This statement aims to clarify our understanding of black economic empowerment (BEE) and how we can integrate it effectively into all our strategies.
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) goes to the heart of the debate in South Africa about the fundamental tasks of transformation. BEE has been a consistent theme in ANC policy from at least the time of the Freedom Charter. Indeed, two of the Charter's main demands were: "The people shall share in the country's wealth!" and "The land shall be shared among those who work it!" The goal of BEE has therefore been a central pillar of the democratic Government's strategy for economic transformation.
The ANC's 1969 Strategy and Tactics emphasises that:
"In our country - more than any other part of the oppressed world - it is inconceivable for liberation to have meaning without a return of wealth and land to the people as a whole. It is therefore a fundamental feature of our strategy that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy. To allow the existing economic forces to retain their interests intact is to feed the root of racial supremacy and does not represent even a shadow of liberation."
The ANC Policy Guidelines (1992) gave details of policies required to fundamentally transform the South African political and economic landscape -in areas such as housing, land reform, the environment, health, social welfare, education and building the economy. It should be noted that all these policies were designed to create an enabling environment to empower the black majority.
With the regards to specific instruments to deracialise the economy, the Policy Guidelines said:
"management of both the public and private sectors will have to be de-racialised so that they rapidly and progressively come to reflect the skills of the entire population. Equity ownership will have to be extended so that people from all sectors of the population have a stake in the economy and power to influence economic decisions."
The Reconstruction & Development Programme (RDP) set out the key development challenges for the new government that include: the creation of jobs; human resource development; provision of infrastructure; changes in ownership patterns and the reduction of inequality in society. The RDP document provided a more comprehensive framework (than the earlier documents) for addressing the issue of BEE. There were recommendations calling for:
In relation to ownership the RDP said:
"The domination of business activities by white business and the exclusion of black people and women from the mainstream of economic activity are causes for great concern for the reconstruction and development process. A central objective of the RDP is to deracialise business ownership and control completely through focused policies of Black Economic Empowerment.
(RDP 4.4.6.3)"
The ANC's Strategy and Tactics document, as amended at the 50th National Conference, December, 1997 talks about:
"The creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society.
This, in essence, means the liberation of Africans in particular and black people in general from political and economic bondage. It means uplifting the quality of life of all South Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are African and female."
The Government has implemented various measures in different areas of public policy to advance the objectives of BEE. However, there is an absence of a coordinated and targeted approach that integrates all these efforts and measures their impact on advancing the levels of black participation in economic activities.
However, South Africa's economy is still characterised by inadequate investment, low levels of economic growth, huge development backlogs, vast inequalities in income and rising levels of unemployment and poverty.
As President Thabo Mbeki pointed out at the BMF National Conference in 1999:
"Five years after the arrival of the democratic order, we have not made much progress and may well be marching backward with regards to the de-racialisation of the productive property. Clearly something is not right."
There have been numerous obstacles that have hindered the successful implementation of the national transformation project. The ANC Strategy and Tactics, December 1997 mentions some of these obstacles:
"The current wide front of struggle has had the potential of dissipating focus. As such, some of the detailed action undertaken may not clearly reflect internal consistency and a relation to the strategic objective.
While decisive progress has been made, the questions remain: "Have there been missed opportunities? Have the constraints been fully understood and confronted? Does the movement have the cadreship to carry out its objectives on all fronts?"
The NGC (July 2000) discussed the issue of Economic Transformation:
"Although macro-economic stability remains a necessary condition for growth, it is not a sufficient condition for growth, development and job creation" and that "other more targeted strategies are necessary in areas such as:
This NGC resolution was taken forward by the NEC Lekgotla and the Cabinet Lekgotla in January 2001 and formed the basis for government priorities for the year. The targeted strategies that were agreed to were elaborated upon in President Thabo Mbeki's State of the Nation Address to parliament and Budget Speech in February 2001.
"The objectives we seek to achieve are moving the economy onto a high-growth path, increasing its competitiveness and efficiency, raising employment levels and reducing poverty and persistent inequalities."
The Cabinet Legkotla in January 2001 said that BEE is a key component of a sustainable growth path, which needs to be effectively supported, through integrated policies that significantly increase the economic contribution an d productivity of all South Africans. This was reinforced in the State of the Nation Address, BEE was sited as an indicator against which performance would be measured.
The BEECom under the auspices of the Black Business Council drafted a report on a "National Integrated BEE Strategy". The ANC met with the BEECom in a workshop to discuss the BEE Strategy on March, 3 2001. It was agreed at this workshop that the ANC would draft a Statement on BEE incorporating the outcomes of the workshop and subsequent consultations.
The BEECom submitted its report on to the President on April 11,2001. The DG Cluster on Employment and Investment was mandated to coordinate the response to the BEECom and to design a National BEE strategy.
The ANC believes that the BEECom report has made a significant contribution to the challenge of defining BEE. The report argues that BEE is a necessary measure aimed at increasing South Africa's growth prospects through programmes, which in a targeted and deliberate manner address the marginalisation of the black majority, by substantially increasing access to and the use of productive assets.
Such a strategy is both a political and an economic imperative. It is an investment in democracy, prosperity and security over the long term. BEE must become the responsibility of all Government departments, the private sector and civil society.
The BEECom has encapsulated a broad definition of BEE. It argues:
This approach was adopted by members of the ANC's Economic & Transformation Committee (ETC) at the workshop on March 3, 2001.
The COSATU input to the ANC Policy Workshop said:
"We therefore do not see BEE narrowly as the enrichment of a few black individuals. Rather, we see it as empowerment of the black majority in the context of dealing with the legacy of apartheid and the NDR. We accept that the process of dealing with discrimination may ultimately lead to the development of a new black bourgeoisie. Our approach, however, is that for BEE to make sense for the majority of our people, the emphasis must be on blacks as a whole."
This definition is thus a significant contribution to the contextualisation and the design of a comprehensive BEE Strategy and Programme. It locates BEE in the overall transformation programme, the RDP, and it argues that the broader and meaningful participation of black people in economic activities is central to growth, poverty eradication and the building of a more egalitarian society.
SA's transformation challenges can only be addressed in a context of a growing economy. However, economic growth whilst being a necessary condition to raise the living standards of the people, is unlikely to reduce the racial and income inequalities of the society unless the growth process is accompanied by creative economic and social programmes that address these inequalities. Furthermore, prevailing inequalities, unemployment and poverty have a fundamental impact on prospects for attracting productive investment and thereby reinforce the low growth cycle.
Economies that increase the participation of its people in production through equity ownership, skills development and social pacts between government, labour and business, amongst other interventions, are more likely to become competitive.
The government's current industrial policy needs to move beyond competitiveness strategies, which place a premium on expanding the current industrial base through complex manufacturing, beneficiation and knowledge based production. The Strategy must address the need for complementary policies (in the form of a BEE Strategy) to forge an accumulation path based on adding the factor inputs of the majority (land, labour, capital, innovation, entrepreneurship etc) into the economy. A range of interventions, (which include skills and business development, better workplace organisation and innovation support,) beyond the basic production process are thus required to enhance competitiveness.
In the face of prevailing constraints and trade offs that come with resource allocation and prioritisation, our programmes should address issues of providing real economic opportunities to various strata. A BEE strategy, which does not support all strata in society, and especially the most marginalised, will be ineffective.
It is simultaneously necessary to implement measures, which ensure the emergence of black human capital and black enterprises as dominant economic players with increasing influence. The inevitable consequence will be the growth of a black middle class. This is a necessary step in BEE process, which can contribute towards transformation in the economy.
Adopting the wider definition, the process cannot be led alone by black business and professionals or organisations such as the BEECom. It must include the rural poor and the working class. There is a view that working class leadership of the BEE process must be highlighted. However an integrated BEE strategy will require an amalgamation of classes to drive the process.
However, there are a number of questions. Will the middle classes benefit at the expense of the rural poor and the working class? This illustrates the importance of an Integrated BEE Strategy that will empower the majority of South Africans who are poor. There will be different levels of empowerment (in other words, different benefits for different classes.) Therefore, there should be a correct balance in the benefits that accrue to the various classes.
Achieving broader control and ownership of assets, both collectively and individually represents a critical strategy for BEE.
The ANC believes that there is a need for various interventions, to promote an enabling framework, which access to financial services and capital for households, to facilitate affordable ownership, and increase levels of savings. The following areas have been raised for consideration:
The ANC agrees with the emphasis on skills development as a central component of BEE. The Government has adopted the Integrated Human Resources Development Strategy, which contains indicators and targets for all aspects of HRD. The training of the youth, who make up the majority of those unemployed, needs urgent attention.
There is a need to promote partnerships between the state, the private sector, labour and civil society through social compacts and industry-based agreements. This will enable the participation of all economic actors in policy development and implementation. The ANC has the responsibility to mobilise and lead all social forces, including the emerging middle class, black business structures, community organisations and trade unions, with the aim of ensuring that their interests as a sector are closely linked with our broader transformation agenda.
It is also critical to ensure capacity and advocacy amongst groups in civil society, as significant agents of change. In the long term, this mobilisation requires funding for organisational development and the establishment of participatory processes and forums. Moreover, government at all levels must prioritise engagement, dedicating the necessary time and resources for broad consultation and negotiation. Business organisations in particular can play a role in transformation. The ANC therefore believes that it is necessary for it to support the development of a viable business organisation framework, which actively promotes BEE.
The ANC supports the proposal to establish a Black Economic Empowerment Council located in the office of the President. The structure would promote the BEE strategy and play a monitoring and evaluation role of the implementation of BEE across the economy, against agreed targets.
The make-up of the structure, the authority and mandate would require further investigation. Apart from the national or broader level structures, there is a need to promote adequate institutional capacity at a local level.
This could also involve a training component for community service into undergraduate training. The new activism for the development of the country should go down to the level of village-level development workers.
The Strategy would spell out measurable and realistic outcome targets that will underline the desired structural changes in the economy. These targets would provide for a national framework against which progress in achieving BEE will be measured.
The following indicators have been identified by the ANC, against which to measure the success of a BEE strategy.
The BEECom proposed the promulgation of a BEE Act, which would define BEE and establish the appropriate institutional structures. It was argued that substantial progress in increasing the levels of participation by black people in economic activities could not be achieved if left to the market alone. The ANC believes that legislative interventions to promote an enabling environment for BEE are necessary. Existing legislation should be investigated to advance BEE in a number of areas. It will also be necessary to draft a new piece of legislation, aimed at providing clarity and guidance on BEE.
The Government has begun the implementation of an Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDS). The ANC agrees with the contention that the promotion of economic activity, deracialisation of and access to land ownership and support measures to ensure appropriates use of land are critical elements of the ISRDS which require additional focus and which contribute to BEE.
The BEECom recommended a TDI Accord to boost the levels of fixed investment and economic growth. The BEECom focuses on the redirection of financial investment and calls for a larger percentage of Life and Retirement Company's total assets, as well as the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) to be diverted towards productive investments in areas of national priority over an adjustment period of five to seven years
Some successes have been achieved in government-led infrastructure projects; in improving collaboration between and the mandates of the DFIs and finally in the design of sectoral or industry strategies e.g. in the Motor Industry Development Programme. However, government efforts to attract appropriate investment have faced a number of challenges, especially in terms of the mobilisation of sufficient resources, adequate private sector investment and BEE.
There is growing consensus that the government itself needs to demonstrate a commitment to invest in its own projects and thereby lower the risk for the private investor. Furthermore, that development should be stimulated through a targeted investment strategy, which entails a coordinated mobilisation of resources and mechanisms to promote co-financing in a manner, which minimises risk. The ANC is of the view that it is possible to design such funding vehicles.
The mobilisation of social and private capital behind a defined strategy is fundamental to promoting appropriate targeted investment. A major source of resource mobilisation is savings under management by life and retirement companies as well as the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF). A proposal that government should allocate an increasing portion of its own pension fund towards such investments should be explored through an examination of the activities of the Pubic Investment Commissioners (PIC).
The traditional areas of investment for retirement funds have been the domestic and international equity, fixed income and property markets. More recently there has been a move locally towards building a socially responsible investment (Targeted Development Investments) class that can serve as a vehicle to mobilise retirement savings for infrastructural and BEE projects. It is thus also necessary to reach agreement with the private sector on a framework for enhancing targeted development investment funding.
The notion of an Investment for Growth Accord, which accommodates some of these issues, should be pursued through discussion between the social partners.
An additional challenge is to increase the effectiveness of public sector funding instruments and incentive schemes. This would include enhancing DFI activities; matching support instruments to strategic priorities; and improving the administration of schemes and ensuring targeted support for black companies. Although many of the programmes are supposed to be biased in favour of SMEs and firms owned by black persons, it appears that the bulk of funds have often not in fact gone to such enterprises.
In 10 to 20 years, South Africa must be a completely different country to the one we know. Our human resources strategy must have eradicated illiteracy and produced thousands of black accountants, engineers and scientists. Our workplaces must be areas of equality and opportunity to advance through training. Our workers must have a meaningful influence in the production process. The levels of small and medium enterprise activity in the key growth sectors of the economy should have increased and the competitiveness of these industries substantially improved.
Together, we must enable a black woman in a rural area to participate in the economy, to save money, to increase the circulation of money in her area. If it is possible to add value to the economic activities of most of the country's women, the multiplier effects on the whole nation will start a virtuous cycle of economic growth, investment and job creation.
As the ANC we must mobilise around the idea that a BEE strategy is required to eradicate the vast inequalities that characterise our economy and thereby ensure black people can actually participate in mainstream economic activities. This inclusion and participation of the majority of our people in the economy is fundamental to our ability as a nation to expand the productive base and grow our economy.
BEE is therefore a necessary measure and the responsibility of all stakeholders to implement. A BEE strategy on its own will not solve all the problems facing our economy and our people, similarly an employment strategy and a poverty relief strategy and finally an industrial strategy are key drivers of growth. As a result of their direct relation to each other these strategies must be must be implemented simultaneously and in an integrated manner.
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is an important organisation. Whilst it has become the target of protest there was no country that did not attend the Conference in Doha, Qatar. The Peoples Republic of China and the customs area of Taiwan were accepted into the WTO. Doha was an intense and critical moment for the global economy.
The essence of the Doha negotiation in November was to seek a new balance between the needs of developed and developing countries. More accurately it was to redress an imbalance against the developing countries that exists in the world trade system.
Accordingly, after six intense days the Director General of the WTO considered carefully the name, the Doha Development Agenda, for the outcome of the negotiation. This was an achievement for the developing world that will require a great deal of hard negotiation and a consolidation of strategy to give it meaning.
However, the fact that he could suggest the appellation was in itself fairly remarkable if we consider the events that had preceded the Ministerial Conference.
During 1999 before the Seattle Conference the developing countries had focussed on the many issues that were either outstanding from the Marrakech Agreement or which could be described as problems in the implementation of that Agreement. Many developing countries were reluctant to deal with matters other than these implementation issues.
The Seattle Conference failed. In the aftermath of this failure positions hardened and eighteen months of virtual inactivity followed in the Geneva headquarters of the WTO. The battle lines were clear. It was a question of dealing with the implementation issues and the built-in-agenda alone or of having another Round.
To understand what this means requires a brief look at the history of trade negotiations. In the 1920s it became clear that there would have to be some form of multilateral trade agreement. This led to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The then South African state was one of the founder members.
Members proceeded by means of a method of negotiation called a round - a negotiating Round. This meant a single negotiation, over a few years, tried to reach agreement on a number of issues. The outcome of the negotiation would generally depend on an agreement being reached on all issues - the so-called single undertaking. Unionists and our own negotiators at Kempton Park will be familiar with this method. It has a lot of advantages, as issues can be traded one against the other to try and seek an overall balance of interests.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was formed during one of the Rounds in the 1960s to assist developing countries. South Africa occupied the Presidency of UNCTAD from 1996 to 2000.
The Uruguay Round started in 1985 and led to the Marrakech Agreement in 1993. The achievement of this Round was the formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) a new and fundamental development in the global economy.
It is a rules-based organisation that can discipline members that break the rules. This added a new dimension to the world trading system.
Another important aspect of the Marrakech Agreement was that it included new economic relations in the rules based agreements. These were matters related, among others, to investment support measures, intellectual property and agricultural production.
In the Marrakech Agreement not all the issues could be completed and the member States agreed to continue the negotiations by a particular time.
Agriculture and trade in services were the two main such issues. These were therefore referred to as the built-in-agenda.
What this meant was that the built-in-agenda had to proceed irrespective of what else happened. In addition to this the developing countries succeeded in getting acceptance that the implementation issues - some 92 of them -should also be dealt with. This last was an important achievement for which India and Pakistan need to take most of the credit.
The question that then arose was whether other issues should be added to the negotiation agenda. If this was done then in effect the member States were embarking on a new Round. The new issues had been identified in Singapore in 1996. They were investment, competition, trade facilitation, government procurement and labour standards. This was a complex agenda and the European Union (EU) insisted that environment be moved from consideration in a Committee to the negotiation. Each of these issues was at different stage of consideration by the WTO in 2001. This set of issues came to be known as the New Issues or the Singapore Issues.
Their addition was bitterly opposed by some developing countries. The reasoning for this opposition was sound but the choice was really one of strategy and not the substance of the issues. Again India and Pakistan were the leaders of this opposition. Around them they formed a Like-Minded Group of developing countries mainly from Africa and Asia.
At the other end of the spectrum was the European Union with a very ambitious agenda to commence negotiations on all the new issues. The previous USA administration largely shared this view with the exception of not wanting to negotiate the anti-dumping measures. However, the new USA administration did not have such an ambitious agenda but retained the stand on anti-dumping.
Japan supported a new Round but was defensive on agriculture and strong on the need to deal with anti-dumping and subsidies.
There were no developing countries that supported the ambitious EU agenda.
However, there were many who were prepared to consider a modified, less ambitious and carefully defined agenda. They were prepared to consider this because the rapid changes in the global economy needed to be accommodated within the WTO. In addition a wider agenda made it possible to achieve key objectives in agriculture and industrial tariffs.
This group of developing countries was flexible on the timing of negotiations on the Singapore issues - they did not see them as urgent priorities but accepted that they would have to be addressed sooner rather than later. The developing countries in the Cairns Group would have been good examples of this approach.
The Cairns Group was originally formed to deal with the agricultural protectionism of the EU, Japan and Korea. The USA position on agricultural support is more complex but it exists. The Cairns Group is composed of developed economies like Canada, Australia and New Zealand and key developing economies in South America and South East Asia. South Africa became the first African member of the Group a few years ago. With countries like Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and South Africa in the Group it was clear that this was also a powerful group of developing countries.
The Cairns Group economies are similar in that their agricultural potential is greater because they have the industrial capacity to fully develop their agriculture. The protectionism and agricultural support of the EU and others is an immediate problem because the Cairns Group have a considerable export potential that is being blocked. In more recent times the USA has moved closer to Cairns.
Other developing countries such as India are more interested in the fact that agriculture is the major economic activity for the economy as a whole and exports are not such a factor. In Africa the level of agricultural development and the problems in African economies has caused them to focus on the need for assistance rather than expanding their export capacity. It is for this reason that the New Partnership for African Development focuses on agriculture, industrialisation and the ability to export.
The developing countries as a whole would broadly support the stand on agriculture in relation to the EU. However, the Cairns Group was prepared to make it a deal breaker. The EU countered this with an insistence that trade and the environment be negotiated. This raised major issues around what this would mean in practice. Cairns was not opposed to the environmental matters - Brazil had hosted the Rio Summit and ten years later South Africa would host the next - they feared a new form of protectionism in Europe.
This somewhat simplified categorisation of the economies within the WTO membership is enough to outline the major battle lines in Doha. The countries organise their delegations on almost military campaigning lines.
South Africa matched the best in this. We were proud of our abilities considering we are in fact a new democracy and have only recently participated fully in such processes.
One battle line was between the overly ambitious and self-centred agenda defined by the EU on the one side and the very narrow agenda of India. It was this battle line that brought the Conference to the brink of a second failure.
The second major battle line was between the Cairns Group and the EU. Japan, Korea, Norway and Switzerland associated with the EU. This related to the question of agriculture and the need to phase out the excessive support for agriculture in the latter countries. Agriculture, as we have seen, is part of the built-in-agenda but the negotiation mandate was too vague for the Cairns Group and they wanted to redefine it and bring it into the new negotiation.
A third battle line was between the USA and the rest on the question of entering negotiations on refining the anti-dumping and subsidies agreements.
This was and is a complex matrix of interests. At times in Doha it seemed an absolutely insurmountable problem. In previous Rounds it was easier for the Quad - the EU, Canada, USA and Japan - to come to an agreement and then line up the rest behind it. The power of the developing countries prevented this and a great deal more time was needed for consultation and negotiation. The lack of time itself could have led to the failure of the Conference.
Underlying this matrix of interests and battle lines was a larger question of what it would mean if there were a second failure. The active trading countries, including South Africa, made it clear that they would have no option but to enter further bilateral negotiations and to try and strengthen the regional trading blocs of which they were members. The prospect was one of more regional blocs and complex overlapping agreements with a tendency to regional protectionism. This was a particularly dangerous prospect for the economically weaker developing economies.
Whilst this would be an inevitable result of failure it was a dangerous prospect that sensible leaders would want to avoid. On the sixth day of the Conference and after nearly 36 hours of intense final negotiations following the report back on the facilitation and consultation processes this was the choice that faced 142 countries.
Africa came to occupy the lynchpin position. Africa was divided at the outset. Quite correctly the African countries were wary of the idea of a new Round. The majority of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are also in Africa and they were particularly wary.
In the Conference the LDCs, the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) and the OAU members met as a group. In this Nigeria (OAU), Kenya (ACP) and Tanzania (LDCs) came to fulfill a key role. In addition Botswana was a deputy chair of the Conference and South Africa and Egypt were asked to help the Chair (Qatar) as facilitators or ' friends of the Chair' in WTO language. African states came to occupy influential positions in the Conference.
Only South Africa and to some extent Egypt were in strong support of the Cairns Group and therefore part of that battle line. However, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) members were more open to the general position of those developing countries in Cairns. North Africa and certain countries in West Africa were also closer to the Cairns type position. The rest of Africa and the island states were closer to India. Pakistan moved closer to Cairns.
The crucial dimension of the debate on these issues rested on how to deal with the reality of a lack of capacity to enter into a Round and the consequences of another failure. For Africa, excluding South Africa where we have now built considerable capacity (increasingly this is a SACU capacity), this is a very real dilemma. However, India occupied an interesting and problematic position in this regard. India cannot claim a lack of capacity.
Their resistance stems from their economic size and the fact that they are not that dependent on trade as well as a complex political configuration.
They can defend their interests in all situations whereas the position for most developing countries is not the same. The latter could find themselves even more on the margins of the system as others race into agreements.
The entry of China into the WTO during the Conference was of profound importance. They can and will swing the balance of power. China supported the idea of a carefully defined Round.
At the 11th hour the focus rested on Africa. After some 24 hours of continuous negotiation a point was reached where the choice was between a delicately crafted and carefully defined agenda for a wider negotiation - in effect a Round - and failure. It was impossible to persuade the developed countries and key developing countries that we should only deal with the built-in-agenda and implementation. Of particular concern to many developing countries were the considerable gains made in the negotiation. Here we need to remind ourselves of the single undertaking idea. It was all or nothing.
The declaration on health and the TRIPS agreement; agriculture; industrial tariff negotiations with defined objectives; a waiver for the Cotonou Agreement with the EU and the ACP countries; major commitments on technical assistance and real progress on implementation were some of these gains that would redress the imbalance of Marrakech.
Africa debated and decided on the Doha Development Agenda. This was the built-in-agenda with new terms for agriculture; outstanding implementation issues to be completed; problem areas of industrial tariffs to be addressed; negotiation on investment, competition, trade facilitation, government procurement to be de facto decided on about two years from now; environment to be negotiated in a tightly defined mandate and a statement on labour standards.
This left India isolated with a few Caribbean supporters and it finally entered the consensus about fifteen minutes before the Conference ended.
Africa realised that if it coordinates it does have power in the WTO. Now the task of coordinated negotiation has to start. However, we can feel confidence in our abilities since we were all inspired by how a small country in the developing world - Qatar - was able to host and chair such a crucial Conference. The developing world showed on all accounts that it was in the process of a Renaissance.
South Africa's delegation of government, community, labour, and business representatives worked immensely hard - each and every one was a critical representative and we can feel proud of their skill and knowledge. For South Africa and our continent Africa we may look upon this time as a turning point in the role we play in world economic affairs.