While there are various ways of conceptualising the current form and role of the South African state, there are certain basic requirements if the objectives of the national democratic revolution are to be advanced, writes Siphelo Ngcwangu.
The contradictions that have emerged within this transition period have required varying tactical manoeuvres aimed at formulating a basis for a sustainable development path. However these contestations have also opened the space for a meaningful debate within the movement about the resources, measures and mechanisms necessary to building a state capable of responding to the legacy of apartheid and colonialism.
Three forms of cynicism have emerged to criticise the development path chosen by the ANC. The first cynicism argues that the ANC government is creating a 'technicist' approach to governance, meaning that all policy is reduced to technical jargon and bureaucratic reasoning. The second cynicism argues that the masses have been left out of the development agenda due to the prevailing bureaucratic rationality. Thirdly, a rather tired argument by so-called 'new social movements' that the ANC is advancing 'neo-liberal' policies. Interestingly this voice also finds expression within the broad movement itself. Given that neo-liberalism calls for a minimalist state, it is not possible to characterise the development path of the ANC as neo-liberal. We now have greater consensus that in certain areas we actually need to widen the capacity of state to deliver services to our people.
What are the implications of a purely pragmatic approach? Is it not too soon to discount the possible benefits of a capacitated technical bureaucracy that could lay the basis for a future strong democratic state? What are the limits to the 'stabilisation' paradigm? To what extent has deepening democracy through people's participation been construed? Are structures set up for this task, such as ward committees, effective? Is this not an integral phase of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR)? Consequently how do these debates impact the different structures of the ANC and the debates ensuing in these structures?
The current approaches to the debate are all inherently problematic because they engage with the formation of the state from a perspective of a closed experiment. Whereas, as was argued by Zita (2002), you cannot approach an experiment as something that is closed, you should of necessity be open-ended.
Varying methods of conceptualising the state exist. The South African state is a capitalist state, while the government is democratic.
'WEAK' vs 'STRONG' DEVELOPMENTAL STATE HYPOTHESIS
The proponents of the 'weak' vs 'strong' developmental state hypothesis suggest that the weak state approach privileges the power of globalisation over that of the state while the strong developmental state approach privileges the agency of the state. Overwhelmingly both schools of thought emphasise the structural factors influencing state formation.(1) In other words the 'weak' state succumbs to the dominance of global capitalism and is therefore 'hollowed out' as it is forced to conform to the dominant global reality.
The weak state is therefore unable in the face of rampant capitalism to provide the necessary potential for a possible alternative solution to underdevelopment. Therefore the South African state cannot be seen as 'weak' due to the current development trajectory that seeks to improve and rehabilitate the state machinery to deepen democracy and development. However this project cannot of necessity neglect the possibility of mobilising certain elements of capital that could strategically support our own developmental path, with the long-term goal of solidifying the state's resolve in driving the development programme.
On the other hand a 'strong' developmental state, it is argued, is formed by the emergence of an internal consensus that sees an advancement of the productive forces to the extent that the state is able to drive the development project itself. Theorists view the 'strong' developmental state as having potential to avert the negative implications of globalisation with the likelihood of creating exit strategies in the face of globalisation's advance. The South African state is emerging out of a process of democratisation that has seen an institutional reform aimed at building strong democratic bodies that can drive the initial phase of the development project. This has been supported by extended social measures such as the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), extended social welfare systems, free basic education, free water and electricity supply to the indigent, etc. These are intended to give meaning to the democratic transformation process with the intention of adding socioeconomic value to the democratic ideals enshrined in the constitution.
Viable states require a minimum of administrative capacity. Contrary to a pervasive mythology, the popular goodwill which the South African government still enjoys is based partly on relative (albeit uneven) success in delivering public goods to citizens denied them in the past.(2) Although sometimes discounted as 'technicist' the state-building project in South Africa in certain areas will rely on a strong technical base to ensure a trajectory of sustainable development. This should not however be read to mean a teleological approach, which sees the building of capacity as an end in itself.
The current phase of the NDR is subject to these contestations. Ensuring that the capacity is built into governance structures will consolidate the gains that have been made in the last twelve years. However, as the Spanish experience showed in the 1990s, what can start off as a stabilisation project may well have unintended consequences in as much as what starts as a popular project could end with conservative outcomes. Such is the paradox of consequence.
The underlying logic should not see economic stability as an 'end' but rather as a 'means' to deepening national democracy. Therefore capacity in the state is necessary to facilitate the emergence of national democracy accompanied by socioeconomic meaning for our citizens. Even the emerging protests by communities do not challenge the legitimacy of the government nor its class bias. A well-functioning public service could drive the delivery and expansion of those services while democratic structures adequately carry out their tasks. Therefore a narrow dichotomy of weak or strong does not answer the question effectively. The path towards building the state and the complexities it engenders is where our debate should currently be situated.
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSITION
How clear is our programme on international capital? What role will or can state-owned enterprises play in the development project? Are we clear about the 'line of march'.(3) We have realised that consolidating the state in the face of advancing capitalist globalisation may well be a challenging task.
Thus it becomes necessary to outline which mechanism we wish to put in place to regulate the activities of international investment. Until now our policy has been crafted around an approach of 'positioning' South Africa in a hostile global market as an investment destination.
However as the latest UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report on foreign direct investment suggests investments should be linked to the idea of strengthening the local economies of host countries while contributing to sustainable livelihoods. For example, Joseph Stiglitz argues that foreign banks with their greater size may 'crowd out' domestic banks by offering terms which local banks may battle to compete with, thereby challenging the approach government has adopted in transforming the financial sector. This is an exemplar of the ambivalences of social change in a democratic South Africa. At the level of providing banking services to the 'underbanked', the Mzansi account campaign has been a success, but increased investments and participation in our economy by foreign banks could well undermine the gains made through the transformative initiatives in place. The state's position within that framework becomes crucial, specifically as it relates to policy formation. The regulatory instruments we have in place should be consolidated to ensure that the bias towards the poor is sustained.
The State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) therefore have an important role to play in improving infrastructure, not merely to attract investment, but as a conscious effort to ensure a broader production base is laid for greater fixed investment. The idea should be to avert the possibility of the state being unable to drive the regulatory framework within which capital operates. Following the Growth and Development Summit we have consensus that SOEs should actively pursue a development focused approach to ensure the democratic forces greater leverage over the overall thrust of the productive forces in the country. The ideas presented so far illustrate that the South African reality and state-formation can't be interpreted through 'grand narrative' approaches.
The path necessitates that the class character of our society (and our movement) be played out and contested at all levels of government. The NDR seeks to mobilise the working class, the statist element and capital with the intention of playing out the ultimate society we want to build in South Africa. In the short to medium term, as argued earlier, a bureaucratic core of cadres will emerge to implement that reality. The emphasis should be on that cadre not to be oblivious to the values and historical mission of the democratic movement. As such the debate of 'bureaucratisation' of the movement should not be shortsighted but consider the concrete reality and the political environment in which we operate.
THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
Mass mobilisation is integral to ensuring the success of our programme.
It's only when the masses are organised at the community level to be both a bulwark for the NDR and also sustain the local level as a site for political engagement that our development path will have meaning. This is an inherent part of the goals of the ANC. It is well within reason for the ANC leadership to view with skepticism the emergence of extra-parliamentary voices, as they quite, often do not necessarily challenge the development thrust of the government but primarily raise the leadership component at the local level. More broadly centralising power in the movement allows for greater control over the expediencies of local leaders and ensures greater accountability to the working class. This should not be interpreted to mean that local democracy is not necessary, and local communities are distrusted, but a measure of coordination at the centre ensures the ANC is able to give strategic guidance to its leadership at the local level.
The strategic framework therefore has to negotiate the basic pillars of the NDR, consolidate the capacity of the institutional framework (including the regulatory environment), ensure popular participation at all levels and devise policies that play out the class character of our society with a bias to the working class, the poor and the landless. Representative democracy would then clearly be a means to an end and not an end in itself.
Electoral politics may not provide a substantive politics, but it does guarantee an important principle of the Freedom Charter that 'the people shall govern'. The people have a chance to determine their own future and choose who their leaders should be.
Siphelo Ngcwangu is a Ford Foundation Research Fellow at Colorado State University, USA. He is former activist of SASCO, ANCYL, SACP and the ANC.
Notes
1. Hobson, M & Ramesh, M (2002) Globalisation Makes of States What States Make of It: Between Agency and Structure in the State/Globalisation Debate,
New Political Economy Vol.7 No.1
2. See Friedman, S (2000) Beyond Consolidation: State and Democracy in Contemporary Africa, Centre for Policy Studies
3. Jordan (2003) Launch of Chris Hani Institute, Johannesburg.
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