28 June 1996
It is with much gratitude _ and with some trepidation, as well - that I have accepted the invitation to be here this evening. I am grateful because it is a great honour to be singled out in this manner to share some views on the process of political negotiations and transition.
At the same time I must admit to feeling a bit anxious about representing accurately and fairly the complexities of the transition that South Africa has undergone over the course of the last six years. I sincerely hope that I do this task justice.
Back in the days of apartheid, the struggle for democracy in South Africa received much significant support from this part of the world. It is mindful of the debt that we owe the peoples of this region, that we are here today to share with you some of our experiences of transition to democracy.
While we faced many of the typical' problems associated with achieveing a negotiated settlement to a protracted political conflict, South Africa's experience was unique in many ways - not only in terms of the problems we faced, but also in the way we chose to tackle them.
So too is the situation here. While you might learn some lessons from other experiences, you will ultimately have to find for yourselves the processes and solutions which suit your conditions.
South Africa was the last country on the African continent to be liberated from colonialism and minority rule. As such we had a number of experiences - a continent-full, in fact - from which to take lessons. The negotiated settlements achieved in Zimbabwe and Namibia were particularly instructive.
South Africa's negotiated settlement began, arguably, in August 1989 when the Organisation of African Unity produced the Harare Declaration, which contained a vision for a peaceful settlement in South Africa. A few months after the Harare Declaration, the first preconditions to genuine negotiations were met, with the unbanning of the ANC and other illegal organisations and the release of political priosners, including Nelson Mandela.
In a sense, we have just finished that process. Last month, the Constitutional Assembly - elected in April 1994 in South Africa's first democratic elections - finalised South Africa's new constitution.
It was an historic moment as the 490-member assembly voted by a more than two-thirds majority to approve South Africa's first fully-democratic constitution - the constitution by which South Africa is to be governed for generations to come.
The constitution has been described as the birth certificate of a new nation - the document which defines its being and shapes its destiny. It is a document that has been 300 years in the making. It is a document which forbids for all time the oppression of one South African by another. Most importantly, it is a document which all South Africans - regardless of their background, their race, their religion or political affiliation - can call their own.
Negotiations
So how did we get, in the space of six short years, from a repressive apartheid state to a thriving democracy?
The starting point for the ANC was that it bore the historic responsibility of bringing apartheid to an end. From its inception in 1912, the ANC had sought to engage successive white governments in negotiations for the achievement of basic human rights for black South Africans. For the greater part of this century was the leading force in the struggle to bring about an end to racial tyranny, oppression, intolerance and human rights abuses.
Even as the ANC embarked on armed struggle in 1961, we continued to agitate for a negotiated settlement in South Africa. Towards the end of the 1980s we intensified our efforts for political negotiations, sensing that international and national events would necessitate a negotiated peace sooner rather than later. Hence, the Harare Declaration and the ANC's willingness to engage in discussions with the then National Party government.
The ANC reurned to South Africa in 1990 with a number of strengths. During its years in exile, it had established a world-wide anti-apartheid movement which had been the driving force behind comprehensive economic, military and cultural sanctions. The world was against apartheid, and the world was keenly interested in a peaceful solution to the South African conflict.
The ANC also had the support of the overwhelming majority of South Africans, who had been effectively mobilised through community organisations to resist the apartheid government. The ANC's underground structures were still in place. So was its military capacity.
Taken together, these strengths made the ANC a force to be reckoned with.
That is not to say the ANC didn't have its share of weaknesses. For one thing, the ANC's return from exile was a massive logistical operation which required the devotion of masisve human and other resources. It did not command, or even have access to, the vast machinery of the state (which the National Party did).
It didn't have a military capacity which could match that of the National Party. Nor did have access to the machinery which could police the transition.
The National Party similarly had a number of weaknesses. In the eyes of the world and the majority of South Africans, the National Party had no legitimacy. Apartheid had been rendered ungovernable. The economy was in a downward spiral, threatening the country with a socio-economic catastrophe. There was pressure even from among the National Party's traditional supporters both inside and outside the country to reach a settlement.
As much as the ANC and the National Party were on opposite sides of the apartheid divide, there was sufficient sense on each side to realise that - as much as their respective visions of South Africa were different - the country's survival depended on them reaching an agreement.
Looking back, I suppose the key motivation for engaging the National Party in an effort to achieve a negiotiated settlement was the realisation that if we didn't make use of the opportunity, a settlement would imposed on us.
A number of events taking place beyond South Africa's borders indicated a growing impetus throughout the world for the resolution of conflict. In our own part of the world, we have seen the resolution of protracted civil wars in both Angola and Mozambique. We've witnessed remarkable progress in peace initiatives in the Middle East.
The ANC had the choose of getting on board and helping to steer the negotiations bus, or be strapped to the back and go wherever negotiations take us.
While the ANC and the NP were the two principal forces in South Africa at the time, it was recognised that there were a number of other players in the South African arena who needed to be party to any settlement.
While the negotiations process began with bilateral meetings between the ANC and the government, the ANC always insisted that negotiations needed to involve all South Africa's political parties. This led to the formation in December 1991 of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, also known as Codesa.
The starting point for Codesa was the need to establish a common, albeit broad, vision of what needed to be achieved. The Declaration of Intent, which was adopted by all parties at Codesa (except the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Bphuthatswana bantustan government), laid the basis for an inclusive and binding negotiations process.
The declaration committed the NP government to be bound by the decisions of Codesa and to see to their implementation. Codesa itself would draft the text of all legislation necessary to give effect to agreements reached.
In pursuance of our intention that these negotiations be as inclusive as possible, there were no preconditions for attendance other than that parties to the negotiations needed to be bona fide political organisations with at least some demonstrable support in the country. While this gave a voice to parties who were little more than NP puppets, it did make for a process in which all parties could be made to feel part.
In August 1990, the ANC unilaterally suspended its armed activities as an indication of its commitment to a peaceful settlement. (ad lib)
Process
Following the principle of inclusivity, the processes of negotiations were designed to reach an inclusive settlements. All agreements and decisions were to be arrived at by general consensus. Where general consensus couldn't be achieved, decisions were taken on the basis of sufficient consensus'.
Sufficent consensus meant there was enough agreement from enough parties to enable the process to move forward. Parties who disagreed with the decision could have their objections formally recorded, but, in the spirit of cooperation, could not hinder the process from going forward.
The application of the concept of sufficient consenus' ensured a balance between the need for inclusivity and the need for a settlement to be achieved.
The sufficient consensus mechanism was not always enough to break every deadlock, particularly when there were significant differences between the ANC and NP.
Bi-lateral meetings were extensively used, not only during multi-party negotiations, but also during negotiations more recently in the Constitutional Assembly. These meetings allowed for more focussed discussion and, I think, more frank discussions on the various options available.
Bi-laterals, multi-laterals and special technical committees generally made for a more streamlined negotiating process.
Conclusion
I am discussing our negotiated transition with the generous benefit of hindsight. It is very easy now to analyse the various twists and turns which negotiations took, identifying what went wrong and, ultimately, what went right.
But when you're in the middle of it all, the answers are not as clear. Nor are the prospects all that promising. At the beginning of the process, the obstacles are numerous and overwhelming. The way forward uncertain.
That, I imagine, is your experience today, as our's was a few years ago.
The negotiation process in South Africa was not easy or straight-forward. It was fraught with enormous difficulties and setbacks. It often felt that for each step we took forward, we took two or three steps back. You might feel the same way too sometimes.
I am confident, however, that as much as this island has seen conflict and bitterness; as much as there are obstacles and hindrances; as much as there is a conflict of views and interests - there is one thing which makes a settlement so necessary: the common desire for peace, justice and prosperity throughout Ireland.
The very fact that the negotiations process exists at all is testimony to the desire for a solution. The challenge to all parties is to capture that desire and make sure that it gives the negotiations sufficient impetus to see it through to a solution acceptable to all.