10-13 October 2004 , International Convention Centre, Durban, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Paper prepared for the International Conference on:
International Anti-Apartheid Movements in South Africa’s Freedom Struggle:
Lessons for today
by Hilda Varela
Speaking in general terms, the lack of knowledge of the African continent in Latin America is amazing. From journalists to scholars, people in Latin America hardly even know the names of every African country. Yet, South Africa has been the big exception. Nelson Mandela is widely known; even though people don’t always know exactly what he did, most people can linked his name to South Africa’s recent history and to struggle against racism.
The popularity of South Africa, so much as that of Nelson Mandela in Latin America, began in the decade of 1980 and is undoubtedly connected to the anti-apartheid movement in the United States of America. In this paper I intend to present a general view of Mexico’s case. My objective is to review the period between 1980 and 2004, from two different perspectives: 1. Mexico’s official policy towards South Africa and 2. South Africa’s struggle against racism in the “Mexican imaginary”. This paper includes the following parts:
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. For the first part, the following documents and sources were reviewed:
This journal comprises three different sections: articles (the majority of them written by Foreign Affairs Secretary staff), and a chronology of Mexican foreign policy. On the third section official documents are published. The analysis of this journal should allow knowing the true tendencies on the decision-making process of Mexican foreign affairs (beyond the public statements) as well as the true concerns on foreign affairs of the government highest rank officials.
For the second part I selected some important facts from South Africa’s recent History in order to see how they were presented by the mass media in Mexico. The sources were:
First Part. Mexico’s foreign policy towards South Africa
It is important to start this paper with some historical data that may let us better explain the continuities as much as the changes and, in some cases, the undeniable incongruencies of such diplomatic activity.
Even though the Mexican political system was formaly labeled as a multiparty democracy, throughout seven decades, the PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party) was a party-State. With an extraordinarily weak political opposition, all the way through to the year 2000, the PRI won every presidential election.
In that wich refers to internal policy, the governments that came out of the PRI were caracterized by being politically conservative and for defending strongly nationalist statements. Up to the decade of 1980, the political elite of the PRI had the capacity to co-opt critical voices (intelectuals, politicians), yet, when this capacity failed, the government did not stop to think before imposing repressive measures. Due to its great capacity to resist changes and to remain in the power, the Mexican political system became known as a “soft dictatorship” or as a “perfect dictatorship”.
As to the foreign policy, the PRI’s approach was historically defined to be based on principles. Mexico’s nternational realtionships have always orbited around the bilateral relationship with the United States, which has been traditionally described as difficult, and very wide. A constant of Mexico’s foreign policy has been, on one hand, to avoid conflicts in this bilateral relationship, and, on the other hand, the search for a relative independence from the United States in the field of foreign policy. This complex dinamics explain partially the constrast that has historically existed between internal and foreign policy in Mexico. Specially, throughout the Cold War, Mexican foreign policy was fundamented on strongly nationalist statements and was caracterized by its support to progressive causes in the so called countires of the South.
Mexico managed to maintain open spaces for negotiation and a relatively autonomy position in international forum as much as in bilateral relationships with the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean, and Europe, in certain difficult situations in which the United States were involved, being one of the clearest examples the adoption of economic sanctions against the South African regime.
Several studies point out that the Mexican political elite, in its relationship with the “South”, searched for a way to equilibrate their great dependence from the United States, and therefore, international policy responded to the need to find support in this countries for initiatives presented by Mexico in international forum.
Mexican civil society hardly existed and the media, generally speaking, did not question the behavior of the political elite. In a complex process, labeled as transition or democratization, for the first time in 70 years, the presidential election in the year 2000 was won by opposition candidate Vicente Fox, for the National Action Party (PAN).
It is important to underline that in Mexico a foreign policy toward African countries has never been structured. It may be said that diplomatic relationships with countries of the African continent have been characterized by a discontinous diplomatic activity and have deliberatedly kept a low political profile, avoiding getting involved in the continent, choosing instead a passive diplomacy that in the right context would make Mexico “visible” in Africa.
Between 1970 and 1976 the first approach between the Mexican government and certain African countries took place. Being characterized by statements in favor of Third World countries, this encounter gave Mexico the possibility to attain an initial presence of Mexico in certain African countries. This approach, summed to the defense in multilateral forum of issues sensible to African countries –as the disapproval of the apartheid- made it possible for Mexico to become visible in some African countries for the first time in its history. However, when revising the foreign policy of such period we might come to affirm that such approach responded to an unclear political definition. Sadly, it responded to the President’s search for international prestige.
Africa has never been a priority in the foreign policy agenda of Mexico. Yet, between 1984 and 1994, South Africa became a special country. It has never been a vital issue to Mexican foreign policy, but in those years it was indeed a very important country to the United States. Taking into account the worldwide trascendence of the apartheid problem, Mexico had to have a very specific oficial stand in international forums that had to be congruent to the principles of Mexican foreign policy without being a source of problems with the United States. Therefore, everything points to the fact that the Mexican government chose to officialy support international rejectionof the apartheid, without being directly engaged.
In the context of the traditional statements and principles of Mexico’s foreign policy, and usually with a great ignorance of Africa, the relations with African countries have been strongly influenced by the current President’s personal view but also by conjectural facts, and in a more specific way by the main topics in international relations in that moment. A coherent foreign policy would allow identifying common problems and common interests with African States.
In this paper, the two decades have been divided into four periods, taking into account the changes that have occurred in Mexico’s foreign policy towards South Africa. It is important to consider that the diplomatic relationship between the two countries were established in 1994, so until the late 1980’s, Mexico’s diplomatic activity was developed on international forums. In each period, the following aspects were considered:
- The most important concerns in the Mexican foreign affairs
- South Africa’s relevance in the Mexican foreign policy agenda
- The changes in the Mexican foreign policy agenda in relation to South Africa
This period includes the last three years of López Portillo’s government and the six years of De la Madrid. In the internal arena, the first years of such decade were influenced by the increase of oil production. However, from 1984 on, an intense economic crisis took place. Even though the disarmament debate, the refugees’ problem, the external indebtedness and the illegal trade of narcotics were constant issues in Mexico’s foreign policy in such years, the main worries for Mexican international relations were the bilateral relationships Mexico-USA and the stressing situation in Central America.
Based on official documents and statements and given the closeness to the conflicts in Central America, my argument is that in the first years of such decade, South Africa’s situation was not considered as a crucial issue to Mexico. Yet, it acquired relevance halfway throughout the decade. From 1985 on, the situation in South Africa became a constant worry to Mexico’s diplomatic activity, which made numerous declarations in international forums against the violations committed by the South African regime and supported the international efforts against the apartheid.
From this date on, the activity reports presented by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs generally mention South Africa’s case, emphasizing the solidarity of Mexico to the struggle against the apartheid and speaking in favour of a pacific negotiation.
It is important to mention that in oficial terms, since the foundation of the United Nations Organisation, the Mexican government affirmed that, respecting the sovereignty of South Africa, it supported every international effort that might have contributed to the end of the human rights violations in South African. In 1976 Mexico signed the International Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination that implied the commitment not to maintain economic, financial, commercial, and sportive and turistic relationships with South Africa.
In this context, some of the incongruences between the official statements and reality can be observed. Then, it is amazing to find out that Mexico decided to sign the International Convention of the United Nations for the Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid only until April 1980, when it had been adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 30th, 1973.
Besides, from the beginning of the decade of the 1980s on –in the context of Mexico’s great oil boom- some political adversaries suspected that the Mexican government did not respect the principles stated in the 1976 Convention. Yet, in Mexico it was very difficult to find proof of this. Up to this moment, three aspects that might validate the suspicion can be brought up:
South African exports to Mexico (in million of rands)
YEAR 1969
1976
1978
1980
RANDS
0.931
4.85
9.49
10.4
South African imports from Mexico (in million of rands)
YEAR 1969
1976
1978
1980
RANDS
0.461
1.425
1.909
3.442
These numbers are almost meaningless if compared to bilateral commerce between South Africa and the United States in the same moment. But, taking Latin America as a reference and considering Mexico’s official statements in relation to the apartheid system, the numbers become interesting. Then, on the value of the South African exports to Mexico as much as on the imports coming from Mexico, in the year of 1980, Mexico was the fifth most important commercial partner of South Africa in Latin America.
The official documents referring to this period, found in the Historical and Diplomatic Archive. They contain mainly political information which I divided into the following categories:
Diplomatic correspondence. Reports and letters sent by Mexican ambassadors in different countries, directed to the General Direction for Africa, Asia and Oceania at the Foreign Affairs Secretary. Among other aspects, in these reports the ambassadors transmitted the received information:
Analysis elaborated by the General Direction for Africa, Asia and Oceania. Starting on June 1985, these analyses were made for the internal knowledge of the Foreign Affairs Secretary, discussing important issues for the decision making process on foreign affairs policy, specially those which might interest the United States (for instance, the campaign of dis-investment and the economic sanctions). Undoubtedly, the goal of these analyses was to give the highest officials useful and important information. Yet, the interest to give them arguments that might support the government’s stand against apartheid in international fora is notorious.
Petitions made by Mexican businessmen. These petitions are rare. They demanded permission to import South African goods. In one letter a visa was demanded for a South African physician, who worked at the University of Natal, and curiously enough, the country was named as the “South African Union”. In every case, letters of official response are included, denying these permits. There were other letters were South African official government were allowed to visit Mexico.
Cuttings of newspapers articles. More than 90% correspond to foreign newspapers, generaly published in English in the United States.
This period refers to Salinas de Gortari’s government. In foreign policy, the most relevant issue was globalization. In this context, the so called “thesis of the disconnection of Africa from world politics”, that would let the main Western powers seek disengagement, seems to have influenced decisively the great lack of interest in African affairs.
In a strict sense, the beginning of such change (of a negative character) in Mexico’s foreign policy towards South Africa began in the last years of De la Madrid’s administration. Therefore, the beginning of change coexisted with the economic crisis in Mexico, with the “Politics of Understanding” with the United States and with Mexico’s membership to the OCDE. The lack of interest for Africa strongly grew during Salinas de Gortari’s government, with the approach to the countries of the Asian Pacific Rim.
Influenced by the Head of State’s personal conception, in the first years of the Salinas administration, the Foreign Affairs Secretary began what seemed to be a strategic approach towards Africa, explained as the redefinition of the diplomatic representations to reinforce the presence of Mexico in such region. In 1990 the Itinerant Embassy for Africa was created. This representation was ephemeral and shortly afterwards was substituted by a system of active concurrencies. Everything seems to indicate that this expensive experience was a new variant of coyuntural erratic diplomacy, which seeked mostly the President’s prestige.
At the end of Salinas de Gortari’s government, only the relationship with two African countries had acquiered greater importance compared to past presidential administrations: Morocco and specially South Africa4. However, these countries were still insignificant in the global frame of Mexico’s foreign policy.
In July 1991, Nelson Mandela paid a visit to Mexico, where he was received by Salinas de Gortari. The government agreed to keep supporting the struggle against the apartheid regime.
In this period, Mexico’s foreign policy towards South Africa was limited by the new signs of change: activism, immediacy, economicism and pragmatism, which seeked to obtain short term results. In the last years of Salinas de Gortari’s administration, the Mexican government started behaving as if being a first world country. The traditional statements that supported solidarity with the developing countries were abandoned. The bilateral relationship with the United States was strengthened and economic forums where developing countries did not participate were preferred.
This change affected Mexico’s formal commitment to the struggle against the apartheid regime. In 1993, government officials began to express the need to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa as soon as possible, which aroused criticism from the sectors that supported anti-apartheid struggle. Though small, these sectors were powerful enough to keep the government cautious. Government officials argumented that the change seeks within South Africa had already been produced. When some voices echoed the demands made by the ANC to keep a solidary stand against the apartheid regime while a difficult phase of the negotiations ended, government officials affirmed that profit had to be made from the context and that Mexico should secure its place in South Africa before other possible commercial competitors appeared. Ironically enough, by the end of that year, only one big Mexican company had entered the South African market.
In official reports, terms as solidarity to popular struggles disappeared. In February 1984 the Mexican Embassy began activities in South Africa. In April the first Mexican ambassador arrived to Pretoria. Despite the relevance of the episode, months later, the Mexican ambassador represented Salinas de Gortari in the ceremony of inauguration of Mandela’s government. This time, the Mexican government lost a great chance to be congruent with a tradition of solidarity towards the anti-apartheid struggle. If a high ranked delegation had been sent, the sympathy of wide sectors of Mexican people towards a long-lasting struggle would have arrived to the South African people and government. On the other hand, members of different sectors of the Mexican society (intellectuals, scholars, artists, politicians), as well as foreign diplomats turned the ceremony in the house of the South African ambassador in Mexico City into a real party: there was indeed much to be celebrated.
Facing the regional changes in Africa, the erratic tayectory of Mexican diplomacy was stressed: without further thought which might have weighed the possible consecuences, the normalization of the relationship with South Africa served to justify the closure of the Mexican diplomatic representation in Harare (January, 1994), action that aroused protests from the government of Zimbabwe. In the last months of that administration, Mexican diplomats started a campaign to place Salinas de Gortari as a candidate for the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This campaign was coldly received by African governments who, by then, identified this candidate with the interests of the first world and, therefore, not with their own interests.
The official documents referring to this period. In the first years of this period, the reviewed documents had political information similar to that mentioned in the 1980-1988 period. However, from 1990 on, though political records still exist, an emphasis towards economic information is clearly perceived. The documents fall into the following categories:
Diplomatic correspondence. Reports sent by Mexican ambassadors (including the itinerating ambassador), directed to the Direction for Africa, Asia and Oceania of the Foreign Affairs Secretary.
Analyses made by the General Direction for Africa, Asia and Oceania. In these analyses emphasis was made in the internal changes and the political violence, with a close follow-up of the negotiation process, the constitutional process and, finally, the 1994 general election.
Petitions made by Mexican businessmen. With arguments based on South Africa’s commercial relevance, they expressed their interest in the establishment of diplomatic relationships between both countries, as shortly as possible.
Cuttings of newspapers articles. The vast majority correspond to foreign newspapers, almost always in English. (Al most all published in the United States.)
Documents related to the Mexico-South Africa relationship. Among the most relevant aspects, I want to mention:
Starting on September 1991, there are documents that allow us to affirm that direct negotiations between both governements to establish diplomatic relationships had already began. Reports filed include data of the economic costs of establishing an embassy and houses for the embassy officials, its ubication, etc.
Starting July1992, a direct communication between both governments already existed.
In April 1993, a Mexican representation office in South Africa was opened.
Documents directly linked to the opening of the diplomatic mission:
From the documents consulted (1980-2000), the files containing the largest amount of information belonging to the years 1991-1992.
The erosion: 1994-2000
Zedillo’s government started with a financial crisis (1995-1996) –the worst in the last decades-. In the official discourse Mexico was defined as a “multiple belongings country” and a relevant position was assigned to the new foreign policywhich should be active to consolidate “Mexico’s presence in the world”10. This policy should beadapted to the demands on Mexico’s insertion into the new world dynamics tostrengthen and increase the national sovereignty based on the international relationships diversification.
In this period the traditional official rhetoric was abandoned without elaborating a new discourse, coherent with the new world dynamic. All of the Mexican foreign activity was dominated by the searching of a major rapprochement with the United States, the European Union, the Asian countries which count with prosper economies and, in a second stand, with Latin America. In this new dynamic, the African continent was the one with a major loss.
While the African political scene was been transformed, Mexican relations with Africa got to their lower level since the year of 1960. Despite of some ephemeral attempts to elaborate a foreign policy agenda towards African countries, the disregard for Africa grew bigger, making more notorious the contradictions between the official discourse and the practice.
Mexico was invited to participate in SADC (South African Development Community) meetings, however, probably because of the government ignorance, this participation had minimum repercussions.
Mandela’s government showed great interest in developing South Africa’s relationship with Mexico. During Zedillo’s administration, many diplomatic12 and economic missions visited Mexico, and supported diverse –cultural and academic- activities with the purpose of spreadingSouth Africa’s new reality image. One of these missions was headed by the –on those days- Vice-President Thabo Mbeki (1997).
In multilateral forums, both countries united their strengths in order to support joint purposes.In reference to Mexico the Foreign Affairs Secretary organized several meeting with Mexican businessmen to promote South Africa’s market opportunities. However, the only remarkable answer of Mexican diplomacy to the South African rapprochement policy was in 1999, when the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Rosario Green) assisted in representation of the Mexican executive to President Thabo Mbeki inauguration ceremony. This was the first visit from a Mexican Chancellor to South Africa.
The documents referring to this period. Documents decreased in a remarkable way, from political reports to newspaper articles. The existent information was only about economy subjects and bond searching between South African and Mexican businessmen, the violence persistence and some incidents occurred to the Mexican diplomatic body accreditedin South Africa.
In the journal Revista Mexicana de Politica Exterior, the first articles around Mexican and African relationship were published in this period, even though they had a mere informative character. In some articles, that are not focus in African related subjects, South Africa is mentioned, (for example in the “new South” definition for the Mexican foreign policy). In these journal was published a speech pronounced for a South African government official, in official visit to Mexico.
First three years in Fox’s government: 2000-2004
In these years of Fox’s administration, contrary to what had happened in the previousgovernments, the foreign policy wasdefined by the character of the two following Mexican chancellors – first Jorge Castañeda and currently Luis Ernesto Derbez- and not because of the Head of Statepreferences.
In an article published in 2002, Fox stated that it could not be denied that previous governments have had “active and brilliant” moments in foreign policy, as the apartheid condemnation, but that his government would not be limited to repeat such policy. According with these kind of thoughts, his government priorities are: to intensify the participation in multilateral forums and to strategically strength the relationship with the United States and Canada14.
It is from these priorities that it could be found an explanation to the change registered in the year 2002 in the African-Mexican relationship.So far, this change, has been unimportant and it is inscribed in the traditional absence of a definition of politics towards this regionand where, once more, the diplomatic activity has been determined for Mexico’s necessity of finding support in African countries in order to built its new projection as a regional middle power, similar to South Africa’s.
In the year 2002, among its multiple international tours, Fox fulfilled a quick visit into two African countries at a time in which his presence was overshadowed for some other crucial events. In South Africa, the visit was fulfilled at the Sustainable Development World Conference’s frame. In Nigeria, the Mexican President arrived while the country was living a difficult moment15.
The official visit to South Africa was foundered on very valuable arguments –the economic and political relationship strengthening, the search of an understanding and creation of convergences in multilateral forums- however everything points to believe that it was fulfilled without a policy towards this country. With a new chancellor and without having given continuity to this effort, doubts arise around the President’s real motives to visit South Africa. In the year 2004, it can be supposed that this visit was a simple new expression of the traditional erratic – favourable and low profile - diplomatic activity in Africa in general, and particularly in South Africa.
The tenth South African democratisation anniversary was last commemorated by the Foreign Affair Secretary with a major event. However, once more, answering to some government officials of the Foreign Affairs Secretary initiative and to the enthusiasm and sympathy of diverse Mexican community sectors, but is not inscribed in a wide foreign policy frame.
It is not possible to ignore certain decisive factors that allow us to think, at least in short term, that South Africa will not be a priority country in Mexican foreign policy: among other aspects, there are not important Mexican groups resident in South Africa, and there is a fragile perception of the common strategic interests. In equal form it is not possible to ignore the geographic proximity and enormous influence that the United States exercises in Mexican foreign policy. In this context, however, not only for the United States but in general to the principal political and economic Mexican associates -Canada and the European Union- South Africa is an important country for its foreign policy.
In synthesis, the words used by a scholar16 to define Mexican foreign policy, seem in general to be more adequate to resume Mexican-South African relationship. “it in not good or bad: it is just not foreign policy”
For this government period I wasn’t able to find any document in the Foreign Affairs Secretary archives.
Second part. South Africa’s idea in the Mexican “imaginary collective”
After checking a great quantity of Mexican newspapers published during the period from 1980 to 2004 I considered that my original objective was very ambitious. In relation to the written press analysis, I realised that I would have to analyse separately from each historical moment to the information published in each of the newspapers. Besides, not only the government changes but even the internal administration changes from the newspapers can influence the quality and quantity of the published information. As a result I decided to carry out a much simpler task; I limit myself to a recount on such information.
The consulted newspapers were:
In the 1980 years, Uno mas Uno and Excelsior.
For the decade from 1990 up to 2004 La Jornada (founded in 1984), El Universal and Reforma (founded in 1993) these are national circulation newspapers, which are relevant in each particular historical moment. It is important to take into consideration that contrary to other Latin American countries, Mexican press gives great importance to international news (cosmopolitan character).
In the 1980 decade, in both of the consulted newspapers international information section, Latin American and United States news where given a major importance. When ever a critical moment was registered in South Africa, both newspapers has published related news. However, while in one of them (Excelsior) the news used to be very brief and when talking about critical moments it was hard to find news or these where irrelevant, in the other the news on South Africa generally occupied more space and there was an average of one article published per day.
In the first half of the 1990 decade, Latin America, United States, Canada and in minor degree,Middle East where the most attractive subjects. The number of news dedicated to South Africa changed in a relevant form. Nevertheless subjects as Mandela’s liberation or the 1994 elections received a wide coverage. In the 2000 decade, the space dedicated to South Africa was considerably diminished, being in occasions reduced to nothing more than several lines. It was in a very gradual manner that news that were not related with politics started to be published.
In the 1980 decade, during Mandela’s liberation and the first democratic election in 1994, South Africa first appeared among the most important international news. In exchange the general election in 2004 received very little attention. The information could be vague and succinct.
In the 1980 and 1990 years, in relation to the content, the news could be generally, more o less, similar from a newspaper to another. This has to do with the fact that they used the same sources (great international press agencies). Occasionally, the newspaper nucleus was the deployed activity for the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. In other cases mistakes could be found, but these generally were not serious. It could be thought that the international news redactors where in general well informed on the most important South African events.
One of the greatest differences where the news headlines: Which may emphasize negative aspects (with a racist emphasis) or underline positive elements. The subjects which were given more importance where:
Between 1984 and 1990: the most attractive news were on political violence, executions, censure to the local media, economic sanctions, anti-Apartheid movement in the United States, or Mandela related news.
Between 1990 and 1994: the information was about Mandela’s liberation, violence, Mandela’s visit to Mexico, peace negotiations and internal changes, Winnie Mandela’s situation, the end of economic sanctions, and the 1994 election.
In the 2000 decade: Sport news, AIDS related news, Nobel winner writers, the production of an alcoholic drink which imitates Mexican most representative drink (tequila), and finally the general election.
Especially until 1994, South Africa became one of the main concerns of radio and television programs analysis, the same in privates as in publics. South Africa was the main topic in many conferences. In these kinds of actions, people questions allowed an approximation to the way in which they imagine South African situation. In these questions there were always certain recurrent subjects: Mandela, violence, poverty and United States attitude. A very frequent question, especially in the 1980 years was: Why the black community does not organizes and defends itself? The most adequate answer would have been: Why do not Mexicans get organized and fight for democracy?
There are certain relevant aspects about South Africa which Mexican press has given little importance and that must be spread. This way, despite that in Mexico there has been proposed the creation of a commission of the truth which will investigate the 1960-1970 years repression, the TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) experience is almost unknown in Mexico. In the other hand, the Mexican press publishes very few information about the diplomatic activity of South Africa as a mediator.
Account of a Disagreement
In Mexico there never really existed an anti-Apartheid movement. In the 1970 decade, mostly because of the reflection of the anti-Apartheid in the United States and partially because of the –in those days- Mexican Head of State prestige search, under the Mexican government sponsorship the foundation of an anti-Apartheid Latin American movement was intended. However this attempt had no results. For the Mexican government, South Africa was just an important subject in the news.
Without the existence of any organised movement, there was in Mexico a certain audience, interested in South Africa. Belonging to different walks of life, even almost all of them corresponded to urban sectors: intellectuals, artist, politicians, journalists, some unionist groups and specially University sectors, both academic and studentship.
Many of these were persons considered as progressive. However not all of them had a critical conscience when expressing their sympathy with the anti-apartheid conflict. Some were in opposition with the United State, country which they identified as “the imperialism”, and considered that the anti-apartheid movement was a way to weaken the United States. Others had a much more romantic idea of what the anti-apartheid struggle was. It is unquestionable that there were some people whom did not fully understood what was happening in South Africa, but despite this stated their sympathy with the South African population and rejected the apartheid.
There is a basic question: Why, despite that violence was a much more recurrent problem, in the majority of the transmitted information by themedia in the years of 1980 and 1990, a great part of Mexican population felt identified with the anti-Apartheidstruggle No other African country has achieved the popularity level South Africa had until the year 1990.
I base these affirmations in diverse facts: For example, at least until the first democratic election in 1994, any act that implied support to the anti-apartheid struggle had a wide answer, practically in any city in the country. In urban sectors, indistinctively of the social class, people could identify the name of Nelson Mandela as well as the fight against racism and the anti-apartheid movement as a fair fight and a shared cause among Mexicans.
I could mention some other facts in order to fundament my statement, However I consider as the best proof the popular receptiongiven to Mandela during his brief visit to Mexico City. People went to the airport to see him, in a very spontaneous way. Among his activities, Mandela had a breakfast in a fancy hotel. While walking by a corridor, several hotel service employees recognized him and immediately clapped at him. In a few seconds the hotel activity was paralysed: everybody wanted to see him. Other activity was a press conference, which took place in a completely full auditorium in the Foreign Affair Secretary. When going out, Mandela was surprised to see a group of people, belonging to a popular organization that had practically blocked the street. According to a journalist version, there had been only one similar situation in Mexico, in the 1960 decade, when John Kennedy visited Mexico.
In the Mexican context, the fact that wide Mexican population sectors where identified with the anti-apartheid conflictwas practically incredible. And it happens to be much more incredible, if you take in consideration the possibility of a great number of South African populations whom ignored the fact.
In the last decade, in Mexico, the information around South Africa’s situation suffered some deterioration, as much in quantity as in quality. Each time less information concerning South Africa is published and news tend to go into two extremes: unimportant facts or internal problems news, mostly exaggerated. In an ironic way, when South African government had searched a rapprochement with Mexico, It seems that Mexicans had stopped to be interested in South Africa. The great contradiction is that until 1994 South Africa was the only known and prestigious African country. From that date on, it has been loosing space in the press.
Hilda Varela
Center for Asian and African Studies
El Colegio de México
Mexico City
hvarela@colmex.mx
Bibliography
Footnotes
2. I would like to thank the personal from the Archivo Histórico y Diplomático, for their support.
3. Monthly Abstracts of Trade Statics. Department of Customs and Excise, South African Government. Véase: Davis, South Africa in search of Allies. United Nations Council for Namibia. Seminar on the Military Situation in and Relating to Namibia. SMS/CRP No. 1982 / 15
4. Cfr. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Informe de Labores. México, años 1988-1989 a 1993-1994; “Cronología de política exterior de México”, Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, de 1989 a 1994
10. Poder Ejecutivo Federal. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1995-2000, México, Secretaría de Crédito Público, p. X
12. In 1995 started a negotiation with a General Cooperation Agreement between South Africa and Mexico, but it was not signed until 1998 in New York.
14. V. Fox, “La política exterior de México en el siglo XXI”, Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, enero-marzo 2002, no. 66: 14.
15. The Mexican president arrived Nigeria in a very bad moment, days after a woman had been sentenced to death for giving birth to a child without being married. Marcela Turati, Amina, “Nueva causa Foxista”, Reforma, 5 de septiembre de 2002
16. Humberto Garza Elizondo. “Crisis de la política exterior de México”, p. 180