The Afrikaner Empowerment Movement
Editor's Note: In this edited extract from his seminal work, Dan O'Meara traces the development of the economic movement within Afrikaner nationalism prior to the Second World War.
Many of South Africa's key economic institutions, including Sanlam, Volkskas, Avbob and Santam, emerged from this movement, which aimed to liberate the Afrikaner 'volk' from the yoke of poverty by breaking the chains of economic 'imperialism' and building a business elite that could benefit poor whites.
In the course of debating 'economic liberation' the Afrikaner nationalist movement encompassed a variety of views, stretching from 'utopian' ideas of defeating the 'poor white' problem through cooperatives, to the patently capitalist proposals for a finance company to pool emerging Afrikaner capital and direct it toward productive investment.
Notably, these debates took place in the period when the Afrikaner nationalist movement did not have full control of state power, as was the case after 1948. In a separate paper, O'Meara argues that: "While the economic movement did lead to the economic empowerment of some Afrikaners, these were not the vast bulk of the farmers and the workers whose savings contributed so heavily to the success of volkskapitalisme. To the extent that Afrikaner workers and farmers became economically empowered under the National Party, it was the state, rather than Afrikaner business, which looked after their interests".
In considering the historical lessons of the Afrikaner empowerment movement, it is important to bear in mind two factors that distinguish this history from contemporary debates. First, Afrikaner nationalism represented a narrow, ethnically-based and exclusive nationalism. In contrast, the project of African nationalism, led by the ANC, has always been broad, non-racial and inclusive.
Second, the nature of the international economy has profoundly changed since the 1940s. In the context of globalisation, the space for state intervention to protect and support an emerging 'national bourgeoisie' is much smaller. And today, capital is more than ever a global (rather than national) institution, throwing into doubt the possibility of there existing a 'patriotic capital'.
---By the 1930s, the historical trajectory of capitalist development in South Africa had produced a pattern of ownership of the means of production in which Afrikaans-speaking whites controlled an insignificant proportion of production in all sectors except agriculture. Only in the Cape had there emerged anything resembling capitalist undertakings controlled by Afrikaans-speakers.
In the words of his biographer, WA (Willie) Hofmeyr was the first among Afrikaner intellectuals to see the golden opportunity "to develop national consciousness into a business consciousness". He pursued this vision with an iron determination.
In December 1914, a petty bourgeois group around Hofmeyr formed Die Nasional Pers to publish De Burger ('The Citizen'). The initial £8,000 capital was provided by a few wealthy Stellenbosch wine farmers - beginning a long-standing economic and political alliance. After 1915, De Burger formed the Cape Section of the Helpmekaarsvereniging (Mutual Aid Association) to pay the fines and otherwise assist those imprisoned participants in Afrikaner rebellion of 1914-15.
De Burger played a vital role in mobilising contributions for this appeal, which collected almost £250,000. The Helpmekaar movement demonstrated how nationalist sentiment coordinated through the press, party and special institutions, could be an extremely powerful mobiliser of both the revenue of rich farmers and the meagre savings of the petty bourgeoisie and workers.
According to the official chronicler of the economic movement: "All at once the Afrikaner realised that, comparatively poor as he was, there nevertheless lay locked up in him a dispersed capital which could and must help him to find his economic feet - if the money could be effectively mobilised." (EP Du Plessis 1964:8)
The Helpmekaarsvereniging organised Afrikaans speakers from different classes, reinforcing the idea of a classless nation. "The Helpmekaar gave rise to the mighty clarion call to the volk to try to conquer the last stronghold, the business world. Then would a new day dawn. And out of the combined influence of the awakened nationalism, the Helpmekaar and the Cradock congress [on the poor white problem], each backed-up and interpreted by De Burger and the Nationalist Party, were born those symbols of victory in the Afrikaans business life of South Africa - Santam and Sanlam - with their fitting and illuminating motto, 'Born out of the Volk to serve the Volk'." (le Roux, 1953:125)
As a direct result of his experience as chairman of the Peninsular Helpmekaarsvereniging, Hofmeyr formed the Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust Maatskappy (Santam) in 1918. The £20,000 initial capital was provided by the same Western Cape farmers who financed De Burger. Santam was initially intended to effect both short- and long-term assurance. Within a few months the two operations were separated. In June 1918, a wholly owned subsidiary life assurance company was formed - Sanlam. Two months later, a further division of life and industrial assurance was effected. Though its own paid up capital stood at a meagre £20,000, Sanlam splashed out £120,000 to buy African Homes Trust and Assurance Company.
By 1919, the stable of Santam, Sanlam, and the African Homes Trust offered a range of short- and long-term insurance services. Santam's major function as a trust company was to provide short-term credit to agriculture.
Growth was slow. Competitors used every jingoist device and emotion to confine Sanlam's activities to the petty servicing of agriculture. Moreover, as the potential investors and clients, Afrikaner farmers had to be weaned from the hoary myth that 'the Afrikaner is no businessman and could accomplish nothing in the business world'. The group's major weapon in its struggles to attract business was a self-conscious evocation of nationalist sentiment, well revealed in the 1922 Chairman's report: "Sanlam is an authentic institution of the Afrikaner volk in the widest sense of the word.
As an Afrikaner, you will naturally give preference to an Afrikaner institution. I would just remind policy holders that we are busy furnishing employment to young Afrikaners, and training them in the assurance field. We hereby intend to provide a great service to South Africa. If we want to become economically self-reliant then we must support our own institutions. To this end, Sanlam offers you the opportunity."
The Santam/Sanlam group aimed to pool the money resources of all Afrikaans-speakers in a central fund, there to be converted into productive-capital. This money was to come from a number of sources. Through the mobilising agency of Afrikaner nationalism it sought to draw together the revenue of capitalist farmers and the small savings of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie.
The most important source of funds was Afrikaner farmers. The ability of the group to centralise money-capital was determined above all by the accumulation of capital in agriculture, particularly in the Cape. The years 1918 to 1937 saw a concentration of capital in Cape agriculture beyond anything occurring in other regions.
An agent and index of the concentration of agricultural capital was the rapid development of the agricultural cooperative movement following the Cooperative Association Act of 1922. The most important cooperative, that of the Cape wine growers - the Ko-operatiewe Wynbouers-Vereniging (KWV) - had been established in the same year as Santam/Sanlam. The cooperatives were instrumental in the concentration of agricultural capital through the processing and marketing of their members products; the collective - hence cheaper - purchase of seeds, implements, machinery etc; and the provision of various services, for example, repairs. By 1937 the Union-wide members of agricultural cooperatives stood at 75,316 with a total turnover of £15.9 million.
SANLAM APPROACHES THE BROEDERBOND
Dependent for the bulk of its funds on Cape agriculture, the growth of Sanlam was slow. By 1928, its assets stood at £500,000. It achieved an annual premium income of half a million pounds in 1936 and was providing interest free loans to holders of all policies over £1,000.
Other factors hindered Sanlam's growth. Firstly though it enjoyed support from Cape farmers, it had not gained a real foothold in the north. Given the conditions of northern agriculture less latent money-capital was available for centralisation in the north. Secondly, farmers with capital available for placement in credit institutions would not necessarily wish to invest it all in life assurance, where they had to wait long for any return, and faced difficulties in withdrawing funds should it become necessary. Moreover, whilst Sanlam had centralised money in its assured fund, all sorts of statutory limitations hedged in the investments of life assurance companies.
Thus, by 1937, the company was confined largely to small-scale credit and had not been able to move into productive investment in industry. The situation of the economic movement in the Orange Free State (OFS) and the Transvaal was very different from that in the Cape. The concentration of agricultural capital was less developed and had not given rise to centralising institutions like Sanlam. The few 'financial' undertakings which did exist, such as the Suid-Afrikaanse Spaar-en Voorskot Bank (Sasbank) and the Afrikaner Verbond Begrafnis Ondernemings Beperk (AVBOB) were very small establishments dependent largely on the petty savings of Afrikaner workers.
Thus the gradual development of the economic movement in the north occurred under different conditions from the Cape. Sanlam's need for access to the profits of northern agriculture drove it into an approach to the Broederbond in 1937. This involved much more than business cooperation. It required above all ideological and political coordination.
Following the formation of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenignings (FAK) as its 'public front' in 1929, the Broederbond had increasingly turned its attention to economic issues. Its 1930 congress resolved to strive for the "economic self-sufficiency of the impoverished section of our volk, and for the training of a commercial community among Afrikaners".
The August 1931 congress decided that a 'people's bank' should be established. After an extensive discussion, the bank Volkskas (literally 'people's treasury') was established in Pretoria by sixty broers in April 1934. Volkskas was always regarded as the Broederbond's bank. All vacancies on its board were filled by the Broederbond Executive Council.
Volkskas began as a cooperative bank with a paid up capital of £5,000. Although "not announced at the time" the bank later acknowledged that it had always intended to abandon this cooperative form. Responding to charges that the Board misled the public, it argued that the initial adoption of the cooperative form was necessary "to gain the cooperation of the Afrikaner masses". Volkskas immediately faced great hostility from both the big commercial banks and the existing volk's banks (notably Sasbank). The former refused it clearing facilities, and endeavoured to get Volkskas prosecuted under the Usury Act, whilst the latter bitterly attack it within the ranks of the volk as a 'capitalist' institution. But the Broederbond connection was used to mobilise support for the bank.
The 1930s saw extended debate within the Broederbond on economic questions. Through its various fronts it sought to involve a much wider 'group of Afrikaners' in the debates. A theoretical journal associated with the Broederbond, Koers ('Directions'), took the lead. Its first issue warned of the "golden chains" of growing economic domination by "imperialism". The journal continually returned to the theme of the 'economic reorganisation of our national (volks) life'. The perilous position of 'Afrikanerdom' was blamed on a long series of 'profiteers'. The development of the credit system was held particularly responsible for reducing large numbers of Afrikaners to debt and, through lack of access to large-scale credit, preventing their transformation into entrepreneurs. This led to the regular demand for easy credit "to suit the national requirements rather than capitalist profit". A key interventionist role was assigned to the state, which should regulate the market, protect domestic industry and agriculture, ensure the complete segregation of the races, and organise the unemployed into a "labour army" to fulfil "national requirements".
Dr N Diederichs, who was to become the Chairman of the Broederbond and later on the National Party's Minister of Finance, also took up these issues. Writing in the Afrikaans-Nasionaal Studentebond (ANS) organ, Wapenskou ('Review of Arms') he laid particular stress on the inter-connection between the struggles for language and economic equality. Readers were urged to 'buy Afrikaans' and to insist on using Afrikaans in all economic activities. But this was not enough: "Consider further how you can contribute to the struggle. Act individually, act together with others, but ACT, ACT, ACT! We must seize this [economic] struggle and win through".
Outside the Broederbond, the venerated Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) pastor JD 'Vader' Kestell regularly raised economic issues in his column in Die Volksblad, concentrating particularly on the 'poor white' question. In a series of articles he pleaded for collective action under the slogan 'Saamwerk, Helpmekaar, Redmekaar' (cooperation, mutual aid, collective redemption) and urged the creation of another central fund similar to the old Helpmekaar. This would finance the return of 'poor whites' to the land.
Yet despite the regular discussion of economic questions, the direct achievements of the Broederbond in the economic field prior to 1939 were negligible. The explanation is simple. While the Broederbond harnessed the talents of the intellectual cream of the northern petty bourgeoisie, in the blunt words of its official history on economic questions the broers were dom. They not only lacked business experience, above all else they lacked capital. Precisely because the Broederbond was a purely petty-bourgeois organisation; precisely because, unlike their southern counterparts, the northern petty bourgeoisie were politically isolated from capitalist farmers the Broederbond was cut off from all sources of capital, and politically too weak to begin to achieve a similar centralisation of capital as in the Cape group. Furthermore, the Broederbond was weak in the Cape itself where it had relatively few members.
Only after Sanlam approached the Broederbond in 1937, did the Broederbond's concern with economic issues begin to be translated into effective action. Both groups needed each other. Sanlam needed the Broederbond's control over the levers of cultural legitimacy while the Broederbond needed Sanlam's expertise and capital. But it was always a conflictual relationship. There were differences of "political and economic outlook", and fear in the Broederbond of "political and economic domination" of the north by the "established interests" of the Cape. Nevertheless, the Sanlam-Broederbond collaboration began in 1937, when the enactment of the Marketing Act promised to make available potentially large sums of latent-capital in agriculture, to be centralised in credit institutions. Realising that Sanlam on its own lacked the resources to mobilise such potential capital, its financial strategist, MS Louw, now discussed his plans with Broederbond leadership.
TOWARDS THE ECONOMIC VOLKSKONGRES
When Louw made his approach in late 1937, the Broederbond was itself planning a volkskongres on the 'poor white' question. According to his biographer, on hearing this Louw immediately realised that "the formation of such a finance company would acquire much greater weight if the plan could receive the support of such a representative volkskongres, and it would therefore be in the interests of the volk if he made his plan part of the programme of action of the congress". No doubt what was good for Sanlam was good for the volk.
Louw's plans were extensively discussed within the Broederbond, leading to a very different emphasis in the proposed volkskongres. By July 1938 it had been decided that the focus of the kongres would be on the economic position of the Afrikaner and how to transform it. Louw was appointed to the Broederbond committee, chaired by LJ du Plessis, charged with organising the forthcoming kongres. Louw himself was especially mandated to draw up detailed proposals for an investment company.
The volk were to be carefully prepared for the volkskongres. The Broederbond was organising the celebrations for the impending centenary of the Great Trek. It was now decided to make these celebrations "serve the economic interests of the Afrikaner". The Eeufees (centenary) or Tweede Trek (second trek) more than succeeded in preparing Afrikaans speakers for an economic volkskongres. All along the route, the economic plight of urban Afrikaners was a leading theme as significant voices stressed economic issues. Dr HF Verwoerd reminded the volk that the 300,000 'poor whites' were the descendants of the Voortrekkers, whose message to the living was "Afrikanerise the cities and assume your rightful place in commerce and industry".
The venerated 'Vader' Kestell best captured the spirit and function of the Eeufees. In a powerful speech in front for the wagons in Bloemfontein, Kestell encapsulated his writings of the last nine years in an emotional plea for a great 'deed of Salvation', by which the volk would rescue itself from poverty. Kestell's theme - 'n volk red homself ('a people rescues/redeems itself') - became the slogan of the economic movement.
Whilst the Broederbond was 'creating the right climate' for the Volkskongres, Louw pressed ahead with his planning of the finance company. In the midst of the Eeufees, he laid his first proposals before the Sanlam directorate.
Louw proposed the formation of a finance company with a capital of £1 million. It would aim firstly to secure the largest possible profits for its shareholders, but, secondly, "the major aim shall always be to strengthen the position of the Afrikaner in commerce and industry". Sanlam itself should take the initiative in the establishment of such a finance company. "I cannot propose a more effective method than this, to employ the mobilised capital of the Afrikaner in the furtherance of his national interests in the spheres of commerce and industry, and to capture key positions [in the economy]. Such a finance company appears to be the appropriate means through which the Afrikaner can realise his legitimate struggle to assert himself in the economic domain. It will be the starting point of further large scale undertakings, only the first step in a mighty program"
Eager for expansion out of the narrow field of insurance, the Sanlam board endorsed these proposals. Sanlam would underwrite the share issue and free one-twelfth of its personnel for the venture, provided the official backing of the forthcoming Volkskongres was secured - Sanlam could not risk such an undertaking without the mobilising resources of the Broederbond.
In a memorandum of 20 April 1939 to the Santam board (which controlled Sanlam), the aims of the proposed company were spelled out: "The company will itself do no business. Its function should be the financing and establishing of Afrikaner commercial and industrial undertakings. Through the purchasing of shares, or in other ways, it will also obtain control over existing businesses and Afrikanerise them. It will also finance existing Afrikaner undertakings through the discounting of bills etc." (Bezuitenhout 1968:64-5)
The detailed plans were accepted by the Santam board. When likewise approved by the Broederbond in May 1939, a three-man committee was mandated to lay these proposals before the kongres as its primary plank. The committee was composed of Louw and two other prominent Cape broers - Dr E Dsnges, and Professor CGS Schumann, Dean of the Faculty of Commerce of Stellenbosch University.
Despite its hostility to WA Hofmeyr, in effect what the Broederbond was recommending to the volk were Sanlam's plans for expansion. The proposals had been conceived by its actuary and were first cleared by its board. The share issue was underwritten by Sanlam with administration to be undertaken by its specially seconded personnel. For Sanlam, this was the way out of the narrow horizons of insurance. Through the mobilising power of the Broederbond and its front organisations, the scheme offered Sanlam access to the potential money-capital of a much wider group of farmers, and to the savings of both Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie and workers. Now it would be able to lay claim to these funds by right as the official organ of Afrikanerdom, and so enter entirely new fields of investment hitherto barred to it. On the other hand, Sanlam's proposal transformed the Broederbond's view of the role of the kongres. It opened up much wider possibilities for the northern petty bourgeoisie. What Sanlam had achieved might be open to others as well. But without the expertise and established financial strength of the southern group, movement out of the narrow world of petty trade was unlikely. Thus, despite the strong antipathy to and fear of dominance by the financiers of the south, the Broederbond seized on Sanlam's scheme. Yet the ambivalence and tensions remained.
CONTRADICTORY TENDENCIES AND VOLKSKAPITALISME
Proceedings and recommendations of the Volkskongres, convened by the FAK in October 1939, deeply reflect this ambivalence. On the one hand were the clear-sighted proposals of the Cape trio, making up the main recommendations laid before the kongres. Here was advocated a finance company whose shareholders were to be rewarded not with 'pious sentiment', but in the 'jingling coin' of profit. The large-scale capitalist character of this undertaking was unmistakable, and Schumann and Louw, in particular, made no effort to disguise it.
On the other hand a great variety of generally utopian cooperative schemes were proposed. These stressed the plight of the 'poor whites' and were geared to 'rescue them' through developing small business. All of this was cast in a strong anti-capitalist rhetoric totally absent from the Sanlam proposals. Finally, in the middle, and trying to hold together what were clearly contradictory tendencies through a stress on nationalism and the unity of all Afrikaners, stood the chairman of the organising committee, LJ du Plessis. Assuming a role with which he was to become increasingly familiar, du Plessis' opening address on the 'Purpose of our Economic Struggle' tried to reconcile both tendencies through a plea for volkskapitalisme: "[In the past] we also accepted that the masses who were unable quickly and easily to adapt to capitalism would sink into poor whiteism. Sympathetically we belittled them and distanced ourselves from them, at best philanthropically offering them 'alms' or poor relief from the state. And meanwhile this process of adjustment was destroying our volk by denationalising its economic leaders and proletarianising its producing masses. But, in the awakening of national consciousness, the volk has perceived this too, and the new national economic movement sets for itself the goal of reversing this process; no longer to tolerate the destruction of the Afrikaner volk in an attempt to adopt to a foreign capitalist system, but to mobilise the volk to capture this foreign system and adapt it to our national character." (EP du Plessis 1964:104)
The wide differences between the Sanlam conception on the one hand, and the solidly petty-bourgeois orientation of the northern delegates on the other are crucial to an understanding of both the economic movement, and of Afrikaner nationalism itself.
Professor CGW Schumann introduced the Sanlam proposals to the kongres. In sharp contrast to du Plessis' keynote address, and the concerns of many of the delegates with the poverty of 'poor whites', he bluntly stated that in the past too much attention had been paid to "this unhealthy section".
Rather than concern itself with 'poor whites' the kongres should aim to "help the Afrikaner become an entrepreneur, an employer and an owner of capital". This could only be achieved by mobilising the "capital resources" of the volk. There were two potential sources of such capital. Firstly, Afrikaner consumers controlled an annual buying power of £100m. Secondly, and more importantly, "the farming community clearly forms the most financially strong section of the volk. They should become the source of capital for Afrikaner business in commerce and industry etc". This would also benefit farmers, as it would provide for the diversification of agricultural capital into other sectors of capital accumulation.
Schumann was immediately followed by Dsnges who argued that so many Afrikaans speakers lived in poverty because "Afrikaner capital power is not being purposively mobilised nor productively employed with the aim of giving the Afrikaner that place in commercial life to which he is legitimately entitled". Existing Afrikaner financial institutions were designed and developed "purely to provide for the long term capital requirements of the Afrikaner agriculturalist", and were unsuitable for investment in industry and commerce. Any attempt to mobilise 'Afrikaner capital' for investment in such fields faced both the "psychological preference of the Afrikaner to invest in tangibles, land, houses etc" and a lack of suitable investment channels.
The proposed finance company would provide the appropriate channel for the investment of such capital. This would ensure "the Afrikaner his legitimate place in the economy". Dsnges was also very clear on just what the 'legitimate' place was. The aim was to develop a group of Afrikaner capitalists: "not just to Afrikanerise commerce and industry to a greater extent, also not only to attract more Afrikaners as workers in commerce and industry, but to increase by ten-fold the number of Afrikaners employers in commerce and industry". To ensure the successful functioning of the finance company it should have a management both "in full agreement with our aims", and "experienced in investment and [which] has made its mark in commercial and economic fields". Only Sanlam fulfilled the requirements.
Louw's speech showed how this ten-fold increase in the number of Afrikaner capitalists could be achieved by drawing together the capital of farmers and the small savings of Afrikaner workers and petty bourgeoisie in a great alliance: "The finance company will stand in the forefront of the forthcoming struggle of the Afrikaner to find his legitimate share in the commerce and industry of our country. It will mesh together the farmer, the investor, the consumer and the employee on the one side, and the retailer, wholesaler, manufacturer and credit establishment on the other."
Each section would benefit in this great service to the volk: "For the investor it will create the opportunity to use his capital in the interests of this Afrikaner concern whilst drawing profit from his investment. The Afrikaner farmer will find Afrikaners to process and distribute products. Opportunities will be created for the practical training and employment of Afrikaner boys and girls in commercial and industrial undertakings where they can occupy the highest posts."
Yet lest there be any doubts as to the real purpose of the company, Louw bluntly dispelled them. The first aim was profit. Investments would be made with an eye to profitability rather than sentiment or demand: "If we wish to achieve success, we must utilise the techniques of capitalism as it is applied in the leading industry of our country, the gold mining industry. A finance company must be established which will function in commerce and industry like the so-called 'finance houses' of Johannesburg". Louw's directness must have appalled many.
In effect the Volkskongres was a pure rubber-stamp for these plans. Indeed, the preparatory committee had been mandated to proceed with the establishment of this Sentrale Volksbeleggings Company even before the congress. A board of directors - "Afrikaners who have already made their mark in commerce and industry" - had already been appointed by the committee. Most were senior Sanlam employees or close associates like Dsnges and Schumann. And Sanlam was to provide the management and administration of the new company. The capitalist character of the proposed company is clear. The Cape trio made little attempt to dress it up in plebeian Voortrekker garb.
Concerned with the position of small operators other speakers detailed less grandiose schemes. Great emphasis was laid on cooperatives. A number of speakers argued that cooperatives were the appropriate form for volkskapitalisme, as they avoided both evils, monopoly and individualism, by drawing all groups into mutual support and cooperation. Existing cooperatives in banking, retailing and agriculture were extensively analysed. The speech of JH van Vuuren on cooperative "People's Banks" offers a revealing insight into one conception of cooperatives.
"So long as nearly 300,000 Afrikaans-speakers live below the breadline; so long as a large percentage of our fellow Afrikaners remain the hewers of wood and the drawers of water in their own country; so long as the Afrikaner is notable by his absence in our business life; and so long as a large section of the agrarian population are forced by circumstances to migrate to the cities in order to make a living, millions of pounds belonging to Afrikaners lie around unproductively." (EP du Plessis 1964:117-18) The 'People's Banks' could centralise such loose money and turn it into productive-capital. Others had a different view of cooperatives. Producer and consumer cooperatives were valued because they provided necessary services to their members and did not strive after large profits for their shareholders. This emphasis on cooperatives emerged as the universal panacea of the congress. Great stress, too, was laid on the coordination of the buying power of Afrikaners to develop Afrikaner businesses. Collective action, emphasising the unity of the volk and the great dangers of class divisions, was a theme constantly echoed in all proposals.
The recommendations of the Ekonomiese Volkskongres accepted as its major plank the plans of the Cape three-man committee. Resolution II declared the conviction of the kongres "that this is the most effective plan for the application of Afrikaner capital to improve the position of the Afrikaner in the commerce and industry of our country, and calls on the volk to support this undertaking, by taking up its capital".
To this end, the same resolution mandated the FAK to take steps to ensure that: "Thrift should be cultivated and strengthened in our volk; full support be obtained for existing Afrikaner savings and credit institutions; greater facilities for the exercise of thrift be provided through the establishment of new savings and credit institutions, if, after investigation, these are deemed necessary; new opportunities for the profitable and safe investment of capital be created through the establishment of new commercial and industrial undertakings, or through the expansion of existing establishments; Afrikaners and financial strong Afrikaner establishments must be encouraged to invest a greater share of their capital in commerce and industrial undertakings" (EP du Plessis 1964:125-33)
The first resolution of the kongres recognised that a permanent (Afrikaner) proletariat had been created. It urged the state to provide for the training of this proletariat, and further urged that young Afrikaners be trained in business studies. Other resolutions stressed the importance of cooperatives and the necessity to establish a central cooperatives union. Afrikaner consumers should be organised to provide a market for Afrikaner industries.
Industry should be established on a cooperative basis and an Afrikaner Chamber of Commerce and Industry was proposed. The kongres stressed the importance of agriculture as the 'backbone' of the economy of the volk.
Since the entire financial strategy of the Volkskongres was predicated on profitable agriculture, much emphasis was laid on the need for stable agriculture prices. Finally, to create the widest possible support for the proposed finance company and other 'supplementary proposals', it was decided that: "The time has arrived for calling into existence of one large, Christian-national volks' organisation, which will propagate and give effect to these measures, and others which may appear necessary". The FAK was further mandated to call into existence a new Ekonomiese Instituut to give effect to all the resolutions and to take any further steps.
The Ekonomiese Volkskongres is one of the great turning points in the development of Afrikaner nationalism. The Broederbond's official history argues that "never before... was such an important congress held". Here was crystallised a strategy to transform the position of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie within South African capitalism. This was elevated to the status of a great national movement under the joint direction of the Broederbond and Sanlam. The economic struggle of the petty bourgeoisies became the central core of the nationalist movement in the 1940s, and was clearly seen as part and parcel of the overall nationalist political struggle.
'LOOSE MONEY' TO PRODUCTIVE CAPITAL
The economic strategy was straightforward. First and foremost, utilising the full organisational and ideological resources of the Broederbond working through the FAK, all 'loose money' was to be drawn out of the pockets of Afrikaans-speakers of all classes and into the coffers of the new finance company. Here it would be transformed into productive capital in commerce and industry. Through a coordinated centralisation of money-capital, industrial capital would be generated. But this was predicated above all else on a further centralisation of agricultural capital. As has been repeatedly stressed, the capitalist farmers were the major source of capital. They had to be persuaded that the accumulation of their capital should occur in a new form. Instead of always being reinvested in more land, part of the profits guaranteed by the Marketing Act should be invested in the new finance company, to be utilised productively in commerce and industry. But the savings of workers and the petty bourgeoisie were also seen as a source of such money capital. Yet it was not expected that workers would be able to buy shares in the new company. Their small savings should rather be centralised in other kinds of credit institutions.
All this was fine in theory and made a lot of sense. But the difficult part was precisely the mobilisation of such money capital. As Dsnges recognised, this involved three sorts of changes. Given the widespread belief that "the Afrikaner can never be a businessman", it required a major ideological offensive - a "transformation of economic consciousness" as Dsnges put it.
As this ideological offensive developed, the transformation of economic consciousness became a redefinition of Afrikaner nationalism itself - of its goals, strategies, alliances, priorities and class character. It became above all a redefinition which stressed the role of the Afrikaner entrepreneur, and in doing so redefined the relations between classes. Now, more than ever, class consciousness was a mortal danger to the petty bourgeoisie and its developing economic movement. Afrikaner workers had to be made "part and parcel of the daily life of the volk". Thus, secondly, alongside the gathering ideological offensive in the 1940s, there developed a complex organisational structure to direct and mobilise all classes of the volk for the economic struggle. Thirdly, and finally, the mobilisation of capital required the establishment of new forms of credit institutions. This was provided for by the new finance company, which finally emerged in 1940 as Federal Volksbelegging (FVB).
In its resolutions on producer and consumer cooperatives, on the coordination of buying power, etc, the Ekonomiese Volkskongres also attempted to develop a strategy which would lead to the development of existing and new smaller undertakings. The volk were also to be mobilised to support these. But already a division appears. The kongres was dominated by the Sanlam scheme for a financial company. This emerged as the major recommendation of the kongres. The full organisational resources of the Broederbond (together with those of Sanlam) were put at the service of the new FVB. No other undertaking enjoyed the privilege. The Ekonomiese Volkskongres had mirrored the two views which were to spill over into nationalist politics in the years to come - the straightforward capitalist concerns of Sanlam, and the petty bourgeois, anti-capitalist rhetoric of the northern delegates.
Dan O'Meara is currently with the Department of Political Science at the University of Quebec, Montreal, Canada.
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