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INTRODUCTION

The ANC Gauteng province commissioned Strategy & Tactics Research Group to undertake a multi-method study of ANC members. The study included two-score in-depth interviews with leaders of Alliance partners in Gauteng; a number of focus groups; participant observation at ANC branch meetings in the province; and a structured survey of ANC paid-up members and branch officials.

A report on the qualitative components of the study has been submitted separately. This report is drawn from the survey of ANC members and branch officials. The nature of this report is primarily analytic: our focus is on understanding the values, attitudes, needs and objectives of ANC members and branch office bearers, not on generating recommendations – that is the purview of the ANC.

CONTENTS

The survey questionnaire covered the following areas and issues:

- What do ANC members most value about the ANC
- The state of branches
- The value of provincial support/deployment structures and strategies
- Alliance membership
- Social capital
- ANC and the media
- Voting
- Policy issues
- Attitudes and mood
- How has the ANC changed since 1994 and what must be done by 2012?

SAMPLING

At the outset of this project it was envisaged that the membership database, having been cleaned appropriately, would be sampled by S&T to ensure that the survey accurately represented all branches in the province (in formal and informal areas, suburbs and the smaller rural areas, and so on).

This process, however, was not possible because the database was still in the process of being updated. With timelines being tight, the ANC identified 130 branches across the province – drawn from all 6 regions and from formal and informal areas – in which the survey was to be conducted. The sampling process resulted in branches across the 6 regions being chosen of different character – weak and strong branches, township versus informal settlement versus suburb, and so on.

At each branch visited, all members and office bearers in good standing were assigned numbers and then respondents were selected using a random number grid, to ensure that randomisation was built into selection. The process was meant to yield 5 – 7 members and 2 branch officials per branch. The only additional sampling mechanism was to ensure (where possible) that 1 male and 1 female branch official was selected 2 branch officials were interviewed.

Altogether, the sample stretched across 136 branches, amounting to over a third of all ANC branches in Gauteng. The methodology was of course cumbersome, and relied on Walter Sisulu House organising meetings and briefing officials so that fieldwork teams could get to meetings when they were held, and were expected when they got there. Sometimes only a handful of people were present, limiting the ability to sample randomly. Fieldwork took a long time to complete, given the attenuated process, meetings being

cancelled, venue changes, no advance warning of the survey taking place, and so on. Fieldwork began in July 2006 and ended in September, with data processing and analysis in October.

Region	Sample frame	Realised sample
Johannesburg	11 994	144
Tshwane	11 243	140
Ekurhuleni	10 148	146
Sedibeng	5 375	108
West Rand	4 268	122
Metsweding	1 578	57
Total	44 606	717

Table 1: Realised sample of members by region compared with database of members in good standing

At the end of the fieldwork phase a total of 983 interviews with ANC members across the province had been conducted – 717 with members and 266 with branch officials.

Once the information from each interview had been coded and captured on computer, the sample was weighted back to the actual distribution of all members in good standing across the six regions (as per Table 1). In this way, the quantitative data presented in this report should be seen as representative of all members in good standing in Gauteng as of September 2006.

The key point to bear in mind is that this is a survey of the activist core of the ANC in Gauteng. Respondents are all members in good standing – that is, they are paid up members, not merely card carrying or supporters – and they attended meetings where fieldwork took place, suggesting that they are both paid up and active. Moreover, the survey (and this report) included both members and branch officials. As such, this is not a traditional survey of ANC voters in Gauteng; the data in this report reflect the views of ANC activists in Gauteng.

MEMBERSHIP

ANC members in Gauteng span a number of generations. As we show in this report and in the accompanying qualitative report, older ANC members have a very different approach (and often live in different socio-economic circumstances) from younger members.

We asked respondents the year in which they joined the ANC. This occurred in waves: there are the pre-1960 members, the tiny number who joined in the bleak early 1970s, then a large post-1976 wave, followed by the largest single intake in the 1990–94 period, dropping but still continuing in the immediate post-democracy phase of 1995–1999. The worry lies at the far right of the graph, where we see that (statistically) no new paid-up members have been drawn into the movement. This may be the result of incorrect memory, though this is unlikely to be repeated across the 120 different branches we sampled. Rather, it suggests that the activist core of the Gauteng ANC was recruited predominantly in the struggle phase or immediately afterwards, when it became possible for sympathisers to join an unbanned organisation. It raises difficult questions about the capacity of the ANC in the province to reproduce itself sufficiently to face the challenges of the next decade.




Figure 1: Year joined ANC (members, branch officials, all)

As we can see, there is quite a different profile when comparing branch officials with members. A third (30%) of members joined before 1969 – true of half that number (14%) of branch officials. Seen from the other end of the spectrum, 41% of members had joined the ANC since 1990, rising to over half (51%) of officials. Let’s look at age. ANC activists tend to be of working age. The mean (or average) age of ANC members is 40, rising slightly to 41 among of- fice bearers. Just 6% of members are aged 18 to 24 (most cluster at the upper end of the age cohort and joined in 1999) while at the other end of the scale just 3% of paid-up mem- bers are aged above 60 (this rises to 5% when we include office bearers as well). Across members and office bearers, 45% are aged 25 to 39 and the same proportion aged 40 to 59. The only area where this changes slightly is Metsweding, where the mean age is a youthful 36.

As the qualitative report makes clear, a young, well edu- cated and ambitious cadre has joined the ANC; as we shall see throughout this report, there is a strong generational dif- ference between them and older ANC members. Here we

see officials tending to be younger, reflecting the extent to which ‘new’ ANC members have moved into leadership po- sitions at branch level. So there is a slightly contradictory set of issues: on the one hand, a slowing down in recruitment of (or failure to keep) new paid-up members after 1999, and a simultaneous movement of newer, younger members into leadership positions at branch level.

SERVICE ETHOS

We went on to ask members and officials – all of whom, we should recall, are card-carrying members in good stand- ing – what they value most about being an ANC member. Overwhelmingly, the answer was service – to the commu- nity (39%) and to the country (39%). This ethos was slightly more evident among officials than members (by a matter of 4-5%). It was equally shared by women and men, and particularly strong among younger members. Almost half (45%) of ANC members and officials aged 18-24 talked of service to their community, dropping slightly to 40% among those aged 25–39. As respondents aged, they spoke more of




Figure 2: What do you value about being an ANC member? (member and official)




Figure 3: Why are you an ANC member? (closed question, all respondents)

service to the country – rising from 30% among the 18–24 cohort to 42% among the 40–59 cohort.

The other important reason members value the ANC is that it gives them a sense of belonging (true of 14% across members and office bearers). This was most evident among ANC members aged 60 and above (73% of whom gave this answer), and stronger in Ekurhuleni (25%) than other regions; but equally true across branches in formal and informal areas.

We asked a slightly different question about why people are ANC members, which gave the options ranging from ‘it means nothing’ through ‘I want to be involved but am not’ to ‘Being an ANC member lets me get involved in political decisions about my country’. Just 3% of respondents felt that their membership ‘means nothing’ – although that is 3% of the activist core – and most were drawn from the 60+ age cohort (60% of whom shared this view). It does appear that there is quite strong disaffection among older ANC members, which should be monitored carefully.

Turning to those who say they want to be involved but are not, no particular pattern emerges across demographic variables or when analysed by region. It is slightly more evident among unemployed (22%) than employed (16%) respondents; but the main factors appear to be political. People who joined the ANC after 1990 are more likely (20%) to feel this way than those who joined earlier (13%); more importantly, members who do not belong to other Alliance structures are twice as likely (30%) to feel this way compared with ANC members who also belong to other Alliance structures (15%). Getting involved in the Alliance is clearly good for ANC members and should be encouraged.

For the majority of respondents, they want to be (and feel they are) involved in political decisions that affect their country, something denied to the majority of South Africans for four centuries. What matters is that the ANC develop strategies to move respondents from the right-hand set of bars toward that on the left: from disaffection or non-involvement to feeling that they are taking part in political processes. This may take two forms: a particular approach to older ANC members, those who carry the ANC’s traditions and values and are needed to transmit these to the younger members; and deepening the political involvement of others, since it appears that a more thorough-going po-

litical engagement – mainly via Alliance structures – makes ANC members feel more secure about their contribution and role.

ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

We went on to ask respondents which Alliance structures (in addition to the ANC) they belonged to. Although we sought to avoid the confusion between being a ‘supporter’ and a card-carrying member of an Alliance partner, this seems to have crept into responses, so it is difficult to distinguish those who think of themselves as, say, an ANCWL member, and those who are card-carrying ANCWL members.

The ANCWL was the most popular among Alliance partners, which a third (36%) of ANC members and officials said they belonged to, followed by SANCO (29%) and the ANCYL (22%). In each case, we probed as to whether or not these were card-carrying members, and the figures dropped: 41% of those who said they belonged to the ANCWL were card-carrying members; 30% of SANCO members were card-carrying members; and 24% of ANCYL members were card-carrying members. (None of these responses were checked against membership data from the respective organisations.) As noted above, there was some confusion around the issue, with some respondents believing as a paid-up ANC member they were automatically a paid-up member of other Alliance structures they supported, and these figures should be treated with caution. They are possibly more useful as an indication of ANC members’ support than paid-up membership of ANC/Alliance partner organisation.

Notably, a fifth (20%) of ANC members and officials say they belong to no other Alliance structure – this is extremely positive, meaning that 8 in 10 ANC members in Gauteng also regard themselves as members of other Alliance structures.

It is the 20% that do not belong to other structures that should be monitored: and as we saw, they were most likely to feel ineffectual within the ANC. This group were more likely to be male (26%) than female (15%); analysed by age, they tend to be working age (lower among young and older members); and they were likely to live on commercial farms or other places fairly far away from urban or met-




Figure 4: Membership of Alliance structures

ropolitan centres. But non-membership of Alliance structures was highest in the Johannesburg region (30%), then Sedibeng (26%) and Ekurhuleni (25%), and lowest in Metsweding (9%), suggesting that spatial location may be important but is not the key variable. Intriguingly, the category includes 22% of those who joined the ANC pre-1990 and almost the same proportion (19%) of those who joined after 1990.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

ANC members are very active in civil society, far beyond the average for the country or province: it can reasonably be argued that ANC members are the backbone of civil society

in the province. Just 1% of ANC members and officials in Gauteng told us they belong to no structure at all, compared with a national average of around one in seven (15%). In part this was because all respondents belonged to the ANC and felt themselves to be Alliance members as well; but other civil society structures enjoy high ANC membership.

It is notable that while in many respondents ANC members are similar to other citizens – the high membership of religious structures, burial societies, and so on – they have a far more political profile. But ANC members are also taking up all the spaces created by government for citizens’ participation in governance – they are to be found in community policing forums, community development forums,




Figure 5: Membership of civil society structures

ward, block and street committees, school governing bodies and so on.

We went on to ask respondents which of these structures they attend most often (taking frequency of attendance to reflect the importance attached to membership). Political meetings dominated as the most frequently attended, for both members and office bearers. This was followed by attendance at meetings of religious bodies (which would be the main mention in a random population survey), followed by women's groups among members and by Ward Committees among office-bearers.

And this civic engagement is reflected in generally positive views of community and individual-level trust (social capital). For example, while 37% of ANC members and office bearers believe that people only watch out for themselves, two-thirds (62%) believe people care for their neighbours as well as themselves. But if you allow people to take advantage of you they will do so, according to 59% of respondents (higher among officials than ordinary members), while 39% believe people will not take advantage. A similar proportion (56%) believe that 'you need to be very careful', while 44% believe they can trust people in their community. 4 in 10 respondents have remarkably high levels of trust in their fellow citizens, given the levels of crime – and press coverage thereof – in the province.

Taken together, ANC members in Gauteng emerge as highly politicised (predictably) as well as heavily engaged in civil society organisations, from faith-based to security to development; they are wary but inclined towards positive views of their fellow Gauteng citizens. Given that 58% of respondents said that crime was the main problem facing their community, social capital has to be maintained in the face of considerable odds, which we turn to below. But what should be clear is that ANC members tend to be politicised and politically engaged, taking up opportunities for participation in governance and populating civil society organisations across all types. They are active, engaged citizens.

A BRIEF SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF ANC MEMBERS IN GAUTENG

The survey is representative of the activist core of the ANC in Gauteng. Those activists are overwhelmingly African (96%), with tiny numbers of coloureds (2%), Indians (1%) and whites (1%).

ANC activists are more likely to be female (53%) than male (47%) when analysed as members – but men dominate heavily as office bearers, comprising 62% of our sample while women made up the remaining 38%.¹ Taken together, women (51%) still very slightly outnumber men (49%) in the sample. The gender imbalance in office-bearer positions is an area the ANC will need to monitor, given the 50/50 quota implemented among elected local officials and the points noted in our qualitative report about men blaming women for only electing men, not supporting other women as candidates, and so on. ANC members do however reflect very positive attitudes towards gender equality and the 50/50 gender quota, an issue we return to below.

ANC members are more likely to be from formal metropolitan or urban areas (63% rising to 71% among office bearers) than from informal areas (30% among members, dropping to 20% among office bearers). Given the heavily urbanised nature of Gauteng, the urban/rural axis is not one that will feature much in the report: just 6% of members live in a rural area. We did not ask about suburb/township differences, but there is a long-standing and well-known com-

plaint among ANC members that their leaders and officials leave the township/informal settlement as soon as appointed/elected. Certainly there seems to be a significant difference between office bearers and members in this instance, and the danger of membership/leadership disconnect – at branch level – needs to be borne in mind.

The domestic situations differ widely among respondents – and poverty is a daily reality for many ANC members and leaders. For example, if we look at access to water, we find quite inequalities among ANC members – and also find a quarter of members (considerably lower among office bearers) who do not enjoy water to RDP standards.

	Members	Office bearers	Total
Water in dwelling	56	67	59
Water out of dwelling (piped)	21	17	20
Other (tanker, river, etc.)	23	16	23

Table 2: Water access (by member and office bearer)

We asked all respondents how often, if ever, do people in their household go hungry because of a shortage of food – a poverty proxy question. This is a daily reality for 3% of members and 2% of office bearers; weekly for 19% of members and 18% of office bearers; and only changes when we get to the seldom/never category, which includes 55% of members and 64% of office bearers. In the midst of press and opposition hype about ANC leaders and conspicuous consumption, it must be stressed that for the majority of ordinary members, the benefits of democracy are visible in access to basic services, but many still lack even these basics. And they still belong to the ANC, believing it to be the right vehicle for realising their aspirations.

Furthermore (using the 'expanded' definition of unemployment that places no conditions on the answer such as having had to actively seek work in the period immediately prior to being interviewed), 42% of ANC members in Gauteng are unemployed, dropping to 31% among office bearers. (To be precise: 40% of members said they were unemployed, and a further 2% said they had 'piece work' or casual work, which we have included here given the temporary and unpredictable nature of such work.) The gender inequalities in society are reflected among ANC members: 37% of male members are unemployed, rising to 47% among female members.

There are also wide disparities in income among respondents. A quarter of respondents chose not to answer the income question, which asked how much disposable income (i.e. after tax and other deductions) their household had available per month.

In both instances, there is a grouping with no or low household incomes, but members' incomes bulge at a lower level than those of office bearers: 52% of members earn between R200 and R2999 per month, true of 36% of office bearers. The latter have higher incomes, with 23% earning in excess of R7000 per month, true of 12% of members. Members have considerably lower levels of disposable income than office bearers; but in both groups, there are considerable inequalities between those with lower and those with higher levels of disposable income.

	Member	Office bearer	Total
R0–R199	2	2	2
R200–R599	7	6	7
R600–R999	16	9	14
R1000–R2999	29	21	26
R3000–R6999	12	16	13
R7000–R13999	8	10	9
More	4	13	6
No reply	24	22	24

Table 3: Monthly household disposable income (by member and office bearer)

In part this may reflect the very different educational profiles of members and office bearers.

As we can see, at the lower end of the scale, members and office bearers are fairly similar in the level of education they have completed; but at the upper end, more than twice as many branch officials have a post-matric qualification as ordinary members. At one level, this is perhaps predictable, given the responsibilities of officials; but we saw in the qualitative report that there is growing resentment in some quarters against what is seen as a new, educated elite that is seen to be using ANC membership and office-bearer status as a stepping stone to employment elsewhere. It is important that political education is provided equally and is seen as a more relevant qualification than formal educational attainment.

Perhaps more importantly, the ANC activist core has higher education levels than the provincial average. According to Census 2001, 7.6% of all Gauteng residents have no formal schooling at all, while 17% have primary level education, 29% have completed junior secondary, 36% senior secondary, and 11% have gone beyond matric. Among ANC members, just 1% have no formal education, and considerably fewer have primary or junior secondary schooling, while over half (53%) have completed matric and a quarter (24%) have a post-matric qualification. ANC cadre are well

educated, politicised, and engaged citizens, and comprise a significant human resource base for the movement.

That said, the ANC should be aware of and sensitive towards the inequalities among members, and between members and office bearers. To note these differences is not to pass a (more or less explicit) judgement. In many cases, people who high education and are in employment have the time and money to play an active role in a branch executive that others cannot; and we live in a society marked by deeply skewed income levels. That said, while women bear a bigger brunt of unemployment, they also comprise the majority of ANC members. ANC members are certainly aware of these internal differences, and what matters is that the ANC manages some of the associated underlying tensions – pointed out in the qualitative report – and actively work to ensure that difference is not an axis of hostility.

THE STATE OF BRANCHES

A substantial part of the survey deals with the state of branches, and support/deployment strategies aimed at strengthening branches, since this was the main focus of the project. As with the qualitative report, we concentrate more on analysing the situation than developing a detailed set of recommendations; the latter is the appropriate function of the ANC.

A third (31%) of respondents told us their branch had an office (by which was meant a space regularly used for meetings and activities, not necessarily a rented/owned set of offices solely dedicated to ANC work), and as we can see from Figure 7 these are most likely to be found in Johannesburg or Tshwane, and least likely on the West Rand. While having a branch office may not be a requirement for efficiency, having a regular accessible meeting place is, and as we saw from participant observation (and covered in the qualitative report) many branches battle to meet regularly because they lack the resources – an office to meet in or the money to pay for other venues. There are pronounced inequalities among ANC branches when measured across the 6 regions, which the ANC need to identify, monitor and actively seek to ameliorate.




Figure 6: Educational attainment (members and office bearers)




Figure 7: Incidence of branch offices (by region)

We asked respondents about the state of finances in their branch, a perennial problem. Just one in ten (11%) told us finances were 'good' while a fifth (19%) didn't know. For the remaining 70%, finances were said to be 'poor'. While very few respondents told us their branch finances were in a good state, those complaining of poor finances were mainly to be found in Metsweding, Ekurhuleni, the West Rand and Sedibeng; Tshwane and Johannesburg looked rather different. This will become a familiar pattern as we analyse the survey data. According to 60% of respondents, their branch costs are paid by member donation; just 4% are covered by private donations.

We have already seen that ANC members participating in the survey suffer widespread unemployment, and income levels are correspondingly low. Donations to the ANC follow suit – but, happily, office bearers give considerably more than members.

	Member	Office bearer	Total
Nothing	35	19	31
R1 – R5	5	3	4
R6 – R20	22	14	20
R21 – R50	20	16	19
R51 – R100	8	13	10
More	10	34	17

Table 4: 'How much, if anything, do you donate to the ANC in a year?'

Among members, those aged 60+ were most likely not to give donations – 73% gave none – but also had the highest proportion giving more than R100 per year, with 12% of this age cohort doing so (true of 11% of 40-59 year olds, with younger members in single figures). Members giving annual donations in excess of R100 were most likely to come from Tshwane, Johannesburg and Sedibeng. More focused fund-raising among members may yield positive results.

Despite the seemingly parlous state of branch finances, only 46% of all respondents told us their branch had undertaken fund-raising activities in the last year; while 6%

were unsure, the remaining 48% of members and office bearers said their branches had not done so. Branches in Tshwane and Johannesburg were most likely to have undertaken fund-raising activities, with the West Rand least likely to have done so (82% of West Rand members told us their branch had not done so in the last year).

Branches in the more affluent parts of the province seem to fund-raise fairly regularly, while those in poorer areas – and presumably therefore branches which most need funds – do not fund-raise very often. This is logical in one respect – funds are easier to raise in more affluent areas – but counter intuitive. Supporting branches in poor areas in designing and implementing fund-raising activities would be an important intervention.

And it can come about by branches from different regions sharing their experiences. We asked members whose branches had done fund-raising if those activities had been successful or not, and 62% (61% when office bearers are included) said the fund-raising had indeed been successful. And this was true regardless of whether the locale was more or less affluent – 67% of West Rand members whose branches had tried to fund-raise said it had been successful, more than in Johannesburg (58%) and on a par with Tshwane (68%) and Ekurhuleni (65%).

We asked respondents about the kinds of campaigns their branches may have run in the last year. Recruiting new members was the most common branch activity, cited by 86% of all respondents, closely followed by work around the 2006 local elections, cited by 82% of respondents. Recruitment was high across the board, with the lowest return in Metsweding – where 75% of members nonetheless told us they had undertaken such activities. The same was true of election-related work. Political education was most frequently mentioned by respondents from Sedibeng and the West Rand, but differences between regions were not large.

Perhaps the most interesting – certainly by comparing the ANC with traditional conceptions of what political parties do – is that branches in all 6 regions were heavily involved in community work. We did not follow up with a more detailed question and cannot specify the different forms it took. But members and office bearers in large numbers, and from all regions, said their branches had undertaken community work – and it was high in areas such as West Rand and Metsweding that scored less well on other branch activities.




Figure 8: Campaigns undertaken by branches in the last year

STRENGTHENING BRANCHES

Given the high levels of activity described by respondents – members and office bearers – it is perhaps not surprising that respondents predominantly see their fellow ANC members as active in the movement. We asked respondents to think about the majority of members in their respective branch and tell us how active they were.

	Members	Office bearers	Total
Very active	50	40	47
Involved sometimes	39	50	42
Hardly ever active	8	8	8
Inactive	4	2	3

Table 5: Describing members

Members tend to be slightly more charitable than office bearers, but there is a large degree of consensus across the two groups, who agree that around half of branch members

are very active, and a slightly smaller four in ten sometimes active. In the view of both groups, there is a small inactive rump in their branch, accounting for around 1 in 10 members.

We went on to ask what organisational skills were needed by branches to work more efficiently. Fund-raising and financial management skills were most wanted by members and office bearers (80%), followed by campaign plan and execution (64%), member administration (60%) and media production (51%). Minute-taking and meeting planning were not widely regarded as necessary.

Attitudes to skills acquisition differed by region. Respondents from Metsweding and the West Rand were most desirous of all the possible skills, across the board. Even where items scored low on average, such as planning a meeting or taking minutes, between half and two-thirds of respondents from these two areas wanted such skills development. This makes targeting relatively easy: the branches falling into less affluent parts of the province are also those most wanting their skills developed in all areas. There is an unsurprising correlation between poverty and ANC regions in the province.




Figure 9: Skills wanted by branches




Figure 10: Impact of deployees

On some issues, such as financial skills, need is high across the board (from a low of 71% in Tshwane to a high of 91% in Metsweding). Planning and running a campaign is a felt need by more than half of respondents in all regions, from a low in Tshwane of 52% to a high of 84% in the West Rand. Administration of membership is similar, not dropping below the 50% mark anywhere, while media production is wanted everywhere barring Tshwane (where just 44% of respondents mentioned it). Minute taking was mentioned by over half of respondents only in Metsweding and West Rand.

SUPPORT STRATEGIES, DEPLOYMENTS, ETC.

A number of strategies have been developed to strengthen the ANC in Gauteng, and to strengthen the branches which are its lifeblood. One of these is the deployment of members of the Regional Executive Committee, another is from the Provincial Executive Committee. Firstly we asked respondents if they knew who the deployees were – always a slight-

ly awkward question, since it tests knowledge and respondents do not look like not knowing something they feel they ought to know – and then we asked what kind of impact the deployees had had.

	Regional Exec cttee	Provincial Exec cttee
Members		
Know them	59	55
Don't know them	22	26
Unsure	19	19
Office bearers		
Know them	76	77
Don't know them	19	17
Unsure	5	7

Table 6: Knowledge of deployees




Figure 11: Impact of Constituency Office (all respondents)




Figure 12: Attitude to ward committee performance

As we can see, office bearers were far more likely than members to know who their deployee was, perhaps predictably. Knowledge of deployees among ordinary members was highest in Sedibeng and Ekurhuleni and lowest in Metsweding. Whether this reflects different approaches or different deployees operating in different ways is unclear, but it may be worth finding out what worked well in Sedibeng and Ekurhuleni and replicate it in other regions.

As we can see, the impact of deployees is widely regarded as positive, though respondents do not give a resounding endorsement. One in four (39%) think the deployees had a very positive impact with a further one in five (22%) thinking the impact had been slight. Very few, on the other hand, think deployees had a negative impact; but large numbers (25%) simply don't know what impact they had, just as we saw large numbers did not know who had been deployed to their branch. The constituency office performed a lot better, in the eyes of respondents.

Just one in ten (11%) had not heard of it, while 73% thought its impact had been positive, and 9% thought it had had a negative impact. Perhaps tellingly, respondents from

West Rand and Metsweding were most likely not to have heard of the office, suggesting that more concerted efforts are needed to take these support structures to the areas most in need. Areas that are materially poor are also knowledge poor. On the positive side, it was again respondents from Sedibeng and Ekurhuleni who were most positive in their opinion of the impact of the parliamentary constituency office.

We asked respondents what they thought the main function of the constituency office should be.

	Members	Office bearers	Total
Build branches	59	62	60
Mobilise communities	35	26	32
Focus on governance	6	12	8

Table 7: What should be the main function of the constituency office?




Figure 13: Functions of ward committees (all respondents)

There is consensus among members and office bearers that the office should focus primarily on building branches, with a secondary focus on mobilisation. Perhaps the question invited these answers – branches would benefit directly more from such activities than from a governance focus, which may nonetheless be important in the long run. But it is apparent that greater dialogue is needed, between branches and Walter Sisulu House, to ensure that support strategies are understood, their purpose appreciated, and their functions agreed by all.

But if the constituency office fared well, the ward committees did not. Over half of all respondents – members and office bearers – did not know about their ward committee, and while 13% of the remainder had no opinion, nearly a third (29%) thought the performance of the ward committee had been bad. A tiny 3% gave it a positive rating.

Asked what the ward committee should rather do, respondents gave differing answers, suggesting there is little clarity on the future role of the ward committee, something the ANC should move to resolve as quickly as possible.

In the same way as governance was seen as less immediately beneficial to branches, so is the (very important) monitoring of councillors – this was recommended by 44% of respondents from the West Rand but few from other regions. Respondents (both members and office bearers) agreed that the two main foci of ward committees should be managing community projects (especially in Sedibeng) and focusing on local economic development (especially in Metsweding).

While resolving these issues, it is important to balance the importance of intangible work less rated by branches – such as monitoring councillors or focusing on governance – with activities that will provide visible benefits to branches.

MEDIA, TRUST AND COMMUNICATION

ANC members and office bearers in Gauteng consume a lot of media. Three-quarters (73%) watch TV every day, with just 9% only doing so seldom or never. In all, 70% listen to the radio every day, with 9% seldom or never doing so. Me-

dia consumption figures are always lower for newspapers, and here we see that 48% read a newspaper every day and 37% do so at least every week; 15% seldom or never do so.

ANC members to a large degree are model citizens – they are very active in civil society, believe in local and national service and are well informed, consuming large amounts of media. And they are discriminating consumers. Asked which medium they trust to provide accurate information about South Africa, TV was the main choice at 58%, followed by radio (29%) and newspapers trailing behind (9%); just 3% said they trust no media at all. In other words, trust tends to reflect consumption patterns. But asked if the media accurately reflects the interests and issues that affect their community, respondents were more circumspect.

	% respondents
All the time	14
Most of the time	28
Some of the time	40
Hardly ever	11
Never	7

Table 8: How often does media reflect issues affecting your community?

Almost a fifth (18%) feel the media seldom or never deals with the issues affecting their community, while 40% think it does so ‘some of the time’.

But at the same time, respondents do use the media to find out what is happening in the ANC. And this is problematic, as we saw in the qualitative research, where people complained that the ANC does not communicate enough with branches, and that members are more likely to find out what happened at a national meeting, for example, from the media than from Walter Sisulu House. Over half of all respondents – 56% in all – said they use media reports to find out about the ANC, while a third (34%) said they did not.




Figure 14: How ANC branches communicate with members




Figure 15: How should ANC communicate with members? (all respondents)

The reason this is problematic is that large numbers of respondents do not trust the media to report honestly about the ANC – but they nonetheless have to use it to find out what is happening with their movement. Nearly two-thirds of members and office bearers (60%) do not trust any media to report honestly on what is going on in the ANC; one in ten (11%) has no view on the matter, leaving just 29% who do trust media reports on the ANC. (Respondents from Tshwane were most mistrustful of the media, with 67% mistrusting it and 23% trusting it to report honestly on the ANC.) So ANC members mistrust the media when it comes to reporting on the ANC, but are forced to rely on that same media to find out about the ANC.

So how should the ANC communicate with branches, and ensure that they receive accurate – and timeous – information about the movement? We canvassed a range of options. Firstly, we asked if respondents believe the ANC should have its own media products such as a newspaper. The response was overwhelmingly positive: 80% of members and office bearers replied in the affirmative, with 16% saying ‘no’. There were no significant demographic or regional differences in these responses. There seems to be a very solid call for ANC media products from the Gauteng ANC activist base.

We went on to ask about other ways in which the ANC could communicate with branches. But first let us start one step closer to the grass-roots and understand how branches communicate with their members.

Most communication between branches and their members is done via loud hailers – particularly in the West Rand (66%) and Metsweding (68%). Writing letters is the second

main form of communication, more common in the more affluent regions including Johannesburg (39%) and Tshwane (35%). New technologies are beginning to impact – though their penetration is fairly limited – for example, SMS communication is fairly widespread, cited by 16% of respondents (more pronounced in Ekurhuleni and Tshwane). But given the coverage of cell-phones (and e-mail in the more affluent areas), there seems to be considerable scope for using technology to greater effect.

We also asked respondents how the ANC should communicate with them. Here, people do not want technology – they want face-to-face interaction with officials.

And this is important, because ANC members feel uninformed about the ANC, building on what we noted above and in the qualitative report, where people complained that they learned about the ANC from the media rather than from the ANC itself. We asked people to tell us how well-informed they felt about ANC activities in their area.

Quite remarkably, 62% of activists and branch office bearers believe themselves to be ‘completely uninformed’ about ANC activities in their area, with just 22% feeling reasonably informed. Members clearly want more information, and their preferred means of getting it is through face-to-face interaction with ANC officials, not briefing documents and the like. The earlier endorsement of ANC’s own media products would presumably also apply here; but above all (and this is true of the South African public generally) the preference is to be able to discuss issues, ask questions and so on, not merely passively receive data via a document or media insert.

It is worth noting that provincial government officials are

	Ekurhuleni	Jo’burg	Metsweding	Sedibeng	Tshwane	W Rand	Total
Once	22	24	47	17	22	17	23
2–3 times	29	27	26	39	16	34	28
3+ times	21	23	5	31	29	7	25
Never	8	19	12	7	20	40	16
D/know	20	8	9	6	13	2	9

Table 9: Visits by provincial government in last 5 years (by region)




Figure 16: Election work undertaken in 2006

fairly active in visiting different parts of Gauteng.

Just 16% of respondents said no government official had ever visited their locale; others had had one or more visits by officials in the last year (barring 11% who didn't remember). What matters is that ANC officials do the same.

VOTING ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR

Not unexpectedly, as the core ANC members in the province, reported voting turnout is exceptionally high. 98% of respondents told us they voted in 2004 (the general election), dropping slightly to 96% for the 2006 local election. Although numbers are very small, among those who said they did not vote were younger members – aged between 18 and 24 (some of whom may have been too young in 2004) – as well as a slightly higher proportion in Metsweding than other regions, and among ANC members living in rural parts of the province, on commercial farms, and the like. In

the 2006 election, the 60+ cohort also featured as non-voters in slightly higher proportions than other cohorts.

We went on to ask respondents what election work, if any, they had done for the 2006 local election. There may be a degree of over-claim here, with respondents aware of what they 'should have done' as ANC cadre, but this should not be so great as to completely distort results.

8 in 10 respondents told us they had engaged in door-to-door campaign work. Younger and older respondents were less likely to have done so than those aged between 25 and 59, although men and women were equally likely to have done so, as were respondents from formal and informal areas; and office bearers were considerably more active than ordinary members. These trends are true across all election-related questions analysed in this section. Responses were highest in Sedibeng (90% said they had done door-to-door work) and lowest in Metsweding (74%). More office




Figure 17: Feeling warm or cold about other parties

bearers (76%) than members (55%) had organised rallies or meetings, lowest in the West Rand and Ekurhuleni and highest (among members) in Metsweding. The only item where the trend changes is with regard to acting as a party agent, where respondents aged 60+ were most likely to have done so, and more men did so than women. Men were also more likely than women to have helped with transport, presumably reflecting economic inequalities.

Despite recent issues affecting the ANC and the Alliance, declared party loyalty seems unwavering: 98% of respondents said they would vote ANC if a general election were held tomorrow. We went on to ask if there were any chance respondents would consider voting for another party, but with such overwhelming ANC support, responses were tiny: 1% of members told us they would consider voting DA, ID and PAC respectively.

FEELINGS ABOUT POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In the election research we have previously done for the ANC, we have used a ‘thermometer’ to allow respondents to tell us how ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ they feel about different parties, often an easier way of understanding their feelings than exploring this or that attribute of other parties. As we see below, ANC cadre are ‘icy’ regarding all political competitors; but considerably less so regarding social movements.

As we can see, where the ANC is overwhelmingly ‘hot’, all other parties are given an ‘icy’ reception. No political rival exerts any significant pull on ANC respondents. Tiny numbers still rate the ID, and slightly more (9%) have lukewarm feelings about the DA, though this may reflect (previously polled) warmth towards their role as an opposition party, not as a party respondents would consider voting for. We asked respondents if they agreed or rejected the notion that ‘For good government we must have a strong opposition’? On the less positive side, 1 in 6 (17%) rejected the notion, while 4% had no opinion. But democratic and pluralist impulses remain strong in the ANC in Gauteng: 78% of respondents either agreed with the statement (40%) or strongly agreed (38%). There are no significant demographic or other differences behind these responses: the overwhelming majority of ANC members across the board share this view.

But the icy response to political parties changes when we turn to social movements rather than political rivals. We began by asking about awareness of some of the leading social movements.

Heard of?	% members	% office bearers	% total
Treatment Action Campaign	61	80	66
Landless People’s Movement	53	77	59
Anti Privatisation Forum	47	67	52
Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee	45	63	50

Table 10: Awareness of social movements

Awareness is rather lower than might be expected, given the profile some of these social movements enjoy in some media and academic circles and given the highly politicised respondents we were talking to. Office bearers were more aware of all social movements than members. Among members, knowledge of all social movements was lowest among the 18 to 25 cohort, and among respondents from Metsweding and Ekurhuleni (barring the SECC where knowledge was low in Tshwane).

It should be noted that ANC branches often work with NGOs in their area (this was asked as a general question rather than with specific reference to any NGO or social movement). Over half (53%) of members and office bearers told us their branches have run joint campaigns with NGOs in their local areas, highest in Sedibeng and Johannesburg, lowest in the West Rand and Metsweding. Moreover, of the social movements we tested, only one (the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee) has successfully competed in (local) elections with the ANC: notably, it enjoys the lowest ‘warmth’ among ANC members.

Using the same thermometer as shown above, we tested how ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ respondents were once they had indicated that they had heard of that social movement (i.e. we have excluded the fairly large proportions who have not heard of each of the social movements).




Figure 18: Feelings about social movements




Figure 19: Attitudes to government handling of HIV/AIDS (all respondents)

As we can see, there are far warmer feelings towards social movements – or towards their messages – than towards rival political parties. Previously in research for the ANC in Gauteng we have noted that there are sympathies among core ANC activists towards a more left-leaning entity, if it could share the qualities of the ANC. We may be seeing a similar factor at work – i.e. sympathy or support for a more redistributive approach, a more proactive and supportive HIV/AIDS regime, and so on. But it may also result in part from the fact that most social movements are not electoral rivals, and ANC activists regard them differently from political parties (note that ‘icy’ feelings towards the SECC are nearly double those for the TAC, a far more strident critic of government). The truth is probably a mixture of the two; the point is that there appears to be a lot of support for the agenda of the social movements tested here. This may disappear if those social movements stand against the ANC. But the warmth seen here, as we show in the final sections of the report, seems to be because social movements espouse the same pro-poor sentiments as many ANC members and officials.

By way of illustration, we asked respondents what they thought of the national government’s efforts to stop the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic – the core issue of the TAC, which enjoyed greatest ‘warmth’ among ANC members and officials. In the qualitative report we noted the strong feelings among leaders and branch members about the refusal of branches or the provincial leaders to speak out on HIV/AIDS or adopt any position that may embarrass the national leadership. A similar unease exists among members and office bearers.

Half of respondents (51%) preferred to have no opinion on the matter, while slightly fewer (45%) felt that government is not addressing the issue at all. Respondents from the poorer regions were most outspoken, with 69% of West Rand and 54% of Metsweding members and officials criticising their government on HIV/AIDS. Women (53%) were more outspoken than their male counterparts (42%). But ANC members do not see their government as uncaring on the issue: just 12% believe that government does not care about people with HIV or AIDS, while 78% believe it does care. In this context, it is not surprising to find warm feelings towards the TAC; it is perhaps surprising that they are

not more pronounced. This in turn presumably reflects negative feelings about some TAC attacks on government, which places ANC members in an awkward position, caught between defending their party and accepting that it may be wrong on a particular issue.

POLICY ISSUES, ATTITUDES, MOOD

One indication that social movements are attracting ANC activists’ sympathies is the feeling among some respondents that the ANC is not doing enough to help the poor. Posed as a Likert item, 23% of respondents (office bearers and members) agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. This does not mean respondents think the ANC is doing nothing for the poor – but they do feel that it is not doing enough. Respondents from Ekurhuleni (30%), Tshwane (27%) and Metsweding (25%) were most likely to agree. This echoes similar sentiments found in previous ANC research, qualitative and quantitative, and is key to understanding the different emphases within the ANC in Gauteng: poverty and redistribution lie at the heart of the issue, followed by HIV/AIDS. On both, as we saw in the qualitative report and again in this quantitative report, members believe the ANC to be a pro-poor party, a voice for the poor and the downtrodden: but they differ as to whether the ANC is doing enough or moving fast enough in this pro-poor direction.

We posed the issue in a different form, to read: ‘The government only cares about rich people’, but this was widely rejected – 9% agreed or strongly agreed (a minority, to be sure, but still 1 in 10 members/office bearers) while 83% rejected the statement. The issue is not that the ANC is seen as pro-rich, as its erstwhile left critics would have it, but insufficiently pro-poor.

The ANC in Gauteng – with more women members but more male leaders – remains committed to gender equality. Prior to the recent local government elections, a 50/50 female/male quota was agreed as policy. At the time, there were anxieties that it may generate negative responses at grass-roots level, while we saw in the qualitative report that a number of women leaders in the Alliance remain concerned that it was imposed at a time when more women than ever before were in leadership positions. But there is no negative response apparent in the survey results, where 87% of




Figure 20: Attitudes to the 50/50 gender quota (all respondents)

respondents regard the gender quota as a good thing, 1 in 10 have no view, and just 1 in 20 see it as a bad thing. The latter include more men than women, predictably; and tend to cluster around Metsweding (16% think it a bad thing) and the West Rand (10%).

But this is testing reactions to a mechanism for advancing women, so we also asked an attitude question about the role of women in society. Respondents could choose between 3 options, namely ‘women should not be elected into positions of responsibility because they are not capable’; ‘women should be elected into such positions because they are more capable’; and ‘men and women need to work together to promote gender equality’.

Again we see a tiny proportion believing women to be less capable than men, and 1 in 10 (9%) who believe the opposite, while again 9 in 10 respondents believe gender equality to be something women and men need to work together to achieve.

Nonracialism is one of the ANC’s core values, but is coming under some strain within the organisation. We read out the following statement to respondents: ‘Blacks and whites in South Africa will never trust each other’, with which 37% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed, while 50% reject-

ed it. Interestingly, office bearers were more likely to agree than ordinary members. Clearly there is still a long way to go before nonracialism becomes the norm in South Africa, rather than an ideal.

Of equal concern is the degree of hostility to ‘foreigners’. This appears elsewhere in the report, where ‘illegals’ are rated among the province’s key challenges by a small minority of ANC members. We posed the issue as a Likert item, to which respondents had to agree or disagree. The statement read: ‘We fought hard for change and should not have to share the benefits with people from other countries’. On the positive side, 58% of respondents rejected the notion, while 9% had no opinion. On the negative side, a third of respondents (33%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. Agreement was highest among respondents from West Rand (55%), Metsweding (45%) and Ekurhuleni (44%), and drops among respondents from more affluent regions. This is an issue that should be flagged and monitored, given how easily anti-‘foreigner’ hostilities can (and have previously) take violent expression.

The depth of the human rights culture in the ranks of the ANC is clearly being tested by crime. Elsewhere we note that crime is a close second to unemployment/jobs as the




Figure 21: Attitudes to gender




Figure 22: Mood

main concern of ANC members and office bearers. We posed a Likert item to respondents that stated: ‘Criminals have too many rights’, deliberately trying to reflect the conservative rhetoric of most opposition parties and much of the media. And (just) over half of ANC members and officials agreed, 51% in all (35% agreed, 16% strongly agreed). While 10% had no opinion, 4 in 10 (39%) rejected the notion. A massive 81% of West Rand respondents agreed that criminals have too many rights, joined by 63% in Metsweding, 51% in Tshwane, 49% in Ekurhuleni, 48% in Johannesburg and 44% in Sedibeng. Taking these issues together, it is apparent that the ANC has a hard-edged conservatism that sits alongside the democratic impulses of members; and that there is a great deal of internal political work needed.

But this is not a depressed or dispirited cadre by any means. We asked respondents to ‘think about everything that is happening in the country’ and tell us whether they think, overall, things are getting better, getting worse, or

staying the same. In response, three-quarters of all respondents told us that things are getting better, while 16% – again, not a small group, but a minority – think that things are getting worse.

It is clearly important to target those with negative views, since they are unlikely to be very effective ANC ambassadors. They are likely to be unemployed, to live in Sedibeng, Metsweding or the West Rand; and to be younger (30% of 18 to 25 year olds share this view). They are also twice as likely to belong only to the ANC as those who belong to other Alliance structures. They are also likely to have joined the ANC after 1990, not before. In short-hand, there seem to be cadres with a longer-term perspective, who joined the ANC earlier, also belong to other Alliance structures, and are in their forties or older – this group seems to be qualitatively different from members who only belong to the ANC, joined relatively recently, and are younger.




Figure 23: Main issues facing respondents' communities (multi-mention)




Figure 24: Performance in key areas in last 5 years (all respondents)

MAIN PROBLEMS

But there are also substantive issues at play. Respondents were asked to tell us about the 2 main issues facing their communities. When we asked this question in the 2003 Gauteng baseline that preceded the 2004 general election, results were overwhelmingly dominated by jobs – as we said then, a tweak to the Clinton campaign slogan – ‘Its about jobs, stupid’ – fitted the situation perfectly. Some 60% of respondents cited jobs as the priority for the province; the next issue to be mentioned was crime, at 11%; thereafter, no issue made it into double figures. Three years later, the situation has changed significantly – jobs remain priority number one, but two other issues have taken far greater

prominence, namely crime and HIV/AIDS.

Two issues continue to dominate – as they have done for the last decade – jobs and crime. But crime has leapt in importance from 11% to 41%, and trails just behind jobs as the top issues facing the province. And it is notable that HIV/AIDS is getting far more prominence in ‘top of the head’ mentions – that is, items spontaneously offered by respondents (rather than responding to a list that is read to them). Where HIV/AIDS was cited by 4% of respondents (Gauteng voters, not ANC members, it should be noted) in 2003, it has increased massively to 24%.

Read in conjunction with points made earlier about HIV/AIDS, it is clear that this is a key issue to manage internally while combating the pandemic externally. It could be




Figure 25: How will situation change in next 5 years? (all respondents)




Figure 26: Confidence in institutions/sectors (all respondents)

argued that ‘poverty’ and ‘unemployment’ could be combined, in which case it would dominate the picture – but either way, the provincial agenda is about jobs, crime, HIV/AIDS and poverty. And these are exactly the issues that social movements mobilise around.

SERVICE

Before we analyse confidence in government, let us briefly examine how respondents feel about service delivery in key areas. We began by asking about 6 key areas and whether respondents felt that the situation in each case had improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated.

Again, jobs and crime dominate the situation, both seen as having deteriorated in the last 5 years by two-thirds of respondents. Health care is less negatively regarded: 4 in 10 respondents (44%) feel the situation has improved in the last 5 years, 1 in 3 (33%) think it has stayed constant, and just 23% think it has worsened. While unemployment is worse, 51% of respondents think the economy more generally has improved; 69% feel social welfare has improved, and a massive 72% think that education has improved in the last 5 years. Social and economic policies seem to be working: but stopping crime and starting jobs are not working.

We then asked respondents to look into the future, focusing on the same 6 issues, and tell us whether they think things will improve, remain constant or deteriorate.

As we have noted elsewhere, ANC members and office bearers are optimistic, and this is reflected in the graph where the majority – often an overwhelming majority – believe things will improve in the next 5 years. This is especially true of education, health, welfare and the economy. Even on unemployment, the bugbear of post-apartheid South Africa, 7 in 10 respondents see a positive future. Pessimism is only really evident on the issue of crime – which has grown in prominence as an issue facing ANC members in Gauteng – but even here, two-thirds of respondents remain optimistic. In sum: ANC members and office bearers invest their government with a great deal of confidence and

believe that good services will improve, and that poor services will be improved. This shifts the burden of responsibility to government to deliver on the faith and confidence placed in it.

Part of the issue is that attitudes to and expectations of the future are mediated by attitudes to institutions of state and civil society. We have already seen that ANC members and office bearers have positive views of social movements, but how do they feel about government, the public service, security cluster institutions and social partners?

There is both positive and negative in the graph. On the positive side, national parliament and the provincial administration enjoy high confidence; this drops somewhat with regard to councillors, where 20% of respondents told us they have little or no confidence. The same number have little or no confidence in the public service, a worrying finding.

But it is the safety and security cluster that gives most cause for concern. A third (30%) of respondents lack confidence in the police, a quarter (25%) have little or no confidence in the courts, and a fifth (18%) have none in the SANDF. This is of real concern given the prominence of crime as a concern and the need to deal with it appropriately. Recent political attacks on the legal system and institutions of security – which preceded and continued during the fieldwork phase of this survey (July – September 2006) may have resulted in lowered confidence, and we may be seeing the results of this in the graph. And those results should be of concern, given that the respondents are ANC cadre, politically aware and active, as well as positive and optimistic about the future.

Finally, it is notable that confidence in the churches and trade unions is average – slightly more than half of respondents have some confidence in both – but neither enjoy very high confidence levels among respondents. This may be the result of similar causal factors as those cited above; but it does suggest that selecting social partners for programme intervention, service delivery or outreach needs to be done with some care. Moreover, given the heavy penetration of civil society organisations by ANC members (shown earlier)




Figure 27: Confidence in spheres of government (all respondents) ('don't know' not shown)

er), the ANC in Gauteng has a wide range of potential partners in this regard.

A final point is that confidence-building measures may be needed, and these fairly negative views – especially of the safety and security cluster – need to be monitored over time. If ANC members feel negative, others in society may be feeling far more so; and it is critical that this sector enjoys high public confidence as it sets to the critical task of reining in crime and violence.

CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT

Government – in all 3 spheres – has a key role to play if these major challenges are to be met in Gauteng. So we asked respondents – ANC members and office bearers – how much confidence they have in different spheres of government. This was a focused question on the spheres, separate from the preceding question that mixed government, state and

civil society together.

As we can see, the national sphere continues to enjoy the highest level of confidence among ANC members and office bearers, followed by provincial government. Confidence in the provincial sphere dips in the poorer regions, where 44% of West Rand have 'some' confidence, joined by 37% from Metsweding and Ekurhuleni respectively.

What is striking is the high level of confidence in the local sphere, which reflects the attitudes of ANC members to councillors they helped put in office a year ago – not necessarily a level of confidence that would be found outside the ranks of the movement. As we note in a number of places in this report, ANC members remain irrepressibly positive and optimistic. High levels of confidence in the local sphere are particularly evident in Tshwane (64% have 'lots of confidence'), Johannesburg (61%) and Sedibeng (50%); in the poorer regions, confidence is a lot lower. This again under-




Figure 28: Which sphere has done most for your quality of life? (all respondents, 'don't know' not shown)




Figure 29: Awareness of provincial programmes

scores the differences between regions in Gauteng, which seem closely linked to poverty levels in different parts of the province.

We followed up by asking which sphere of government ‘has done most to improve your quality of life in the last five years’. Given the integrated nature of governance this is not a means of judging which sphere is performing better than others but what ANC members think about the different spheres.

The national sphere is regarded by two-thirds of respondents as having done most to improve their quality of life in the last five years, and, surprisingly, the local sphere is highly rated by slightly more respondents (16%) than the provincial sphere (14%). The functions and role of the provincial sphere seem to be as opaque to ANC members as they are to respondents in other surveys in and beyond Gauteng.

We went on to ask respondents which if any of a list of provincial programmes they have heard of, as a way of testing knowledge and awareness. Results suggest that the provincial government needs to improve communication, given that relatively small numbers of this politically aware and engaged group have heard of key provincial interventions.

Batho Pele and the Gautrain are the most widely known, but it is extremely positive to find that over half (57%) of respondents have heard of the Provincial Growth & Development Strategy (PGDS), a figure unlikely to be equalled outside the ranks of activists. The other programmes we tested were only known by a limited number of respondents, signalling the communications work that is needed for the provincial government to better market its programmes and services.




Figure 30: Provincial priorities

PROVINCIAL PRIORITIES

Earlier, we saw the priorities facing the communities in which ANC members and office bearers live, dominated by unemployment, crime and HIV/AIDS. We asked a related but slightly different question, namely what two things should the provincial government do to make Gauteng a better place? In the graph we have combined first and second choices to show overall patterns in the data.

The same 3 issues are at the top end of the scale – but joined now by providing decent housing, a recurrent issue that was previously dwarfed by the urgency of jobs and crime. The agenda for the provincial government is clear: create jobs; stop crime; provide decent housing; and deal with HIV/AIDS. All of these form part of a poverty eradication strategy. (Figures do not add up to 100% because this was a multi-mention question, and because first and second choices have been combined.) But note also that the issue of illegal immigrants’ features at the lower end, reminding us (as noted earlier) that there are issues that populists could easily use to whip up negative public sentiment, and which the provincial government needs to manage with sensitivity.

THE ANC IN 2012

Finally, one of the motivating factors for the study was to help inform efforts to ensure that when the ANC turns 100 in 2012, its members share the core values of the organisation, and that the organisation remains relevant (and central) to the political landscape of South Africa.

One issue we probed was ethnicity, given the recent media coverage of political events and the ethnic element identified or predicted by many commentators. We offered respondents 4 options to best describe how they felt about the ANC, namely that it was a home for all, that minorities (Ndebele, Tsonga, etc.) get nowhere, that it is Zulu-dominated, or that it is Xhosa dominated.

	% members	% office bearers	% total
Home for all	81	88	83
Minorities get nowhere	3	1	2
Zulu dominated	1	0	1
Xhosa dominated	15	11	14

Table 11: Ethnicity

Office bearers have a rather more sanguine view of ethnicity within the ANC, with 88% seeing it as a home for all – but even among this group, one in ten (11%) see the ANC as Xhosa-dominated. This rises to 15% among members. This is a grounded perception, and the ANC needs to work hard to change those perceptions. It may be a future fault-line.

And we should remember: ANC cadre in Gauteng are irrepressibly positive, according to survey results – even when their socio-economic circumstances suggest that they ‘should’ be negative or pessimistic. We ended the questionnaire by asking questions about the ANC itself. Firstly, as we can see, 9 in 10 ANC members and office bearers believe that since 1994 the ANC has changed, and for the better. Just 1 in 20 believe that it has changed for the worse. There is a visibly positive energy in the Gauteng membership that gives the leadership a solid foundation on which to base future interventions.

Finally, we asked what the ANC needs to do to ensure that it remains the leading force for progressive change in South Africa. This was an open-ended question, where respondents could give any answer they wished, to which a numeric code was subsequently applied. But – predictably – we received a very broad range of answers, which are more amenable to qualitative than quantitative analysis.

To a considerable extent, responses reflect points made earlier: the ANC must focus on job-creation, the eradication of poverty, delivery in all areas and combating HIV/AIDS. It also needs to fight crime. These are the dominant sets of responses.




Figure 31: Changes in the ANC since 1994

But below them (i.e. responses given by fewer respondents) comes an interesting set of inputs from ANC members and office bearers. One of these is the need to stop corruption within the ANC and amongst its councillors; earlier we have seen more general remarks about stopping corruption. Another is the need to listen and consult more rigorously; coupled with the need to 'stop in-fighting'. Where the leadership interviews yielded remarks about a 'climate of fear', 'smear campaigns' and the like, the message from the members is to stop the on-going politicking at leadership level, and get on with the job of delivery. Finally, a number of respondents raised the need to get branches functioning as they should be as an ANC priority. A minority explicitly requested that 'the youth' be reined in and 'stop wrecking our branches', again reflecting the negative impact at branch level of leadership tussles.

The implication – explicit in the qualitative report – is that the ANC is and will remain the key force for progressive change, and needs to deepen its pro-poor stance and

speed up delivery – nothing particularly new in that. But there is a second dimension to this, an internal one, where respondents are aware that the ANC's political project can be de-railed by on-going internal disputes, lack of consultation, and so on. And the point that respondents are making is that the ANC must get its own house in order if it is to meet the massive challenges that face it now, as well as new challenges it will be facing by 2012.

The survey has shown conclusively that the ANC in Gauteng has a powerful human resource base – a membership that is optimistic, committed, pro-poor, active, and deeply embedded in civil society – in short, a membership base that any political party anywhere would envy. What matters is that the ANC provides appropriate leadership to focus members' energies on the tasks at hand and join with the membership in fighting for a better life for all, rather than allow on-going politicking to dissipate energy and commitment.