The ANC's position in the Western Cape continues to improve, while the Democratic Alliance loses ground, mainly to the Independent Democrats, writes James Ngculu.
The 2006 local government elections confirmed once gain the assertion that the ANC continues to grow and is increasingly becoming the dominant force in the Western Cape. The election also proved to be a major breakthrough for the organisation, as the ANC made significant gains across the province and in the city of Cape Town.
The election results confirm that confidence in the ANC is growing. This is particularly significant if one considers the environment in which the elections were contested, characterised by a hostile and negative media; dissident groups, mainly from the ANC, given to political intolerance and threats of violence; and a sustained negative and racist campaign by the Democratic Alliance (DA).
THE ANC STRATEGY
The ANC campaign strategy in the Western Cape was basically in line with the national strategy framework and message. It avoided deviating from the core message of the ANC, and approached the election from a positive perspective.
This meant identifying where ANC voters were and getting them to vote. The core strategy involved mass mobilisation and door-to-door work in African base areas and identifying coloured voters through door-to-door canvassing with a special emphasis on rural coloured wards and those wards in the metro identified as winnable.
The ANC put up candidates in all 105 wards in Cape Town, and engaged vigorously in the poster war with message and candidate posters. The ANC also contested print and electronic media in a hostile media environment.
It also focused on former New National Party (NNP) supporters in coloured areas utilising former NNP leaders. Sectoral work was done especially in the religious community and to some extent in the broader Afrikaans-speaking community.
While the ANC campaign saw a massive and successful mobilisation of the movement's cadres across the province, the list process exposed starkly the weaknesses in our branches. In many areas the only activities our branches are engaged in are list processes and preparations for Branch General Meetings (BGMs) and conferences. Problems found in our structures are not based on any ideological differences but more on competition for positions and in particular those positions that result in some form of remuneration.
Levels of discipline and tolerance in some of our structures have plummeted to low levels. The level of political education and therefore political consciousness must be addressed at all levels of the movement including in the Alliance.
THE DA STRATEGY
The DA saw Cape Town and the Western Cape as areas which could be wrestled from the ANC. They therefore ploughed massive campaign resources into the province. They ran a sustained and widespread poster campaign, flighted thousands of radio ads, and maintained a daily advertising campaign in the press. In the tabloid newspapers, they concentrated their adverts on page three, where these papers publish pictures of semi-naked women. From the perspective of nation building, the DA campaign can be characterised as racist, negative, destructive and counter-productive.
The core focus of the DA was in the white and coloured areas. In Cape Town they focused on the call for the largest turnout in white areas by, among other things, portraying the city management and political leadership as corrupt and incompetent. The DA ignored the African areas, except for some sorties meant to counter the accusation that their campaign was racially exclusive.
Their campaign in these areas was largely limited to postering. Most DA ward candidates in African areas stood in more than one ward, indicating that they had no structures or support in these areas.
The core messages of the DA revolved around the notion of 'Take back your city', which was directed at whipping up emotions among the white community, particularly if taken to its logical and barely-disguised conclusion: '...from these inept Africans'. Still focused on the white community was the poster, 'Bly getrou' (Remain loyal), suggesting that whites should stand together against Africans.
These two slogans - 'Take back your city' and 'Bly getrou' - are reminiscent of the slogans used by the Conservative Party in the 1980s to rally the white 'volk' against the 'verligtes'. The Conservative Party's version of 'Take back your city' was 'Klou aan wat joune is' (Hold on to what is yours).
The other version of their election campaign was particularly targeted at the coloured community, with slogans like 'Stop ANC racism'. DA mayoral candidate Helen Zille was even more crude when she said in the Cape Times of 28 February 2006 that the ANC-led council was "...applying rigid racial quotas for city contracts and employment...".
"It makes no sense, for example, for the ANC to apply national demographics to government appointments and contracts in this region... Individuals have been identified as a group, on the basis of their skin colour, and singled out for privileged access (or exclusion) by government policy."
In the Cape Times of 2 February 2006, she said: "In order to meet employment equity targets that reflect national rather instead of local demographics, municipal employees are pushed out for having the wrong skin colour." She goes on to say: "In housing allocations, the decision to build the N2 Gateway in Langa was an indication to many coloured residents that they were being left behind because of their race."
The theme of the 'incompetence' of Africans was evident in the DA's response to the electricity outages in the Western Cape, where they tacitly blamed 'highly-paid' black managers for the outages the city was facing. A DA councilor, Ian Neilson, was quoted in the Cape Times of 22 February 2006 as saying: "There may be numerous competent people at a mid-management and lower level who knew something was needed, and said so, but the problem is that in most cases, their new managers no longer have the depth of technical understanding of the problems... That is what Cape Town faces now. Three years of ANC government with a year of low-tech senior managers... have led to inadequate performance." A 'new' manager is code for 'African' managers, all of whom, according to Nielson, lack the competence to undertake the running of a city like Cape Town.
The DA used, in particular, the allocation of land at Big Bay and the issue of Jewellery City to claim corruption in the ANC-led metro council. Yet it was the DA that sold the Big Bay land without tender to a specific company below its real value and in disregard of black economic empowerment policy.
The DA used a crude radio advertising and pamphlet campaign to claim that coloureds were not white enough during apartheid and now not black enough in the free and democratic South Africa. They mixed their message with a sustained attack on the Independent Democrats (ID) telling coloured voters in particular that a vote for the ID was a vote for the ANC.
THE ICOSA STRATEGY
The Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa (ICOSA), though registered in the Free State, was mostly active in the Western Cape, focusing on coloured communities in the rural areas. It started growing in Knysna but spread to other areas. It used various methods: in some areas, such as Beaufort West, Knysna, Mossel Bay and Kannaland, it campaigned as ICOSA; while in other areas, such as Oudtshoorn and Laingsburg, became an ally with civic groups.
The organisation ran a racist campaign in these areas based on ethnic mobilisation of coloured people. As part of its campaign, ICOSA volunteers wore t-shirts bearing the slogan, "Still no Freedom" - a clear attempt to portray coloured people as still being in bondage.
One of their candidates, Truman Prince, also used his dismissal as municipal manager of Beaufort West for the benefit of this racist campaign, attributing his dismissal to what he called "Africanists".
In the first local government election in 1995 the ANC in the Western Cape decided to work with a number of civic organisations in Oudtshoorn, Beaufort West, Mossel Bay and Kannaland, which were mainly based in coloured areas.
Some of the individuals involved in these organisations - such as Truman Prince, Jeffrey Donson, Michael Carelse, and Angeline Le Kay - later joined the ANC. However, it would seem that they never imbibed nor assimilated the ANC ethos or policies, especially the principle of non-racialism. These were exactly the same people who, when they were not happy with the outcomes of the list process, decided to stand against the organisation.
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
The ANC made significant gains in the Cape Town metro and in rural towns, while the DA suffered significant losses. In the 2000 local elections, the ANC received 40% of the vote or 444,883 of the total PR votes cast in the province. The ANC controlled four councils -Bitou, Beaufort West, Matzikama and the Central Karoo District.
In the 2006 local election, the ANC increased its share of the vote to 40.13% with actual numbers increasing by 16,298 to 461,181. The ANC is now in control of 19 municipalities, 11 together with the ID, 6 with the DA and 2 outright.
On the other hand the DA experienced a dramatic decline from 51.58% to 40.25% or a decline of 109,328 votes. The DA registered declines in all municipalities, save for Swartland (Malmesbury) where it remained static at 58%. The DA suffered significant losses in 19 municipalities.
The ANC registered significant gains in 12 municipalities even gaining a majority in municipalities where the DA was previously in absolute control.
The ANC suffered significant losses in only three municipalities -Beaufort West (21%), Laingsburg (24%) and Oudtshoorn (11%). These losses should be understood in relation to the emergence of ICOSA.
CAPE TOWN METRO
The Cape Town metro represents the most important area of elections in the Western Cape, where over 70% of voters in the province live.
There were 1,486,781 registered voters in Cape Town compared to 1,269,582 in 2000, of which 737,234 voted compared to 717,365 in 2000, representing a 3% increase. The voter turnout in 2006 was 50% compared to 57% in 2000. The ANC marginally increased its support from 38% in 2000 to 39% in 2006 -an increase in numbers of about 6,531. In 2000 the ANC had 71 seats and the DA 103 seats. In 2006 the ANC increased to 81 seats and the DA dropped to 90 seats. The number of DA votes decreased by 72,837.
The DA didn't just suffer losses at a macro level. Its decline is equally and even more telling at ward level. Out of 105 wards in the metro, the DA dropped in all but 16 wards:
However in the rest of the 89 wards in the metro, the DA suffered significant reverses, with the DA's votes in wards 2, 26, 28, 29, 66, 82 dropping by over 2,000. The DA failed dismally to make any inroads in the African areas.
On the other hand the ANC maintained its strong support in African areas, getting 95.36% of the vote in Phillipi, 95.91% in New Crossroads, 92.72% in KTC, 94.59% in Nyanga, 87% in Langa, 75% in Lwandle, and between 74.5% and 93.15% in areas of Khayelitsha. The ANC polled significantly well in Khayelitsha notwithstanding the most virulent opposition from independent candidates and those within the ANC who supported these independents.
The Independent Democrats (ID) are new to contesting local government elections. The election results suggest the white former NNP supporters recoiled to the DA and their coloured supporters mainly went to the ID, with some split between the ANC and DA.
This analysis is borne out by a comparison of DA and ID votes at a ward level. We have already shown how the DA lost significant numbers of votes in the metro, especially in its base, white and coloured areas.
In ward 7, which covers Northpine and Scottsdene and is mainly coloured, the DA lost around 1,000 votes and the ID gained just over a 1,000. In ward 13, which cover Delft and Lyden and is mainly coloured with Africans in Lyden, the DA lost around 1,200 votes and the ID gained exactly the same number.
The ANC won the ward.
In ward 29, which is a coloured ward in Mamre, the DA lost over 2,000 votes whereas the ID gained around 1,800 votes, though the ANC won the ward. In ward 66 the DA lost over 2,000 votes and the ID gained around the same number and won the ward. In ward 79, in Mitchells Plain, the DA lost around 2,000 votes and the ID gained over 2,000 votes. Exactly the same occurred in ward 82, also in Mitchells Plain.
These wards reflect a pattern across the Cape Town metro, with DA losses in predominantly coloured areas being mirrored very closely in the ID's vote.
ANALYSIS OF NON-METRO RESULTS
As indicated, the ANC now controls more municipalities than it did in 2000.
The ANC won the Bitou and Hessequa councils with an overall majority -Hessequa for the first time.
The ANC is the largest party in the following municipalities:
This is a demonstration of the strides made by the ANC in this election. However, because the ANC does not have an outright majority in most councils, it is bound to negotiate with other parties to form council executives.
As indicated, the Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa (ICOSA) positioned itself as the group to frustrate ANC advances in coloured areas outside the metro. It is possible to assess how it managed to achieve this objective and how the ANC faired in this situation by looking at some of the key councils:
There are five district councils and one metro in the Western Cape. The Boland, Karoo, West Coast and Overberg district councils are controlled by the ANC and other parties. The South Cape district is controlled by the DA.
The local government election results in the Western Cape conforms to the national picture, captured in a statement by the ANC National Executive Committee of 26 March 2006 that "the ANC's overall share of the vote has increased in every province in comparison with the 2000 local government elections. The ANC has more councilors elected in 2006 than in 2000".
James Ngculu is ANC Provincial Chairperson in the Western Cape.
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