Chapter 12

The Control of Ideas

This process of cleansing our 'Kultur' will have to be applied in practically all spheres. The stage, art, literature, the cinema, the Press, and advertisement posters, all must have the stains of pollution removed and be placed in the service of a national and cultural idea.       HITLER in Mein Kampf

'Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right included freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.'

So reads Article 19 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948. For obvious reasons South Africa refused to sign the Declaration, and the Nationalist government feels under no obligation to honour it. The policy of apartheid is in its very essence a violation of the fundamental human rights of the majority of the population. How could the Nationalists be expected to respect the freedom of the Press when they were ruthlessly assaulting every other freedom?

In fact, the record of the Nationalists since they came to power is one of sustained attack upon the freedom of the Press, and the attack has mounted in intensity during recent years in direct proportion to the crisis which has overtaken the country. Control over the means of propaganda has become for them an absolute necessity, for without it they must fail in their bid to dominate the country.

For the Nationalist government remains basically weak. Taking the 1960 referendum figures as a guide it speaks for fifty-two percent of the White population, and by virtue of the very nationalism which constitutes its strength, it can never attract to its banner more than a small proportion of the remaining forty-eight percent, for the English are unlikely to accept absorption by an alien culture, though by virtue of their minority position they may have no alternative but to concede its overlordship. As for the non-Whites, it can be assumed that the overwhelming majority are bitterly opposed to apartheid, and the savage laws which have been put on the statute book are testimony to the resistance which has more and more been forthcoming from their ranks.

To preserve themselves in power, therefore, the Nationalists have had to mobilize their resources on all fronts with the greatest care and skill. By careful husbandry they have succeeded in harvesting for themselves a majority of votes. But votes are not everything. The one sphere where they have felt a permanent weakness is that of ideas, the written and spoken word, the Press, books, cinema, and stage. Day after day insidious, undermining ideas have been circulated in South Africa, liberal, un-national ideas, infiltrating the population in its millions, weakening the resolve of the faithful, producing in the very citadel of Afrikanerdom itself a succession of minor if unsuccessful revolts. It has taken all the ingenuity and cunning of the Nationalist leaders - with the frequent display of force - to combat this intellectual erosion. But they have dedicated themselves to the struggle against freedom of opinion and expression with all the determination of ultimate despair. The white supremacist is playing for high stakes. He must either win or die. There is no room for compromise in the battle of ideas.

Unhappily for the Nationalists, this is a battlefront on which they do not enjoy a superiority in weapons. Ask for guns, armoured cars, baton charges, detention without trial, hangings, lashes, and all the other trappings of physical intimidation, and they can prove their advantages. But ask them for an idea which can stand the moral scrutiny of the world, and their deficiencies are immediately exposed.

The very weakness of their position has made the Nationalists all the more determined to ensure that they obtain absolute control over the instruments of expression. Nothing must be said in South Africa which undermines their authority; nothing sent out of the country which stimulates antagonism. The only answer is - censorship. And the Nationalists have had this in mind ever since they came to power.

The difficulties that the Nationalists have had to contend with are best revealed by a comparison of the following figures, which cover the circulations of the Nationalist and non-Nationalist daily and weekly newspapers:

DAILY NEWSPAPERS

WEEKLY NEWSPAPERS

The circulation figures quoted above are based on external audits. The list of daily publications is complete, but the list of weekly publications is restricted to newspapers and excludes national periodicals, reviews, communal and religious publications. If these were included, the non-Nationalist total would be even higher.

Certain changes which have taken place between 1962 and 1967 should be noted. The opposition-controlled Afrikaans newspapers Weekblad and Sondagstem ceased publication, while the Landstem was bought by the Nationalist firm, Dagbreektrust. The effect of these changes is that not a single Afrikaans language newspaper of any consequence in South Africa is today controlled by the opposition; the Nationalists have achieved total dominance in this field. The triweekly Oosterlig became a daily paper in 1961, but its 1962 circulation figures (10,000) became available too late for inclusion in the first edition of this book. The new Nationalist Sunday paper Die Beeld, and the Cape Herald, organ of the Labour Party of South Africa, a new Coloured party formed in Cape Town, started publication in 1965. Figures for the Daily Representative, Queenstown, were not quoted in the 1967 audit. A new Nationalist daily newspaper, Hoofstad, was started in Pretoria in 1968. Its circulation figures were stated by the Financial Mail (8 November 1968) to be 18,000.

From these figures it can be seen that when it comes to influencing public opinion through the medium of the Press the Nationalist Party is at a serious disadvantage. The figures show that not all Nationalists read the Nationalist Press, and that many Nationalists read the non-Nationalist Press.

So long as this position is permitted to persist, it will be impossible for the Nationalists to eliminate all foreign political and cultural influences. The man who daily reads the newspapers of his political opponents is bound in the long run to be influenced by what he finds there. Whether he is conscious of it or not, he will be exposing himself daily to non-Nationalist ideologies, perhaps even to humanism and liberalism. Some of the ideas that he encounters may sooner or later win acceptance from him.

Two courses were open to the Nationalists to combat this danger. They could found rival papers in competition with the English Press, or they could force the English Press to conform. The first alternative was out of the question. The English Press, linked as it is with the great mining and financial houses, has financial resources which are beyond the reach of Nationalist competition. The English papers are bigger and brighter and contain far more news and features than the Nationalist papers, which concentrate largely on propaganda. Not surprisingly a Johannesburg survey has shown that, whereas only one to four percent of English-speaking South Africans read an Afrikaans daily, between twenty and forty percent of Afrikaners read an English daily newspaper. And this trend is unlikely to be reversed in the foreseeable future.

The alternative was control, and on this front the Nationalists, after more than a decade of agitation and pressure, have been able to achieve a great measure of success.

The Nationalist government was not the first to try and control the Press or to introduce censorship. In the 1830s Lord Charles Somerset suppressed the newspaper of Thomas Pringle and James Fairbairn, The South African Commercial Advertiser, and deported George Greig, the editor and printer. Pringle and Fairbairn are names now known to every schoolboy because of the fight they undertook in defence of the freedom of the Press. They rallied support both in the Cape and in London, and after a bitter three-year battle managed to get the autocratic Governor's order reversed. Pringle wrote of the atmosphere in the Cape at the time:

It was difficult to conjecture to what lengths the violence of arbitrary power would at this dismal period proceed. Fear is the most cruel of all passions, and infuriated by fear or exposure, the Colonial government seemed determined to strike down every man who should dare even to look or think disapprobation of the deeds. A frightful system of espionage pervaded every circle of society, and rendered perilous even the confidence of the domestic hearth. ... Informers and false witnesses abounded, and rumours of plots and disloyal combinations against the Government were assiduously kept afloat, for purposes as obvious as they were mischievous.

There seems to have been very little change since those days!

When the South African Commercial Advertiser reappeared, a special ordinance was passed providing that henceforth the Press would be under the protection of the law and immune from arbitrary suppression. In the days of the Transvaal Republic, President Kruger took a crack at The Star, but the paper appealed to the courts and its rights were fully restored. It was not until the time of the fusion government under General Hertzog that a serious attempt was again made to introduce censorship. The government's cause for complaint against the Press was that certain newspapers had insulted the heads of the Nazi and Fascist states in Europe, in consequence of which a complaint had been lodged with the South African government by representatives of the German Reich. Instead of brushing these complaints aside, Hertzog, by this time inclining ever more strongly to National Socialism, decided to take action against the Press. Dr A.J.R. van Rhyn, Nationalist M.P., told the House of Assembly in January 1950:

In 1937, General Hertzog called the editors together in his office and talked very seriously to them. He said that he was not satisfied with the attitude of the Press, and that he intended to introduce a strong Bill, in order to introduce a certain measure of control, if the situation did not improve.

The Press did not improve, and Hertzog circulated a draft censorship Bill which he intended to propose. The newspaper editors hastily got together in July 1939 and recommended the adoption of a code of discipline which they would apply themselves if Hertzog would agree to drop his Bill. The Prime Minister refused to budge, and announced his intention of proceeding with his Bill at the next session of Parliament. But then the war intervened, and Hertzog together with his Bill was swept into limbo.

The idea of Press censorship continued, however, to simmer in the Nationalist mind. Provision for it was made, as we have seen, in the draft constitution drawn up during the war. And soon after the Nationalist government came to power, in January 1950, Dr van Rhyn, a former editor of the Nationalist daily Die Volksblad, moved in Parliament:

That whereas this House is of the opinion that a free Press is essential to a free democratic country, and whereas it is convinced that a self-disciplined freedom ultimately constitutes the best safeguard for the maintenance of the freedom of the Press, and that all activities and tendencies to undermine or abuse such freedom which exist or are taking root in this country should therefore be combated, it accordingly requests the government to consider the advisability of appointing a commission....

The government indicated during the debate that it looked upon this proposal with favour, and in October 1950 appointed its famous commission to inquire into the South African Press. The terms of reference were sweeping: (1) The measure of concentration of control, financial and technical, of the Press and its effect on editorial opinion; (2) accuracy in the presentation of news; (3) tendencies towards monopoly in the collection of news and the distribution of newspapers; (4) existing restraints on the establishment of new newspapers; (5) self-control and discipline by the Press; (6) sensationalism and triviality; (7) the extent to which any of the above factors militate for or against a free Press in South Africa and the formation of an informed public opinion.

Justice J.W. van Zyl, of the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court, was appointed Chairman of the Press Commission, while the other members were Professor L.I. Coertze, Dean of the Faculty of Law at Pretoria University and later Nationalist M.P. for Standerton; A.A. Frew, a former chief editor of the South African Press Association; Professor P.W. Hoek, head of the Department of Accounting at Pretoria University; J.W. Lamb, a former President of the South African Stock Exchange and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (S.A.B.C.); A. E. Trollip, M.P., later Administrator of Natal and Minister of Labour; and Dr van Rhyn himself, later to be High Commissioner for South Africa in London.

The subsequent career of this commission constitutes one of the most extraordinary episodes in the history of the Nationalist regime. Its personnel changed with bewildering rapidity. Where the British Royal Commission on the Press managed to complete its task (with a far wider field to survey) in a matter of two years, the South African Press Commission kept itself busy for over thirteen. Its report was promised every year from 1953 onwards, but with magnificent consistency year by year failed to appear, until at last in 1961 the first part of the report was published. The remaining sections of the report, according to a statement by the Minister of the Interior on 29 January 1963, were expected by the end of April 1963, but did not in fact appear until May 1964. The total cost of the commission, up to 31 December 1962, was £152,000, and the final cost was expected to reach the neighbourhood of £175,000. The Minister indicated that Justice van Zyl and Dr Coertze were the only two original members of the commission involved in the final report. A portion of the report had been signed by Lamb and van Coller (who filled Trollip's place), but both of them had resigned and the State President had accepted their resignations.

What had the Press Commission been doing all these years? The journal of the South African Society of Journalists in September 1959 said:

It is understood that the commission is hopelessly behind its official schedule. Analysis and collation of material is likely to take from two to four years. The reasons given in informed political circles are that the work has been slowed down because of the complexity, bulk, and unwieldiness of the evidence; dissension among members of the commission; and the sweepingly broad terms of reference which give little guidance on what precisely is required. Not all the commissioners are believed to be active.

It has been a sorry tale indeed. Yet this commission has hung like a shadow over the whole South African Press ever since it was appointed. It has explored every aspect of newspaper management and control, grilled editors and journalists behind dosed doors, confronted foreign correspondents with copies of their cables and demanded explanations. Nationalist politicians have on several occasions referred with confidence to the outcome of the commission's work, indicating that it would prove a bombshell for the English Press and pave the way for some kind of State control.

And yet, and yet ... The very thoroughness with which the commission went about its business reduced its ultimate value to the Nationalist government. Year after year passed by and there was no result, no report, not even an interim report on which to hang a Bill. When the commission's first report was finally issued in 1961, it proved something of a damp squib.

The commission dealt only with items 1 and 3 in its terms of reference - that is, the measure of concentration of control, financial and technical, of the Press of South Africa; and tendencies towards monopoly or the concentration of control relating to the collection of news and the distribution of newspapers and periodicals. From a welter of facts and figures presented by the commission, the following points emerged:

(a) That the South African Press Association, the only internal news agency, was dominated by the English-language newspapers, which controlled 87.4 percent of the votes that could be cast at a general meeting. The Afrikaans Press accordingly performed no more than an advisory function on the S.A.P.A. Board. (b) That world news agencies could not compete for the dissemination of news about South Africa, because S.A.P.A. placed Reuters news agency in a position to beat its competitors in time. (c) That the three newspaper concentrations -the Argus Group, South African Associated Newspapers, and the Nasionale Pers -together dominated the South African Press. (d) That the Afrikaans and English dailies were so biased in the selection and presentation of news concerning racial and political affairs that it was impossible for Afrikaans or English unilingual readers to obtain an informed political opinion from newspapers. Afrikaans dailies all supported the Nationalist Party, while the English dailies split their support between the United Party and the Progressive Party. (e) That the Central News Agency enjoyed a monopoly of the distribution of newspapers and periodicals.

The commission recommended that S.A.P.A. curb its monopoly and cease its bias in favour of Reuters - failing which the Minister should revoke its licence - while voting safeguards should be introduced so as to provide the English and Afrikaans Press with an equal say. Finally, the commission suggested a Board of Trade investigation into the Central News Agency's monopoly of distribution.

Most of the facts which the commission had so laboriously and time consumingly collected came as no surprise to the South African public, while even some sections of the Nationalist Press protested mildly at the attack on S.A.P.A., stressing that they did not suffer in any way by the present arrangement. The impact of the commission's report was also lessened by the fact that it was not made available to the public, which had to rely on the Press itself for all its information on the commission's findings. The commission's first report earned headlines and editorials for a few days - and was then quietly dropped.

The second section of the Press Commission's report was published on 11 May 1964. Consisting of nine fat volumes standing over two feet high when laid on top of one another, it was based on an exhaustive examination of the work done by the four news agencies represented in South Africa - Reuters, Associated Press, United Press international, and Agence France Press - along with cables to and comments on South Africa contained in newspapers in Britain, the United States, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, West Germany, Canada, Israel, Italy and India during the years 1950 to 1955. The commission came to the conclusion that the bulk of reports sent out of the country by news agencies and correspondents fell into the category of 'bad' and 'very bad'. A small portion of the commission's report was devoted to reports sent out of the country in later years, noting a slight improvement in certain categories, but coming to the overall conclusion that the news about South Africa conveyed overseas was unfair, unobjective, biased and partisan.

In their report, the remaining commissioners, Mr Justice van Zyl and Dr L.I. Coertze, stated that they had not studied the content of local newspapers as required by their terms of reference and asked to be relieved of this task because of 'the enormous volume of work involved'. Yet this omission of theirs did not prevent the commission from recommending the establishment of a statutory Press Council, with the power to impose unlimited fines on the owners of newspapers and periodicals, so as to ensure the self-control and discipline of the Press in South Africa. The Council would consist of representatives of South African newspaper proprietors, journalists, the general public and parliamentary parties, with an equal number of English- and Afrikaans-speaking members. The commission said that it had not recommended the representation of the non-White communities 'because it is of the opinion that at the moment there is not a need for these groups to be represented on the Council'.

The main object of the Press Council should be to maintain the freedom of the press, encouraging the greatest practicable accuracy in the presentation of news, the free expression of opinion, and informed, responsible comment that can assist in the formation of an informed public opinion, and lead to a better understanding between the linguistic and racial groups.

Proposing the control of news leaving the country, the commission said that no cable authority should be issued to journalists who were not registered with the Press Council. Copies of all cables or reports sent to other countries should be filed with the Press Council.

The commission stated that if the government wished the rest of the terms of reference to be acted upon it should reconstitute the commission, as much of its work was already outdated. Four days later, on 15 May 1964, the Minister of the Interior, Senator J. de Klerk, announced that the Press Commission had been disbanded and relieved of its duties. The commission would not be required to report on the contents of the South African press.

While the commission was busy with its explorations, the Nationalist government was compelled to carry on with the day-to-day business of administration and to face up as best it could to the challenge presented by a more or less informed public opinion. Alex Hepple in his invaluable pamphlet Censorship and Press Control in South Africa, published in 1960, enumerated thirteen laws and twenty-one provincial ordinances then in force which provided for censorship of one kind or another. Most of these were already on the statute book before the Nationalists came to power, but the new government applied them with an intensity which would probably have left the original legislators breathless.

Section 21 of the Customs Act, for example, prohibited the importation of 'goods which are indecent or obscene or on any ground whatsoever objectionable'. It was not the discovery of the Nationalists that this clause could be used to ban the importation of literature from abroad. Books had been banned by the United Party government before, though just how many cannot be established with certainty. It was not the practice prior to 1939 to report the names of banned publications in the Government Gazette. In 1956 the Nationalist government published a consolidated list of bannings under the Customs Act since 1939, but gave no indication of the proportion of bannings for which it had itself been responsible. There were over 4,000 titles in that list, and by March 1962, a further 4,118 single publications and 198 series of publications had been banned from importation into the country, according to the evidence given by a J.L. Hattingh, Parliamentary Officer of the Department of Customs and Excise, to the Select Committee on the Undesirable Publications Bill. Since the rate of bannings has been fairly even over the last decade, one may assume that most of the more than 4,000 books banned between 1939 and 1956 fell to the credit of the Nationalist government.

It is when one comes to examine the 8,000 titles that one realizes how the Nationalist government has used the Customs Act to impose a blatant political censorship on the South African people. A fair proportion of the banned titles consists of pure smut and pornography, and few would quarrel with its exclusion from the country. But amongst the banned are some of the most celebrated works of art, accepted as serious literature throughout the civilized world. Here are some of the works which have been banned, culled at Random from the list:

Voltaire's Candide (following public outcry, it was later 'unbanned', and the Minister admitted that a 'mistake' had been made); Gorky's Mother; all the novels of James Alldridge; novels by Erskine Caldwell, James T. Farrell, Nadine Gordimer, Daphne Rooke, and others; Sartre on Cuba, by Jean-Paul Sartre; Congo, my Country, by Patrice Lumumba; all paperback editions of I, Claudius and King Jesus by Robert Graves; Advertisements for Myself by Norman Mailer; a book on Belafonte by Arnold Shaw; Borstal Boy by Brendan Behan; I Speak of Freedom, by Kwarne Nkrumah; Marilyn Monroe by Maurice Zolotov; South Africa -Yesterday and Tomorrow: The Challenge to Christians, by Ambrose Reeves, the former Bishop of Johannesburg who was deported from South Africa by the Nationalist government; African Profiles by Ronald Segal; In the Realm of Large Molecules, by Soviet scientist R. Rozen; proceedings of a scientific session on the Physiological Teachings of Academician J. P. Pavlov, issued by the Academy of Medical Sciences of the U.S.S.R.; Why I am not a Christian by Bertrand Russell; The Roots of Prejudice by Arnold Rose (UNESCO pamphlet).

All works which violate the rigid moral code of the Calvinist Dutch Reformed Churches, all works which contradict the race theories of the Nationalist government, and practically all works issued in any of the socialist countries or which are published under the auspices of any left-wing organization or individual in the West are automatically excluded from South Africa under the Customs Act as soon as they come to the knowledge of the censors. Anyone who imports or is found knowingly in possession of any banned publication is liable to a fine of £1,000 or imprisonment for five years or both.

Film censorship has in the past been effected under the provisions of the Entertainments (Censorship) Act of 1931 and has also been used as a weapon to keep from South Africans not merely smut and pornography but all concepts with which the Nationalists disagree. In the four-year period from 1958 to 1962, no fewer than 133 films were banned, mostly the products of famous motion-picture companies abroad like United Artists, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Columbia, and Rank. Among the films banned have been Battleship Potemkin, I Passed for White, Taste of Honey, Lolita, and Boccacio 70. In the case of the lastnamed there was an appeal to the Minister of the Interior, who overruled the decision of the Censorship Board and allowed the film to be shown -with appropriate cuts. (Perhaps the reason for the Minister's clemency is that the company circulating the film was an Afrikaans concern trying to make its way in competition with the non-Afrikaans companies already entrenched in the industry.) Many films passed for showing are so mutilated by the Censorship Board as to constitute an insult to any sophisticated cinema-goer. Some films are passed for adults, but not for children of various age groups. Some are passed for showing to Whites, Coloureds, and Asians but not to Africans, whose staple film diet - where they get the chance to see a film at all - is made up of Westerns.

One of the films banned in 1962 was Men from Brazil, produced by Moral Re-Armament. Asked in the House of Assembly why the film had been banned, the Minister of the Interior replied:

The film was prohibited in the light of the provisions of Section 5(2) (g) and (r) of the Entertainments (Censorship) Act which read as follows:

5(2) The Board shall not approve any film which in its opinion depicts in an offensive manner (g) scenes containing reference to controversial or international politics; (r) scenes of intermingling of Europeans and non-Europeans.

The Dutch Reformed Church, it should be explained is strongly opposed to the activities of the Moral Re-armament movement because the latter acknowledges no colour bar.

Sometimes censorship exceeds the bounds of all sense. The famous Negro trumpeter Louis Armstrong was excised altogether from The Glen Miller Story, although advertisements containing his name appeared all over the country. The advertising posters of The King and I were designed to show Deborah Kerr embraced by a bare-chested Yul Brynner in the role of a Siamese King. Since Siamese are Asians, however, this could not be allowed, and the posters were altered to reveal Deborah Kerr in the arms of a raceless shadow. The poster for the film Oceans II showed Sammy Davis Jr walking down the street side by side with Frank Sinatra and John Wayne. In the South African version, the two white stars are accompanied by a featureless black shape. Sammy Davis Jr had been eliminated, and White supremacy spared one more shock.

Yet despite the sweeping censorship powers which the Nationalists found ready to hand with their advent to government, and which they have utilized with almost Teutonic thoroughness, they still hankered after more - and used their political control to get them. The 1950 Suppression of Communism Act contained a section empowering the Governor-General to ban any publication which in his opinion professed to be a Communist publication, was published by or under the direction of a Communist organization, served mainly as a means of expressing views propagated by such an organization, or served 'mainly as a means for expressing views or conveying information, the publication of which is calculated to further the achievement of any of the objects of Communism'. By a later amendment, the word 'mainly' in the last part of that definition was replaced by 'inter alia'. There was no appeal to the courts against such a ban unless it could be shown that the Governor-General had acted in bad faith - an impossible onus to discharge.

Using its considerable powers under this Act, the Government banned the weekly newspaper Guardian in 1952, its successor Advance in 1954, and the succeeding New Age in 1962. The magazine Fighting Talk was banned under the Act in February 1963.

Further drastic powers to interfere with Press freedom were incorporated in the Criminal Laws Amendment Act and the Public Safety Act of 1953. During the 1960 state of emergency the newspapers New Age and Torch were temporarily banned under the emergency regulations framed in terms of the Public Safety Act. The Liberal newspaper Contact was later convicted of 'subversion' as laid down in the emergency regulations and penalized by a heavy fine.

Not surprisingly, in January 1956, the International Press Institute, an organization of editors with headquarters in Zurich, found that in South Africa during the previous five years the encroachments of the government on the freedom of the Press had become increasingly serious. Citing the hostile attitude of the Nationalist government towards the opposition Press, the enactment of laws restricting Press freedom, and the suppression of Guardian and Advance, the Institute declared that the government's actions constituted a Sword of Damocles for the entire Press.

'There is, it is true, no censorship as such, nor do the government issue directives to the Press, but nevertheless they exert pressure by virtue of a body of laws, often laudable enough in intention, but which complicate the journalist's job, intimidate him, or even directly threaten him.' The Institute recalled that the Editor of The Star in Johannesburg had written to the Institute in 1952 that 'editing a newspaper under these conditions is like walking blindfold through a minefield', and it went on to say that the restraints on publication in South Africa were so complex that in few countries in the world this side of the 'Iron Curtain' was a greater strain imposed on newspaper editors.

The Institute quoted figures to demonstrate how far the South African government was favouring Nationalist newspapers through copious official advertising.

In the Cape Province the Cape Argus carried advertising worth £820 and the Cape Times £854, while the Burger's was worth £1,248. In the Transvaal the figures were £2,548 for the Transvaler, the main Nationalist daily, and £1,790 for The Star. In the Free State, £1,059 for the Volksblad and £514 for the Friend. These figures bore no relation to those for circulation and distribution.

Yet despite the menacing extent of its existing powers, the government was inevitably driven to seek even further control over the instruments of expression. On I January 1968, in its annual review of the state of the world Press, the International Press Institute was obliged once again to call attention to the government's 'war of nerves' against the opposition Press and the threat of legislation to curb it. Including the Rhodesian censorship in its strictures, the Institute said: 'It is particularly regrettable that the two countries, which are Southern Africa's richest, and where Press freedom has long been established should set such a bad example' (Star, Johannesburg, 2 January 1968).

Desiring to extend to internal publications the powers that it possessed over imported ones under the Customs Act - and perhaps also despairing by now of ever getting a report in time from the Press Commission - the government in 1954 appointed a Commission of Inquiry into Undesirable Literature, under the Chairmanship of Professor Geoffrey Cronje, of Pretoria University, one-time secretary of an appeal fund for Ossewa Brandwag members charged with high treason.

The commission's period of gestation was remarkably short compared with the Press Commission's, and in October 1957 its report was completed and published. Most of the commission's massive 285-page report was taken up with a discussion of the incidence of pornography in South African and imported publications, and means to control the evil; but the most serious sections dealt with political issues. Stating that evidence had been placed before it that 'the control of Communist publications is at present not as effective as it should be', the commission proposed that 'Communist' publications should fall under the draft Censorship Act included in its report, and that the Publications Board, the chief censoring authority, should be accorded legal recognition as the expert on what was 'Communistic' and what was not.

The commission produced no evidence that it had made any study of the nature of 'Communistic' literature in the Union. Not a single example was quoted of matter regarded as ' Communistic', and no newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, or leaflets were cited as evidence of the existence of Communism in the Union. From its own ludicrous definition of Communism it might be gathered that the commission was not very clear itself about just what Communism was.

What the commission did do was constantly emphasize that the White man should remain boss in South Africa, and that undesirable literature was that which was 'seriously undermining the European's position in this country. As the torchbearer in the vanguard of Western civilization in South Africa, the European must be and remain the leader, the guiding light, in the spiritual and cultural field, otherwise he will inevitably go under.' Elsewhere the commission remarked that the White man would be able to remain the boss only if he 'moves on a high moral and cultural plane and sets the non-European an example which is worthy of being followed'.

'The commission wishes to express its concern about the fact that magazines which frequently have highly objectionable covers are openly displayed in public and sold by non-Europeans - to a large extent to European women.

'The commission was very concerned with the effect of sexy magazine illustrations and advertisements on the standing of the European woman and even went to the extent of questioning several non-Europeans about their attitude towards it.

A certain non-European who occupies a responsible position declared that the European woman is held in high esteem and that she is in effect placed on a pedestal by non-Europeans. With reference to undesirable illustrations in which European women are portrayed and depicted in a reprehensible manner, he asserted that Europeans themselves are tumbling the European woman from her pedestal.

The report found that a conspicuous feature of weekly newspapers intended for non-Europeans was 'the high incidence of reports, articles and other contributions which tend to engender ... friction or feelings of hostility between the European and non-European population groups of the Union'.

On the other hand the commission gave the Press as a whole a comparatively clean bill of health. 'The commission deems it necessary to record at the very outset that not much that is undesirable occurs in the reporting of newspapers in the Union. In fact, the occurrence of undesirability in this connexion must [be] regarded as trifling.' Since the commission's report was to pave the way for full-scale censorship, this finding is of more than ordinary significance.

The commission expressly approved the manner in which the Customs Act had been used to prevent the importation of undesirable literature into the Union. 'The commission was afforded the opportunity of perusing the contents of hundreds of banned titles and is convinced that a great service has been done to this country in prohibiting the publications concerned. This finding is given particular prominence and is especially emphasized.' The commission's report gave the government the green light for which it had been waiting. In the 1960 session of Parliament, the Deputy Minister of the Interior introduced a Publications and Entertainments Bill providing for pre-publication censorship and referred it to a select committee for consideration after the first reading. The Bill shocked the country by its severity and led to an enormous public outcry, not least from the Afrikaans section of the community who would suffer most by censorship. The English writer, after all, if he fails to get his work published in South Africa, can always find a market overseas. But the Afrikaner must be read either in South Africa or not at all. There is no world market for his products.

Bowing to the storm, the government announced that it was not proceeding with the measure. But then came the counterblast. During the recess a deputation from the Dutch Reformed Church interviewed the Minister and pressed for some form of extended control over internal publications. The wishes of the Dutch Reformed Church were to be completely ignored in the matter of liquor legislation, but on the publication front the views of the Church happened to coincide with what the government itself intended.

Nineteen-sixty was the year of the Sharpeville massacre and the state of emergency, a year during which the fortunes of South Africa slumped and the reputation of the country was slashed in the overseas Press. Driven into a corner, the government hit back at its critics. Once again it held the English Press to blame. Opposition to apartheid was tantamount to treason. An obviously inspired and viciously sustained campaign of abuse was launched against the government's Press critics.

The Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd, in a radio address on 7 October 1960, following the Nationalist victory in the republican referendum, proclaimed:

'A politically nonconformist Press will not be tolerated in the Republic.'

The Minister of Justice, Vorster, who after his appointment had complained that 'rights were getting out of hand', on 10 August 1961 warned the Press that he would counter agitation with all the means at his disposal.

The Minister of Railways; Ben Schoeman, attacking what he called the licence of the Press during the 1961 session of Parliament, called Sunday Times columnist Stanley Uys 'probably the most unscrupulous liar in South Africa and a self-confessed traitor '. Needless to say, he did not repeat his remarks outside of Parliament.

J.C. Greyling, Nationalist M.P. for Ventersdorp, speaking at Queenstown, announced that the time was approaching when the government would 'legislate to call the Press and its reporting to order'. Replying to an anti-Republican article in the Queenstown Daily Representative, Greyling said: ' I warn that the time for this type of newspaper is growing short. We can stand on our own feet, we can make our own rules, and damn the rest of the world.'

Eric Louw, Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking at Brits on 12 August 1961, referred to a Press report that the managing director of an Athens newspaper and two of his assistants had been sent to jail for causing 'alarm and despondency'. 'I wonder if the time has not come,' he added, 'for us in this country to follow the example of the Greeks.' Blaar Coetzee, M.P. for Vereeniging, in a speech during the week ending 2 September 1961, declared: 'On 18 October [date of the general election] a mandate will be sought to take the English Press by the throat.' The freedom of the Press was 'inviolable', but it could no longer be tolerated that lies should be told, as in some newspapers, that the good name of South Africa should be calumniated and the Black man incited against the White.

W. A. Maree, Minister of Bantu Education, said at the 1961 congress of the Nationalist Party in Natal that there were clearly serious objections to the role of the Press. Readers were being indoctrinated in favour of liberalism.

Dr C. de Wet, Nationalist M.P. for Vereeniging, who rose to fame when he asked in Parliament, before the full details of the Sharpeville shootings were known, why so few Africans had been killed, said at Johannesburg on 10 August 1961 that severe action should be taken against the 'English-language Press, which was guilty of "crime and sabotage" against the Republic.'

Against this background the Minister of the Interior introduced a new measure during the 1961 session of Parliament. Called the Undesirable Publications Bill, it was referred to a select committee after the first reading. Initially it seemed an improvement on the previous Bill, for the principle of prepublication censorship had been dropped and the whole scope of the Bill had been narrowed. But the select committee, on which the Nationalists possessed an automatic majority, reintroduced pre-publication censorship and all in all fashioned an instrument which constitutes a deadly danger to freedom of expression and opinion in South Africa. The Bill in its revised form was then brought before the 1962 session of Parliament, but was not considered until the following year when, with minor modifications, it was put on the statute book as the Publications and Entertainments Act of 1963.

In terms of the Act, it is possible for the government (a) to prohibit the circulation of any newspaper which is not a member of the Newspaper Press Union (the reason for this exclusion will appear later); (b) to prohibit the circulation of any book, either imported or printed and published in South Africa; (c) to close down any stage or film show or art exhibition which is considered to be in any way undesirable; (d) to ban the work of any South African artist, novelist, poet, or sculptor (e) to prohibit the importation of all publications produced by a specified publisher or which deal with a specified subject, except by special permit.

The Act also prohibits the importation of all paperback books costing less than five shillings without a special permit, on the theory that the major proportion of pornography is conveyed through the medium of the paperback.

The Publications Control Board set up by the Act is to consist of no less than nine members, 'of whom not less than six shall be persons having special knowledge of art, language, and literature or the administration of justice'. In terms of section 8 of the Act, the Board has the power to declare any 'publication or object' undesirable. In terms of section 5 of the Act, it then becomes an offence to ' distribute, display, exhibit, or sell, or offer or keep for sale' any publication or object which has been declared by the Board to be undesirable.

A 'publication or object' is defined as any newspaper not published by the Newspaper Press Union; any book, periodical, pamphlet, poster, or other printed matter; any writing or typescript which has in any manner been duplicated or made available to the public or any section of the public; any drawing, picture, illustration, painting, woodcut, or similar representation; any print, photograph, engraving, or lithograph; any figure, cast, carving, statue, or model; and any record or other contrivance or device in or on which sound has been recorded for reproduction.

A publication or object, declares the Act, shall be deemed undesirable if it or any part of it (a) is indecent or obscene or is offensive or harmful to public morals; (b) is blasphemous or is offensive to the religious convictions or feelings of any section of the inhabitants of the Republic; (c) brings any section of the inhabitants of the Republic into ridicule or contempt; (d) is harmful to the relations between any sections of the inhabitants of the Republic; (e) is prejudicial to the safety of the State, the general welfare, or the peace and good order; or (f) discloses indecent or obscene matter in relation to reports of judicial proceedings.

Some attempt is made to clarify what is meant by ' indecent or obscene or offensive or harmful to public morals', but no attempt at all is made to define what is meant by 'harmful to the relations between any sections of the inhabitants of the Republic'; 'prejudicial to the safety of the State, the general welfare, or the peace and good order'; or ' brings any section of the inhabitants of the Republic into ridicule or contempt'. Theoretically there is an appeal from the decision of the Board to the courts, but considering the vagueness of these descriptions, it is doubtful whether this will constitute an effective safeguard.

The Board is also to be responsible for film censorship. In addition to the prohibitions mentioned above, it is forbidden to approve any films which propagate Communism as defined in the Suppression of Communism Act or which depict in an offensive manner the State President, the Republic's armed forces or any member thereof, death, human figures, love scenes, controversial or international politics, public characters, juvenile crime, criminality and the technique of crime, brutal fighting, drunkenness and brawling, addiction to drugs, scenes of violence involving White and non-White persons, intermingling of White and non-White persons, and violence towards or ill treatment of women and children.

The Board is empowered to stop any suspected stage or art show, and the Act entitles any policeman to be admitted free to any show for the purpose of undertaking an inspection.

The penalties laid down for contravention of the Act are severe. For a first conviction, the penalty will be a fine of not less than £150 and not more than £250, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both fine and imprisonment. For a second conviction the fine is to be not less than £500 and not more than £1,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than six months, while all subsequent convictions will entail fines of not less than £1,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than six months.

The Bill led to an outcry by South African artists, and particularly by Afrikaner intellectuals, who conducted a vigorous correspondence in the columns of the Nationalist newspaper Die Burger complaining that art, and in particular Afrikaans art, would be stifled by the proposed censorship provisions. After the Act had been passed, 172 of South Africa's foremost writers, painters, sculptors, and graphic artists, English and Afrikaans, signed a declaration of principles which was presented to the Minister of the Interior by a delegation consisting of Afrikaans authors W. A. de Klerk and Jan Rabie and best-selling English novelist Miss Mary Renault. While stating that circulation of obvious pornography should not be allowed, the signatories declared that the Act was 'in conflict with the most fundamental principle of art: that each work should be judged as a whole', and that ' the nature and intent of a literary work should be considered as a criterion of judgement'.

We are deeply alarmed for the future of creative effort in this country, since no frank discussion or honest inquiry or spiritual growth can be expected as long as the answer to such searchings may be silenced at the outset. Above all, writers who must publish inside the country are liable to be forced either into silence or superficiality, with fatal consequences - especially for Afrikaans literature.

The declaration made no mention of the dangerous political censorship empowered by the Act, which had already done irreparable damage even before becoming law.

By 1968, books were being banned by the Publications Control Board at the rate of nearly two a day, stated a report in the Sunday Times.

'Since the Board was instituted in November 1963, after the Publications and Entertainments Act was passed in Parliament more than 11,000 books have been banned (Sunday Times 21 April 1968).

The previous December, writing in the literary magazine Contrast, Afrikaans author W.A. de Klerk declared that his premonitions about the Act had been fulfilled. South African literature, especially Afrikaans literature, was being eroded and forced to work within a framework set up by the Church and State.

Though to date not a single Afrikaans book had been banned, de Klerk noted:

The most subtle, the most damaging censorship is not imposed by the Publications Act, but begins with the author himself. This happens when he has been so conditioned by things around him that he, too, must hesitate, look warily around him and then over his shoulder.

The main consideration is - at least as far as Afrikaans authors are concerned - what the inner circles would say if writers were to tell the truth; just what is, without praising. Ultimately there is general capitulation to the Idea [the Government's evaluation of the importance of the Church and the State]. Approaches become timid, clever, and in the end evasive.

The writer Nadine Gordimer, whose own novel The Late Bourgeois World was banned by the Publications Board in 1966, has described South African writers today as 'a persecuted professional group in this country'. Delivering the annual address to the Society for Human Rights at the University of the Witwatersrand in May 1968, she said that there was no country in the Western world where there was less freedom, and less encouragement given to writers to develop their talents without fetter, than in South Africa. 'Any South African writer today who chooses to thrust deeply into the life of his society and not confine himself to an approved sector and approved attitudes is likely to find himself, like me, moving rather ghostlike among his own people.'

Referring to the increasing tension between the young Afrikaans writers and the establishment, Miss Gordimer said that the whole superstructure of censorship and banning had brought with it the closing of 'whole areas of the world of ideas'. It had affected art; it was affecting literature and the theatre. It was narrowing down the horizon of all the creative arts. 'All that restrictions of freedom in the various media have done in our country is to produce a climate of insidious intimidation that is leading us into intellectual inertia and apathy' (Sunday Times, 19 May 1968).

Meanwhile, the members of the Newspaper Press Union, faced with the threat of censorship contained in the Publications Bill, and wilting under the ceaseless Nationalist assault on the English Press, had been persuaded to adopt a so-called 'code of conduct', in terms of which they agreed to censor themselves in return for exclusion from the provisions of the Publications and Entertainments Act. Voting on the code took place at a meeting of the N.P.U. on 13 March 1962, with seven newspaper managements voting against - the South African Associated Newspapers (Rand Daily Mail, Sunday Times, Sunday Express), the Bailey group (Drum, Post) and Wings Magazine and twenty-five voting in favour - the whole of the Argus group (Star, Cape Argus, Natal Daily News, etc.), the whole Nationalist Press, and the Cape Times.

The board of directors of S.A. Associated Newspapers in February 1963 proclaimed its belief that political pressure had given rise to the adoption of the code, particularly as clause 3(d) had political implications. The board had decided, however, that it would not be in the interests of the company to dissociate itself from the code and that it would, therefore, accept it, together with the jurisdiction of the Board of Reference established to administer it, 'but under protest'.

The code itself consists of three clauses, each containing a number of sub- clauses, mostly setting out the principles of standard newspaper practice in general terms to which no one could reasonably have any objection. News should be truthful and accurate, and should not be distorted by omissions, while headlines should accurately reflect the contents of a story, and so on. But clause 3(d) reads: 'Comment should take due cognizance of the complex racial problems of South Africa and should take into account the general good and the safety of the country and its peoples.'

Strong objection to the whole code of conduct and in particular to clause 3(d) was voiced by the South African Society of Journalists, which protested that, as the only organization representing working journalists, it had never been consulted, while its representations on the matter had been ignored. Referring to clause 3(d) the Society declared: 'We say without hesitation that this clause requires the journalist and the editor to modify the expression of his honest opinion on political grounds.... We believe that the last clause of the code of conduct means plainly that criticism of present government policy must be toned down.'

In a memorandum submitted to the N.P.U. itself the Society stressed:

The Press should not relieve the government from the odium which will and should attach to political censorship of the Press. An evil is no less an evil because it is self-inflicted.... Censorship may be imposed upon the Press in this country, but not we hope until the Press has fought it to the last. No self-respecting journalist or newspaper can voluntarily submit to a so-called code of conduct which is political in its origins and intentions. We ask the Newspaper Press Union to join us in rejecting censorship and in refusing to act as the government's agent in imposing censorship on the South African Press. Our function as a Press is to resist any move to gag us - it is not our function to gag ourselves, in the hope that the process will in that way be made more comfortable.

The Society has advised its members to refuse to be associated in any way with the code.

The code is administered by a Board of Reference consisting of an ex-Judge and two employer representatives, one from the Afrikaans and one from the English Press. The members of the Board of Reference as first constituted were: Chairman, ex Justice Heinrich de Villiers, former Judge President of the Eastern Cape Division of the Supreme Court; W. R. McCall, retired general manager of the Argus Printing and Publishing Co.; and H. R. Malan, retired managing director of the Nasionale Pers. This Board has the power to reprimand any proprietor, editor, or journalist adjudged to have been guilty of an infringement of the code and force the offending newspaper to publish the reprimand ' in such manner as may be determined by the Board'.

One of the first decisions of the Board, announced on 22 April 1963, was to condemn the Sunday Express for publishing an article by Julius Lewin, Senior Lecturer in African Law and Administration at the University of the Witwatersrand, entitled 'So this Is Peace'. The complainant, B. Coetzee, a Nationalist M.P., alleged that the following statements from the article were untrue: (1) The government employ the political police (the co-called Special Branch) to restrain or silence almost every form of outspoken protest; and (2) This feeling is not expressed with more vigour because men are afraid of the personal consequences to themselves, or their businesses or jobs, if they speak their minds openly.

The Sunday Express replied that the complaint referred to a signed article and that the newspaper did not accept responsibility for the veracity of every statement in such an article. The Board rejected this explanation and found 'that the article complained of contains both overstatement and unfair comment and that the newspaper failed in its duty to avoid these violations of the code of conduct'.

This staggering rebuff to the freedom of expression was passed over practically in silence. The Sunday Express itself criticized the Board's decision, stating that Lewin had a right to his opinion and that the Sunday Express would 'strenuously defend his right to express his opinions in its columns. Any lesser stand would be an admission that this newspaper is prepared to accept voluntary censorship. And it is not willing to do that under any circumstances.

But the rest of the Press preserved a discreet silence. Doubtless in future one will see fewer complaints about Special Branch intimidation published in the Press. At all events, it is doubtful if the Publications Board set up under the Publications and Entertainments Act could have served the government better in the way of recommending Press censorship. At least from the decisions of the Publications Board there is an appeal to the courts. From the Board of Reference established under the code of conduct there is no appeal at all. The Press must just grin and bear it -and try to reform.

The Nationalists themselves, however, have on the whole lacked enthusiasm for the Press Board of Reference, and up to November 1968 only sixteen complaints had been referred to it. Of these six verdicts were in favour of the Press and nine against (Dagbreek, 10 November 1968).

In his 1968 report the chairman of the Press Board of Reference, Mr Justice H. de Villiers, said that after holding his position for six years he had come to the conclusion that, generally speaking, there was an excellent press in South Africa, 'which compares favourably with any Press in the world' (Star, 12 September 1968). At the annual conference of the Newspaper Press Union of South Africa in Cape Town on 4 October 1967, the outgoing President, Mr D. M. Craib, said that no complaints at all had been referred to the Board during the year under review, ending 30 June 1967, though two had been noted since then.

All the evidence points to the conclusion that the Nationalist government would prefer some more direct form of control over the Press by the State. The Minister of the Interior, Senator de Klerk, as early as 8 September 1964 gave the Transvaal Nationalist Party congress the assurance: 'It would not be long before the Government would announce the acceptance of recommendations or other measures to curb the evil which had given rise to the appointment of the [Press] Commission.'

In a speech at Koffiefontein on 11 August 1967, the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, said that he was sick and tired of reports based on hearsay - which involved both himself and members of the Cabinet. These reports also affected members of the public, and he had made up his mind to put an end to this. The call to the Press to discipline itself had been ignored.

He had come to the conclusion that South Africa's laws of libel were not enough and had instructed the government's legal advisers to prepare legislation making it a punishable offence to publish 'ascertainable factual lies'. He anticipated that the employers of reporters who produced untrue reports would pay 'very high fines.'

During the following week, the Prime Minister told the Natal congress of the Nationalist Party that alleged newspaper lies would be judged by an impartial tribunal, not by the government or by a politician. The Nationalist newspaper Dagbreek reported on 17 December 1967 that legislation on these lines had already been drafted and would probably be tabled in Parliament during the 1968 session. It forecast that the 'impartial tribunal' of which the Prime Minister had spoken would consist of a permanent Parliamentary Select Committee, on which members both of the government party and the opposition would serve.

Speaking at Colesberg on 8 November 1968, the Minister of the Interior, Mr Muller, said the government was deeply concerned about the standard of reporting and articles in the Press and was determined to curb sensational reporting and sex, which dominated certain publications to the detriment of the nation's moral values. He was recommending to the cabinet that members of the Newspaper Press Union should no longer be exempted from the Publications and Entertainments Act.

This would mean that the daily and weekly Press would become liable to censorship and banning on the same basis as any other publication. Almost coincidental with the Minister's statement was the announcement that Mr J. Kruger, former editor of the Nationalist paper Die Transvaler, was replacing Professor G. Dekker as chairman of the Publications Board. Should the Press be brought within the purview of the Board, it could expect short shrift under its new management.

Mr Muller said his recommendations would be considered by the cabinet early in 1969 (RDM, 9, 12 and 16 November 1968).

The Press is the most important medium of propaganda, but it is not the only one. There are also the radio and television. The Nationalist government has decided not to introduce television to South Africa, and in the House of Assembly on 3 May 1967 the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Dr Albert Hertzog, explained why.

Damning television as only a 'little house-bioscope', Dr Hertzog said that the Opposition wanted it introduced only because a group of them and their friends were out to make a profit.

Television was a medium which not only devoured a great many programmes - it positively gobbled them up. Even Britain had to import TV films to fill up time, and if TV were introduced in South Africa, films would have to be imported, mainly from Britain and America.

'Friends of mine recently returned from Britain', said Dr Hertzog, 'tell me one cannot see a programme which does not show Black and White living together; where they are not continually propagating a mixture of the two races.'

Obviously the Opposition wanted such films imported into South Africa because the concept fitted with its own, said the Minister.

There was another aspect - that of advertising. TV was expensive and would cost South Africa between 40 and 50 million Rand to maintain each year. This cost could only be covered by advertising, and the sponsors would dictate the content of TV programmes just as they did in other countries.

One of the main factors influencing advertisers would be the existence of a non-White as well as a White viewing public. 'There is one advertising technique which we mustn't forget,' said Hertzog. ' That is, if you want someone to buy something, you must make him dissatisfied with what he already has.'

On 7 February 1968, in a cabinet reshuffle, Dr Hertzog was displaced as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs by Mr M.C.G.J. van Rensburg. In his first press interview, Mr van Rensburg said that he was taking on his portfolio 'without any preconceived ideas about television', and top businessmen in the electronics industry were quoted as being 'cautiously optimistic' about the improved chances of television (Star, 8 February 1968). Up to the time of writing, however, government policy on television has remained unchanged.

The radio, on the other hand, is a government-controlled monopoly in South Africa and completely under Nationalist domination. Chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation is Dr P. J. Meyer, who, according to a statement in the Sunday Times of 24 March 1963, is also Chairman of the Broederbond. In recent years the radio has become so blatant an instrument of Nationalist propaganda, indeed, that it has evoked widespread and bitter protests from non-Nationalist sections of the population. Though responsible for the appointment of the men who control the S.A.B.C., the government has made a habit of refusing to answer parliamentary questions about the corporation's activities, on the grounds that it is fully independent. The result, of course, is that the corporation has become a law unto itself, immune from criticism because it can afford to ignore it. The Nationalist attitude towards it was expressed by a front-bencher in 1962 when he said that criticism of the S.A.B.C. was a crime and that people who attacked the corporation should be dealt with in terms of the Sabotage Act.

In an attempt to voice the dissatisfaction of non-Nationalists, United Party member E.G. Malan in March 1963 moved a private member's motion condemning the government's refusal to supply Parliament with information on the activities of the S.A.B.C. and urgently requesting consideration of the advisability of appointing a commission to inquire into the policies of the corporation. On the question of political talks and news reports, he said that there were three criteria summed up in the questions: Are the news sources adequate? Are the criteria for selection correct? Is the presentation of news such as to avoid distortion?'

To each of these the answer is a qualified but definite "No" ' he declared.

Seconding the motion, United Party member A. Gorshel complained that there was a consistent assault on the English culture by the S.A.B.C. and that any English-speaking person or organization would be able to produce evidence of this.

Using its majority the Nationalist Party was able to defeat the motion and get Parliament to adopt an amendment approving the policy followed by the S.A.B.C. But the nature of the debate, and of the widespread public criticism which had preceded it, made it quite clear that the S.A.B.C. has now become a party political instrument in the hands of the Nationalists. It has altogether ceased to be an independent corporation serving the needs of the whole community and has been converted into an instrument for massive political indoctrination instead. Over 1,000,000 people pay wireless licence fees in South Africa, so that the Nationalists have been able to a substantial degree to make good by this means their shortfall in the sphere of Press circulation.

The South African Broadcasting Corporation runs three main channels, one for English-speaking listeners, one for Afrikaans speaking listeners, and a commercial channel known as ' Springbok Radio' which carries advertising. (For some reason best known to Dr Hertzog, radio advertising is apparently not as unsettling to public opinion as TV advertising.)

In a speech at Benoni on 7 December 1967, S.A.B.C. chairman Dr Meyer said that about two thirds of the Springbok Radio listeners were English-speaking. Listeners to the Afrikaans programme totalled almost one million, while listeners to the English service had increased to 400,000.

There is a separate programme for Africans, called Radio Bantu, and Dr Meyer in his speech declared that the achievements of the S.A.B.C. in this sphere were the most impressive of the year. The number of letters from African listeners was expected to exceed 4,000,000 by the end of 1967 (Rand Daily Mail, 8 December 1967).

In September 1967 the S.A.B.C. opened an external radio service, transmitting the 'Voice of South Africa' in nine languages to Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Canada and the United States on a twenty-four-hour basis. At the opening of the H.F. Verwoerd Transmitting Station' at Bloemendal, near Meyerton, on 25 September, the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, said: 'We shall use our external service to present a true and unbiased picture of the Republic. We will answer misrepresentations with dignity and will not wage a war of words against hostile nations' (Rand Daily Mail, 26 September 1967).

In his Benoni speech, Dr Meyer claimed that the S.A.B.C. had received 20,320 letters from listeners to the 'Voice of South Africa' in all parts of the world. 'Without exception, our news services and news reviews, particularly, are praised as the most objective of any of the world's foreign radio services,' he said.

One of the first tasks undertaken by the Nationalist government when it came to power was the reorganisation of its information services, which were steadily increased to counter unfavourable publicity abroad. Following the Sharpeville shooting and the economic crisis of 1960-1, the external propaganda drive was greatly stepped up. In 1962 a Separate Department of Information was created, under English-speaking Minister Waring, and the sum spent on information services was boosted from a meagre £50,000 in 1949-50 to R4,159,000 in the 1968 Budget. The number of employees of the South African Information Services in 1950 had been twenty-seven Whites, according to a statement in the House by the Minister of Information on 16 September 1966. By 1960 the total had become 107 Whites and five 'Bantu'; and by 1966, under the new Department, 255 Whites, 11 Coloureds and 79 ' Bantu '. Although some of these officials were engaged on information services at home, the majority were busy trying to improve South Africa's image abroad.

This resulted in a flood of periodicals, pamphlets, booklets, press releases, radio broadcasts, cinema and television films, produced for distribution abroad. Many of these productions are of high technical quality, and of the hundreds of cinema and television films produced over thirty have won diplomas, medals and cups at international festivals.

Giving evidence on 3 March 1966, before the U.S. House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Africa, Dr Vernon McKay, Director of African Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, gave details of the methods used by the South African Department of Information in the United States, indicating that from 1960 onwards, in addition to the efforts of its own servants, the South African government had paid top U.S. public relations firms hundreds of thousands of dollars to 'help sell South Africa to the American public'. Dr McKay declared that, in addition to straight 'information', 'South Africa also has a large budget (141,000 dollars for the first six months of 1965) for the New York office of the South African Tourist Corporation, which publicizes the Republic's numerous scenic attractions. Three American law firms are also used by South Africa, one of them being a lobbyist for South African sugar'.

More recently, South Africa has concentrated on promoting visits by persons likely to be sympathetic to South Africa, particularly businessmen, journalists and academicians who can be expected on their return home to regurgitate in one form or another what has been fed to them in South Africa. After analysing in depth the content and method of South African propaganda in the United States, Dr McKay concluded:

Mr Chairman, I have taken time to describe this South African propaganda offensive because of the dimensions it is attaining. ... Naturally, I have no objection to the airing of such views because I believe in free competition in the marketplace of ideas. ... But I also believe that the public should be aware that it is being subjected to a carefully planned and well-financed campaign which has the effect of bolstering the present South African regime.

Dr McKay stressed that it would be an illusion to think the American public impervious to the propaganda directed towards it by the South African Information Department. 'The misleading half-truths which portray South Africa as a stable, prosperous Western ally in contrast to a chaotic and savage black Africa infected with communism are striking a responsive chord, particularly among certain American conservatives.' (United States-South Africa Relations, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1966).

Perhaps more effective than the efforts of the Department of Information has been the work of the South African Foundation, formed in 1960 to undertake 'the promotion of international understanding of the South African way of life, achievements, and aspirations' and 'positive campaigns which shall present to the world at large the true picture of South Africa. The Foundation, in short, represents the alarm of South African big business as a whole, irrespective of party outlook, at the damage being done to the South African economy as a consequence of the unfavourable international reaction to apartheid. President of the Foundation is Sir Francis de Guingand, Lord Montgomery's Chief of Staff from 1942 to 1945, chairman of the British tobacco firm of Carreras which belongs to the Rembrandt empire (see page 393) and director of more than twenty South African companies. Deputy President is Dr H.J. van Eck, chairman of the Industrial Development Corporation and perhaps the most powerful figure in the sphere of South African industry.

Vice-Presidents of the Foundation include D.H.C. du Plessis, former general manager of the South African Railways, director of the Coloured Development Corporation and the retail Afrikaans chain Uniewinkels; Leif Egeland, former South African High Commissioner in London; I.G. Fleming, director of the South African Reserve Bank, the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), Raleigh Cycles and Cyril Lord (S.A.); Dr J.E. Holloway, former Union Secretary of Finance, Ambassador in Washington and High Commissioner in London; Dr M.S. Louw, chairman of Bonuskor (playing a leading role in the Atlas Aircraft Corporation), Saambou, director of Sanlam and one of the recognized leaders of Afrikaner business opinion; Dr F. Meyer, Vice-chairman of the Munitions Production Board, director of the Trust Bank and a leading member of a number of Afrikaans cultural organizations; Dr Etienne Rousseau, chairman of SASOL and vice-chairman of Federale Volksbeleggings; Dr J.G.F. van der Merwe, director of ISCOR, the African Aircraft Corporation and a number of Afrikaans companies, and of Voortrekkerpers, the publishers of the Nationalist daily Die Transvaler. Elected a vice-chairman of the Foundation at its first meeting was C.W. Engelhard, an American financier who has acquired large financial interests in South Africa.

Other members of the executive committee of the Foundation include H.T. Andrews, director of Consolidated Diamond Mines of South-West Africa, Welkom Gold Mining Company, former S.A. Ambassador to France and the United States, and permanent representative of South Africa at the United Nations; C.L.F. Borckenhagen, director of a number of Afrikaans chemical concerns; W.B. Coetzer, chairman of General Mining and Finance Corporation, Federale Mynbou and about fifty other companies; S.A. Hofmeyr, director of Federale Volksbeleggings; Jan S. Marais, director of the Trust Bank of South Africa and a number of companies in the Federale group; Gideon Roos, former director general of the South African Broadcasting Corporation from 1948 to 1961; D.R. Scorer, managing director of African Explosives and Chemical Industries, which are linked with Imperial Chemical Industries in Britain; and Ivan Solomon, one of South Africa's leading producers and exporters of citrus.

Other members of the Foundation include H.F. Oppenheimer, chairman of De Beers and the Anglo-American Corporation; Anton Rupert, the 'tobacco king'; and leading figures in the business world, both English and Afrikaans-speaking, both Nationalist and anti-Nationalist, controlling over 400 industrial, finance and mining companies.

It is especially significant that the Foundation is strongly represented in the exporting industries of South Africa, as well as in the ranks of the munitions and plane-makers, ship-builders and the like who are trying desperately to get the British and American arms embargoes on South Africa lifted.

The Foundation also has strong links with the South African press and other communications media. Among the Foundation's members are, in addition to those with press interests already mentioned, Adrian Berrill, former chairman of the Central News Agency and a director of the British publishing firm of Gordon and Gotch; G.H.R. Edmunds, former chairman of South African Associated Newspapers, Rand Daily Mail Ltd and the Sunday Times syndicate, now director of African Consolidated Films and Odeon Holdings; Clive Corder, chairman of Syfrets Trust and of Cape and Transvaal Printers Ltd which publishes the Cape Times; Colonel Eugene O'Connel Maggs, a member of the board of the S.A. Reserve Bank and chairman of the World Printing and Publishing Co. and its subsidiaries, which between them control the bulk of papers circulating amongst the African people; Dr A.L. Geyer, a director of Nasionale Pers, publishers of Die Burger, and former S.A. High Commissioner in London; and Dr P.J. Meyer, chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation. Dr M.S. Louw and Anton Rupert have both served on the directorate of the Nationalist weekly Dagbreek.

The Director of the Foundation, L.B. Gerber, was formerly attached to the Department of Foreign Affairs and was a member of the South African team at the United Nations. The Financial Director, J. de L. Sorour, was formerly a major in the South African Permanent Force.

The Foundation carries on activities both abroad and at home designed to reassure people with money that, no matter what South African politics are like, the country is still a sound field of investment.

In a three-page advertisement inserted in the Johannesburg Sunday Times on 14 May 1967, the Foundation's Director Mr L.B. Gerber, replied to the question: ' What is the secret of the Foundation's success ?'

Why has the Foundation gained the confidence of press, radio and television services abroad ? Why do leading writers, politicians, academics and businessmen accept the Foundation's invitations? Why, in short, does the whole operation succeed? The answer to these questions is three-fold: In the first place, the Foundation is accepted because it is independent - independent, that is, of party political bias and Government control. The Foundation's Trustees, in fact, represent a complete cross-section of South Africa's political, business and professional spheres -are drawn from both language groups and every Province including South-West Africa.

The Foundation is successful, in the second place, because it aims at that sector of the public which carries weight in international news media, international business and international politics. It does not address itself primarily to the committed left-winger or to the extreme right-winger. The Foundation's main effort is directed at the fulcrum of moderate opinion, which in the final instance sways governments, determines policy, attracts trade, investment and immigration.

In the third place the Foundation does not attempt to sell the unsaleable. It is futile to expect our friends in other countries to take any constructive interest in our problems; nor can we expect them to become supporters of our political philosophies; nor should we delude ourselves that they are interested in what we are doing for our less privileged peoples. After all, why should they? Do we in South Africa take any interest in the political morality of, say, Czechoslovakia or the Philippines or Panama, or in their social services or their race problems ? Why should we expect countries like Britain, the United States and France to take any interest in our political ethics, or in what we do for our non-Whites?

The hard fact of the matter is that people are motivated by self-interest - and if we want to generate real constructive interest in South Africa, we can do it best by publicising those aspects which are to the direct or indirect advantage of the people to whom we are addressing ourselves.

This has been the guiding principle underlying the Foundation's activities: to publicise the opportunities South Africa offers. To tell the world about our high standards and low cost of living; about the country's vast potential - and the tangible benefits it can bring to the investor, the trader, the visitor and the immigrant.

The Foundation believes we should stop making excuses, apologising, explaining and defending. We should eliminate the plaintive note in our voices and substitute a tone of confident self-assertion. We should tell the world what we are and what we have to offer. ... Our answer [to critics] must be continually to let the world at large know that South Africa is peaceful, prosperous and strong - and that it becomes more so with every day that passes. These are the hard facts that will finally blunt our assailants' attacks, and will eventually prove to them that it pays to be with us rather than against us.

The Foundation has offices in London and Paris, and announced at its 1968 conference in Johannesburg that it hoped soon to have enough funds to open an office in the United States. Entrusted with the task of promoting the establishment of the U.S. office is Mr Jan Marais, managing director of the Trust Bank and chairman of the Foundation's membership committee, who told the conference that America would undoubtedly be the Foundation's 'toughest and most expansive market'. At a private luncheon in Johannesburg in 1967, the financial director, Mr J. de L. Sorour, said that, to finance the American office, the annual income of the Foundation would have to be raised to 'about 500,000 Rand a year -double the present figure'.

The Foundation's income is derived almost entirely from membership fees. Private members pay 20 Rand a year (25 Rand overseas) and corporate members anything from 20 Rand to many thousands. Mr Sorour said that the main contributors were a few large business houses. 'The man we would like to reach, however, is the small businessman who is prepared to invest money with the aim of establishing better international relations for South Africa' (Sunday Times, 14 May 1967).

The Foundation has managed to establish powerful lobbies in the countries where it operates. In America the work of the Foundation and the South African Information Department has been assisted since 1965 by the formation of a pressure group called the American-African Affairs Association, organized to fight what it terms the 'fallacious liberal' approach to African issues. The A.A.A.A. contends that the West is losing the struggle with Communism in Africa 'because of the ignorance, cupidity and mischievous intent of those individuals, institutions, periodicals and organizations which are in effective control of American policies toward Africa' (Evidence of Dr Vernon McKay, op. cit.).

In Britain the Foundation cooperates closely with the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association, which 'provides the London office with an invaluable outlet to British commerce and industry' (L.B. Gerber, Sunday Times, 14 May 1967).

Mr Gerber follows this up with the highly revealing claim:

The London Office again this year widened its circle of contacts with Members of Parliament, and information supplied by the Foundation could again be discerned in speeches made in both Houses. Encouraging, and indicative of the Foundation's reputation for accuracy, is the fact that Foundation material and assistance was used by both Labour and Conservative members and that protagonists for reasonableness and non-interference in southern Africa appeared in the Government benches.

In the light of Mr Gerber's earlier explanation of the Foundation's aims, the words 'reasonableness and non-interference' in this sentence should be replaced by 'cupidity and avarice'.

The Foundation Office in Paris cooperates closely with the Comite France Afrique du Sud, described by Mr Gerber as 'an independent organization of French business and professional men under the leadership of M. Jacques Segard. The Foundation's part-time representative in France and editor of the newsletter France-Afrique du Sud is journalist M. Paul Giniewski.

In Germany, reported Mr Gerber in the same advertisement, 'There has been a marked improvement in attitude towards South Africa. ... German industry needs little persuasion that South Africa is the most valuable trade and business partner on the African continent.' The promotion of the Foundation's work in Germany was greatly assisted by the formation, under the joint auspices of the Foundation and the Afrikaans-Deutsche-Kulturgemeinschaft, of a strong and influential (once again described by Mr Gerber as 'independent') German organization, the Deutsch-Sudafrikanische-Gesellschaft.

The South Africa Foundation has always claimed to be nonpolitical and non- partisan in relation to South African politics, but there is no doubt that it has done a first-class public relations job for the Nationalist government. In fact, as much was claimed for it by Dr H. J. van Eck, Deputy President of the Foundation and chairman of the Industrial Development Corporation, at a Foundation banquet in Cape Town in June 1967. The Foundation had been formed, he said, to counteract the attempts of those who, in the 'liberal' atmosphere of hostility to colour discrimination which had developed since the war, wanted to promote friction between East and West, between White and non-White, and 'indeed to foster revolution for their own nefarious ends'.

Using a technique of 'personal contact at top level', Van Eck went on, the Foundation won for South Africa 'good friends and reliable supporters in key positions in the power structure of the world. When one looks back on the many vicious attacks that have been launched on South Africa in the past seven years, it must be obvious that without behind the scenes intervention on our behalf at crucial stages of these several campaigns, we could never have won through to the position of international respect and domestic peace and prosperity which we enjoy today' (Rand Daily Mail, 21 June 1967).

Hardly could the identification of aims between the Foundation and the Nationalist government have been more plainly stated.

At the 1968 conference of the Foundation held in Johannesburg in March, the Director, Mr Gerber, praised the government's new 'outward looking policy' of cooperation with independent African states, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi. Referring also to the world's first heart transplant operation by Professor Christian Barnard, he said: 'These events have powerfully reinforced the image of South Africa as a land of peace, prosperity and progress.'

There is no doubt that the Foundation has had a pronounced impact on business circles abroad and has successfully used its influence to counteract the international boycott of South African goods. It is equally active inside South Africa itself, where in 1967 a score of so-called Man-to-Man committees, comprising some 230 members of the 'foreign communities' in South Africa, began working ' tirelessly and consistently on behalf of their country of adoption or residence ' (Gerber, Sunday Times, 14 May 1967).

The Foundation has also done a great deal to convince the English Press that in certain circumstances criticism of apartheid can be unpatriotic. South African newspapers are today reluctant to criticize the South African government's handling of foreign affairs, as in the dispute over the status of South-West Africa. The government, through the Foundation and by other means, has largely succeeded in convincing the Press organs of White South Africa that it is in their own interests to help present a united front to the world.

For, of course, the Foundation speaks only for White South Africa. It has no representation from non-White South Africa and has made no serious attempt to obtain any. In the first place, apart from the small Indian merchant class and a handful of Coloured and African businessmen, there is no non_White big business worth considering. Secondly, if non-Whites were brought into the Foundation on an equal footing with the Whites, the Nationalist members would promptly withdraw. So the Foundation stays White and acts White, reinforcing the impression that in the long run White supremacy is largely a matter of big business.

At the 1968 conference of the Foundation, a substantial part of the discussion was devoted to South Africa's role in Africa, and it was decided to establish a special Africa Committee that would promote good relations with other African countries. Mr Desmond Colborne, representative of the Foundation in Paris, said that there was an excellent prospect of using persons in France to influence opinion in French-speaking African states. This could serve as a 'bridge in Africa', because most of the former French colonies had retained close bonds with France.

The convention discussed the idea of sending non-Whites from South Africa to plead South Africa's case abroad. One delegate, citing the 'tremendous impact' on the Netherlands made by the visit of an African Minister of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, said: 'We should consider sending African businessmen who have no political bias overseas. This would create a tremendously good impression.' The conference decided, however, that too many 'practical difficulties' stood in the way of this suggestion, not least that such emissaries would be exposed to 'political vituperation' which they might not be able to resist.

What is true of the Foundation is true of the South African Press as a whole. It is overwhelmingly a White Press. Not a single African- or Coloured-owned newspaper exists in any shape or form anywhere in the country. There are two or three Indian-owned weeklies in Natal. For the rest, the whole apparatus of propaganda resides in the hands of the Whites, to come, as we have seen in this chapter, increasingly under the control and influence of the Nationalist government. Even books are not freely accessible to non-Whites. The main libraries, with few exceptions, practise a rigid colour bar. The price of new books places them out of reach of the majority of the population, to whom even the cost of a paperback must be measured against the price of a loaf of bread. And on top of all this, there is now total internal and external censorship.

'Everyone', states the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 'has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.' In South Africa this right has long since ceased to exist.