MAY 23-25, 1991
A process of change was undisputably set in motion in South Africa during the year 1990 and is continuing in 1991, opening the prospect that apartheid will be eradicated through negotiations, and a new society based on a non-racial and democratic constitution will emerge in South Africa. Two factors have been essential in bringing about these changes. On the one hand, the continuous struggle of the majority of the South African population against the oppressive rule of apartheid persuaded the South African authorities that apartheid was unworkable and unsustainable. On the other, the pressure exerted by the international community led the regime to accept the necessity of political changes as a way out of the country's international isolation and economic stagnation.
The Special Committee, which played an instrumental role in the adoption by consensus by the General Assembly of the United Nations Declaration on Apartheid in 1989, is monitoring closely the developments in South Africa and uses the Declaration as a yardstick to assess progress. It is unfortunate that one and half years after the adoption of the UN Declaration, a climate conducive to negotiations has not yet been established. Political prisoners are still in jail and only a few political exiles were permitted to return without restrictions, and although it was announced that the Internal Security Act would soon be revised, repressive legislation is still used to curtail free political activity. One year and a half after the declaration we still do not see an agreement about the forum that will be employed to draft a new constitution. And while the ANC, the PAC and many other organisations called for an elected body to adopt a constitution, Pretoria is still impervious to these demands.
The consensus Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, adopted first in December 1989 and reaffirmed twice in 1990, is a document which clearly laid down internationally agreed steps towards the creation of a climate conducive to negotiations and the fundamental principles for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. The Declaration also suggested guidelines for the process of negotiations and for the drawing up of a new constitution. It established a Programme of Action, calling on the international community not to relax existing measures aimed at encouraging the South African regime to eradicate apartheid and to adopt a new constitution, until there was clear evidence of profound and irreversible changes, bearing in mind the objectives of the Declaration. This position was upheld during the resumed 44th session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1990 as well as the 45th Session of the General Assembly in December 1990.
At the opening of the new parliamentary session, on February 1, 1991, President de Klerk announced his intention to introduce legislation to repeal some of the other legal pillars of apartheid, namely the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the Group Areas Act of 1956 and the Development of Black Communities Act of 1984. Interim changes would be introduced to the Population Registration Act of 1950, which provides for the racial classification of all South Africans at birth. The South African authorities also released a "Manifesto for the New South Africa" in which they committed themselves to "the creation of a free and democratic political system". These are indeed welcome pronouncements which, when implemented in full along with others announced by the regime in 1990, are capable of constituting major advance towards the ending of apartheid.
Also encouraging were the talks held between the ANC and the South African authorities in May 1990 at Groote Schuur and in August 1990 in Pretoria. These talks have led to a number of important agreements relating to the removal of some obstacles to negotiations such as the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles. The ANC took at that time the landmark decision to suspend its armed struggle. Thus it appeared last fall that most of the measures necessary to create a climate for negotiations were going to be taken. The implementation of these agreements, however, was seriously hindered by discrepancies in their interpretation. While the ANC assessed the number of political prisoners at more than 3,000, the South African authorities estimated in November 1990 that only 250 to 800 persons in South African prisons clearly fell under the definition of political offenders. Furthermore, the joint working group of the ANC and the authorities failed to reach an agreement on the definition of the "armed actions and related activities", which the ANC has decided to suspend. The South African authorities insisted that the term "related activities" was meant to include the recruitment and training of cadres for the ANC's armed branch - Umkhonto we Sizwe - and as a result, granted indemnity against prosecution for leaving South Africa without permission to only five per cent of the 30,000 or more political exiles. These differences were apparently resolved during a meeting between President de Klerk and Nelson Mandela on 12th February, 1991, and it was understood that all political prisoners would be released by the end of April and that the return of political exiles would be accelerated. It is of utmost importance, at this stage, that the South African authorities abide by these recommendations, if the momentum created by these talks is to be maintained and the trust established with difficulty between these two major political actors consolidated.
Further measures will have to be taken by the South African authorities before an atmosphere of free political activity can be established in the country. The existing repressive legislation, in particular, should be repealed, as promised, without delay, President de Klerk's silence on this issue, during his speech to Parliament on February 1, 1991, when he made no reference to the Internal Security Act, remains a source of serious concern and raises doubts as to the willingness of the regime to do away with its repressive apparatus. The Internal Security Act confers to the authorities wide powers of detention without trial, banning of persons and organisations, gatherings and publications, and imprisonment for various political actions. The notorious Section 29 of the Act authorises indefinite detention for interrogation without charge or trial. Section 50 allows a police officer to arrest anyone without a warrant and hold that person incommunicado for 48 hours. The Act also grants indemnity to the security forces against prosecution in numerous cases.
The Human Rights Commission of South Africa estimates that some 150 persons are currently detained without trial, more than half of whom are being held under section 29 of the Internal Security Act. Recent declarations by the Law and Order Minister stating that Section 29 was "still needed to curb the danger of terrorism" and that the repeal of the Act was "for the future government of this country to decide upon" do not augur well for a prompt revision of the Internal Security Act, let alone for its abolition. As for the Public Safety Act of 1953, it enables authorities to declare a state of emergency granting even wider and more unbridled powers to be used on mass scale, or, alternatively, to designate certain areas as "unrest areas" in which the security forces are granted extended powers without a state of emergency being actually declared. Such "unrest areas" were declared at various times after the lifting of the nationwide state of emergency in June 1990.
It is encouraging that President de Klerk mentioned recently that he intends to have part of the Internal Security Act revised. We are eager to examine the extent of these revisions.
The loss of credibility affecting the South African security forces, who are granted such wide powers, is a further impediment to the creation of an atmosphere of free political activity. During the violence which swept through the black townships around Johannesburg in late 1990, and which have continued to reoccur, persistent allegations were made against security forces for their complicity in killings and other acts of violence. Similar accusations were made concerning the ongoing conflict in Natal in a report released in January 1991 by the International Commission of Jurists. In general, an unacceptable level of violence has prevailed in South Africa for the last few months. While this violence is an expression of political conflict, its roots lie in the socio-economic factors resulting from the apartheid system, and in particular in the homeland policy and the migrant labour system, which have increased tensions in black communities. The authorities, either by neglect or design, have failed to bring this violence under control and to punish the perpetrators.
In this context, an encouraging development was the summit meeting held on January 29, 1991, in Durban between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Both parties expressed their commitment to end political violence and pledged to facilitate peace initiatives at the local level. They called for the security forces to play an effective peace-keeping role and to act without political bias. A meeting between ANC Deputy President Nelson Mandela and PAC President Clarence Makwetu further contributed to a peaceful dialogue among opponents of apartheid and could, it is hoped, lead to the forging of a broad front which will be useful in the future negotiations.
The South African people's mistrust of the security forces was reinforced by the conclusions, incomplete though they were, of an investigation carried out into the activities of death squads. After the dismissal in court, in January 1991, of a libel suit by the head of the police forensic service against two newspapers who had accused him of supplying poison for the assassination of anti-apartheid activists, many organisations called for a new investigation to be carried out on the activities of these death squads. President de Klerk, however, chose to say in his speech to Parliament that "by and large the security forces were doing an excellent job" and "did not deserve the vilification to which they were subjected from any quarters". It is to be hoped, nevertheless, that after the assassination on 16 February 1991 of lawyer Bheki Mlangeni, an ANC member who had been investigating the activities of death squads inside and outside South Africa, an independent investigation will be carried out, at least into this assassination. The disclosure, by the South African Auditor-General that the notorious Civil Cooperation Bureau, which was officially disbanded in July 1990, had spent millions of rands after this date, reinforced the feeling shared by many anti-apartheid activists that death squads have not ceased all their activities.
Until such a time when the authorities would have restored the people's confidence in the security forces, there will be no normal political life in South Africa. Once an atmosphere of free political activity has been established in the country so that negotiations can take place, the political debate will focus on the form and content of these negotiations, and in particular on the mechanisms for the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution. The South African authorities have called for multi-party negotiations to design a new constitution, which would then be submitted to a referendum. They have repeatedly rejected the notion of a constituent assembly, arguing that it is not appropriate for a country with an existing government and constitution, and that the election of a constituent assembly would result in a dangerous "political vacuum". They do not specify, however, who would select the various parties to be invited at the round-table negotiations, nor on which criteria they would be selected.
An all-party conference will have to address as a priority the issue of an interim government. Contending that the present authorities cannot be both "player and referee" in the process of the drafting and adoption of a new constitution, the ANC calls for an interim administration which would replace the existing National Party government and, once the constituent assembly has concluded its work, hand over power. The Declaration on the Question of South Africa adopted in August 1989 by the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa had already stated that "the parties shall agree on the formation of an interim government to supervise the process of the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution; govern and administer the country, as well as affect the transition to a democratic order including the holding of elections". Most anti-apartheid organisations support this view. President de Klerk and leaders of the National Party, meanwhile, insist that there should be an orderly government and efficient administration at the national, regional and local levels during the process of negotiations for a new constitutional dispensation and only concede that "consideration should be given to certain transitional arrangements on the various legislative and executive levels to give the leaders of the negotiating parties a voice in the formulation of important policy decisions". The United Nations 1989 consensus Declaration provided some guidelines on this issue, and called for "agreed transitional arrangements and modalities on the process of the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution, and of the transition to a democratic order, including the holding of elections".
The role of the international community, in fact, will probably be even more determining in the coming years than it has been during the past decades. It will consist first in promoting the peaceful process of negotiations. As I have said, particular attention should be paid to the elimination of obstacles to this process, obstacles which are related not only to the impediments to free political expression but also to the social and economic inequities of the country. Assistance to the disadvantaged sections of South Africa and to the victims of apartheid has to be foremost among our concerns. We should also look ahead and make suggestions for the type of assistance that will be particularly needed if a smooth transition to a non-racial democracy is to be ensured, such as technical advice in the fields of public administration and management of public facilities and services. In a country where 45 per cent of the black population have not been taught to read or write, plans will have to be made to ensure that a major part of any assistance received focuses on human resource development.
In the meantime, the international community should remember that the negotiations about to start in South Africa will not be held between equals. On the contrary, the negotiations will be between those whose authority is based on a system which has been universally condemned on the one hand, and those whose struggle is for the realization of the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the other. The moral and political element which is at the heart of the problem should not be lost, and we should treat the two sides in the negotiations with appropriate differentiation.
It will also be essential, during the coming months, to monitor and influence the international response to the evolving changes in South Africa. On two occasions, last year, in September and in December, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted consensus resolutions reaffirming the need to maintain measures against South Africa until further changes, which should be profound and irreversible, have taken place. However, it is foreseeable that pressure will mount from some quarters to relax the level of sanctions imposed on South Africa. The European Community, having already lifted its ban on new investments, will most probably proceed later this year to abrogate some other restrictive measures. Similar tendencies could be encountered in the United States. At the same time, some Eastern European States and even some African States are proceeding to normalize diplomatic relations and to establish or strengthen commercial links with South Africa, in contradiction with their previous policy of vigorous condemnation of apartheid. At this crucial point in the delicate process towards negotiations, all those unilateral moves may be detrimental to the success of full negotiations. For, as was restated recently in London by the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, "Sanctions have been crucial in bringing about the changes which have occurred to date, and will go on being crucial if the destruction of apartheid is to be ultimately assured".
Mr. Chairman,
In spite of the delicate circumstances which surround the ongoing process, in spite of the luring temptation for members of the international community to lift sanctions and in spite of overwhelming optimism in certain quarters, we sincerely hope that the ongoing peace process will not prematurely suffer a setback due to the unguarded action of some countries. We cannot stop running because we have seen the finish line. We have all run a good race - so to say - but to win we must cross the finish line. In South Africa, crossing the finish line means putting in place a new Constitution with entrenched Bill of Rights and all other rights being guaranteed. We must, therefore, not fall victims of unguarded optimism until structures that will sustain a democratic, non-racial South Africa are established.