also recall the pertinent provisions of the Declaration:
"We are of the view that the parties concerned should, in the context of the necessary climate, negotiate the future of their country and its people in good faith and in an atmosphere which, by mutual agreement between the liberation movements and the South African regime, would be free from violence. The process could commence along the following guidelines:
Mr. President,
Today South Africa is on the brink of disaster. Violence is rife and the South African authorities seem hesitant to advance the negotiations to their logical conclusion and in good faith. The task before this Council, Mr. President, has already been spelt out by African States when they requested this meeting. It is "to examine the issue of violence in South Africa and to take all appropriate action to put an end to it, as well as to create conditions for negotiations leading towards a peaceful transition towards a democratic non-racial and united South Africa".
Mr. President,
There are two critical questions that must be addressed by this Council. Both have the capacity to undermine peace and security in South Africa, and consequently in the Southern African sub-region. The first is violence. And the second is the deadlock in the political negotiations. I will address both issues separately.
Mr. President,
The blame for political violence in South Africa must rest primarily on the doors of the government of the day. The South African government, as the administrative authority, has a moral and full responsibility for the security of life, liberty and property of every South African citizen, as well as that of the State. In both respects, the government has failed.
I wish to recall that our distinguished Secretary-General in his Soweto Day address on 16th June, pointed out clearly that "violence serves no useful political end, and most certainly is not conducive to peace and stability". This is a notion I believe we all share. But certainly, the raging violence in South Africa seems geared at achieving a sinister motive - that of derailing the process toward a non-racial democracy in South Africa. If not, how else does one explain or justify South African government's wilful failure to implement the agreement it freely entered into within the framework of a National Peace Accord adopted on 14 September 1991? It is difficult to believe that a state with a proven security capability to enforce a national state of emergency and media clampdown, cannot contain this violence.
In the past four months, there have been an average of fifteen deaths daily in South Africa, attributed to political violence. Confirmed figures put the death tolls for the months of March, April, May and June at 437, 356, 296 and 373 respectively. Ample evidence exists in inquiries and investigation reports of respectable organizations on violence and the degrees of culpability. In every instance, the South African government's culpability is glaring - even if only by acts of omission. A case in point. Under the National Peace Accord, certain responsibilities devolve on the South African government, particularly its security forces. A few among these are worthy of recall:
Despite these clearly enunciated responsibilities of the security forces, today we confront overwhelming police complicity in circumstances of violence that threaten every fabric of the South African society. But perhaps what is most troubling is the wilful refusal by the de Klerk administration to employ its administrative, legislative and executive powers in controlling the raging violence.
Beyond these acts of omission, there are other grounds for adducing government's complicity in the violence. First, it was the government that legalized the carrying of dangerous weapons on the grounds that they are cultural weapons. Secondly, the government is responsible for the conduct of its military proxies (such as the CCB death squads, Koevoets and Buffalo Battalion 32), trained outside South Africa by the SADF, and brought into South Africa. In a belated but still very welcome development, the South African government is reported today to have decided to disband these unlawful military and para-military units. Thirdly, the government reneged on the agreement to phase out single-quarter hostels in the townships or at least convert them into fenced off family units, even after acknowledging that violence emanated from them. Finally, the government must bear full responsibility, even if only vicariously, for the conduct of its agencies that invariably result either in inadequate police investigations, sham trials and unwarranted acquittals of perpetrators of violence, ineffective jail sentences and bails, and police cover-ups. As the Goldstone Commission report issued last April concludes:
"Well documented criminal conduct by individual members of the South African Police and the Kwazulu Police exacerbate the perception of so many South Africans that the government or its agencies are active parties responsible for violence."
I might add, Mr. President, that this viewpoint has also gained currency internationally. The recent report of the International Commission of Jurists on violence, as part of its conclusion, notes that "...cynics might suggest that the violence can be used as a reason to postpone the elections for a Constituent Assembly, but this is not an option. If the violence is not stopped now", the report continues, "it will run out of control and become endemic and there will be no winners. It is also having a very adverse effect on the economy. Violence is the most pressing problem which South Africa faces."
Mr. President,
These are the realities in South Africa and of the proliferating violence. No one, least of all members of this Organization, takes delight in frivolously accusing the de Klerk regime of complicity in the violence - but the facts speak for themselves as do the escalating death tolls. Perhaps the acts of commission or omission on the part of de Klerk's administration are best summed up by the views expressed by Anthony Lewis in an article in New York Times, of July 6, 1992. The article concludes:
"At minimum, Mr. de Klerk and his colleagues have been grossly insensitive and dilatory on the violence issue. When alleged killers are arrested, nothing seems to happen. Nine policemen were charged for a massacre at Sobokeng two years ago; they remain on duty. With all the attacks on the trains, exactly one person has been tried and convicted."
All one can add to this unsavoury assessment is that the South African government has abdicated its most rudimentary responsibilities to its citizens and the State. Nonetheless, prevailing climate of political violence confronts all South Africans with a profoundly tragic and dangerous circumstance that undoubtedly is an impediment to peace and stability of that nation. The Security Council should, therefore, call upon all parties to the National Peace Accord to act in concert to implement its provisions and collectively give peace a chance in South Africa.
On the question of the stalled political negotiations, one hardly needs to reiterate the imperative need for a negotiated settlement to the South African problem. Whereas negotiations within the framework of CODESA have positively advanced the political process, they are now bogged down at a most crucial junction - and on the vital and inevitable question of constitution- making. That the South African regime has elected at this stage to create an impediment to the negotiations raises serious questions as to its sincerity of purpose and long-term commitment to a non-racial democracy in that country.
Two salient factors at play must be underscored. First, time-honoured democratic principles, which are universally accepted, and which define true democracies cannot be subverted in South Africa on the grounds that majority rule is that nation is tantamount to black domination. Second, while demands for guarantees that protect minority rights are natural and desirable, they must not be allowed to be the basis for establishing a white minority veto that could easily disrupt the normal functioning of a non-racial democratic society.
In this respect, Mr. President, I can only re-echo what the President of the African National Congress, Mr. Nelson Mandela, said recently that "constitution-making should be a unifying and legitimizing process which should enjoy overwhelming support". One does not see how this could be achieved if de Klerk and his colleagues hold on trenchantly to positions that do not advance South Africa towards a non-racial democracy, but only strive at protecting white minority interests.
Mr. President,
The role of this Council and the international community at large in helping to ensure that the deadlocked negotiations in South Africa are resumed cannot be over-stated. But fundamentally, a curious question has arisen as to whether the South African government had all along been executing a political grand strategy aimed at facilitating its re-entry into the international community and the lifting of global sanctions - all without any intent of really relinquishing power in that country? Has the international community, including the United Nations, been hoodwinked into abdicating hastily its responsibility and removing the political leverage it had on the South African authorities? These are two vital questions this Council must bear in mind in the course of its present deliberations.
Without taking up any more of the Council's precious time, I wish to conclude my remarks by stating that this Council has an obligation under its Charter's mandate to act immediately on the situation in South Africa. Beyond that, the international community has a moral responsibility for the provisions of the 1989 United Nations Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa.
Mr. President,
I have just come back from London, where I was attending an International Hearing on Violence in South Africa and the implementation of the National Peace Accord. There I heard the convincing and dramatic testimony by South Africans and others with first hand experience of the violence, and their appeal to the international community to live up to this moral responsibility. I would like to refer in particular to the concluding remarks by Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, a copy of which I requested be transmitted to the members of the Security Council.
Mr. President,
The international community now calls on this Council to respond to the situation in South Africa. Various suggestions have been made, ranging from the introduction of international monitors to oversee the implementation of the Peace Accord in particular, and law enforcement in general, to direct involvement in the political negotiations so as to guarantee neutrality of both the convener and venue. Recent experiences of political violence in other nations should compel this Council to act in a timely manner. Thee is a broad spectrum of possible action that can be undertaken - all well within the framework of recommendations and proposals made by our Secretary-General in his report to this Council, document A/47/277-S/24111 of 17 June 1992 on Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping.
Finally, Mr. President, allow me to add that the founding fathers of the United Nations were dedicated to the proposition of the indivisibility of peace as enshrined in the Charter of the Organization. Therefore, the Security Council, as the organ of our Organization charged with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security must demonstrate clearly that the tragic, recurrent and escalating loss of lives in the Black townships of South Africa is no less deserving of its prompt, concrete and effective response than the loss of lives in Sarajevo in the former Yugoslavia.
South Africa poses a new challenge to this Council and the United Nations. We cannot fail to respond accordingly.