

III. THE ARMS EMBARGO

A. United States enforcement of the arms embargo

United States enforcement of the arms embargo has not been carried out by special legislative measures, but handled within the legislative and regulatory framework controlling all military and commercial exports.

Commercial exports of United States armaments and military equipment of all types are regulated by the State Department's Office of Munitions Control in consultation with the Defense Department, using a jointly agreed-on Munitions List. Although the Munitions List should offer a clear reference for enforcing the arms embargo, the record shows that it has been carried out on an *ad hoc* basis, and at various times this enforcement system has failed. Currently, as is noted below, the Reagan Administration has in fact been licensing the sale of items on the Munitions List for sale to South Africa.

Export of non-military goods, including "dual-use" items (products which, while not specifically of military origin, could be put to military use), is controlled by the Commerce Department, although the Defense Department is currently seeking a role in controlling such exports. There have been continuing controversies over the policies of various Administrations concerning the licensing of dual-use items for sale to South Africa.

Exports Regulations Relaxed

In 1978, the Carter Administration introduced regulations barring the export of all United States commodities or technology to the South African military and police forces. As part of the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement," it has moved to loosen these restrictions in a series of three revisions in the export regulations (in March and September 1982 and January 1983).⁹ As of the latest revision..., a number of United States goods are allowed to be supplied to the South African military and police if it is determined that they would not "contribute significantly to military or police functions." Among these are: trucks, cars, tires, and personal computers. Also authorized are medical equipment and supplies, including air ambulances, foreign-made goods with less than 20 per cent United States-origin components, and airport anti-hijacking equipment. Aircraft and helicopters may be approved for sale to South African customers on condition that they are not put to military, para-military or police use.

⁹ *Africa News*, February 1983.

Poor Embargo Enforcement

Laws and regulations can only be effective if they are rigorously enforced. A number of cases have generated continuing concern about the effectiveness of the United States enforcement of the embargo. Perhaps the most significant violation of the arms embargo involving the United States was carried out by the Space Research Corporation (SRC) in 1976 through 1978. In this period, the SRC provided South Africa with some 60,000 155mm extended range artillery shells, at least four 155mm guns, and a radar tracking and firing range instrumentation system. The two chief executives of the company were fired and given short prison terms, a light penalty, considering the magnitude of the violation. A study of the case by the staff of the House Subcommittee on Africa, released in 1982, concluded that there is a “non-system” of enforcing the arms embargo to South Africa. Since 1963, “the relevant United States government agencies have thus far failed to adopt procedures to effectively implement the embargo.”¹⁰

Unnamed federal officials were quoted in a 1982 article on the general problem of illegal arms exports as saying, “The system frequently breaks down... There’s little one can do if a buyer misrepresents a shipment’s final destination or simply labels arms as something else.”¹¹

In hearings before the House Subcommittee on Africa in December 1982, a State Department representative cited examples of recent efforts to improve enforcement procedures, thus implicitly accepting criticism of inadequate enforcement. He also cited ten seizures of illegal shipments to South Africa by the United States Customs Service as a part of Operation Exodus, to control exports of United States arms and technology. But these interceptions must be compared to several thousand stopped shipments that were destined to Eastern Europe. “South Africa is not on the priority list,” said one Customs official. And the public affairs staff at the Customs agency are not allowed to discuss illicit exports to South Africa.¹²

A significant example of the low priority given to enforcement of the arms embargo was the seizure in Sweden in November 1983 of an advanced United States computer, about to be shipped to the Soviet Union. The Digital Equipment VAX 11/782 is capable of a variety of military uses, including missile guidance and nuclear research. It was called “super hot stuff” by a Customs official, and Secretary of Defense Weinberger said it was “identical to a number of highly

¹⁰ United States Congress, House Subcommittee on Africa, *The Space Research Case and the United States Arms Embargo against South Africa*, Staff Study, 24 March 1982.

¹¹ *New York Times*, 21 March 1982.

¹² NARMIC, American Friends Service Committee, *Military Exports to South Africa - A Research Report on the Arms Embargo*, January 1984, pp.8-9.

classified American systems” that could be used to make “faster, more accurate, and more destructive weapons.”¹³ Yet, this advanced computer had first been exported from the United States to South Africa with no apparent difficulty before it was re-routed to Sweden. It is therefore hard to believe that export controls on South Africa are being rigorously enforced.

A detailed study of the South African military and the arms embargo was made by Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Reagan Administration, shortly before taking office. He indicated knowledge of embargo loopholes and violations involving “European, East Asian, and Israeli firms and Governments.”¹⁴ Yet, since he has been in office, there has been no public campaign to close such loopholes or stop violations. And United States enforcement has been loosened.

United States Exports of Arms and Military Equipment to South Africa

In January 1984, a report on United States military exports to South Africa by NARMIC (National Action/Research on the Military Industrial Complex, a programme of the American Friends Service Committee) revealed that during fiscal years 1981-1983, the State Department’s Office of Munitions Control had authorized 29 separate exports to South Africa of commodities on the Munitions List, worth more than \$28.3 million.¹⁵ The exports included data encryption equipment, navigation gear, image intensifiers and technical knowhow, according to the office. Seven more applications for military exports were pending as of November 1983. The head of the office claimed that the exports were approved because the equipment had civilian uses, and that most were devices for commercial systems. Nevertheless, the commodities were under explicitly military headings on the Munitions List, including fire control, guidance and auxiliary military equipment, and “Military and Space Electronics.”

The State Department identified two recipients of the exports as the National Physical Research Laboratory and the National Institute for Aeronautics and Systems Technology, both of which do classified military research. The other recipients were said to be private firms.

The significance of these exports can be gauged by comparison with earlier figures: for the entire 1950-1980 period, the value of such commercial military exports to South Africa was \$18.6 million. Following the 1977 embargo, their

¹³ *The Sun* (New York Times News Service), 21 November 1983; MacNeil/ Lehrer News Hour, Broadcast, December 1983 - cited in NARMIC, *Military Exports to South Africa*, p.1.

¹⁴ Chester Crocker, “South Africa’s Defense Posture: Coping with Vulnerability,” *Working Papers*, No. 84 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1981), p.51.

¹⁵ NARMIC, *Military Exports to South Africa*, pp. 3-4.

value was \$14.6 million in 1978, \$25,000 in 1979, and no such exports were licensed in 1980.¹⁶ Thus, the \$28.3 million allowed by the Reagan Administration is a dramatic increase in military exports to South Africa.

Holes in Embargo - Some Cases

Since its 1981-1982 edition, the *Military Balance* has listed Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, which are of United States origin, in the South African arms inventory.

In July 1981, the *Washington Post* reported that South Africa was developing a new air-to-air missile similar to the United States Sidewinder that was guided by a United States-made computer. A letter from the American Committee on Africa to then Secretary of State Haig asking about the report received a reply from the State Department indicating only that “Few details were provided in the story, which makes an investigation of the case quite difficult.”¹⁷ The missile, the V3B, is now in service in South Africa and it is offered for export. It has been reported by *Jane’s Weapons System 1983-1984* that this missile conforms to Sidewinder’s mechanical and electrical interfaces. Moreover, *Military Balance 1984-1985* refers to it as being a “Sidewinder type” missile.

South Africa’s missile patrol boats, the first group assembled in Israel, the rest assembled in South Africa, use a number of key components from foreign sources. One report states that the ships use chaff launchers (a radar decoy device) made by Hycor of Woburn, Massachusetts. The company has denied selling the devices to South Africa; if true, they could have been acquired via a third country.¹⁸

In 1982, the Commerce Department authorized the sale of 2,500 electric shock batons, used for crowd control, to private buyers in South Africa. The United States has had a policy of barring the sale of such police equipment to South Africa. In this case, the State Department claimed “an honest mistake” had been made.¹⁹

Aircraft

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Cited in Richard Knight, American Committee on Africa, *Statement before the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid*, 3 April 1984.

¹⁸ *Naval Forces*, No. 5, 1981; NARMIC, *Military Exports to South Africa*, p.5.

¹⁹ *Africa News*, 27 September 1982.

The Carter Administration informed the United Nations Security Council in 1979 that it had stopped the supply of spare parts for the South African Air Force's C-130 Hercules military transport planes, but indicated that South Africa continued to get the parts "from somewhere."²⁰ These parts are in fact under United States export controls.

Since its 1981-1982 edition, the *Military Balance* has included the United States-made Lockheed L-100 aircraft (the civilian version of the C-130), operated by the South African Government's commercial transport airline, Safari, in its listing of the South African Air Force Reserves.

As part of its relaxation of arms embargo enforcement, in 1982, the Reagan Administration licensed the export of six Beechcraft Super King 200C planes for use as air ambulances by the South African Air Force. The United States also permitted the sale of anti-hijacking metal detectors for use in airports by the South African police.

In addition, South African Airways operates more than 40 Boeing aircraft of different models, including five 7147s. These planes can be a valuable military asset for transport of troops, weapons and equipment.²¹ In 1983, it was reported that the Pentagon had raised objections to the export of a Boeing 707 airliner to Iran because it could be used for military transport. No such objections have been raised in relation to aircraft exported to South Africa.

United States exports of commercial or civilian aircraft and related equipment of all types to South Africa in the period 1980-1982 alone totalled more than \$706 million.²² Given the record of South African conduct, the possibility that some of this material may be put to military use must be viewed as strong. For example, Goodyear is among several United States companies selling aircraft parts in South Africa; a local trade directory notes that it offers "products serving commercial, military and private aviation" in South Africa.²³

United States corporations shipped more than half a million dollars worth of "non-military arms and ammunition" to South Africa during 1981-1982 (no such exports were recorded in 1980). United States Colt and Browning weapons have been reported in use at a commercial "anti-terrorist" training centre in South Africa, and United States advertisements in South Africa security journals

²⁰ United Nations document S/14179, 19 September 1980, p.10.

²¹ *New York Times*, 12 April 1984.

²² NARMIC, *Military Exports to South Africa*, p.14.

²³ *Interavia World Directory of Aviation and Aeronautica*, 31st edition, 1983, cited in NARMIC, *Military Exports to South Africa*, p.4.

indicate that United States police gear, including electronic sensors, infrared detectors and tracking equipment are available on the open market.²⁴

Computers

The Reagan Administration approved the export of two powerful computers (a Control Data Cyber 170/750 and an Amdahl 470/V7) to the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), a government-run body which sponsors research in a variety of strategic fields, including work for the military. There was said to have been concern at the Pentagon about authorizing sale of the Control Data Computer (the first approved) because it is powerful enough to be used for breaking United States secret codes, and for nuclear research. Although the United States required assurances that the computers would not be used for military or nuclear applications, verification is difficult. The new computers are to replace two IBM machines that were being used by the CSIR.

In 1982, it was revealed that the Commerce Department had approved the sale of two Sperry computers (one during the Carter Administration and the other under Reagan) to the Atlas Aircraft Corporation, a subsidiary of Armscor producing military aircraft. After Congressional protests, the Reagan Administration included Armscor's subsidiaries within its definition of South African military entities.

The Bantustans

There have been several recent reports that the Defense Forces of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei, both of which are instruments of the South African Defense Force, have received light aircraft of United States origin or with United States components.²⁵ The Ciskei Defense Force was reported to have obtained United States-made Mooney light planes via Israel, and to have obtained two Skyvan light planes, made by a British-owned company and powered by a Garrett-Ai research engine made in the United States, from a civilian source in South Africa.

In 1982, the Bophuthatswana air wing received two Hello Courier planes made by General Aircraft Company of New Bedford, Massachusetts, from a civilian source in South Africa. This plane is in use by the United States Air Force, in some cases for counter-insurgency purposes. In the same year, the Force obtained a police surveillance plane of Italian/West German origin powered by an Avco-Lycoming engine, which should be subject to United States export controls.

²⁴ NARMIC, *Military Exports to South Africa*, pp.4-6.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.3-14.

B. Nuclear collaboration between the United States and South Africa

The sighting of a twin flash characteristic of a nuclear explosion on 22 September 1979, off the coast of South Africa by a United States Vela satellite offered strong evidence that South Africa had exploded a nuclear device. Even without final verification of the Vela incident, it is widely agreed that South Africa has gained the capability of producing nuclear weapons in a limited number.²⁶

Recently, the United States State Department desk officer stated that South Africa's "nuclear capability is a fact today and cannot be denied," and claimed that the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation is therefore to solve South Africa's security fears.²⁷

History

The development of South Africa's nuclear capability, which threatens southern Africa and the fabric of world peace, has been assisted in significant ways by the United States and other countries.²⁸ United States nuclear co-operation with South Africa began in the 1940s, in the field of uranium production. In 1957, the two countries signed an agreement under the Atoms for Peace programme; it was later renewed to extend until the year 2007. In 1958, a joint United States-South African team observed a secret United States nuclear weapons test off the South African coast. Allis-Chalmers of the United States designed and built the Safari I research reactor for South Africa that came into service in 1965. In the following decade, the United States supplied 231 pounds of highly-enriched (weapons grade) uranium for the reactor. More than 155 United States scientists assisted South Africa's nuclear programmes and 90 South African nuclear scientists had completed assignments in the United States by mid-1977. The United States also provided equipment and technology, including powerful computers, for South Africa's Valindaba uranium enrichment plant and for the Koeberg nuclear power reactors. Finally, the 155mm SRC howitzer obtained by South Africa from the United States is capable of firing a nuclear shell.

²⁶ Dan Smith, *South Africa's Nuclear Capability*, (Oslo: World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, 1980).

²⁷ *The Citizen*, 12 March 1983.

²⁸ See United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, *The Development of South Africa's Nuclear Capability*, Document A/AC.115/L.602, 25 October 1983; Dan Smith, *South Africa's Nuclear Capability*; Washington Office on Africa, *Stop the Apartheid Bomb*, October 1982.

Uranium Enrichment - A Lever

In 1975, the United States stopped shipments of enriched uranium for Safari I and in 1978, with the passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, indicated that it would not enrich uranium provided by South Africa for Koeberg since the Act bars exports of nuclear materials to countries which have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). South Africa has been obligated to deliver the uranium to the United States for enrichment under a 1974 agreement.

Nuclear issues have been a key aspect in United States-South African relations during the Reagan Administration. This was reflected in a South African position paper on nuclear relations which was among several secret State Department documents prepared for a meeting in May 1981 in Washington between South African Foreign Minister Botha and Secretary of State Haig, which were leaked.²⁹ The paper indicated that South Africa sought from the United States to either fulfil the 1974 Koeberg fuel agreement, or allow an arrangement to be made through France, and that the agreement with the United States be cancelled or postponed. It also said that South Africa would not sign the NPT and “set the minds of would-be attackers at rest,” which shows how the Nationalist Government is using the nuclear weapons capability as an ultimate threat against the Front-line States.

The Carter Administration had attempted to use the leverage of the 1974 agreement to have South Africa sign the NPT. The Reagan Administration, while not allowing South African uranium enriched in the United States to be supplied directly to Koeberg, did facilitate South African circumvention of the NPT by allowing two United States companies to serve as brokers for enriched uranium for Koeberg obtained from a Swiss utility via a French enrichment plant.³⁰

The South African uranium held in the United States was arranged to be sold off - 95 per cent to United States utilities and the rest to a Japanese utility. South Africa remains obligated to deliver uranium to the United States for Koeberg annually until 1991, but the sell-off permitted by the Administration eased the pressure the NPT act had put on the Nationalist Government.

Personnel Exchanges

Growing out of United States-South African nuclear talks, there have been visits exchanged by scientific and technical personnel reportedly related to

²⁹ Leonard, Richard, *South Africa at War*, Lawrence Hill and Company, Westport, 1983, pp. 252-53.

³⁰ United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, *The Development of South Africa's Nuclear Capability*, pp. 9-10.

nuclear safeguards. Two South African scientists visited a United States facility in 1981, followed by a visit of four Americans to the Valindaba uranium enrichment plant. And at least four South Africans have apparently received United States training on protection of nuclear facilities since 1978.³¹

South African scientists involved in nuclear research continue to visit the United States regularly, participating in conferences and visiting and working in United States laboratories.

Most recently, the Programme of the 10th International Conference on Cyclotrons and their Applications, held from 30 April to 3 May 1984 at the Kellogg Center, Michigan State University, listed 10 talks to be given by South African scientists from the South African National Accelerator Centre in Pretoria.

Nuclear Equipment and Technology

The Reagan Administration also eased United States export restrictions on nuclear equipment and technology to South Africa. A study by the General Accounting Office commissioned by Representative Howard Wolpe, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, revealed that South Africa was the third largest recipient of such exports in the year ending June 1982. The seven export licenses approved in the period included computers, ultrasonic tracking equipment, radio navigation equipment and calibrated testing equipment, for a total value of more than \$2.29 million.³²

The Commerce Department also approved licenses for the export of a hot isostatic press, which may be used in making nuclear weapons components and 95 grams of helium-3, which can be converted into a component in thermonuclear weapons. But both exports were stopped after Congressional and public protests which were promoted by the Campaign to End US-South African Nuclear Collaboration, co-ordinated by the Washington Office on Africa.³³

Legislation to tighten export controls over “dual use” exports of nuclear technology and equipment passed the House in 1983, and it is under consideration by a joint House-Senate Committee. Other proposed bills would cut all nuclear ties with South Africa and close general loopholes in the non-proliferation law. In addition, Democratic party presidential candidates and former candidates, including Walter Mondale, Gary Hart, Jesse Jackson, John Glenn, and Allan Cranston, have expressed support for a cut-off of all nuclear assistance to South Africa.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.9.

³² Washington Office on Africa, *Campaign Update*, 29 October 1983.

³³ *Ibid.*

South African Uranium

South Africa has gained a growing role in the nuclear field in the United States as a source of imports of uranium oxide for United States nuclear power reactors. The relatively low cost of South African uranium is related to the poor pay and working conditions of black South African miners under apartheid. These imports have drawn growing protests by the Campaign to End US-South African Nuclear Collaboration. In 1982, the United States imported some 800 tons of South African uranium worth \$139.5 million.³⁴

Maintaining South African Reactors

In December 1983, maintenance contracts for Koeberg worth some \$6 million annually were awarded to Framatome of France and to the South African subsidiary of the Fluor Corporation of the United States.³⁵ In March 1984, the first Koeberg power reactor was put into service. South Africa has claimed that it would abide by Non-Proliferation Principles and has also agreed to modify the Safari I reactor to operate on lower grade uranium. But it has continued to refuse to sign the NPT, which would mandate inspection of its pilot enrichment plant. Thus, the eased restrictions offered by the Reagan Administration have aided South Africa's nuclear capability, while gaining only the most minor concessions in return.

C. Summary of United States-South African Police and Military Contacts

Summer 1983

South African vice and drug officer trained under a United States Enforcement Administration programme in Georgia.

1981-1983

Three South African naval officers trained in the United States by the Coast Guard.

October 1983

Two South African representatives participated in the annual gathering of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in Detroit.

³⁴ United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, *The Development of South Africa's Nuclear Capability*, p.19; *Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, 7 October 1983.

³⁵ *Daily Telegraph*, London, 2 January 1984.

1983

Member of Detroit Police Force visited South African police installations.

March 1983

Lt. General Johann Coetzee (Chief of Security Police) visited State Department.

1982

South African police representative participated in police-media relations training programme in Chicago.

November 1982

Major General Lothar Neethling (Chief of Police Forensics) and Major General H.V. Verster (Head of Counter-Terrorism Unit) participated in the annual gathering of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in Atlanta.

September 1982

CIA Director William Casey visited South Africa for meetings with government and military officials.

August 1982

State Department officials met with General P.W. van der Westhuizen, Major General Charles Lloyd (Commander of South African forces in Namibia) and Lt. General Jamie Geldenhuys (Chief of the Army) in Washington for talks on Namibia.

March 1981

United States Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne Kirkpatrick met secretly with General P.W. van der Westhuizen (Chief of Military Intelligence).

(From NARMIC, *Military Exports to South Africa*, p. 13. Sources include information supplied by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the United States Coast Guard, the Washington Office on Africa, the Department of State and various issues of *Servamus*.)

D. Co-operation in the Intelligence Sphere

There have been a number of reports in recent years indicating co-operation between the United States and South Africa in the intelligence field. John Stockwell, the former head of the CIA's Angola Task Force during the 1975-1976 South African invasion of Angola, undertaken in collaboration with the CIA, resigned in protest against the agency's policies. He has written that "the CIA has traditionally sympathized with South Africa and enjoyed its close liaison with BOSS" (the Bureau of State Security, now the Department of National

Security or DONS).³⁶ He noted that while links were not formalized during the invasion, in practice, “co-ordination was effected at all CIA levels.”³⁷

South African journalists have alleged that during the Nixon and Ford Administrations General Hendrik van den Berghe, then head of BOSS, visited Washington frequently and “enjoyed close ties” with the then CIA director George Bush, now United States Vice-President.³⁸ It was also noted that BOSS agents were stationed at South African diplomatic missions in the United States.

A 1982 report by the staff of the House Subcommittee on Africa on the violation of the arms embargo by the Space Research Corporation (SRC), through which South Africa obtained the company’s advanced 155mm howitzer system, cited the role of CIA operative in recommending to Armscor officials that they could obtain artillery from SRC. The report noted that at the least this suggested “serious negligence on the part of the Agency. At most, there is a possibility that elements of the CIA purposefully evaded United States policy.”³⁹ It recommended an investigation by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees into the CIA role in the case.

An article in the *London Observer* has stated that the CIA was prepared to pass on information to BOSS about anti-apartheid activists in the United States in exchange for facilities in South Africa for United States spying elsewhere in Africa. It said that United States planes based in South Africa took photos over other African countries that were passed on to South Africa. The agreement was said to have been violated when the United States tried to spy on South Africa’s nuclear facilities with a secret camera in the ambassador’s light plane. South Africa expelled three United States military attachés in 1980, reportedly because of this, and the United States in turn expelled two South African military attachés from Washington.⁴⁰

The New York Times has reported that there has “never been any suggestion that the Carter Administration halted intelligence sharing with South Africa,” although an American official said it developed an “adversary aspect” reflected in the expulsion of the attachés cited above.⁴¹ *Newsweek* magazine reported during this period that although South African relations with NATO countries were

³⁶ Stockwell, John, “In Search of Enemies,” W.W. Norton, New York, 1978, p.187.

³⁷ Ibid., pp.187-88.

³⁸ *Update, African—American Institute*, New York, 24 March 1981, p.1; *Rapport*, South Africa, 17 June 1978, p.1. cited in *Guardian*, London, 19 June 1978.

³⁹ United States Congress, House Subcommittee on Africa, *The Space Research Case and the Breakdown of the United States Arms Embargo against South Africa*, Staff Study, 24 March 1982.

⁴⁰ *The Observer*, London, 7 September 1980.

⁴¹ *New York Times*, 10 May 1982.

strained, South Africa reported unofficially to the West on Soviet ship movements. And it claimed that South Africa and the United States had exchanged information about Soviet warships near the Cape, as an example of continuing co-operation.⁴²

This relates to another area of reportedly long-standing co-operation between South Africa and the United States and other countries in intelligence: Project Advokat. This is a sophisticated military surveillance center built underground at Silvermine, near Cape Town, which was opened in 1973. Radar, communications, and computer equipment were reportedly supplied by the United States and other Western countries for the project, along with the NATO codification system for the equipment. Silvermine is said to be able to monitor ship and air traffic over wide areas of the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and to be linked to the United States Navy, the British Navy and several other countries.⁴³

In March 1984, South Africa's air attaché in Washington announced that with the retirement of South Africa's Shackleton reconnaissance aircraft at the end of the year, Pretoria would stop providing Western intelligence services with information on ship movements around the Cape. The announcement was seen as a bid to prompt the Reagan Administration to break the arms embargo by allowing South Africa to acquire up-to-date replacements.⁴⁴

The case of South African Navy Commodore Dieter Gerhardt, recently convicted in South Africa of spying for the USSR, indicates another example of United States co-operation with South Africa in intelligence. He was reportedly seized in the United States and held by the CIA for interrogation for eleven days before being returned to South Africa. The case also reflects the continuing close military co-operation between South Africa and Western countries: United States intelligence officials reportedly indicated that he had access to a wide range of strategic military and technical information, particularly from the Royal Navy.⁴⁵

The Botha Government is widely viewed as having given Military Intelligence the pre-eminent position in the intelligence field. In March 1981, less than five weeks after the Reagan Administration took office, five high-ranking military officials made a semi-secret visit to the United States. Among them were Lieutenant General P.W. van der Westhuizen, the chief of Military Intelligence; Rear Admiral Willem N. du Plessis, assigned to the National Intelligence Service, the organizational arm of DONS; and Brigadier Nils van Ponder. These three

⁴² *Newsweek*, 29 September 1980.

⁴³ *New York Times*, 20 April 1981; John Prados, "Sea-lanes, Western Strategy, and South Africa," in Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars, ed., *United States Military Involvement in Southern Africa*, South End Press, Boston, 1978, p.61.

⁴⁴ *Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, 25 March 1984; *Daily Telegraph*, London, 20 March 1984.

⁴⁵ *The Mail*, London, 20 November 1983; *Daily Telegraph*, London, date missing.

were believed to be the top officials in Military Intelligence.⁴⁶ Their visit included meetings with an official at the Defense Intelligence Agency, a staff officer of the National Security Council, Congressional members and staff, and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Ambassador to the United Nations. When news of the visit leaked out of the State Department (which has had a public policy of not permitting visits by South African military officials), the State Department claimed the men had been granted visas through an “oversight.”

The *Financial Mail* concluded the visit was to “discuss matters of common interests” with officials in the new Administration. The *New York Times* noted that several months after the visit, South African Defence Minister Malan cited it as an example of improved relations with the United States.⁴⁷ Thus, the Reagan policies of “constructive engagement” evidently include closer intelligence co-operation with South Africa.

In 1981, a coup attempt against the Government of the Seychelles by a group from South Africa, which included foreign mercenaries and South African military and intelligence men, was repulsed. After international pressure, many of the attackers were put on trial in South Africa for hijacking an airplane in order to escape. At the trial, the group’s leader, the mercenary Colonel Mike Hoare, claimed that the attack had been approved by the South African Cabinet and supervised first by the National Intelligence Service and then by Military Intelligence. He testified that he informed a representative of the CIA in Pretoria about the plan and that he told his men the CIA had approved the plan.⁴⁸

There has been evidence of a relationship between the policies of the Reagan Administration and of South Africa on support for UNITA in Angola. South Africa has long been identified as the main source of support for UNITA. In 1981, the Reagan Administration attempted to repeal the Clark amendment, which since 1976 has barred covert United States aid to forces in Angola. The repeal effort was defeated in the Senate. However, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was invited to Washington and met with Secretary of State Haig and other high officials. Despite the Congressional prohibition, Savimbi has claimed that he is getting support from the United States.⁴⁹ This assertion was reinforced by a January 1984 report in the London *Observer*, based on a confidential memo, which alleged that secret meetings had been held between the United States and South Africa to discuss arms supplies to UNITA. The United States embassy in London called the memo a forgery.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ *Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, 20 March 1981.

⁴⁷ *New York Times*, 10 May 1982.

⁴⁸ *New York Times*, 22 April 1982, 10 May 1982.

⁴⁹ *New York Times*, 13 December 1981; *Washington Post*, 23 January 1982.

⁵⁰ *The Observer*, London, 22 January 1984.

In October 1983, *Newsweek* magazine reported that the CIA was supplying “training, arms, and financial assistance” to UNITA despite the 1976 law.⁵¹ Another report cited South African sources as claiming that the United States was paying Israel for arms captured from the Palestine Liberation Organization, which were being passed on to UNITA and the FNLA by South Africa.⁵² In April 1984, the Government of Cuba accused the CIA of complicity in a car bomb explosion in Angola. UNITA claimed responsibility for the attack in which 14 Cubans working in the country were killed.⁵³

⁵¹ *Newsweek*, 3 October 1983; *Washington Post*, 4 October 1983.

⁵² *Washington Times*, 4 October 1983.

⁵³ *New York Times*, 27 April 1984.