THE STORY OF AFRICAN RESISTANCE IN 1879
"...they were like lions and not afraid of death"British soldier
It is indicative of imperialist and racist history books that the names Tshingwayo ka Mahoye and Mavumengwana are totally ignored. Yet these are the two generals the former a spirited veteran of 70 years; the latter thirty years his junior that led Cetshwayo's crack impis in a spectacular victory over British forces at Isandhlwana on January 22, 1879.
An Astonishing Victory
The battle the centenary of which we are marking this year is generally considered one of the most humiliating defeats suffered by an Imperial British Army in the annals of that country's blood-stained colonial history. It is difficult to exaggerate the astonishing nature of the British defeat. For this was a true David and Goliath situation; a 19th century counterpart to U.S. imperialism's war on Vietnam. Mighty Britain, the world's leading industrial and colonial power, whose army was then the best trained and equipped in history, had launched a sudden, predatory war against a small African kingdom whose army fought with spears and shields and whose population numbered perhaps 300,000. Yet the fearless African warriors of that Zulu kingdom were able to overrun the main staging camp of the invading army despite the withering fire from the breech-loading rifles, cannons, rocket-tubes and Gatling machine-guns and in ferocious hand-to-hand fighting account for the lives of almost all the desperate defenders.
The British lost 858 men at Isandhlwana and an equal number of African levies of the so-called Natal Native Contingent. (Not for the first time in our history are the Pretoria Boers today attempting to use Africans to fight Africans!) The British casualties were colossal in a colonial war where the armed men on horseback expected to lose few of their number. Yet at Isandhlwana 52 British officers lost their lives while at the battle of Waterloo 48 were killed! Six whole companies of the 24th Foot Regiment totalling 602 men, later known as the South Wales Borderers, were wiped out to a man.
News of the Imperial disaster shattered the confidence of Victorian Britain and colonial South Africa. The British Prime Minister, Disreali, stated that the "evil consequences" for his country were "incalculable" and indeed as a result of the rumpus he soon lost office. The arrogant British general, Lord Chelmsford, was disgraced and chided as follows in the Durban Daily News: "You will have seen of our great disaster at Isandhlwana, only a short distance from the border where every man was butchered...it is evident that our general was out-generalled by the Zulus". No less an authority than Frederick Engels, a military expert in has own right, was later to write: "The Zulus did what no European army can do. Armed only with lances and spears, without any firearms, they advanced under a hail of bullets from breechloaders up to the bayonets of the English infantry the best in the world for fighting in closed ranks and threw them into confusion more than once, yea, ever forced them to retreat in spite of the immense disparity of weapons." (The Origin of the Family)
At this time when much racist superficiality and academic claptrap will be written and said both in Britain and South Africa about Isandhlwana we must ask ourselves what are the important lessons to be learnt from this notable victory, and indeed subsequent defeat of Cetshwayo's kingdom; and the relevance today?
An Unjust, Colonial War
To start with let us examine the cause of the war which lasted from January to July, and masquerades in colonial history books under the title of the Zulu War. A cursory glance at events in South Africa in the 1870's and 1880's shows that in this short period Great Britain launched, one after another, violent and sudden wars on our people who were then organised into small and separate national entities and chiefdoms. For example wars to the finish were launched on the Hlubi in 1873, the Gcaleka and Pedi in 1877, the Ngqika, Thembu, Pondo, Griqua and Rolong in 1878, the Sotho in 1880, the Ndebele in 1893. (See Class and Colour in South Africa by the Simons) For centuries Dutch, British and Boer had by degrees been dispossessing our people of their land and birthright. This was part of the world-wide process of colonial conquest that had begun in the 15th century. By the last third of the 19th century the "Scramble for Africa" between the rival colonial powers was intense and Britain was determined to finally bring the whole of Southern Africa under her control. Et is no coincidence that the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1870 excited Britain's insatiable greed and haste. This was the great dividing period in South African history where the basis for dramatic and far-reaching socio-economic transformation was laid and mine and factory were soon to compete with farming estate for cheap labour. As has been pointed out before now, South Africa's industrial era was baptised in the blood of our people. Aptly summing up the economic requirements of the time, Shepstone, then Native Administrator in Natal, had remarked of Cetshwayo's coronation in 1872 that there was a pressing need to transform the Zulu warriors into "labourers working for wages".
Spearpoint of Leadership
By the beginning of 1879, having completed the bloody repression of the Gaika under chief Sandili and the Galekas under Hintsa's son Kreli. the British were free to turn their attention on Cetshwayo. Clearly the independence and military power of the kingdom founded by the great Shake represented a formidable obstacle to Britain's imperial designs. Indeed, it was generally held that "Cetshwayo was the source of disaffection among most of the tribes of South Africa, to whom he sent emissaries and who looked to the warriors of Zululand as the spearpoint of aggressive leadership." (The Red Soldier by, Frank Emery) The British even regarded Sekhukhuni who was giving them and the Transvaal Boors a great deal of trouble as "Cetshwayo's cat's paw". But Cetshwayo had always steered a cautious and friendly diplomatic course with the British and their Natal Colony. It was the Transvaal Boers and-particularly those in the disputed border lands of the Blood River who were the Zulu's traditional enemy. The British had also cultivated a pacific relationship with Cetshwayo. Now when it suited them he was suddenly depicted as the "apostle of darkness and evil" and his people described as a "barbaric and unruly race, unfit to govern their country and a constant menace to the white civilisation of Natal". It was not hard to find a trifling incident as the occasion on which to declare war in this case Zulu justice meted out to an adulteress who had sought refuge in Natal and by January 11, when Chelmsford's ultimatum to Cetshwayo to disband the regiments and lay down arms had been ignored, a British army of 18,000 troops, cavalry and hundreds of wagon trains loaded with food, weapons and equipment, crossed the Tugela river and invaded Zululand.
Bloody Repression
Thus we see that the cause of the war lay entirely at the door of the British; as was the case with all wars of colonial conquest. The troops and officers who were waging an unjust, bloody war of repression against the Zulu were the very troops fresh from the most recent wars against the Gaika and Galeka and the other people of our country; indeed hardened campaigners from colonial repression in the Gold Coast and Ethiopia, India and Afghanistan! Not for the first time in history were the people who were being invaded, whose land was being stolen and plundered, blamed as the blood-thirsty war-mongerers. We see the same racist mythology working today with regard to Zimbabwe, Namibia and our own liberation struggle.
Neither did the British wage war as though it was a game of cricket. This was total war. Kraals and huts were put to the flame; cattle were seized; crops were destroyed; non- combatants tortured for information; the wounded were shot out of hand; after Isandhlwana no prisoners were taken alive. Whether it be the terrorism of Ian Smith or of the Americans in Vietnam the methods of imperialism have little changed through the ages! The British was the army which in the words of the historian H. Lawson: "brought calamities compared to which the cattle raids of the Boers had been mere flee bites." He has written: "The British way was not composed of cowardly cattle thieves but of ruthless and dehumanised mercenaries whose profession was destruction. Moreover, they appeared in their thousands, where the Boers had mustered only a few hundred. When they attacked the African people, the damage they were able to inflict was tremendous." ( from Chapters in the History of the March to Freedom by Lionel Forman)
Formula for Victory
How then did Cetshwayo's impis manage to inflict such a devastating defeat on the British army at Isandhlwana? It is said that the necessity of any successful army is high morale, superior tactics and excellent weapons. The Zulu success is all the more remarkable given the immense disparity of weapons. They made up for this through many superb qualities bred into every warrior from the time of Shaka. These included superb physical fitness, high mobility and speed, iron discipline and above all a fighting determination and fearlessness that provoked total awe in the enemy. Armed with the knobkerrie and short stabbing assegai devised by Shaka, the Zulu warrior was a formidable foe at in-fighting. Confidence in his own ability, with a proud combat record to emulate, helped create the conditions for high morale. Fighting a just war in defence of king and country against the alien invader made for a razor-sharp morale at Isandhlwana. Cetshwayo had addressed 12 of his regiments numbering 20,000 warriors destined for the attack on the British camp with the words: "I am sending you against the Whitemen who have invaded Zululand and driven away our cattle." The problem for generals Tshingwayo and Mavumengwana and regimental indunas such as Usibebu, Sigcwelegcwele and the King's brother Dabulamanzi was how to overcome the superior firepower of the enemy and get to close quarters with the defenders of the camp. The way this was achieved is a testament to the ability of Cetshwayo's generals and the discipline and training of the warriors. It led a British survivor to complain: "The way our camp was taken could not be more cleverly taken by any of our Generals..." (Frank Emery's Red Soldier)
Spies, Decoys and Surprise Attack
Once they had invaded Zululand the British task was to locate the impis. No matter how far and wide they scouted this they failed to achieve. By the skilful use of decoys Tshingwayo and Mavumengwana were drawing the British reconnaissance parties up all manner of blind alleys. On the other hand the Zulu intelligence system based on spies and scouting parties - was extremely efficient and the position and strength of the various British invading columns was well known. By the dawn of January 22, Chelmsford had left his main camp in search of the elusive enemy. Isandhlwana was down to half its strength; that is 2,000 men. While Chelmsford and the other half of the camp's contingent was chasing around the countryside the Zulu force of 20,000 warriors was resting in a steep ravine only four miles from the camp. It was an amazing and brilliant achievement to move an army of this size so close to the British position through countryside which was not exactly covered in forests and which was alive with British scouting parties. One can only marvel at the ability of the commanders; the stealth and discipline of the regiments. Undoubtedly this was the basis for the famous victory, for the attack was launched with great speed and surprise enabling the traditional Zulu "horns" to encircle the camp while the main body the "chest" charged at the weakest point. For half-an-hour the British poured out a desperate fire cutting down many warriors. Displaying great velour and determination the impis kept charging the lines of redcoats until they were able to come to close quarters with infantrymen Engels had described as "the best in the world for fighting at close quarters". On this occasion the assegais of African warriors proved too much for English bayonets and after a battle that had lasted little more than an hour there were very few survivors on the British side to tell the tale. Two thousand Zulu warriors had died in defence of their country and Cetshwayo remarked that "an assegai has been thrust into the belly of the nation".
Generalship and Fighting Ability
The imperialist history books explain-away the British disaster through the ineptitude of Chelmsford; the unreliability of the African levies; the shortage of ammunition. This is all arrant nonsense designed to obscure the superior Zulu generalship and fighting ability which had won the battle for Cetshwayo and for African posterity. Chelmsford was simply out-generalled; the African levies were a minor appendage to the British infantrymen and cavalry who were the main fighting force and were not the only soldiers to run when the warriors broke through the defending lines; and as far as the ammunition was concerned there was a quarter of a million rounds in the camp. The fact that runners from the quartermaster's store could apparently not keep supplies flowing as fast as became necessary at the peak of the Zulu assault was as much the result of the ferocity of the attack as it was owing to the general disorganisation. And that of course is why a surprise attack is so advantageous to the attacker! That Isandhlwana was not a flash in the pan is evidenced by further Zulu victories at the Intombi river on March 12 and at Hlobani on March 28. The British lost 100 men at the former and 80 men at the latter engagements; in both cases they Were taken by surprise.
British Power Boer Power
As crushing a defeat as Isandhlwana was it could only be a temporary reverse for an enemy with the resources of Britain. Thousands of reinforcements arrived in Natal. during the ensuing months and by dune Chelmsford had at his disposal an army of over 30,000 troops. The arrogant British general had anticipated defeating Cetshwayo ~ in a matter of weeks; in the event it took, him six months. Superior fire-power finally won the day at the Battle of Ulundi in July. Zulu power was broken. Cetshwayo was dethroned, the kingdom was split into 13 separate units; the chiefs were subordinated to white magistrates; the disputed territory handed to the Boers and two-thirds of the farmlands given to the settlers. By 1897 what remained of Zululand was made a part of Natal. All of which makes it perfectly clear that the subjugation of all our people took place because of the power of Britain. The Boers on their own did not have the capacity or the resources to carry out this design and were often put to flight by the warriors of Moshoeshoe, Sekhukhuni and Dingane and in the hundred years engagements on the Cape frontiers. Incidentally the victory at Isandhlwana makes utter nonsense of the Boer claim and racist-mongering every December 16 that they had crushed Zulu power once and for all at Blood River in 1838.
It is interesting and important to note that just as it was impossible for the colonial settlers alone to impose their authority on our people so the Pretoria Boers and racists like Smith are today incapable of ruling without the enormous support they receive from Britain, the USA and other Western countries.
Divide and Rule
Following another historic link through to the present we see how carefully the British followed their strategy of divide and rule. In the first place they made certain of quelling the resistance of Sandili and Kreli in what is today the Transkei and then after dethroning Cetshwayo fostered numerous rival claimants such as the traitor Sibebu so as to destroy the kingdom from within. The policy of isolating centres of resistance and of playing one group off against another is imperialism's cardinal rule to this day. It is not hard to see the tap-root from which Afrikanerdom's Bantustan schemes spring. Our people in the 19th century well understood the need for unity and co-ordination; perhaps more so than is generally understood as the British description of Sekhukhuni as Cetshwayo's "cat's paw" indicates. It is clear that an understanding along these lines existed between Moshoeshoe's southern-Sotho kingdom, Sekhukhuni and Cetshwayo that "spearpoint of aggressive leadership". There is plenty of evidence of British casualties from Zulu marksmen during the war of 1879 and it is said that they received some training from Moshoeshoe's expert riflemen. (See Peter Saunders' Moshoeshoe) British and settler anxiety of a united front of the Africans is evidenced from a letter from one of Chelmsford's officers who wrote during the campaign against Sandili: "It is said that a general simultaneous rising against the white people was only spoilt by the quarrel between the Gcalekas and Fingoes bringing on the Kaffir War prematurely." (Frank Emery's Red Soldier) Clearly the objective conditions did not then exist for the national unity which the African National Congress dedicated itself to forge from its historic inception in 1912; just as the conditions for the Balkanisation of South Africa are a thing of the past today and are doomed to failure.
Unity the Key
The broad unity of all our people laying claim to an indivisible South Africa on the basis of the Freedom Charter and under the leadership of the ANC is the indispensable condition for our liberation. That is the recurrent lessons of our history and experience of centuries of struggle against colonial conquest, national oppression, racist tyranny and vicious economic exploitation.
The threads of that struggle of African, Indian, Coloured and democrats of all races are intimately related. In celebrating the centenary of the Battle of Isandhlwana 18 we salute an historic landmark in the more than three centuries resistance of our people. Although the nature of the times were such that actions were generally uncoordinated the many wars our people fought form an indivisible chain that links that era of epic resistance with the national liberation struggle today. The traditions and heritage of that heroic era live on, fiercely burning in the hearts of our people. The names of Hintsa, Makana, Moshoeshoe, Adam Kok, Dingane and Cetshwayo serve as the great landmarks of those epic struggles.
Fearlessness and Determination
The significance of Isandhlwana is that it epitomises the fearless and determined fighting spirit of that whole era of resistance wars. The battle serves as a clarion call to all our freedom loving people, inspiring them to spare no effort in the continuing war to liberate every inch of our, beloved country. Just as the victory of the Vietnamese people over US imperialism inspires oppressed people everywhere in the knowledge that it is possible to defeat a mighty power, so the victory of Isandhlwana reminds us of our warrior heritage and our people's ability to fearlessly face and overcome a military giant.
Today we fight with different methods and under different circumstances when the tide of history is running against imperialism, racism and reaction. With the unity of our people; with the determination of our ancestors; with the correct theory and leadership of the ANC; with international support and with UMKHONTO spearheading a People's War we will win many victories as astonishing as Isandhlwana until the nation is free.
Isandhlwana is a challenge!
Isandhlwana is a clarion call to People's War!
SECHABA - February 1979