This memorandum sets out the basic issues that we wish to discuss with President de Klerk. For convenience, we refer to it as "Memorandum A". It is supported by Memorandum B, which provides a more detailed account of, inter alia, the facts giving rise to the issues raised in general terms in this document. The two memoranda are to be read with the more substantial documentation which we have available and which will be placed at the disposal of the Joint Working Group, which we propose in Section 4 of this document, once it is activated to deal with the Natal problem.
The violence in Natal has been extreme and extensive. It has now spread to all parts of the province and has so far claimed over 4000 lives in the region. It is cause for grave national concern in that it:
(a) constitutes a serious obstacle to the creation of a climate in which the people of Natal can enjoy peace and exercise their political choices freely;The violence cannot be explained in terms of political rivalry only. Ineffective and biased policing has allowed and / or promoted the escalation of the conflict into gross and increasingly violent proportions. It is our belief that, although the security forces are not the principal protagonists in this conflict, their actions, particularly those of the South African Police and the KwaZulu Police, have been an important factor in the increase of the violence to reach the present proportions. While a political resolution will be required to bring peace to the region, the police themselves constitute a barrier to achieving an effective peace accord.(b) is creating a legacy of bitterness and division that will have long-term political, economic and social consequences that may haunt South Africans for decades to come.
In representations to the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Vlok, in February 1990, it was pointed out that four or five prosecutions in November 1987 might well have saved thousands of lives. As matters stand now, only a handful of successful prosecutions have followed the more than 4000 unlawful killings. Indeed, we repeat what has been stated and restated with justifiable exasperation elsewhere that effective and impartial policing during the early stages of the violence would have prevented its escalation to the present levels.
Because there has been a lack of meaningful police intervention, an important category of the perpetrators of the violence, namely, the warlords, organise and carry out repeated attacks on people they perceive to be political opponents, confident of their won immunity from arrest. Thus a distinct feature of the Natal violence is that it has been defiantly public, with Inkatha supporters openly forming themselves into impis, in full view of the security forces and actually carrying out attacks on ANC/UDF/COSATU communities, in circumstances where such attacks could and should have been prevented, the impis disarmed and the ringleaders apprehended. None of these forms of intervention seem to be favoured by the security forces. (See Memorandum B)
On the other side of the violence, since the victims have no effective and impartial agency through which to obtain legal redress, there seems to be no alternative but to hit back in self-defence in acts of bitter vengeance and retribution. We are well aware that those of us who have discouraged self-help have little or nothing to justify the wisdom of our advice.
For the reasons set out in Memorandum B, the credibility of the South African Police, as an impartial law-enforcement agency, has reached an all-time low in the context of Natal violence. This is not surprising. The cumulative effect of events we have documented (see Memorandum B) strongly indicates that the South African Police or at least some elements thereof, have a policy to promote the conflict, probably in order to destabilise the black community.
What has been said of the South African Police applies doubly to the KwaZulu Police. They operate in areas under the jurisdiction of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA). The attitude of the KLA is that the South African Police should move out of those areas where they still operate and make way for the KwaZulu Police. The position is that in those areas which have been taken over by KwaZulu Police, the South African Police have withdrawn completely.
The Minister of Law and Order is on record as stating that the great proportion of the violence in Natal occurs in KwaZulu areas. (Natal Mercury, 18/4/90; see Bundle Page 110) we agree with him. He has, however, also taken the attitude that his police have no jurisdiction to deal with acts of violence in those areas. We feel that in the prevailing circumstances, this is an irresponsible and unhelpful attitude which cannot be justified on any basis whatsoever. It is tantamount to saying that the South African government is obliged to turn a blind eye on acts of murder, arson, etc as long as they occur in KwaZulu.
We have no doubt in our own minds that the South African Police administration cannot abdicate its responsibility to protect life and limb in every corner of the country.
KwaZulu is still very much a part of South Africa. That the South African regime is at least co-responsible is highlighted by the fact that the Commissioner of Police, KwaZulu, is an appointee of the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Vlok. But in terms of Section 5 of the Police Act, No.7 of 1958, the South African Police have, in any event, legal authority in KwaZulu. Further, by virtue of Section 37 of the National States Constitution Act of 1971, read with Article 21B of Schedule 1 of the Act, the South African government has power over the administration of law and order in KwaZulu. The Act provides that the Minister can set conditions for the control, organisation and establishment of police forces by self-governing territories such as KwaZulu.
The duty of the South African administration to intervene has become even more imperative because of the fact that the KwaZulu Police have, as a force, entered the arena of the conflict, on the side of Inkatha. This is hardly surprising as it would flow naturally from the fact that the President of Inkatha is also the KwaZulu Minister of Police; the Deputy Commissioner of Police. KwaZulu, is not only a senior official but also the person att eh head of the Inkatha security establishment. There can therefore be no possibility of impartial policing by the KwaZulu Police.
We are therefore not merely dealing with perceptions held by members of the ANC/UDF/COSATU, etc. We rely also on objective evidence which indicates conclusively that the KwaZulu Police have, in a physical sense, entered the fray against anything perceived by them to be ANC/UDF/COSATU, etc. Concrete examples are discussed in Memorandum B We merely point out that a casual enquiry to South African Police Stations in Natal would confirm the fact that there are to date an unacceptably large number of policemen attached to KwaZulu who have been convicted; others are either awaiting trial or the decision of the Attorney-General, for alleged acts of thuggery against members and supporters of the ANC/UDF/COSATU, etc. Almost invariably, the arrests of these members of the KwaZulu Police have been carried out by the South African Police. It also bears mentioning that an increasing number of members of KwaZulu Police are criminally implicated by evidence given in a number of inquests (See Memorandum B). For reasons incomprehensible to us; no charges follow the inquest findings.
We mention elsewhere in Memorandum B that complaints by ordinary people with regard to acts of violence committed by certain members of Inkatha are ignored or even treated with ridicule by members of the KwaZulu Police at their police stations. Clearly, this in itself serves to increase the sense of frustration that in turn must play an important role in stoking the fires of violence. People in those areas do feel helpless and without redress, their only option being to arm themselves in order to defend and retaliate. In that kind of context, our unilateral pleas to our members to disarm will fall on deaf and incredulous ears, particularly if, as so often happens, Inkatha is allowed to remain armed and its belligerence uncurbed. (See Memorandum B)
There have been attempts at concluding peace pacts and effecting reconciliation. We refer specifically to failed peace initiatives, largely initiated by either UDF or COSATU, in 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990. These are painfully fragile by their very nature. It takes a single act by one hot-head or agent provocateur to derail the process, hence the need for impartial, credible and effective policing. This becomes, in itself, an important ingredient for peace and serves as an effective counter to war-mongering.
The issue of policing is, of course basic to the whole administration of justice in the province. Because of its ineffectiveness, courts are falling into disrepute because of weak evidence-gathering by the police leading to sloppy prosecutions and inordinate delays in bringing offenders to justice. Urgent action is, we submit necessary in order to combat this crises of confidence.
We would like to be able to convince our community that the South African administration, at least, is serious about helping to bring about an end to the carnage in Natal. Removing the KwaZulu Police from the scene and replacing them with an impartial force with no axe to grind would go a long way towards demonstrating the concern and determination of the regime to end the killings and to restore law and order as well as confidence in law-enforcement agencies.
A set of demands have emerged within our organisations over the last few months. These were handed in, in the form of memoranda, at police stations around the country during the marches which took place on 7 July, 1990. They are summarised as follows:-
3.1 The disbanding of the KwaZulu Police. We reiterate our position that this force has effectively become a party in the conflict, is incapable of acting and in fact does not act impartially; as a police force, they are a creation of the South African government and they remain its responsibility. This government can and should taker their powers away and entrust them to a neutral force.
3.2 The lifting of the State of Emergency in Natal. It is clear that the special powers attached to the State of Emergency have not been effective at all in de-escalating the violence. Instead, the violence has increased. Our position in fact is that the State does not need those powers to deal effectively with the situation. The continued existence of the State of Emergency has, on the other hand, itself exacerbated the feeling of bitterness because of the fact that the security powers have generally used whatever discretionary powers they have only against people deemed to be opposed to Inkatha.
3.3 The warlords must be arrested and charged. Failure to do so in the past has had the following consequences:
(A) They became more vicious and brazen as they became more and more confident of their immunity.3.4 A judicial inquiry must be held. A noteworthy feature is the fact that judicial inquiries have in fact been held in respect of lesser catastrophes in our history. It therefore becomes quite baffling that this has been refused in this instance, in the face of very serious allegations levelled against the security forces, particularly the role of the KwaZulu Police.
(B) It contributed largely to the loss of faith by the community in the willingness and ability of the security forces to carry out impartial policing.
(C) It has contributed to a virtual breakdown in the administration of justice in the province, with people being encouraged to take the law into their own hands.
3.5 The security forces must play an effective and impartial peace-keeping role.
3.6 There should be freedom of association and free political activity should be guaranteed to all in Natal. The practical position here is that the African National Congress is still, in fact, unable to operate without harassment, particularly in areas under the jurisdiction of KwaZulu. Security forces have been either unwilling or powerless to protect the rights of non-Inkatha political groups to exist and operate.
Many attempts have been made by the churches, ourselves as well as other organisations to inject a sense of urgency in the government to take appropriate action in this matter. We are still left with a sense of frustration because of our feeling that the problem of violence in Natal is still not receiving the serious and urgent attention demanded by the situation.
Although there have been contacts and exchanges with Ministers and senior police officers in natal, these have been largely ineffective. We feel that this is because they do not take place within an overall framework that is clearly understood by everyone. The internal investigations by, for instance, General Schutts, have failed to restore the credibility and image of the police force; no report has been received from the General and allegations of unlawful conduct ion the part of the police continue to be received. A major flaw is the fact that we never know what internal steps are being taken. This creates a feeling that apart from promises, nothing concrete is being sone.
4.1 In view of the positions stated above, we believe that serious and urgent action needs to be taken. We therefore propose that a Joint Working Group of the Government and the African National Congress be established to deal with Natal. This should be a high-level committee that will be able to give serious and systematic attention to the security situation in the province.
The terms of reference of the Joint Working Group should be to deal with the issues set out below. It should be required to report back within a short period of time which should be fixed, delegations led by President de Klerk and the African National Congress's Deputy President, Mr Mandela.
We feel that the following should be on the agenda of the Joint Working Group:-
4.2.1 Structure
We believe that the existence of three components of the security forces is self-defeating and that serious consideration must be given to having one impartial and effective peace-keeping unit.
4.2.2 Their Role
We note that serious criticisms have been levelled at the security police, inter alia, that:
4.2.3.1 they fail to protect ans assist communities;Criticisms against the KwaZulu Police are even more serious. We believe that these problems need to be addressed and solutions found.
4.2.3.2 they act unlawfully against individuals and communities;
4.2.3.3 they fail to take effective action to disarm people displaying dangerous weapons;
4.2.3.4 they act with partiality towards Inkatha;
4.2.3.4 they are unable to effectively investigate themselves.
We believe that monitoring should embody two inter-related aspects, namely:
4.3.1 the conduct of the security forces and a mechanism to effectively deal with the complaints of misconduct;
4.3.2 situations of violence and impending violence so as to ensure a rapid and correct response by the security forces.
The present mechanisms are unsatisfactory in that -
(a) complaints that are referred to the police are not dealt with adequately and timeously;We therefore feel that the following could serve as a framework:
(b) the response from high-ranking police officers has often been inadequate and the impression has been created that suggestions from the affected communities have not been taken seriously.
1. a common command structure for the security forces;
2. monitoring offices set up by the African National Congress in strategic towns, e.g. Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Empangeni, to have direct radio contact with the security forces;
3. the Working Group should establish some kind of review system for the investigation of complaints against the police and their failure to respond properly to prevent acts of violence.
The fact that there have only been a handful of successful prosecutions in spite of the fact that more than 4000 murders have taken place illustrates quite sharply the failure of the criminal justice system to deal with the present crises.
We feel the following issues need to be addressed by the Joint Working Group, as a matter of urgency:-
4.4.1 The failure of the police to adequately investigate crimes;
4.4.2 The failure to properly prosecute offenders and to display the same vigour employed in the prosecution of political offenders;
4.4.3 The lack of communication between witnesses, including victims, and the investigating officers;
4.4.4 The failure to protect witnesses;
4.4.5 The fact that proceedings usually stretch over a protracted period.
The Working Group should examine ways of overcoming these problems, with particular reference to the creation of special courts and for procedures to monitor police investigations.
We are aware of Minister Delport's initiative with regard to Natal. We see the position of the Joint Working Group as being an urgent measure to improve the security situation in Natal with a minimum of delay. Liaison will be necessary between the Joint Working Group and Minister Delport and the initiatives will allow for political, economic nd social reconstruction to develop more effectively.
We believe the process should begin as soon as is humanly possible as each day that passes counts more deaths and destruction and the wounds of bitterness in our society are deepened.