APPENDIX NINE

1. Introduction

1.1 In the wake of the ugly violence against our people by security forces, vigilante groups and hit-squads it is imperative that our liberation movement takes responsibility for guiding and building people's self-defence units.

• In the past our attempts to defend ourselves have been spontaneous and sometimes poorly planned, and lacking in discipline.
• What we need is an organised and disciplined force, guided by political leadership, which will serve both to protect the community and ensure law and order.

1.2 This task is urgent and should be given top priority by the ANC and our allies.

• The onslaught on our movement and on the people is an attempt by the regime to divide our people, weaken our movement and sow suspicion and confusion. Failure to find ways of protecting our people will inevitably lead to a loss of confidence in the ANC and the liberation movement. There is also the danger of widespread demoralisation among the masses if no solution is found.
• One of the aims of the reactionary forces is precisely to intimidate the masses and eliminate leading activists.

1.3 A political solution to this problem must be sought.

• Initiatives such as the talks with Inkatha are extremely important. Campaigns at local and trade union levels to improve understanding between township communities and hostel dwellers are imperative.
• Political pressure on the regime, side by side with well-documented exposure of the role of the security forces, and mass protests throughout the country, are means through which we can force the government to curb the killers.
• But side-by-side with these political endeavours, we must build organisational structures that can protect the lives and homes of the people.
• The building of strong ANC and SACP branches, trade unions, civic associations, youth and women's organisations and street committees are the foundation of our people's unity and power.
• No matter how strongly we develop these democratic structures, however, in the current climate of violent assault we need to establish specialised, broadly-based people's self-defence structures.
• These should embrace all our people's political, social and cultural organisations irrespective of ideological differences and political affiliation.
• In other words defence units should not be affiliated to any political party or movement but to the protective force which serves the community as a whole.

1.4 We need a two-pronged strategy:

• a political offensive for peace and unity among the people based on strong political organisations; and
• self-defence structures to protect our people.

1.5 Self-defence structures need, by definition, to be para-military. They differ from all the other forms of organisations referred to, including street committees.

• They must be tightly structured to repulse aggression and ensure law and order, they need a specific command and control system; their members must be trained and have a high degree of discipline.

1.6 At present, in the light of the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) alone cannot undertake the task of our people's defence, although this is a right we need to forcefully demand and struggle for.

• The August 6 cease-fire does not neutralise MK.
• It has an important role to play. MK cadres, particularly ex-prisoners and those due to return from exile, must play a leading and active role in the establishment of the defence.

1.7 As we proceed to establish defence units so we must raise the demand for the right of self-protection.

• Government Ministers, including De Klerk and Vlok allow the Inkatha bands to carry so-called "cultural" weapons.
• What is more they allow the AWB to organise military training camps and concede to them the right of "self protection" as long as in Vlok's words their commandos "do not attack anyone".
• Our people, who are overwhelmingly the victims of aggression, must demand the right of self-protection too! It is a demand the regime will find extremely difficult to deny and by pressing energetically ahead with a programme of establishing defence units we will make it impossible for the authorises to prevent their growth.

1.8 Our people have the moral right to state: "We do not intend to attack anybody but we demand the right to protect our lives, our families, our homes and communities! We are forced to create defence units for the sake of our lives".

• Clearly we cannot rely on the apartheid police and army for protection.
• When they are not attacking the people they are encouraging, siding with and arming the ultra-right forces, warlords and vigilantes.
• The impression is also very strong that the sinister hit-squads are recruited from their ranks.
• If we are to protect our lives then we must rely on our own strength, organisations and resources.

1.9 Our strength is in our numbers but it must be organised strength.

• A group of 200 armed thugs cannot possibly overcome a township of 20 000 if the people are prepared united and determined.

1.10 In the past there were some examples of township or shanty-town inhabitants setting up loosely formed defence units.

• These often degenerated into sectarian or personal power-bases and sometimes were used as a cover for criminal activities.
• To guard against this defence units must have firm political direction and be rooted amongst the communities they serve.

1. 11 Considerable experience has been acquired from township and rural resistance. This must be utilised to develop the best way of organising defence structures.

• We need to collect such contributions, organise group discussions, and workshops etc. to learn and generalise from the practical experience.
• This booklet is a contribution to ongoing discussions.
• Theory must grow out of practise and in turn guide practise.

1.12 In forming defence structures there are various elements and tasks we will have to tackle

• Among these are:
• Organisations
• Structure
• Street defence system
• Recruitment
• Training
• Weapons
• Communications
• Intelligence
• Observation
• Barricades & fortifications
• Auxiliaries (support group)
• Work with hostile forces
• Tactics and the operational plan

2. Organisations

2.1 The creation of a defence system for a township, shanty town, rural district or other such area should first be discussed with local organisations.

• Involved in these consultations should be ANC and SACP branches, civic associations, local trade union structures, women and youth groups, and other formations irrespective of ideological or political affiliation.
• As broad a spectrum of groupings as possible should be involved.
• There should be no intention of setting the defence units up as "armies" of any political groupings or individuals.
• This is undesirable and potentially dangerous - it is prescription for "Lebanonising" a conflict.
• The defence units are created for the purpose of protecting the community. But this does not mean that the ANC and its allies should not initiate and guide the process.

2.2 Having agreed on a common approach the local organisations should next approach the community at large in order to explain the need for a local defence system and ensure their understanding and acceptance.

• Time and attention must be given to this important process. It is pointless to proceed unless the people are fully behind the idea.

2.3 Once agreement has been reached by the community, local organisations should appoint or elect a defence committee. It is probably preferable that the committee should be appointed because popular individuals do not necessarily make the best commanders but such appointments should arise out of careful consultation. The committee should be composed of reliable and decisive people who have the ability to organise and command without being dictatorial. Comrades with military skills, such as MK cadres or reliable ex-policemen, could be likely candidates for key positions.

2.4 The committee and the entire self-defence structure serves the community and the people's organisations and is subservient to them.

• This principle must be made perfectly clear to all members of the self-defence structures and to the people.

2.5 Whether the committee is appointed or elected, the popular organisations should have the right to replace anyone on the committee who proves to be unsatisfactory or even to replace the entire committee if need be.

2.6 But when the community is under attack or in danger, all must obey the defence committee's orders.

• This is not the time to attempt to replace members of the committee: that must be done before the danger arises, or after it is over.

3. Structure

3.1 Township Defence Force (TDF)

To begin with we should concentrate on creating defence structures at the township level. This will give us a chance to test and experiment with the appropriate structures.

• This booklet will concentrate on a model for a Township Defence Force (TDF).

(We will need to elaborate models for both urban and rural localities, for squatter camps and possibly for industrial zones. There is the need for defence structures on mine compounds. NUM have established these at some mine hostels and important lessons have been learnt. There is also the need to elaborate some form of protection on the trains, at taxi ranks and in city centres where a system of patrolling is required).

• For the purpose of this booklet we will elaborate a structure for an urban township taking a population size of 20 000 inhabitants as our demonstration model.

3.2 Township Defence Committee(TDC)

The TDC must be headed by a commander who works with a deputy (second in commander or 2iC) and about eight others.

• These head the various defence formations and structures.
• On the committee will be the company commanders plus those responsible for the various specialist responsibilities: chiefs of communications; intelligence; political instruction; ordinance/Logistics (for organisations of weapons and materials).
• Other portfolio could be medical and engineering (construction of barricades/ defence works).
• The TDC must have a permanent headquarters (HQ) - with alternative workplace for reasons of security.
• Security must be promised to ensure the safety of the TDC and its HQ.
• For this purpose a security section under the TDC's deputy commander should be created.
• The TDC must be linked to all subordinate structures by efficient and reliable means of communications.

3.3 Company formations

Immediately under the defence committee are the company formations.

• These should be organised along para-military lines and are probably the most manageable units for the defence of a township of about 20 000 inhabitants.
• Because of the defensive aspect of the tasks and para-military nature of the structures the company and subordinate formations will be larger than found in a regular army.
• Each company could consist of about 500 volunteers.
• Four companies totalling 2 000 volunteers would make up the full complement of the TDF.
• Each company would be under the charge of a company commander and deputy company commander.
• (It will take time for the companies to reach full strength. The numbers involved will depend on the success of the recruitment drive. It might be necessary to first build one company and then proceed to develop additional ones.)
• Alternatively companies could be started simultaneously and gradually built to full strength.
• The strength of platoons and sections, referred to below, will therefore depend on the success of recruitment.
• If there are not enough recruits then the figures suggested could be halved without interfering with the structural arrangement.

3.4 Platoons

A platoon would consist of 100 volunteers, under a platoon commander and deputy.

• Five platoons make up a company.

3.5 Sections

A section would consist of 20 volunteers, under a section leader and deputy. Five sections make up a platoon. The section is the basic unit of the defence force.

4. Street defence systems

4.1 There are a variety of ways in which the townships could be defended.

• The most rational system would be to give each unit a specific area of responsibility which it would protect with the co-operation of the residents of that area. Such a system could be referred to as a "street defence system".
• Units could move out of their allotted defence sectors and take up different positions if need be. This would depend on tactical considerations.
• At present we will simply outline the basic defence sectors of the units.

4.2 Each section is responsible for the defence of a single street from one intersection to the next.

4.3 Five sections (one platoon) defend a block of five streets.

4.4 Five platoons (one company) defend a block of 25 streets.

4.5 Four companies should cover the entire township. If this is too small, additional companies can be established.

4.6 During the period before full strength has been achieved one section could be responsible for defending two or more streets.

4.7 The residents of the respective streets fall under the protection of the appropriate sections.

• They will be organised on a voluntary basis in an auxiliary or support capacity for the defence of their street and homes and to render assistance to the section.
• This support should be organised with the assistance of the street committees where these exist or through the popular organisations.
• Every inhabitant, young and old, has a role to play and should be organised.
  (For the tasks of these auxiliary forces see section 12)

5 Recruitment

5.1 Joining the defence force must be on a voluntary basis.

• A lively and active recruitment drive must be launched to popularise the need for joining up.
• As the first units are formed and begin to train and drill in uniform much excitement and enthusiasms will be generated and the ground swell to join will increase.
• Membership should be open to able-bodied adults, both men and women. The community must set a minimum age-limit - probably 16 or 18. Youth under the age-limit and others of all ages can be deployed in the auxiliary forces.

5.2 Volunteers must be carefully selected. Criminals and other unreliable element must be excluded until they prove their reliability.

5.3 Would be recruits must be screened and checked by the street committees and popular organisations to prevent infiltration by impimpi's. If no street committees exist, a system of neighbourhood checking must be instituted.

• Comrades trained with in the ANC 's security organ should help set up this screening system.

5.4 Recruits must accept the requirements of discipline and readiness to obey orders. They must be prepared to undergo physical and other training. They must be ready to give their time and service and understand the need for punctuality. Above all they must understand that they are serving the community.

• The wearing of uniforms, drilling in formation and political education will build the required discipline and morale.

5.5 Those who display the best qualities should be appointed to leadership positions.

6. Training

6.1 There will need to be a basic training programme for all volunteers and a specialised training programme for commanders and those dealing with specialised tasks such as communications, intelligence etc.

• Instructors will need to be appointed and in most cases given some training guides and assistance. Commanders and deputies from section, platoon and company levels will need to be given some initial training slightly in advance of their units so they in turn can act as instructors.

6.2 Physical Fitness

Volunteers need to be physically fit. Light physical training is best conducted at the section level.

• Time will be a constraint, however, especially for those going to work early and returning home late. Where possible the section should exercise as a unit.
• Ten minutes light exercise followed by a twenty-minute daily jog is sufficient.
• If the section can only exercise together on the weekend then individuals should be encouraged to exercise on their own on a daily basis.
• The joint weekend run can be increased to 30 minutes and is strongly recommended.
• As well as developing strength and stamina the joint run (or toi-toi) will develop a collective spirit.
• A longer run is not recommended because time on the weekends will be needed for other training and activity.

6.3 Unarmed Self-Defence

The joining of martial arts classes like karate should be encouraged.

• Those with such skills should be utilised to teach the basic exercises to the others ("each one teach one").

6.4 Drilling time on weekend should be allotted to marching and drilling information from section to platoon and finally to company level.

• Units will have to be trained to speedily assemble ("fall in") and to rapidly move in formation from one point to another. They must become used to rapid "on the double" movement.
• Drilling is the basis of organised and disciplined manoueuverability. It is also the way of conditioning the volunteers to respond to commands as a formation.
• The units must be trained to immediately respond to various signals and alarms. The use of whistles should be used to convey certain commands.
• For example three blasts of whistle could be the order for a section to assemble at a particular point in their street.
• There needs to be a signal that commands the sections to assemble in their platoon formations and an other which brings the entire company together at a particular assembly point.
• There need to be commands which order sections to take up defence positions in their streets and others which speedily bring the platoons and even companies to specific points of impending attack.
• There need to be signals for advance and retreat and of course an alarm which mobilises the entire township into a state of battle readiness.

All these signals and manoeuvre must be practised until perfection is achieved.

6.5 Political Instruction

At least one evening class should be conducted every week. Initial lectures should deal with the reasons for self-defence and the role of the TDF.

• They syllabus should deal with the national liberation struggle, the current political situation, strategy and tactics etc.

6.6 Weaponry

Firearms

• A political campaign will have to be waged for the arming of the self-defence units.
• All avenues need to be explored, including the setting up of licensed security organisations.
• Licensed weapons can be obtained.
• Funds will have to be collected on a voluntary basis from the community.
• Once even a few firearms have been obtained firearms training can begin. This should be handled by MK cadres and sympathetic township police.
• For initial training purpose airguns should be used. Air rifles and pistols (the pellet gun type) can be bought for about R200 each.
• The advantages is that no license is required and they are an excellent, cheap and safe way for teaching people how to aim and shoot correctly.
• A suitable practise ranges needs to be organised.

Rudimentary weapons

While everything must be done to adequately arm the defence units we should not scorn the use of rudimentary weapons.

• From early times people have used clubs and stones, catapults and spears for hunting and self-defence.
• The martial arts illustrate how formidable simple weapons can be.
• A history of township and rural resistance shows that rudimentary weapon can be effectively used.
• The Vietnamese peasants used rudimentary weapons extremely effectively against the mighty American invaders (for example traps of sharpened bamboo, spikes etc).
• In countries like EI Salvador and Nicaragua home-made weapons have been used on a mass scale in the struggle against dictatorship (e.g. petrol bombs, homemade handgrenades, dynamite).
• Our people must be encouraged to make homemade weaponry purely for defensive purpose.
• We need to face the fact that it is going to be a problem to obtain the necessary firearms. Until we do, we will simply have to make do with homemade weaponry.
• In a country like South Africa, however, there are plenty of sophisticated means of protection that can be legally purchased among them gas guns and sprays. Cross bows and bow-and-arrow sets can also be bought without a licence.
• Factory and engineering workers have the skills and the equipment to manufacture rudimentary weapons.
• Volunteers who do not, have firearms should at least be quipped with two stout sticks, clubs or iron bars and a homemade shield.
• With training these can be utilised in a formidable way for self-defence against assailants armed with rudimentary weapons.
• A section or platoon of determined volunteers, acting in unison, can offer stiff resistance.
• Would-be aggressors will think twice before advancing on a company of 500 trained volunteers beating their shields with the sticks and displaying a militant attitude.
• In many countries this is how the police are equipped for riot control.
• Neither should we scorn the use of missiles such as stones. We have seen how stone throwers can put even the police to flight. A platoon or section of volunteers throwing stones on command and in unison can disrupt and put to flight a hostile attacking force.
• If a few armed volunteers are informed by units hurling stones and other missiles, such as petrol bombs, a very strong defence can be put up.
• This means that training should be conducted to improve the throwing ability of the volunteers.
• The auxiliary forces, township youth etc. need to be given such training as well.
• In this way any hostile force can be met by a sustainable hail of missiles which will make it impossible for them to advance and can actually put them to flight.
• The auxiliary forces can be given the task manufacturing home-made weapons and stockpiling reserves of missiles.
• Work and storage places need to be organised for this purpose and the weapons safely hidden.
• The ordinance/logistics chief is responsible for the acquisition, manufacture and safe storage of all weapons and material. For this purpose he will need a small staff of assistants. They will issues instructions to all units and auxiliaries in this respect.
• We can make up for our shortage of firearms by the well organised use of rudimentary weapons. When these are used by a highly manoueverable battle formation, following well prepared plans and employing flexible tactics, utilising a barricades system and other fortifications and reinforced by the whole population acting as an auxiliary force, the township will be turned into a hornet's nest for the aggressor.
• As the defence units become better equipped with modern firearms so their defence capacity will be increased. The prior used of rudimentary weapons will have served as useful training and practise apart from their defence capacity.

6.7 Training Time-Table

A time-table for training might look like this:

• Physical Fitness - 3-0 minutes first thing every morning plus a longer group run on weekends;
• Political - evening class once a week;
• Drilling - two to three hours on the weekend;
• Firearms - one to two hours on the weekend; Classes should not be too large and are therefore best conducted at section level ( that is for 20 volunteers).