"The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom".
The objective of the armed struggle was the overthrow of the apartheid state
in order to achieve democracy, freedom and peace in South Africa. The ANCs
decision to embark on armed struggle was reached after many decades of
non-violent resistance, which was met by increasingly brutal repression by the
apartheid regime.
The African National Congress (ANC) had no choice but to resort to armed
struggle after the National Party government first narrowed the arena of legal
political activity and finally closed it in 1960 by banning the movement. The
ANC asserted moral legitimacy for the resort to violence on the grounds of
necessary defence and just war. Further, Umkhonto we Sizwe was a means to
channel the revolutionary violence the oppressed were calling for, especially
after the Sharpeville massacre:
From the very beginning, the ANC emphasised that armed resistance took place
within political context, and was one of a number of inter-related methods of
struggle. Cadres had to fully understand the basic policy positions of the ANC,
the first step in military training; they were at all times guided by and
subordinate to the political leadership of the ANC.
Cadres were taught to maintain the moral high ground occupied by the liberation
movement, owing to the justness of our cause, in the actual theatre of battle.
This meant that the choice of targets, attitude towards civilians and treatment
of captives had to reflect the ANCs policies. The forms of armed struggle
adopted by the ANC and MK were intended to achieve the goals of the movement
with the least loss of life: in essence, the armed struggle was waged to bring
peace to South Africa - to stop the apartheid regime as quickly and as
effectively as possible in order to prevent the conflict in the country
degenerating into racial civil war.
2. THE POLITICO-MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND
MK was at all times subordinate to the political leadership of the ANC. Detailed
information on ANC structures and personnel, including military structures and
personnel, is attached to the main document of this second submission (appendix
1.)
3. MK TRAINING AND TRAINING CAMPS
Few liberation movements have had to wage armed struggle under such complex,
difficult and harsh conditions. In the early years, South Africa was surrounded
by countries hostile to the idea of liberation, particularly Rhodesia and the
former Portuguese colonies. There were no friendly bases on the borders of our
country, which made infiltration into South Africa difficult and dangerous.
Cadres spent many lonely years in the camps long after they had completed their
training because of this difficulty. At times there was a scarcity of food and
clothing, a lack of medicines and health facilities.
In this regard, the role of the Commissariat became crucial. In all the camps,
there was a commissariat responsible for the political education, general
welfare and cultural well-being of cadres.
Serious attention was given to the general education of cadres. Special literacy
classes and bridging courses were designed. So successful were these courses
that many who completed them were able to enroll in formal education
institutions in countries such as Angola, Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda.
In a centre outside Luanda called Technical Training Centre (Moscow), formal
education was given in mechanics and auto electrics; driving lessons were also
available. The ANC also ran a huge centre called the Self-Help Medical Centre
(the Plot) where courses in nursing, advanced motor mechanics, building and
carpentry were offered. Hundreds of cadres trained in these centres became
professionals.
There were two centres in Angola (Quela and Camalundi) for training cadres in
agriculture and the production of food for the army. Production was very
successful, especially in the early 1980s. We were able to supply most of the
camps. Our camps were bee-hives of cultural activities. There was a network of
committees to promote music, drama, literature, etc. In all camp programmes,
cultural activity was compulsory. Many excellent choirs, drama and musical
groups were formed. Many poets emerged from our camps, who continue to produce
magnificent work to this day. Perhaps the highest achievement in this regard was
the formation of the cultural ensemble known as Amandla Group. It was supported
and nurtured by great South African artists such as Jonas Gwangwa, Dennis
Dipale, Abdullah Ibrahim, Letta Mbuli, and others. The group became
internationally renowned, staging successful tours in Southern Africa and
Europe.
Military training courses were designed to produce a cadre with a broad
range of skills, well equipped to execute the various tasks of the liberation
struggle. Lectures were conducted on political science, and the art of warfare.
The following military subjects were taught in the camps:
Courses ran for three weeks, three months, six months, nine months or longer
depending on the mission/tasks for which the individual or unit was being
prepared.
Over the years thousands of cadres were produced, among them commanders,
commissars, instructors and specialists in various military fields. Some would
remain to staff the camps and continue to train other cadres; many infiltrated
the country for various tasks; yet others joined the diplomatic corps to run the
many external missions of the liberation movement.
Today many of these cadres are to be found among the leadership of the Alliance;
some are ambassadors and officials in foreign missions; others are Ministers,
members of Parliament, in the civil service and the private sector. Others
served many years of imprisonment, or gave their lives for the liberation of
this country.
A full list of MK training camps and the names of commanders, as requested by
the TRC, is attached to the main document of this second submission as appendix
2.
4. MK OPERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MAJOR PHASES OF THE LIBERATION
STRUGGLE
4.1. The Sabotage Campaign to the Morogoro Conference
The first MK actions in 1960 were sabotage operations; cadres were under strict
instructions to avoid all loss of life. Targets included government
installations, police stations, electric pylons, pass offices, and other symbols
of apartheid rule; in rural areas, there were arson attacks on sugar cane fields
and wattle estates.
The sabotage campaign failed in its objective of convincing the apartheid regime
to engage in negotiations in a National Convention. By the time of the Rivonia
arrests, MK leaders were discussing the possibility of embarking on guerilla
warfare to take the struggle forward.
The draft document Operation Mayibuye indicated aspects of the thinking of the
leadership at this time, and identified targets as follows:
In the years following the Rivonia arrests the ANC built up a force in some
of the liberated countries in Africa. It was decided to launch a joint campaign
(later known as the Wankie campaign) with ZIPRA in Zimbabwe in 1967/8. This
operation was aimed at infiltrating trained MK operatives into South Africa in
line with the concept of rural-based guerilla warfare. However, some of the
operatives were forced to move into Botswana and others had to withdraw to
Zambia after considerable difficulties were encountered, particularly the lack
of bases among the population. A group of cadres, including Chris Hani, were
captured in Botswana and served prison sentences there.
Following the Wankie campaign, the ANC held a watershed Consultative
Conference at Morogoro in 1969 to discuss ways of taking the struggle
forward. Conference adopted a new programme, Strategy
and Tactics of the ANC. This was the first comprehensive set of strategic
guidelines for the ANC in the period of armed struggle.
A decision was made to shift the ANCs approach from sending armed groups of
cadres into the country to spark off guerilla warfare, and instead emphasised
that period of political reconstruction inside the country was necessary since
the successful development of armed struggle depended on political mobilisation
and strong underground structures, an important precursor to theories of peoples
war developed in the early 1980s.
Military struggle was seen as forming only part of, and being guided by, a
broader political strategy to ensure that the battle against apartheid was
fought on all possible fronts, involving not just an army but all those
oppressed by apartheid:
When we talk of revolutionary armed struggle, we are talking of political
struggle by means which include the use of military force (...) It is important
to emphasise this because our movement must reject all manifestations of
militarism which separates armed peoples struggle from its political context. (Strategy
and Tactics.)
4.2. 1969 - 1979: from Sabotage to Guerilla Warfare
Guerilla warfare is carried out by a small and militarily weak organisation -
poorly armed but highly mobile - against a highly organised conventional force
which has all the resources of the state behind it. From the outset MK aimed to
limit the loss of civilian lives, and constantly targeted the military and
police, who formed the frontline of defence of the apartheid state.
Classic guerilla warfare roots itself among the rural population and moves from
there into urban areas; it is dependent on the availability of suitable terrain,
such as inaccessible mountains or forests where base camps can be established.
In contrast, MKs tactics had to take into account the relatively unfavourable
terrain in South Africa. A multi-faceted approach was adopted, with guerilla
operations carried out throughout the country in both rural and urban areas,
targeting the central pillars on which the apartheid state rested:
This basic approach did not change over the years, even under extreme
provocation, However, by the early 1980s it was accepted that in the context of
intensified confrontation between the apartheid regime and forces for democratic
change, the fear of civilians being caught in the cross-fire could no longer be
a decisive factor in avoiding certain armed operations directed against the
personnel and infrastructure of the apartheid state.
The Soweto Uprising
The 1976 uprising, and subsequent massacres and other atrocities by the security
forces, gave new impetus to the struggle. Thousands of new recruits flooded into
MK, bringing with them a fresh will to fight the enemy, born of their own bitter
experience in fighting a brutal enemy only with stones. New vistas opened to
intensify the struggle and to hit back in defence of the people.
The key challenge was to channel this youthful and impatient militancy into
military/political struggle within ANC policy guidelines. The ANC had the
responsibility to educate these youths to understand that the enemy was in fact
the system of apartheid itself, not white individuals. It is a remarkable
achievement on the part of the ANC that we succeeded in doing this. Many of
these youths, after initial training in MK camps and in Eastern Europe, were
briefed and infiltrated back into the country to begin operations.
Between 1976 and 1979 there was a marked escalation of armed actions: about 37
armed actions took place between June 1976 and the end of 1978. Railway lines
were sabotaged, police stations attacked, and Bantu Administration offices were
bombed. The battle was slowly but surely being taken to the enemy, and MK had
moved from concentrating purely on sabotage operations to the first stages of
guerilla war.
4.3. Guerilla warfare and Peoples War, 1979 - 1990
As we stated in our main submission to the Truth Commission, the watershed 1978
Politico-Military Commissions Report (also known as the Green Book) again
stressed the central importance of political mobilisation:
"The armed struggle must be based on, and grow out of, mass political support and it must eventually involve all our people. All military activities must at every stage be guided by and determined by the need to generate political mobilisation, organisation and resistance, with the aim of progressively weakening the enemys grip on his reins of political, economic, social and military power, by a combination of political and military action."
In line with this approach, the Revolutionary Council (formed in 1969 and
chaired by OR Tambo) was reorganised to reinforce the supremacy of political
leadership. It was also intended to ensure that the task of mass mobilisation
and underground organisation received the necessary emphasis - to reinforce the
links between the armed struggle the mass base and the underground structures of
the ANC.
A Central Operational MK HQ was established by Joe Modise and Joe Slovo. After
several years in which there had been no MK actions inside the country,
following the impetus of the Soweto uprising units were sent into the country in
1978 to carry out attacks on police stations - this has come to be known as the
G5 Operation. It was commanded by Siphiwe Nyanda; stations attacked included
Moroka, Orlando and Booysens The following year, in 1979, the President, OR
Tambo, asked the NEC for a mandate to form a special unit to attack key
strategic targets - spectacular operations that would hit the economy hard, and
inspire the oppressed majority. The unit would report directly to him; he would
authorise such attacks and take political responsibility for them. This was
agreed to, and the first Special Operations Command consisted of Joe Slovo,
Montso Mokgabudi (Obadi), and Aboobaker Ismail (Rashid.)
As with other MK units, targets were carefully selected in accordance with the
political policies of the movement, and planning for operations was as careful
as possible. Whenever possible, a final reconnaissance was undertaken just
before an attack to ensure that conditions had not changed: this was to ensure
we minimised the loss of civilian life. A further aspect of all planning was to
ensure that cadres had planned for their safe withdrawal after attacks, and had
the necessary resources to do so.
Initially the targets were limited to oil refineries, fuel depots, the Koeberg
nuclear plant and military targets such as Voortrekkerhoogte. With the
increasingly indiscriminate attacks on neighbouring states and the viciousness
of attacks on South African civilians by the security forces, it was decided by
Special Operations Command to attack military personnel. This resulted in
operations such as the car bomb at South African Air Force HQ in Pretoria.
The case studies presented will indicate that such operations were not carried
out on the spur of the moment or on the whim of a particular individual, but
were based on months of careful preparations.
Parallel to operations carried out by Special Operations, there was a steady
increase in the number of operations carried out by other MK units from
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and, in later years, Zimbabwe. One study estimated
that 150 cases of armed action took place between 1976 and 1982, overwhelmingly
concentrated on economic targets, the administrative machinery of apartheid, SAP
and SADF installations and personnel.
In mid-1983 MHQ produced a discussion document Planning for Peoples War1
which posed the question as to whether the time was ripe to move away from the
1979 approach towards peoples war, defined as war in which a liberation army
becomes rooted among the people who progressively participate actively in the
armed struggle both politically and militarily, including the possibility of
engaging in partial or general uprising. Among the conclusions were that the ANC
should continue carrying out and even escalating those actions which had played
an important role in stimulating political activity, mass resistance and mass
organisation, but that there should be more concentration on destroying enemy
personnel. )The term enemy personnel referred primarily to members of the SAP
and SADF.) The concept of potential future guerrilla zones inside the country
was raised.
This document noted that the policy of arming the people cannot mean that we
begin now to distribute arms to whosoever wishes to receive them among the
oppressed. In the first place, we had neither the capacity nor the means to do
this on any meaningful scale. In the second place it would be completely wrong
to engage in a policy of merely distributing weaponry to people, trusting to
luck that they will use them on the side of the revolution.
This document reflected the debates that were taking place all the time in the
ranks of the liberation movement on how to respond to new situations as they
emerged. The essence of these debates was around the restraint of the ANC in the
face of the enemy s brutality - whether we should not adopt the easy route, and
allow less discriminate control over the usage of weapons and choice of targets.
At each stage of struggle, people on the ground would respond with anger to
repression, and themselves start to take initiatives which would not strictly
accord with the strategy and tactics of the ANC.
The constant challenge facing the ANC and MK was how to channel anger on the
ground to ensure that the strategic perspective of a democratic and non-racial
society is not sacrificed on the alter of quick-fix, dramatic and misguided
actions. The tension between such intensification of struggle and the need to
avoid a racial war that the MK Manifesto eloquently expressed at the founding of
the liberation army, remained with the movement to the last day of armed
struggle.
In contrast to this highly disciplined and restrained approach to the use of
violence, the South African regime committed atrocity after atrocity against
civilian targets inside and outside the country, including supporting the war
efforts of UNITA and Renamo, and massive raids against what were portrayed as
ANC targets in neighbouring states such as Matola in 1991,1982 Maseru massacre,
Gaborone in 1985, Lusaka in 1987, Harare and Bulawayo, to quote a few examples.
Several of the casualties in these operations were nationals of the host
countries. No distinction whatsoever was made between hard and soft targets -
between MK operatives and unarmed refugees and civilians including women and
children.
In an interview with OR Tambo published on 06/08/83 in The Guardian, the
issue of civilian casualties was dealt with:
Referring to the Matola raid, the Maseru raid and the SAAF bombing of Maputo, OR Tambo added:
4.3.1. 1985: The Kabwe Conference and controversies surrounding the issue
of soft targets
The questions of ANC policy towards soft targets and taking the struggle to
white areas arise in the context of the unprecedented, mass-based confrontation
with the apartheid state which was taking place at all levels of society within
the country from the early 1980s onwards. Civics, community organisations, and
trade unions were all engaged in intense struggles. MK operations increased
sharply, most of them carried out by formal units based inside the country, many
of which were supported and housed by underground political cells.
The Kabwe conference was held in June 1985 to assess developments since the
Morogoro conference of 1969. The day before it opened, Pretoria attacked several
homes in Gaborone, Botswana, killing 12 people - two young female citizens of
Botswana (who were blown to pieces), one Somalian, a six-year old child from
Lesotho, and eight South Africans, five of whom were members of the ANC, but
none of them members of MK. All those killed were unarmed.
Conference reaffirmed ANC policy with regard to targets considered legitimate:
SADF and SAP personnel and installations, selected economic installations and
administrative infrastructure. But the risk of civilians being caught in the
crossfire when such operations took place could no longer be allowed to prevent
the urgently needed, all-round intensification of the armed struggle. The focus
of armed operations had to shift towards striking directly at enemy personnel,
and the struggle had to move out of the townships to the white areas. This was
immediately seized on by the propaganda machinery of the apartheid regime, and
falsely portrayed as a decision to begin indiscriminate killings of white
civilians.
OR Tambo expressed the mood of the Conference eloquently. It represented, he
said,
At a press conference he noted that in the preceding nine to ten months many
soft targets had been hit by the enemy - nearly 500 civilians had been killed.
The distinction between hard and soft targets is going to disappear in an
intensified confrontation, in an escalating conflict. (...) I am not saying that
our Conference used the word soft targets. I am saying that Conference
recognised that we are in it. It is happening every day, he said.
By the end of 1985 an official pamphlet titled Take
the Struggle to the White Areas! was distributed inside the country.
Targets were identified as follows: the racist army, police, death squads,
agents and stooges in our midst, and the call to take the war to the white areas
is defined as follows:
The ANC leadership had called on all members and supporters of the ANC to
intensify the struggle at all costs, to move towards creating a situation of
ungovernability and peoples war.
There were long and insecure lines of communication, command and control. Many
of the established MK units had been allowed a degree of initiative in executing
their operations, as long as these remained within policy guidelines.
In contrast with a conventional military force, in which planning takes place at
HQ level by experienced officers, in guerilla warfare most of the detailed
planning takes place at the lowest level: each cadre has to be trusted to make
principled and educated decisions with regard to choice of target, whilst
keeping a close eye on developments and feelings among the people in his/her
community - a responsibility which no soldier in a conventional force ever has
to face. There was no hotline to higher structures to ask for guidance;
communication could - and at times did - result in deaths, given the degree to
which communication lines were monitored. Consequently, a great deal depended on
the political maturity, general experience, and immediate situation in which
each cadre operated.
Maintaining discipline in guerilla and conventional armed forces is also
fundamentally different. In the case of a guerilla force, discipline flows from
a thorough understanding of the political objectives of the armed struggle - not
from threats of court-martial or punishment.
MK cadres conducted crash courses for eager volunteers inside the country. Some
of these recruits had sketchy political understanding of the nature of the
struggle in comparison with those cadres who had gone through the intensive
political and military training offered in camps in exile. Some supporters
drifted in and out of structures, were never thoroughly under the discipline of
the ANC and MK, yet commanders on the ground sometimes found their contributions
indispensable.
Cadres made decisions in the context of pressures they encountered on a
day-to-day basis, in which enemy atrocities against civilians were mounting.
Increasing numbers of attacks took place in urban areas, and civilians were
increasingly caught in the crossfire. Bona fide cadres and supporters who
carried out attacks of this nature believed they were fulfilling the general
direction to carry the struggle to the white areas in accordance with the
political will of the leadership of the ANC.
The period between 1985 and 1988 witnessed unprecedented violence,
overwhelmingly directed at black civilians, as the regime fought to regain the
strategic initiative it had lost.
Increasingly in this period, attacks took place in urban areas, in which
civilians were caught in the crossfire. Bona fide cadres and supporters
who carried out attacks of this nature believed they were fulfilling the general
direction to intensify the struggle and carry it into the white areas in
accordance with the political will of the leadership of the ANC.
This behaviour of the regime was a significant factor in provoking certain
attacks which were in breach of policy. Anger on the ground was explosive: the
atrocities committed by the apartheid regime demanded retaliation, and the
careful response was at times met with angry contempt. In some cases, cadres
responded to state brutality by hitting back in anger, as soon as possible - as
in the case of the Amanzimtoti bomb, described in detail in our main submission.
A comment by OR Tambo in response to this attack is worth repeating:
"Massacres have been perpetrated against civilians: Mamelodi, a massacre. Uitenhage, a massacre. Botswana, a massacre. Queenstown, a massacre...certainly, we are beginning to see South Africans of all races (burying) their loved ones who have died in the South African situation. The whole of South Africa is beginning to bleed...If I had been approached by an ANC unit and asked whether they should go and plant a bomb at a supermarket I would have said, Of course not . But when our units are faced with what is happening all around them, it is understandable that some of the should say, Well, I may have to face being disciplined, but I am going to do this."
A factor which should not be underestimated is that the banning by the regime
of all ANC literature and jamming of broadcasts from Radio Freedom made it
extremely difficult for senior ANC leadership to get through to cadres and
activists on the ground to ensure a proper understanding of policy. Every effort
was made to block and distort the ANCs message, or anything which could be
remotely construed as supportive of the message of the liberation movement. An
extraordinary range of items were banned; possession of ANC publications such as
a pamphlet or a copy of Mayibuye or Sechaba could result in a
lengthy jail sentence.
Given the circumstances at the time, it is remarkable that so few armed attacks
took place in which there was a high rate of civilian casualties. MK acted with
great restraint; we certainly had the capacity to kill many thousands of
civilians - it would have been easy to do this - but the ANC leadership never
took this route, even under extreme provocation. The humanity of this approach
has never been acknowledged - nor reciprocated - by the apartheid regime, which
always saw black civilians in general (and all those who opposed the regime) as
forming an integral part of enemy forces, whether they were armed or not.
Operational and technical difficulties leading to unintended
consequences
When unexpected difficulties arose, cadres had to think on their feet: and
sometimes they made the wrong decisions. At times, given the refusal of the
regime to treat MK members as prisoners of war, the situations they faced were
desperate to the extent that it is highly unlikely that there would be a
peaceful outcome, no matter what they decided - the Silverton bank siege and the
Goch Street incident are cases in point.
Gathering reliable information and tactical intelligence was often exceptionally
difficult. At times attacks which appear to be aimed at civilian targets were
nothing of the sort - the cadre may have had information to the effect that an
SADF or SAP g roup would be present at a particular railway station or hotel or
restaurant a particular time, but due to a range of difficulties - ranging from
faulty intelligence to devices which malfunction and accidentally go off at the
wrong time - an explosion occurs, apparently senselessly, in a civilian area. It
is also possible that some of these incidents occurred through deliberate
disinformation, in which infiltrators into MK units set up attacks of this
nature.
At other times, an attack would take place in support of campaigns or other
struggles taking place within the community - such as strike action, mass
retrenchments, a rent or bus boycott. An explosion at an office block, factory
or chain store makes sense in this context, although the timing of the blast
could go wrong for a range of reasons and result in unintended civilian
casualties.
In some cases, cadres were entirely correct with regard to the political
reasoning behind their choice of target but placed a bomb at an inappropriate
time which resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties. In addition, they did
not have sufficient capacity to convey the intentions of their actions, or were
blocked from doing so by censorship.
At times insufficient training could have resulted in situations in which cadres
were not able to ensure that explosions took place at the intended time, or
accidents occured. Technical failures also occurred, resulting in unintended
civilian casualties.
False flag operations
The regime did not only block ANC communications of all kinds. It saw the active
dissemination of disinformation as a critically important aspect of its
programme of counter-revolutionary warfare, in which much emphasis was laid on
psychological and strategic communication operations. A central concern of
successive apartheid regimes has always been to alienate the people from MK and
the ANC. No effort was spared to discredit and demonise MK - and certain attacks
on civilian targets portrayed as the work of MK were carried out by the regime,
such as the KwaMakutha massacre. In this regard the regime was drawing on the
experience of other wars against liberation movements, including the tactics
adopted by the security forces in the Zimbabwean war of liberation, such as
pseudo operations in which they would attack civilians whilst masquerading as
guerrillas. The tactics developed in Namibia in attempts to counter-mobilise the
civilian population against Swapo were also harnessed (see our main submission,
pp 35 - 36.)
In the mid- to late 1980s, the situation was further complicated by the stepping
up of false flag operations as the regime intensified its efforts to discredit
the ANC internationally, and alienate growing popular support on the ground.
Various examples of work of this nature - such as the Khotso House bomb and the
murder of Griffiths Mxenge were cited in our main submission, and there is
little doubt that several other operations of this nature will come to light as
the work of the Commission proceeds.
In some cases agents infiltrated structures and consistently attempted to
influence people towards un-planned or ill-considered violence, in order to
discredit the ANC, create divisions in communities, and disrupt structures.
There have been indications that some of those who have applied for amnesty have
information on the extent to which false flag operations were carried out in the
1980s and 1990s. We call on the TRC to ensure that all available information on
covert projects, including what the NP has called disinformation projects
approved during this period is obtained, in particular strategic communications
projects, which were controlled by a sub-committee of the State Security
Council. Considerable detail in this regard was presented in our first
submission, pp. 34 - 40.
Paul Erasmus, a member of the SAP security branch tasked with stratkom
(strategic communications) work, has stated that a number of the limpet mines
that exploded in central Johannesburg in the late 1980s, for which the ANC was
blamed, were planted by the security police in order to discredit the ANC. Joe
Mamasela has made similar claims regarding blasts in certain Wimpy Bars. We
trust that the TRC will ensure that the truth in this regard is exposed.
Response of the leadership
In late 1987, all members of MK HQ were called in by OR Tambo, who expressed his
concern at the number of unnecessary civilian casualties which had occurred in
certain attacks, particularly those involving the use of anti-tank landmines. He
tasked MK HQ with ensuring that all cadres fully understood ANC policy with
regard to legitimate targets. Failure to comply with these orders would be
considered violations of policy and action would be taken against offenders.
In response, MK HQ sent senior commanders to the forward areas to meet with MK
structures there, and convey the concerns of the national leadership. When
possible these senior commanders also met with units. In cases where meetings
could not be held with units, command structures in the forward areas were told
to contact all command structures of their units, whether they may have been
involved in attacks of this nature or not, and ensure that all cadres were
entirely clear on ANC policy regarding legitimate targets.
Chris Hani, Aboobaker Ismail and Keith Mokoape visited structures in Maputo;
Ronnie Kasrils visited structures in Swaziland and other areas. Lambert Moloi,
Chris Hani and Julius Maliba (Manchecker) met with Zimbabwe structures, and
Chris Hani, Aboobaker Ismail, and Lambert Moloi visited Botswana structures.
In most cases cadres responsible for these actions had not deliberately set out
to flout ANC policy, but had believed they were acting in accordance with the
wishes of the leadership, or had acted in anger. This was particularly the case
with younger, more recent recruits. Conveying the instructions of the leadership
in this unequivocal manner through the most senior officials of MK HQ was
sufficient action, as the overwhelming majority of MK cadres were disciplined
soldiers and activists.
In August 1988 the NEC issued a statement specifically on the conduct of armed
struggle in the country:
"The NEC further re-affirmed the centrality of the armed struggle in the national democratic revolution and the need to further escalate armed actions and transform our offensive into a generalised peoples war. (...,) However, the NEC also expressed concern at the recent spate of attacks on civilian targets. Some of these attacks have been carried out by cadres of the peoples army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, inspired by anger at the regimes campaign of terror against the oppressed and democratic forces, both within and outside South Africa. In certain instances operational circumstances resulted in unintended casualties."
"Yet it has come to our notice that agents of the Pretoria regime have been detailed to carry out a number of bomb attacks deliberately to sow confusion among the people of South Africa and the international community, and to discredit the African National Congress."
4.4. Post 1990: Suspension of armed operations
Most MK MHQ personnel returned from exile for the December 1990 Consultative
Conference. After this conference, MHQ awaited further instructions from the NEC
with regard to its role and future direction. MK cadres inside the country had
begun surfacing and coming to the ANC office to seek guidance. A rudimentary
structure was set up to look after the needs of these cadres while awaiting
policy decisions from the political leadership.
The ANC had taken a principled decision to release agents of the regime who were
still imprisoned in Uganda at this time as part of the process of furthering the
negotiations. However, the regime did not reciprocate and many ANC cadres,
especially those on death row, were only released in 1992 after the signing of
the Record of
Understanding.
The Groote Schuur
Minute, the Pretoria Minute and the DF Malan Accord determined the future of
MK activities.
The armed struggle was suspended in August 1990 with the signing of the Pretoria
Minute. It was decided that those MK cadres who were outside the country - in
camps or in the Front Line States - should undergo further training to prepare
them for integration into a new South African Defence Force. Limited numbers of
cadres were sent for advanced officers training in conventional warfare.
Countries including India, Ghana, Pakistan, Uganda and Tanzania hosted these
cadres.
In terms of the Pretoria Minute the ANC had agreed to stop bringing arms into
the country. The DF Malan Accord of 1992 aimed to bring the arms of all the
armed forces in the country under control. However, the De Klerk regime
interpreted the Accord to mean that this applied only to MK; various
negotiations ensued, without resolving the matter.
We dealt with the issue of SDUs in considerable detail in our first submission,
and our responses to questions raised by the TRC in this regard are dealt with
in the main document of this second submission. It will suffice to note that
SDUs were formed in response to the violence which erupted as the ANC suspended
armed struggle. In response to pleas for assistance from communities under
attack, the ANC tasked some members of MK Military HQ to attend to issues
relating to SDUs, their organisation, training and the provision of weaponry. It
was made clear that SDUs would be exclusively for the purpose of self-defence,
that the overall control of SDUs was to remain with the communities concerned,
and if MK cadres participated in SDUs they would do so as members of the
community: MK Command would not play a leading role, as it was felt this might
jeopardise negotiations.
In 1991, MHQ organised a conference for MK in Venda to inform cadres of the
state of the negotiations and to get their views on the future of MK. The
conference was attended by representatives of cadres from inside the country as
well as those in camps in Tanzania and Uganda.
The Venda MK conference supported the decisions taken at the ANCs July
conference in Durban, and called on the ANC leadership to secure the release of
MK combatants who were still in prison. Cadres called on Chris Hani to remain MK
Chief-of-Staff.
The conference also called for a reorganisation of MHQ with the view to
preparing for serious negotiations with the regime on military matters and a
future defence force. It was decided that multi-lateral talks would be held with
all forces within the country, and that the homeland armies should be
discouraged from individually holding bilateral negotiations with the SADF.
Following the Venda Conference, the ANC re-organised MHQ (details in this regard
appear in the appendix on ANC structures and personnel.) Regional structures
were established in each of the ANCs 14 organisational regions and cadres
appointed to liaise with MK personnel living in these areas.
By this time, in preparation for negotiations, MHQ had begun to have some
contact with the SADF.
There was increasing pressure from the military camps from cadres anxious to
return home. Once negotiations appeared to be proceeding relatively smoothly at
Kempton Park, the return of these cadres was speeded up.
After initial bi-lateral negotiations between MK Command and the SADF, we went
on to have multi-lateral negotiations with the seven existing armed forces in
the country. MK and other forces participated in the Joint Military
Co-ordinating Council under the Transitional Executive Council.
In December 1993, MK held its final parade. After the elections, the integration
of all members of all armed forces into a new SANDF began in earnest in May
1994. Later that year, the weapons that were in MK Ordnance stockpiles were
handed over to the SANDF. Other weapons were collected and handed over. The
President decided that all MK arms stockpiled in foreign countries should he
donated to those countries; they were not compatible with those used in the
SANDF.
5. CASE STUDIES
We have selected two case studies - one from Special Operations, the other from
general military operations - to illustrate some of the points regarding the
conduct of armed struggle that we have highlighted in our submissions to the
TRC. Operations such as the attack on SAAF HQ and the laying of anti-tank mines
have been seen in some quarters as contradictions of ANC policy regarding the
avoidance of civilian casualties.
The SAAF HQ operation illustrates the problems which arose as a result of the
enemy locating strategic installations in high-density civilian areas. In the
section on anti-tank landmines, we provide the TRC with more detail on the
objective of these operations and the operational difficulties which arose.
5.1. The Attack on SAAF HQ
This operation came in the wake of a cross-border raid into Lesotho in which 42
ANC supporters and BaSotho were killed, and the assassination of Ruth First in
Maputo. The objective was to carry out a highly visible attack, which was
impossible to cover up, against military personnel in uniform. No direct
operations had previously been carried out against military personnel except for
a number of skirmishes between MK cadres and the security forces, usually in the
remote border areas.
It was decided to target military personnel who waited for buses outside SAAF HQ
at approximately 16h30 each day. In the early stages of planning this operation,
discussions were held on the possible loss of civilian life, and whether this
would be justified. After careful consideration it was decided by OR Tambo, in
terms of the mandate he had been given by the NEC, that Special Operations
should proceed with the operation, taking great care to ensure that the target
was unmistakably military.
On the afternoon of May 20th, 1983, the unit drove into Pretoria and parked the
car packed with explosives in Church Street, at the entrance of Air Force HQ.
When the bomb exploded a few minutes earlier than planned, 19 people were
killed, including both MK cadres and 11 Air Force officers, According to initial
media reports, more than 200 military personnel and a few civilians were
injured, but these figures were later distorted by the government in an attempt
to portray this attack as aimed at civilians.
5.2. Anti-tank mine operations
The ANC never used anti-personnel mines, specifically because we were concerned
to avoid civilian casualties. The ANC used only anti-tank mines, which require
at least 300kg to detonate. The objective of these operations was to strike at
the SADF personnel patrolling borders, and at the Commando units consisting of
farmers linked to the area defence systems within the overall security network.
The areas in which these operations took place were primarily the designated
areas along the Botswana, Zimbabwe and Swaziland borders.
In 1979 the Promotion of Density of Population in Designated Areas Act, No. 87,
was passed in an attempt to stem the exodus of white farmers from border areas,
and increase the number of farmers in these areas to serve as the first line of
defence against the infiltration of guerrillas from neighbouring states. At
least R100m was made available over a period of five to six years for the
provisions of loans to such farmers, and for the construction of strategic roads
and airstrips in these areas.
The Act stipulated that loans be given on condition that farms were managed
according to SADF directives, and that all white farmers in the areas had to
undergo military training, be members of the regional and area commandos, and
make themselves available to the SADF and Department of National Security to
carry out reconnaissance and intelligence tasks whenever called on to do so. All
were linked into the Commando system of part-time SADF forces and the military
radio network known as MARNET. Many farm buildings were constructed in such a
way as to constitute a chain of defence strongholds along the borders ready to
be used by the SADF whenever necessary. The Act stipulated that the SADF was
empowered to enter any property in the designated area to demolish or erect
military facilities or any other structure without the consent of the owner.
(For more information, please refer to p. 59 of our main submission.)
These measures were not only defensive: Messina, Louis Trichardt, Alldays,
Ellisras, Thabazimbi, Zeerust, Piet Retief, and Amsterdam were all key towns
from which acts of aggression were launched against neighbouring states.
The tactic adopted was to lay anti-tank mines overnight so that they would be
triggered when the SADF patrolled first thing the next morning. Roads in the
immediate border area were used primarily by the SADF and farmers actively
supporting the efforts of the SADF, thereby defining themselves as legitimate
targets. Most farm workers went on foot and would, it was reasoned, not be
affected.
The decision to use landmines and the choice of area of operation was made at
Military HQ; the commands were based in Zimbabwe and later, for operations in
the Eastern Transvaal, in Swaziland.
Units would be sent into the country to conduct reconnaissance with the aim or
determining the movements of enemy personnel on the roads, their routines and
schedules, the habits of local people, etc. This usually took a few days; once
the reconnaissance had been completed, cadres reported back to their commanders.
Operational plans were drawn up, and the reports and plans were then sent to
Military HQ. When operations were approved, detailed implementation plans were
drawn up and cadres instructed to lay the mines.
Initial operations were carried out fairly close to the borders - within 2-4 km.
However OR Tambo ordered that operations should be carried out deeper inside the
country as the governments of neighbouring countries were coming under pressure
from the apartheid regime. The effect of this was to move some operations into
areas where the roads were not used almost exclusively by the defence force and
Commando farmers. In addition, because cadres had to be in the country longer
there was an increase in the number of firefights between guerrillas and the
security forces.
When it became apparent that the landmine operations were not having the desired
effect of consistently striking at security forces, they were suspended by MHQ.
5. APPENDICES: MK OPERATIONS AND OTHER ARMED ACTIONS
It is not possible to give a detailed account of every MK operation, as
requested by the TRC. We did not keep records of this nature, mainly for
security reasons. More detail will be forthcoming in applications for amnesty by
various commanders and combatants.
There are two lists of armed actions attached to this submission. Appendix
4 provides information on operations carried
out by members of MK, arranged chronologically and according to the nature of
the target in each case. It is drawn from reports, recollections of the MK
commanders, press reports, and the SAIRR annual surveys. There are probably
omissions, and some mistakes may have occurred due to incorrect reporting or a
range of other reasons.
The incidents and attacks listed in Appendix 5 fall
into the grey area described above. We are not certain that all these attacks
were carried out by MK personnel or by people trained by MK personnel. We cannot
state with certainty what the objectives of these attacks were, but it is
probable that many were carried out in good faith in the belief - incorrectly at
times - that the cadre was acting in accordance with the injunctions by the
leadership to intensify the struggle at all costs and carry the struggle to
white areas. In other cases we strongly doubt that our cadres were responsible,
but do not have sufficient information to substantiate this.
6. CONCLUSION
In the course of war life is lost. The challenge before us was to avoid
indiscriminate killing of civilians, which MK certainly had the capacity to
carry out. Although it is possible that entirely accurate statistics will never
be known beyond any doubt, it is evident that MK acted with great restraint.
This record should be compared with the many thousands of deaths of civilians at
the hands of successive apartheid regimes - with this continuing right until
April 1994 - in countless massacres, assassinations, and executions. In addition
there have b een millions of civilian casualties - bloodshed of holocaust
proportions - in wars waged by surrogate forces in neighbouring states.
We also register our deep regret for the deaths of innocent civilians killed in
the course of the struggle for justice and freedom. We extend our condolences to
the families of all those who were killed or injured, including the soldiers and
police wh o fought against us. The taking of life is not an easy thing; to us
all life is sacred, and we have never been callous in our struggle.
1 We regret that we have not been able to locate
a copy of this document