7. The Riekert Commission: a Black Middle Class in the Making?

The Riekert report is a very clever and highly sophisticated piece of work which will probably result in a longer period in which the status quo will be maintained through the creation of a relatively small African privileged group which may serve as a buffer against unrest. In the interim, dreadful human suffering in the homelands and problems experienced by migrant and non-permanent workers will increase.

[Sheena Duncan, South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 4, Nov. 1979, p. 74.]

Shortly after the creation of the Wiehahn Commission in 1977, another commission was charged with making an inquiry into legislation affecting the utilization of manpower. The latter came to be known as the Riekert Commission after its chairman and sole member, Dr P. Riekert, former economic advisor to the ex-Prime Minister John Vorster. Although the Riekert Commission received less public (and certainly less international) attention than the Wiehahn Commission, its contents and its timing reveal a complementary thrust in the overall effort to increase and make more efficient the controls over black, especially African, labour power. As the present document focuses on the current state of black trade unions, less space will be given to an analysis of the Riekert Commission report and subsequent legislation. It is, however, important to highlight the central features that reinforce the recommendations of the WCR and the IC Amendment Act. As a guide to understanding the two commissions, perhaps the following is helpful: What Wiehahn does to black labour at work, Riekert does to black labour before and after work.

One might begin by asking why it was necessary for Riekert to investigate legislation affecting manpower utilization in the late 1970s? In particular, why does the apartheid regime need to amend old laws and formulate new statutes in this crucial sphere of society which has been so heavily legislated for the past three decades under the Nationalists?

The general answer bears upon the multi-faceted crisis in South African capitalism that was touched on in Chapter Five. The Riekert Commission, like the Wiehahn Commission, constitutes the state's desperate attempt to resolve three dialectically related problems. Firstly, the structural changes in the postwar industrialization process have meant not only a shortage of semi-skilled labour but, more critically, the creation of a mass of unemployed Blacks. These Blacks are faced with the choice of either finding work in the urban centres or rotting in the rural Bantustans with those who have little hope of ever being employed. The crisis of unemployment, and more specifically the removal of the unemployed Blacks from the urban centres, became a major focus for the Riekert investigation.

Secondly, the political uprisings of 1976 and later shocked the regime into realizing that a significant portion of Africans with urban residence rights under Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act were (are) willing to reject the "free enterprise system" and simultaneously commit themselves to the struggle for national liberation and class emancipation. The Riekert Commission made this problem another major focus in its deliberations, with the recommendation that Africans with Section 10 rights should be further advantaged relative to their rural brothers and sisters who are more immediately subject to Bantustanization and the loss of their South African birthright. Both of these first two points lead us to realize that the Riekert report is essentially a strategy to divide-and-rule: to create legislative, material and ideological differences within the African majority in such a way that a small minority may be groomed to become a black middle class that may (or may not) identify with the status quo.

Thirdly, international pressure continues to plague the South African ruling class. On the one hand, foreign capitalist corporations insist on a stable political climate with guaranteed high rates of profit as in the 1960s. They need also to be able to defend their investments to their own nationals who have learned a lot during the past decade about apartheid South Africa and how international capital operates. On the other hand, international labour also demands that at the very minimum certain basic rights and freedoms be accorded the African working class. On both fronts, then, the apartheid regime and the Riekert investigation sought to find ways of eliminating the most blatant forms of legislated discrimination without making any fundamental changes to the nature of the system of labour exploitation.

In approaching a summary of Riekert it is essential to lay bare the real meaning of the term "manpower utilization". This polite term encompasses all the hated laws and mechanisms that have controlled and channelled African labour power to where it is most urgently needed by white capital for the creation of super-profits. Pass laws, influx control, labour bureaux - these are the ingredients of "manpower utilization" which Riekert has investigated. Indeed, his report reflects what has been the burning imperative for all exploiters of black labour in South Africa for centuries:

The most important question is whether the right quantity of labour of the right quality will be available at the right time and the right place to satisfy the demands.

[Rickert Report of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting Utilization of Manpower, 1979.]

Much of the Riekert report is a form of legislative housekeeping whereby previous acts are consolidated into new statutes and/or the onus of implementing the old acts shifted to departments not so quickly identified with or tainted by the legacy of apartheid. But there is no moving away from the central tenets of apartheid in the Riekert report; if anything, each fundamental recommendation is a new prop in the overall system of national oppression and class exploitation.

The language of the Riekert report suggests that discrimination is being removed from the legal codes of South Africa. This is obviously for international consumption but could not be further from the truth. The indisputable fact remains that the labour control measures which Riekert has streamlined apply only to the African people. It may seem like a clever semantic trick to rewrite the laws in "non-discriminatory" language but there is no likely prospect that the Whites in South Africa will be restricted in their mobility, residential privileges, or job opportunities by the laws that Riekert is deracializing. The international community will not be fooled.

Even more despicable than these word games is the fact that the commissioner, in line with government policy, does not consider South Africa as one geopolitical totality. The focus is on the black people who have urban residence rights, while virtually excluding the majority of Africans forced to live in the "non-independent" Bantustans (5.5 million South African citizens) or the already 4 million Africans who have been legally stripped of their citizenship through the sham "independence" of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. Riekert will serve to make life (and what will become death for many) more difficult. The report shows absolutely no concern for the effects of his recommendations on this mass of humanity. This and other examples make Riekert's claim that "political matters" were outside the parameters of his investigation another instance of white racist arrogance.

One final comment on unemployment is in order before we summarize the Riekert recommendations. The rapid expansion of South African capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s means that South Africa is firmly tied to a global mode of production that is increasingly dominated by giant multinational corporations. The mechanization of South African industry has been accompanied by the twin processes of concentration and centralization of capital; the first accounts for a few corporations dominating their respective spheres, and the second refers to these same corporations diversifying into other spheres. As capital tends towards monopoly capital in South Africa, as in any capitalist country, the labour power is affected both quantitatively and qualitatively.

In South Africa an increasing proportion of the African labour force is becoming marginalized as they are removed -not only temporarily, but often permanently - from productive labour. The ruling class and the state must then pause to consider how this reserve army of labour power is to be treated - both economically and politically. The failure to deal with this structural problem effectively could lead to more, many and then one-too-many Sowetos for the regime to manage. Hence the importance of Riekert at this point in time.

The ultimate solution for the white regime, and one which is fully accepted by Riekert, is to make all Africans "foreigners" in their own land. Constant reference to "black states" indicates how far this strategy has been internalized into the state's planning apparatus. Eventually, if apartheid lasts that long, even those who now "enjoy" permanent rights of urban residence will be removed to their assigned "black state- when they fail to work for the Whites.

However, in the interim the state (through Riekert) must carry out a two-pronged strategy on this problem of unemployment. For urban Africans with jobs and residential rights, nominal improvements will be made and certain restrictions lifted so that these people might begin to identify with the status quo and become that "buffer" zone between white minority rule and national liberation. For the majority of Africans without these rights - the migrants and "commuters" (those who move from homeland to white area and back each day) -the Riekert solution results in tighter control over their mobility. Throughout the report the exclusion of the migrants from urban centres and the resulting stabilization of the permanent work force is spoken of as a political necessity. To quote the Commission:

Control over the rate of urbanization is, in the light of circumstances in South Africa, an absolutely essential social security measure. Even though, as some witnesses contend, the abolition of such control would lead to faster economic growth, the price to be paid for it in terms of direct and indirect social costs would be too high.

This means that the wage levels of permanent urban Africans might have to be increased slightly in order to have the greater prize of desired stability. Obviously large corporations can easily accommodate this small sacrifice on the way to the bank, whereas smaller, less efficient capitalists may fall by the wayside.

If this restriction on the movement of migrant labour into the urban centres proceeds as envisaged, it will also have the effect of placing greater priority on the further mechanization of production. While it would be very wrong to think of migrant labour as totally unskilled labour, it is also true that the quality of South African black labour is often "low" in the sense that a readily available supply of cheap labour power is used instead of machines. For South African industry to be competitive with other capitalist economies it must increase the mechanization of its production process as well as stabilize its urban labour force. As for mining and agriculture, migrant labour is still destined to toil in these spheres and the state will do nothing to interfere with this historical pattern.

Generally, the system of influx control and labour bureaux has served the capitalist class well over the decades. In the earlier years the massive machinery of administration pried the African labour power away from its subsistence economy in the reserves to work in the mines, farms and factories of "white" South Africa. The same system of laws and regulations is now being converted to ensure that surplus black labour is removed from the urban centres to lessen the potential for urban unrest and revolution. Within these overall trends, unemployment remains a cyclical feature of South African capitalism as well as a structural phenomenon.

The Riekert modifications in no way prevent the tap from being turned in the opposite direction, i.e. to open the rural floodgates in times of labour shortage in certain sectors. Indeed, one recommendation (discussed below) guarantees precisely that. However, it is important to realize that a surplus black labour force is being created in South African capitalism that will never be absorbed into the economy. It is this river of humanity that the apartheid regime is attempting to dispose of within "black states".

The following sections outline the most important modifications to the control and canalization of black labour that follow from the Riekert Commission. As the report consciously sets down the procedures for creating divisions within the African population, the divisions will provide our original point of departure.

URBAN AFRICANS

In order to understand the "new dispensations" accorded Africans with rights of permanent residence in the urban centres, it is first necessary to explain in summary fashion Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1946. Under this Act, Section 10 stipulates that no African may remain in any prescribed (---white---) area for longer than 72 hours unless s/he can prove that s/he "qualifies" to be there. To "qualify" an African must fall under one of the following categories:

Section 10(1)(a): People who have since birth resided continuously in the area.

Section 10(1)(b): People who have worked continuously in the area for one employer for ten years; or have lawfully resided for 15 years in the area.

Section 10(1)(c): People who are dependants of (a) or (b); the wife, unmarried daughter or son under the age of 18, if they entered the area lawfully and live with their dependants.

In the past, qualification for Section 10 (a), (b) or (c) has been difficult to prove and is not easily granted; furthermore, it is not so much a right as a privilege that can be removed in certain circumstances.

One additional category is Section 10(1)(d), whereby a person can remain in an urban area for more than 72 hours only if s/he has the permission of a labour bureau. This permission is granted contract workers - those who can remain in an urban area only as long as their contract of employment is valid. Historically, Section (1)(d) persons could qualify for Section 10(1)(b) rights after ten years of continuous employment, but the 1968 Labour Regulations ruled that contracts may not exceed one year in length. This has the effect of making for discontinuous contracts even though the work itself may be continuous, i.e. making the contract worker ineligible for (1)(b) rights. The (1)(a), (b), or (c) persons are those generally referred to as "permanent urban Blacks". Those who live in the urban area without Section 10 rights are the "illegals" (see below).

Section 10 rights are part of the larger system of labour bureaux which has been generally discussed in an earlier chapter. These labour bureaux cover every city, town, village and rural area in South Africa and amount to an administrative jungle that channels the flow of cheap black labour to various fractions of the capitalist class. The Section Tenners, as they are called, form the relatively privileged minority within the larger context of overall labour exploitation.

The 1970 statistics show that the African urban population in the "white" areas at that time was 4,475,000. Of these, 2,466,000 (1,747,000 men) were "economically active". Approximately 57 per cent of the men and 73 per cent of the women among the economically active qualified as Section Tenners. This is the group which the Riekert Commission hopes to shower "privileges" upon and thus divide these "insiders" from the majority of non-urban Blacks who will become "outsiders" in every sense of the word.

In outlining the Riekert proposals for the permanent urban Blacks we must keep in mind that this amounts to a process of trying to create a black middle class, a black petty bourgeoisie that (in the eyes of the regime) will hopefully come to identify with the capitalist system. Class formation is normally a slow and uneven process in capitalist society, and there is no guarantee that this last-moment effort by the white ruling class will succeed. There are many reasons to believe it will fail.

Recent legislation provides Section 10(1)(a), (b) and (c) persons with 99-year leasehold rights as a means of distinguishing this black minority in a material sense from other Blacks with no rights of property whatsoever. Section Tenners will be able to bring wives and children into the area in which they qualify, subject only to the condition that suitable accommodation is available. In this regard, employers will be allowed to own property in African residential areas on the assumption that they will make housing more readily available for their workers as a result. In other words, for those unable to purchase their own homes, the bosses will assist - with all the possible strings attached that one can imagine under such a system. To risk one's job (through a strike, or joining a union) might entail losing one's home as well, and then the break-up of the family.

Unlike before, Section Tenners will not have to register as work seekers at fortnightly intervals but will have only one endorsement in their identity documents (pass books). And, to encourage the mobility within this privileged pool of labour power, Section Tenners will now be able to move between urban areas without losing their legal rights of urban residence. This particular recommendation, accepted by the government white paper, reflects the evidence submitted that "the black population in rural cities and towns seems to have dammed up, in other words there was a lack of mobility between urban areas". In many small towns there is no chance for significant development or expanded employment and the state wants to ensure that this portion of the black labour force is fully employed before having to rely on the oscillating migrants from the homelands or "black states". Indeed, if this inter-urban mobility proves effective the number of necessary recruits from the rural areas will be reduced and with that potential political unrest as well.

The Riekert Commission spoke of the "work choosiness" of many Section Tenners who refused certain jobs which are notorious for poor pay and working conditions. Employers are now encouraged to use "local" labour (where "local" means Section 10 labour), and they will be subject to a stiff penalty for hiring "illegal" labour, a practice which had become widespread under the previous system. Labour bureaux are also encouraged to exercise strict controls over the admission of contract workers with the same purpose in mind.

For the majority of Blacks driven into the "homelands- and gradually being stripped of their birthright through Bantustan "independence", the future can only be one of starvation and despair. Many have waited for months for labour bureaux to recruit for work in "white" areas, and it is for this reason that they join the ranks of the "illegals" and enter the "white" areas to find work regardless of the penalties if discovered.

While there remains little doubt that the apartheid regime is trying to create a relatively privileged black minority in the urban areas, it must be stressed that those who are being groomed for middle class status have suffered national oppression throughout their entire lives. Even for those Blacks who choose to follow this path there are reasons to doubt whether certain improvements will be forthcoming for these "insiders" with Section 10 rights.

For example, if the strategy is to encourage mobility of Section Tenners to fill vacant job positions in the "white areas", then it must be pointed out that the condition of having approved accommodation may be difficult to satisfy. According to government statistics, there was a shortage of 141,000 family housing units at the end of December 1977. There simply are not enough houses to accommodate these -insiders" on the basis of this condition. Beyond the shortage of housing units per se is the shortage of land upon which to build houses in the first place. With regard to Soweto, the Commission stated that it "... has far too little land available to provide housing in accordance with present patterns even for all the families that are now on the waiting list".

Other changes designed to improve the quality of life for urban Africans presuppose the elimination of blatant forms of discrimination that historically acted as disincentives for remaining in urban areas. Some of these - the inability of a widow to register a house her husband had rented, restrictions on black petty bourgeoisie (shopkeepers), etc. - have been eliminated. In other words, the negative measures have been scrapped in order to appease international criticism and ameliorate the many uncomfortable conditions for urban blacks.

As suggested above, however, these minor adjustments do not constitute a blueprint for the successful cooptation of urban Africans into a new status quo. As one commentator has concluded:

It is simply a question of urban Africans having revolted against the system and having focused international attention on some blatant inequities, which are now being removed wherever they are not essential for the "grand apartheid" philosophy.

[P. le Roux, "The Retention of Influx Control", in "Focus on Riekert", South African Labour Bulletin, Vol 5, No. 4, Nov. 1979 ' p. 113.].

MIGRANTS AND COMMUTERS

Commuters are a special case of migrant workers: they live in the "homelands" at night and work in the "white" areas during the day. In many cases, the state has merely redefined the borders of the "homeland" to include townships that are adjacent to "white" industrial areas. This effectively renders those black workers potential "foreigners" to South Africa with the "independence" of that particular -homeland". These commuters are working under contract in the---white-areas but are not eligible for permanent urban status; they are the Section 10 (1)(d) workers mentioned in the previous section. The Riekert Commission ensures that commuters will not qualify for Section 10(a). (b) or (c) rights. Thus, the capitalist class gets the labour of commuters every day but at the same time the state subjects them to the influx controls that all migrant workers are going to face following Riekert.

Migrant workers will bear the greatest burden after the streamlining of legislation resulting from the Riekert Commission. It is interesting to note that no changes were introduced in either the mining or agricultural sectors. Both mining and agricultural capital are not required to use the labour bureaux system to recruit cheap black labour as both industries have had more efficient and more coercive mechanisms of ensuring a ready supply of labour power. It seems that the state is not going to interfere in these highly strategic sectors. In fact, a recommendation by the Riekert Commission to bring recruitment of farm labour under the labour bureaux system was discarded by the Nationalists. Despite the rapid industrialization of the manufacturing sector, it must never be forgotten that the mining and agricultural products exported from South Africa play a major role in countering the balance of payments deficit caused by the necessary importation of capital goods from abroad. Continuous flows of cheap migrant labour to the mines and farms of "white" South Africa facilitate this accumulation function for monopoly capital.

The Riekert-Nationalist Party assault on migrant workers primarily concerns those ---homeland"and "black state" residents who must move to the cities to find work in order to escape poverty and starvation. Because the regime is determined to control the rate of urbanization as a "social security measure", it is now government policy to restrict greatly this mass of humanity's desperate attempt to sell its labour power. Nothing short of the physical survival of millions of Africans living in the rural areas hangs in the balance.

The Riekert Commission recommended three essential points with regard to influx control affecting migrant workers:

1. that influx control be linked with the availability of work and approved housing;
2. that no employment occur without the authorization of the appropriate labour bureau; for contract workers, as distinct from permanent urban residents, such authorization should be subject to availability of housing, a firm offer of employment and the non-availability of suitable local work seekers; and
3. that the discriminatory 72-hour restriction on Africans in urban areas be removed from the statutes.

The government accepted the first two recommendations but rejected the third on the grounds that while the 72-hour provision did create large-scale arrests and short-term imprisonments of Africans, its elimination would cause more problems. This is because, according to government thinking, controls at the place of work or residence are insufficient to ensure the proper implementation of desired restrictions on the mobility of African people. In sum, eliminating racist laws is a practice engaged in only when control over black labour power is not jeopardized.

The Riekert Commission recognized that if this policy was to be effective, penalties must be levied against employers who are willing to hire "illegal" migrant labour. Indeed, one of the prime factors leading to the formation of the Commission was the fact that both migrant workers (out of necessity) and employers (out of the profit motive) were making a mockery of the loopholes in the previously inefficient influx control system. For employers the system was bureaucratic and time-consuming, not to mention the obvious fact that "illegal" workers would be more willing to accept gross exploitation and intimidation than a Section 10 worker, for example. It was not uncommon for employers to include in their cost estimates the possibility of having to pay a fine if discovered hiring "illegals". For the "illegal" migrants themselves, the law was no barrier when the alternative was starvation for oneself and one's family in the barren homelands.

In fact, as a most revealing comment on the realities of apartheid for most black workers, a professor at the University of South Africa computed that migrant workers benefit from "illegal" work in urban areas even if they must go to prison as a consequence. The worker from the Ciskei "homeland" may improve his/her living standard by over 700 per cent if s/he works illegally in Pietermaritzburg (Natal) for nine months and then spends three months in jail. Or a Bophuthatswana migrant who works three months illegally in Pretoria and spends the next nine months in jail improves his/her standard by 28.5 percent; finally, a Lebowa worker gains by 170 percent for spending half the year working illegally in Johannesburg and the other half of the year behind the vertical colour bars of apartheid prisons.

Now even these "opportunities" will be taken away from migrants because of Riekert's determination to eliminate such a "contemptuous attitude" towards the law by black workers. The burden will now be placed on the employers in the form of costly economic disincentives - a possible fine of R500 for a first offence and minimum fine of R500 per worker for a second offence. The Commission also recommended that penalty provisions against migrant workers themselves (as in the old system) be eliminated; the government, however, rejected this suggestion and instead argued that workers were also culpable in that they choose to enter the "white" areas "illegally". Apparently the racist regime expects rural Blacks to accept starvation and death quietly, i.e. without violating the rule of law.

Shortly after the Riekert report was tabled the fine for hiring "illegal" workers increased from R100 to R500 per worker. The bosses began dumping their "illegals" into the streets in order to avoid the fines. To protect these capitalists against this sudden loss of such a large proportion of their cheap labour the government introduced a moratorium whereby employers could register presently-employed "illegal" workers (under certain conditions). Again, this was reported as an example of apartheid's "enlightenment- whereas in fact it was a process that guaranteed the state that such a backlog of "illegals" would never again accumulate in the "white" urban areas. These "illegals" could gain registered status if they worked for one year for one employer or for three years for different employers in the same administration board area. They also had to have approved accommodation; obviously many were eliminated on this criterion.

For those who failed to meet these criteria for registration, their ability to remain in the urban area became next to impossible. Alternatively, for those who were registered under this moratorium (which expired on 31 October 1979) there are a number of disadvantages: (a) workers are now subject to the very labour bureaux system they tried to avoid in the first place; (b) workers are registered for only one-year contracts, with no guarantee that these will be renewed; this hit women workers the hardest, e.g. in the East Rand more than 75 per cent of "illegal" workers registered under this "dispensation" were female domestics; (c) workers are tied to their employers and the right to change jobs is effectively taken from them; and (d) employers are allowed to continue to pay the same low wages after registration. It was reported that one third of illegal workers registered by the West Rand Administration Board earned less than R45 per month, and labour bureaux officials stated that the bosses used the moratorium as an opportunity to hire workers at low rates by taking on "illegals" and claiming they had been working for one year. Thus, registered workers became tied to employers at "illegals' wage rates---. The more things change, the more they stay the same - or get worse.

The intentional divide-and-rule tactics which in the short run attack "outsiders" (the migrants) more so than the "insiders" (the Section Tenners) should not be overdrawn. Riekert's claims that there will be no "interference with any existing rights of black inhabitants of prescribed (i.e. 'white') areas" are highly misleading and basically a lie. It is apartheid policy that every "homeland- Bantustan will be forced to accept the sham of "independence". Once this happens, every African person born after the date of independence of his/her computed homeland will be covered by Section 12 of the Urban Areas Act instead of Section 10. This means that Africans will be able to enter or remain in "white" areas only with the permission of the secretary, and that permission can be withdrawn at any time. Previously, this applied exclusively to foreign Africans from neighbouring countries.

In other words, there will eventually be no legal rights, but only privileges and permissions for Africans in the land of their birth - South Africa. The ability to work, live, move and even participate in family life will be controlled by permits, the antithesis of legal rights enforceable in a court of law.

However, as long as capitalism exists in South Africa, black labour power will be needed in the "white" cities and countryside. In this regard it is important to note that the Riekert Commission makes adequate provision for the reverse flow of migrant labour (i.e. from homelands or "black states" to "white" areas) when and if that is required. The Commission recommends that "assembly centres- be established near to homeland borders (subject to homeland governments, of course) and that these centres be responsible for an efficient system of recruiting and canalization of "homeland" labour power in times of need.

The general thrust of Riekert's report is to improve the efficiency of the system of influx control which includes labour bureaux, pass laws and aid centres. To quote the Commission report:

The general opinion of witnesses was that labour bureaux were institutions which should be recognized, overhauled and expanded in the interests of effective functioning of the labour market and the administration of black workers in the white area.

As has been outlined in previous sections, labour bureaux are designed to channel black labour power to where it is most needed by white capital and to make sure, at the same time, that this captive and unfree labour power is not allowed to look for jobs outside the administration of the bureaux system. For any Black other than a Section Tenner, to do so is to become an "illegal" worker. It was Riekert's task to suggest methods of improving the efficiency of this coercive system of labour exploitation.

Once again, a deceptive rhetoric has been presented to the international community. Riekert's recommendation, accepted by the government, that compulsory registration by black workers at labour bureaux be discontinued was hailed by many as one of the "most positive" changes coming from the Commission. Such ideological statements are simply untrue. The compulsion and coercion is not caused by registration itself but by a system which forces the majority of black workers onto barren rural lands where subsistence production is impossible and migratory labour the only means of survival. With or without compulsory registration, workers must still be processed through the labour bureaux, i.e. they are not legally allowed to look for the best employment opportunities on their own. In fact, the labour bureaux make sure that they do not get the best jobs. Under the Riekert "reforms" black workers must await recruitment by the labour bureaux and for many this often takes months, even years. The only work that will be available are those menial tasks refused by more privileged black workers in the "white" areas with Section 10 rights.

Hence, Riekert is consciously creating and propagating the myth of "liberalization" while carrying out a streamlining of the system and with the full knowledge that compulsory registration is irrelevant. In the small print of the report one will also notice that payment of unemployment insurance benefits are now to be tied to the labour bureaux system. To get these payments that belong to the worker, that worker must be registered. Compulsion and necessity become synonymous under conditions of wage slavery!

The back-up to the system of labour bureaux are the notorious pass laws. Originating in the Cape Colony of 1760 as mechanisms to control slave labour, the pass law system continues to the present day to restrict the movement of the African people. Its relation to the influx control system is simply that it involves a document which must be produced---ondemand" and which provides information on employers (past and present), residence rights and restrictions on travel. Government Proclamation R270 states:

... a member of the South African police or an authorized official employed by an urban local authority may enter into and search any premises on which it is reasonably suspected that an African is residing in contravention of the Urban Areas Act or a regulation made under the said Act. Such entry may be made without a warrant at all reasonable hours.

Pass laws make possible pass raids which, contrary to the proclamation, take place at the most unreasonable hours and often with the number of Africans subjected to these humiliations varying according to the degree to which the state wishes to enforce the system. Computers provided by western corporations make the administration of the pass laws more efficient. In 1968-69, a total of 621,380 convictions were recorded; that number has declined over the past decade but only with the emergence of aid centres (see below) as an alternative means of administering the system.

Riekert does nothing to eliminate passes but rather reinforces the role they play in the overall administration of influx control. Commission recommendations only suggested a new division of labour in the implementation of the pass laws by different government departments and a consolidation of relevant legislation. For "citizens" of "independent black states", pass books become "passports" but continue to serve the same functions as before.

Aid centres were introduced in 1971 as a method of reducing the expenses involved in implementing the pass law system, which in the final analysis did not intimidate the African population to the extent desired by the white minority. By the late 1960s, nearly 50 per cent of all short-term imprisonments concerned pass law violations. Aid centres emerged to deal with offenders in an administrative fashion by limiting criminal procedures and giving persons the opportunity to get their passes "in order" wherever possible. But these centres are no less punitive on Blacks who have no legal right to be in the "white" areas insofar as they repatriate these "illegals" to the "homelands". As described in the Finance and Trade Review in 1979, aid centres are important in "facilitating their (the black workers) recruitment in such areas for lawful employment in areas or sectors of the economy where labour shortages are experienced". More usually, these centres create mine workers or farm workers out of "illegal" migrants in the urban areas.

Riekert fully endorses the aid centres and makes the gratuitous comment that far less people are being "assisted" by aid centres than could be. Hence, the Commission recommends that "all persons charged with a contravention of the control measures must be referred to the aid centres". Further, Riekert recommends that Section 14 of the Urban Areas Act - the repatriation provisions - should be able to be applied without someone being convicted of an offence. In sum, "illegals" can expect to be "repatriated" with increasing frequency -regardless of whether or not a court has convicted them of any offence.

Therefore, the Riekert Commission's claims to have moved away from discrimination are fully exposed when we realize that the influx control measures are singularly and collectively tightened and consolidated. The basic fact that virtually all the influx control regulations and structures are directed against Africans and only Africans shows just how far Riekert has "moved". Influx control has always been a system geared towards making the sellers of labour power perform that function under the most unfree conditions possible. If anything, that process becomes more oppressive rather than less for the majority of Africans in the 1980s.

What does the "new dispensation for Blacks- amount to in actual practice? Riekert sums up the purpose of his one-man Commission in one short statement: "This control of employment should, with residential control, ensure the regulation of migration." The cities are to be free of the "idles and undesirables", the "illegals" and those who are not generally serving the needs of the white minority. While the majority of blacks are forced to rot in the "homelands-Bantustans-black states" - they amount to the same thing - the apartheid ruling class will desperately search out a black urban middle class to identify with shreds and patches of relative privilege that are tossed their way by monopoly capital.

In the "homelands" the suffering has already reached staggering proportions. Since 1964, African women have found it more and more difficult to find legal employment in the "white" areas, and in the rural areas there is no alternative but to become slave labour for white farmers or receive incredibly low wages (sometimes only R5 per week) in the few decentralized industries that exist. For the majority of African women the role assigned to them by the apartheid masters is that of reproducing the future contract labour force of another generation. Understandably, black women particularly have chosen to resist this slow starvation in rural areas by moving to urban areas "illegally" - living in townships or squatter camps on the edge of townships. Riekert knows about this process of resistance, and it seems fair to conclude that his recommendation that anyone (including Section Tenners) housing an "illegal" in an urban area will also be subject to repatriation is made with this current reality in mind.

Yet the collective resistance continues to intensify. The 1970s have shown that relocation can also be a strategy of resistance. When the squatter communities of Crossroads (outside Cape Town) and Malukazi (outside Durban) emerged as popular forms of opposition to influx control and migrant labour, the South African state was again on the defensive at home and in the international community. Massive police intimidation has not defeated the will of the people in these camps: they provide one type of evidence that strongly suggests that initiatives by Riekert and Wiehahn will not succeed in meeting their objectives.

The failure of government legislation and practice based upon these Commissions is not automatic. Suffering and hardship for the majority will increase in the short run, and there will no doubt be many who will crawl opportunistically for the trappings of middle class status. But South African history has shown that for every one person co-opted a hundred, even a thousand, step forward in unified resistance and struggle. For every Rickert regulation, a new squatter camp! For every Wichalm law, an independent and democratic black trade union! For every so-called "reform", another step towards revolution and liberation!

8. Black Trade Unions Challenge the Wiehan`n Legislation, 1977-80

The revival of black trade unions proceeded at an amazingly rapid pace in the early 1970s as we have already outlined in Chapter Four. In post-Soweto developments, however, thousands more black workers have organized into trade unions and strikes by African workers in particular have reached an all-time high. The latter 1970s have also witnessed greater efforts towards building unity amongst black workers in their struggle for free and democratic trade union representation.

Attempts to build unity: FOSATU

The emergence of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in April 1979 was part of this process. Faced with the legislative onslaught represented by Wiehahn and Riekert, continued intransigence by employers in their dealings with black trade unions, and a rapidly escalating unemployment rate, unity was not only desirable but an absolute necessity.

Between 13 and 15 April 1979, the inaugural meeting of FOSATU was held in Johannesburg, giving birth to the first above ground non-racial national federation of trade unions since SACTU operated openly in the 1950s and 1960s. The more progressive trade union groups had long recognized the importance of strengthening the movement and providing it with a broadly based platform from which to extend and reinforce the growing demands of black workers. From late 1976 onwards moves were afoot to set up a coordinating body for unregistered unions and these initiatives were accelerated in December 1976. At that time, two Eastern Cape unions, the National Union of Motor and Rubber Workers (NUM&RW) and the "parallel" unregistered United Auto and Rubber Workers Union (UAW), disaffiliated from TUCSA.

Discussions began in earnest on the need to establish an alternative federation of like-minded registered and unregistered unions and culminated in the first preliminary meeting, 23 March 1977, in Johannesburg. Present were eleven Black Consultative Committee (BCC) unions (in engineering, sweet and food, chemical, transport, glass, laundry and dry cleaning, paper and wood, building, clothing, textile, commercial and distributive industries); the TUACC unions and CIWW (in metal, textile, transport and general, chemical, furniture, and the IAS); National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa (NUMARWOSA, same as NUM&RW above) and UAW; and the WPWAB. BAWU and the unions affiliated to TUCSA refused to attend. At this preliminary meeting, it was agreed that "a federation of unregistered and registered unions acceptable to our general membership be formed"; it was also agreed that a feasibility committee be set up and a draft constitution and financial structure worked out.

Although a party to the discussions during the initial meetings, the African Food and Canning Workers Union (AFCWU) and the WPWAB decided not to participate in the Federation. These unions, as well as the Western Province Motor Assembly Workers Union, felt that the time was not yet ripe. In their opinion, unions needed more development at the grassroots level first and in the Western Cape greater cooperation between participating bodies was a prerequisite to such a formation. In addition, major political differences were emerging between the AFCWU and WPWAB on the one hand and two of the TUACC unions in particular. The two motor unions led by Fred Sauls, which had only recently left TUCSA, were both totally opposed to any involvement in the political struggle. TUACC unions had previously allowed the link between economic and political struggle to be developed within the organization, particularly in their education and propaganda.

The main stumbling block to the establishment of the Federation was the division between the BCC unions and the rest of the pro-Federation unions, resulting in the postponement of the plans for unity. Eventually, in September 1978 an interim regional committee for the Transvaal was formed by the TUACC group and some unions from the Black Consultative Committee.

While paving the way for the formation of the Federation, this move also brought out the contradictions within the BCC and exposed the deep divisions among its unions. The majority of BCC affiliates were not enthusiastic about participating in the Federation, but a minority of unions defied the rest and joined. Once a Transvaal regional committee had been established, it was possible for regional committees of Natal, the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal to meet on 21 October 1978 and approve a draft constitution.

Thus, FOSATU was established at a conference in April 1979, heralding the beginning of a new era of unity in the continuing struggle of independent trade unions. Twelve unions from TUACC, BCC, some former TUCSA unions and some independent unions were represented:

TUACC:

1. Chemical Workers Industrial Union
2. Metal and Allied Workers Union (both Natal and Transvaal branches)
3. National Union of Textile Workers
4. Transport and General Workers Union (Natal)

BCC:

5. Engineering and Allied Workers Union*
6. Glass and Allied Workers Union
7. Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union

Eastern Cape: (NUMARWOSA; registered)

8. National Union of Motor and Rubber Workers
9. United Auto and Rubber Workers Union

(UAW) (registered)

10. Chemical and General Workers Union
11. Eastern Province Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union (registered)

Western Cape: Union (registered)

12. Western Province Motor Assembly Workers

[The establishment of FOSATU caused this Union to split, with the result that one section (under the leadership of C. Nkabinde) joined the Federation, while the remainder of the Union stayed within the BCC.]

FOSATU's aims and objectives were outlined in its constitution and can be summarized as follows:

• to secure social justice for all workers;
• to strive to build a united labour movement independent of race, colour, creed or sex;
• to bring together all splinter groups, craft unions and small unions into broadly-based industrial unions;
• to secure decent standards of living, social security and fair conditions of work for all members of affiliated unions and the working class as a whole;
• to comment on, advance, or oppose any policy of any authority or institution affecting workers' interests generally and the interests of the labour movement in particular; and
• to build and consolidate membership leading to the winning of recognition and negotiating rights from management at industrial and plant level.

By uniting as one federation, the various affiliates gained strength to develop concerted and systematic campaigns for recognition from employers. Also important was the coordination of linkages to the international trade union movement and in general a greater rationalization in the use of human and financial resources by the independent unions. Educational services too were centralized to benefit more effectively all affiliates; the Institute for Industrial Education was brought under the control of the National Office of FOSATU, while the Industrial Aid Society became part of the Transvaal region of the Federation. The existing TUACC-CIWW Legal Aid Fund was transferred to the national office for coordination, allowing access to all affiliated unions and strengthening them in their struggle against the state and the employers.

FOSATU's aim was to decentralize decision-making in such a way that workers could exercise maximum control, thus guarding against the creation of an unresponsive bureaucracy. The more bureaucratic style was still prevalent, however, in the activities of the BCC. In what was generally considered a retrogressive move, shortly after a meeting called by the African-American Labour Centre (AFL-CIO created) in October 1978, the BCC announced a decision to set up a black counter federation, thus sabotaging any hopes of wider trade union unity at the time. The announcement emphasized that membership of the proposed national formation, to be called the South African Association of Black Trade Unions, would be confined to Africans only.

As the strongest and the most progressive grouping at the time, FOSATU became the target of increasing acts of state repression. Certainly the impending Wiehahn and Riekert reports and subsequent legislation were regarded as an attempt to weaken the power base of all independent unions, including the Federation. At the same time the existence of FOSATU mobilized the independent unions to resist some of the Commissions' recommendations.

Employers too, threatened by the popular support of these independent black trade unions, began increasing their efforts to keep FOSATU unions out of their factories. A preferred strategy was to refuse to negotiate with unions belonging to the Federation while inviting conservative groups like TUCSA to form "parallel" and subservient unions. The other alternative was to refuse to negotiate with Federation affiliates pending the outcome of the Wiehahn Commission.

FOSATU unions - Membership: 50,000 (on paper); 20,000 (paid-up)

MAWU Metal and Allied Workers Union

CWIU Chemical Workers Industrial Union

NUTW National Union of Textile Workers

T&GWU Transport and General Workers Union

E&AWU Engineering and Allied Workers Union

SF&AWU Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union

PW&AWU Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union

G&AWU Glass and Allied Workers Union

J&GWU Jewellers and Goldsmiths Union

EPSF&AWU Eastern Province Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union

*UAW United Automobile, Rubber and Allied Workers Union

*WPMAWU Western Province Motor Assembly Workers Union

*NUMARWOSA, National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa

*In 1980, these three unions merged to form the Automobile and Allied Workers Union.

CUSA unions - Membership: estimated to be 25-30,000

BC&AWU Building, Construction and Allied Workers Union

LC&DWU Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers Union

SACWU South African Chemical Workers Union

T&AWU Transport and Allied Workers Union

FB&AWU Food, Beverage and Allied Workers Union

SE&AWU Steel, Engineering and Allied Workers Union

CCAWUSA Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa

UAMW United African Motor Workers (Natal and Transvaal)

IJAMW&WU United African Motor and Allied Workers Union of Natal

TUCSA unions - Membership: approximately 32,000

MIWUSA Motor Industry Workers Union of South Africa

ALWUAfrican Leather Workers Union - Transvaal

AT&BWU African Trunk and Box Workers Union

GWU Glass Workers Union

SABEU South African Bank Employees Union

ATobWUAfrican Tobacco Workers Union

NUCWNational Union of Clothing Workers

TWUTextile Workers Union - Transvaal

E&AWUA Electrical and Allied Workers Union of South Africa

ATWU African Transport Workers Union

NUEI&AW National Union of Engineering, Industrial and Allied Workers

**Unaffiliated, independent unions

AFCWU African Food and Canning Workers Union

FCWU Food and Canning Workers Union

GenAWU General and Allied Workers Union

SAAWU South African Allied Workers Union

BMWU Black Municipal Workers Union

MACWU Motor Assemblies and Components Workers Union

MWASA Media Workers Association of South Africa

WPGWU Western Province General Workers Union

**As the text indicates, these unions are expressing greater unity through their total non-compliance with government legislation and through their increasing recognition of the link between economic and political struggle.

This latter ploy was used during a "legal" strike by 200 workers at Eveready South Africa, a subsidiary of the British multinational, in October and November 1978. These women workers were all members of the National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa (NUMARWOSA-FOSATU), the registered union for coloured workers. On refusing to negotiate with NUMARWOSA, the managing director of Eveready stated that the company -would prefer to wait until the Wiehahn report was out which we hope will clear the way for the formation of multi-racialism in the form of a multi-racial union". The outcome of the long and bitter strike was the dismissal of all striking workers, despite an intense campaign for international working class solidarity which included an appeal to boycott Eveready products.

Smith & Nephew was the target for an even longer struggle, this one resulting in a victory by the workers. Three years after becoming the first South African company to recognize an unregistered union (in 1974), Smith & Nephew refused to renew the agreement in late 1977. This reversal of policy caused tremendous controversy at home and abroad. Management cited "conflict- between the two unions which were party to the combined agreement - the registered Textile Workers Industrial Union (representing Indian workers) and the unregistered National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW) -and used the excuse to impose a liaison committee on the African workers. They had in fact been under pressure from the government to end their recognition of the NUTW and bring them into line with the committee system.

Indian workers, disgusted with their own union general secretary, Norman Daniels, for his collaboration with the Smith & Nephew bosses, decided to resign and join the African workers in NUTW! The bonds of non-racial solidarity were thus further strengthened and an important step forward was taken in the struggle for independent unions. Finally, after eight months of bitter negotiations and considerable pressure both locally and internationally, a new agreement was signed between NUTW and the company.

SACTU continues to guide working class activity

Throughout this period, SACTU's principled determination to lead the workers' struggle against class exploitation and apartheid was evidenced in many ways.

In May 1977, a well-researched memorandum was submitted to all employers' organizations in South Africa, calling on them to respond to the fundamental grievances and immediate demands of the black working class. SACTU outlined fifteen minimum and essential demands on behalf of the South African workers:

1. We demand the immediate recognition of the right of all workers to form and join trade unions of their own choice.
2. We demand the abolition of the pass laws and of the migratory labour system.
3. We demand the unconditional right to strike for all workers in support of their demands.
4. We demand a national minimum wage for all workers, regardless of race or sex, of R50 per week, indexed to inflation.*
5. We demand the abolition of all discrimination in the work place on the grounds of sex or race, and an end to Job Reservation.
6. We demand free and compulsory education for all children, regardless of colour or creed, and extended training facilities for all workers. We demand the abolition of discrimination in education and training, including apprenticeships.
7. We demand an eight-hour working day for all workers, with a total of 40 hours basic work (excluding overtime) per week.
8. We demand that workers should not be compelled to work overtime, and when overtime is worked, the total number of hours worked per week, including overtime, should not exceed 50 hours. Workers should be paid double their normal rate for overtime worked during the week, and two-and-a-half times the normal rate on weekends and public holidays.
9. We demand four weeks paid leave per year for every worker.
10. We demand that every worker be entitled to twenty-one days sick leave per year with full pay, to be extended in cases of serious illness.
11. We demand that all workers should enjoy full medical benefits.
12. We demand unemployment pay and injury compensation for all workers, without exception or time limit, and fixed at 100% of current salary.
13. We demand that all workers should be eligible for retirement at 60 years of age, on full pension.
14. e demand that women workers be able to participate fully in all aspects of production, without discrimination in wages, training, job allocation or pension benefits.
15. We demand full political rights for all South Africans.

*This wage demand was increased to R75 per week in 1980.

SACTU's underground organizing work continued to be the major priority of its activity. As in the past, brutal repression was meted out to working class militants carrying forward SACTU principles and policies. Nine working class leaders were tried under the Terrorism Act for doing SACTU work in Natal in 1977; they were subjected to torture and electric shocks and humiliated by the security police. Five of them - Harry Gwala, Anthony Xaba, John Nene, Mathews Meyiwa and Zakhele Mdlalose - were imprisoned for life. The other four -Vuzimize Magubane, Cleopas Ndhlovu, Azaria Ndebele and Joseph Nduli - received sentences varying from 7 to 18 years' imprisonment. In Gwala's case, he had previously spent eight years on Robben Island, and the defence council demonstrated that after being released he had been organizing workers into trade unions; the state considers this -terrorism- in apartheid South Africa. During the trial, Mathews Meyiwa spoke of South African trade unionism and stressed that "SACTU lives on in the hearts of black workers---. Joseph Mdluli of SACTU failed to appear at the trial; he had been murdered by security police during torture.

Although forced to operate clandestinely since the mid-1960s, SACTU has maintained its commitment to be the embodiment and spirit of solid working class principles. As SACTU remarked in 1977 regarding the possible formation of a new federation:

There are several coordinating bodies, but only one of these is firmly based on the basic principle of fullest unity of all workers, irrespective of race or colour. This is the South African Congress of Trade Unions, whose members and adherents are very much alive and active despite the terror tactics of the government.

[Annual report of the general secretary of SACTU, 1977.]

However, SACTU also agreed that the expansion of the trade union movement had necessitated the establishment of a legally functioning coordinating body, and issued the following statement on FOSATU:

It is severely limited in its area of operation, but it can and will act as a focus of opposition to apartheid in spite of the actions which will inevitably be taken against it and its leaders by the apartheid state. Trade unions, trade unionists and trade union federations which do not support the liberation struggle will try to make FOSATU a safety valve with which to turn the workers away from the struggle for national liberation. If they succeed in this the Federation will fail....

There is no reason why SACTU and FOSATU should not complement each other in their opposition to apartheid.

[SACTU statement on FOSATU, 1979.]

Yet even in stating its position in this way, SACTU fully realized that an important indication of FOSATU's political position would be whether or not its affiliated unions applied for registration under the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979. By turning to the black trade union responses to the Wiehahn-inspired "reforms" we can clearly evaluate the numerous ideological and strategic positions of these unions and their following amongst the black working class.

We are jubilant at this development. We feel our dream has come true. Now we hope we are able to use the facilities of trade unionism and be able to prove our ability.

Lucy Mvubelo, general secretaryof the "parallel" NU Clothing Workers

Unfortunately those unfamiliar with labour and its problems have only seen in the Wiehahn Commission the cherry-toppe cake and think we'll all be able to eat it... we're still waiting for the legislation but with a caution which rapidly grows to open scepticism with every new statement of the minister.

Alec Erwin, general secretary, Federation of South African Trade Unions

SACTU goes on record to state that the principal purpose of the Wiehahn Commission is to provide new machinery to control the black workers and to consciously destroy the independent black trade unions that have emerged over recent years.

SACTU has always maintained that recognition must come through the struggle and the strength of the workers vis-A-vis the exploiters - it can never be a concession granted by the oppressors themselves. Legality must not be confused with emancipation.

John Gaetsewe, general secretary,SACTU memorandum to the ILO, 1979

When the legislation was finally enacted in October 1979, the fears expressed by the most progressive elements of the independent trade union movement proved to be entirely justified. The message was imminently clear: African unions must be allowed to register so that they can be brought under government control.

The most controversial ruling in the Act was that which excluded migrant workers, commuters and foreign workers from joining registered trade unions (see Chapter Six for details). The black trade union movement was almost totally united in its opposition to this divisive ruling; it seemed that even Lucy Mviabelo's NUCW would refuse to register under these conditions. The regime subsequently issued a proclamation allowing migrants and commuters to join registered unions.

Black worker organizations were now confronted with the dilemma of whether or not to apply for registered status under the IC Amendment Act. Almost immediately TUCSA, which had always refused to embark on any real campaign to organize African workers, suddenly began to encourage its affiliates to form---paralleP' African unions to take advantage of the new law. The new "parallel" Motor Industry Workers Union issued a pamphlet to workers encouraging them to join:

Employers are with this union, and they are prepared to let their black employees join this trade union because it is well run, well organized, and seeks only to improve the position of its members. Because of these reasons, the Motor Industry Workers Union of South Africa is sure to be the only trade union for black workers in the motor industry (sic). Employers trust us because they know that we are only interested in making things better for our members, and are not a political organization. So you are safe in our ranks. We will fight for your rights as a worker, and protect you in your jobs, but we will never place you on the wrong side of the law. (emphasis added)

[South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 6 & 7, March 1980, p. 76.]

While the independent black unions were seriously concerned about the vastly increased state control over their activities and therefore had reservations about applying for registration, TUCSA unions forged ahead aggressively. They were often greatly assisted by employers who, realizing that they would now be forced to deal with unions of African workers, preferred to seek out those which would cause the least problems for them, i.e. "parallel" unions.

FOSATU in particular launched an attack on the TUCSA / "parallel" union recruitment drive although all other sections of the independent trade union movement were equally opposed to their "poaching" practices. They objected to these new unions being able to compete at a considerable advantage over the existing unions of African workers, and to their being used in an attempt to undermine or pre-empt organization by FOSATU or BCC unions. A key motive in the formation of "parallel" unions by TUCSA was the fact that formal job reservation was on the way out; registered unions were keen to organize Africans to protect their own non-African members' job security in the hierarchical division of labour under apartheid. FOSATU also claimed that the "parallels" would agree to conditions (such as the totally discredited liaison committee system and the right of management alone to fix wages) which would weaken the entire trade union movement.

Multinational corporations were among the first to give access to these newly-formed "parallel" unions. Under pressure from their home countries, they tried to reduce criticism by granting recognition and facilities to "parallel" unions of African workers. British Leyland, for example, had long been under attack for blocking the organizing activities of the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU-FOSATU). Soon it was actively encouraging the organization of the "parallel" union MIWU and publicizing this in Britain where workers at the parent company had actively campaigned for recognition of MAWU over the years. In numerous cases, management had invited the "parallel" unions into the plants and actively assisted them with the collection of subscriptions, etc. while at the same time denying access to any independent unions.

Hence, by late 1979 the division between the "parallel" unions and the independent unions was greater than ever before. "Parallel" unions stood for collusion with employers and against the promotion of African workers' interests. Unable to quash the criticisms levelled at "parallel" unions, TUCSA started applying for mixed status from the government in 1980 in order to admit African workers. "Parallel" unions are now merging with their parent unions in many cases. While enrolling African members, however, they keep racially separate branches, with the union controlled by a racially segregated executive.

FOSATU has attacked TUCSA's latest substitute for legitimate trade unionism: "FOSATU will have nothing to do with mixed unions. Separate branches and separate executives are the children of apartheid's separate but equal idea." [FOSATU Worker News, October 1980.] Furthermore, they revealed that the first time many African workers hear about a TUCSA mixed union is in their pay packets. For example, garment workers in Natal were being organized into a mixed union without their knowledge - no questions, no answers, just employers being told to start union deductions on workers' wages.

Registration - emasculation?: the debate amongst independent unions

Even after publication of the legislation, SACTU's message to the black workers of South Africa was clear: registration is a trap which they should refuse to accept! SACTU further called upon workers to make the proposed legislation ineffective by:

1. forming trade unions of your choice;
2. electing your own leadership;
3. demanding recognition of your union;
4. demanding that the employers negotiate with your elected union representatives;
5. not allowing anyone to force industrial committees or unions upon you.

For the protection of the workers against cruel humiliation, vicious exploitation and brutal national oppression, make sure that the proposed legislation is ineffective.

Do not apply for registration!

[Quoted in Luckhard and Wall, op. cit., p. 462.]

Shortly after the proclamation regarding migrant workers, FOSATU unions met with the Western Province General Workers Unions (WPGWU) and the African Food and Canning Workers Union (AFCWU) to work out a common strategy regarding registration under the new labour laws. In contrast to the other two unions and in a reversal of its past attitude to Wiehahn, FOSATU affiliates decided reluctantly to apply together for registration, dependent upon certain conditions. They insisted that unions must be allowed to remain non-racial in membership and control (without separate branches and segregated executives), and that they would not accept provisional registration or any other ruling which would mean having to give up any of their existing unions.

FOSATU seemed to believe that registration was a necessary defence against the "parallel- unions, and this was in fact given as one of the major reasons for applying for registration. They feared that if unions remained unregistered the bosses would refuse to meet with them as they had in the past, thereby opening the doors for "parallel" unions to step in.

On the other hand, the WPGWU totally opposed this position:

Our argument is that these attempts can only be fought by more careful organization. They cannot be fought by recourse to a registration certificate. If unions register because of the threat from the parallels they necessarily end up compromising with them or, at best, fighting them on ground chosen by the parallels. The path that we have chosen... necessarily means that we fight the parallels and their TUCSA bosses on our own ground.

[South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 6 & 7, March 1980, p. 68.]

The following two examples of how the legislation actually weakens the African trade unions which are incorporated into the system essentially represent cases where FOSATU affiliates took actions which tended to align them with the intention of the state. In the first case, the general secretary of the South African Boilermakers' Society (TUCSA) revealed that FOSATU metal unions had agreed not to oppose the formation of a new "parallel" union by the Society on condition that "it only recruits black workers in skilled jobs". The Society wanted to incorporate the skilled African workers in a "parallel" union to strengthen its bargaining position. The FOSATU unions, on the other hand, by entering into such an alliance with a I responsible" registered union stood a better chance of being registered. They would also be freed of the difficulties inherent in having both skilled and unskilled workers as members of one union. Those who opposed this position saw it as splitting the African working class precisely along the lines intended by the state.

In the second case, the FOSATU-affiliated United Auto Workers Union played a retrogressive role in a major strike at Ford, November 1979 to January 1980. The UAW refused to cooperate with a community organization, the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO), to which the workers turned for assistance in their struggle. The union regarded the strike as "too political" (see Chapter Nine for a summary of the strike).

These examples showed a tendency on the part of FOSATU unions to compromise with the state and white workers, while at the same time ignoring black political movements which commanded the support of the majority of a union's membership. This is precisely the effect hoped for by the Wiehahn Commission and the government. Far from linking the workers' struggle on the shop floor to the general issues affecting workers, FOSATU has preferred to take the line of "no politics in the trade union movement". In endorsing this stand, FOSATU not only distinguishes itself from SACTU and from other independent unions that operate openly in South Africa, but also joins a list of unions which historically failed to represent the interests of the black working class precisely because of this position. In effect, FOSATU cast aside the chances for real unity and threw the power of decision-making into the hands of the regime, giving it greater ammunition with which to implement its divide-and-rule strategy.

The WPGWU and the AFCWU differ considerably from FOSATU in their reaction and response to Wiehahn. From the beginning the WPGWU took a firm stand against the Wiehahn report and later the IC Amendment Act itself. Their main contention is that if unions comply with the legislation and register, they will necessarily be losing the most important element of their power - workers' control. "The control of the workers over our union is not negotiable," they insist! The General Workers Union has also argued:

No amount of legislation is ultimately capable of determining the relationship between the workers and the bosses. As a progressive trade union, we know that the relationship between the workers and the bosses is dependent ultimately upon the organized strength of the workers in each factory.

[WPGWU memorandum.

The WPGWU's view on the question of the threat from the "parallels" has been discussed above. The other major issue from their point of view was the central question of union recognition and its relation to registration. To them, it was imperative that each management recognizes and accepts the fact that their workers are members of a union of their own choice, an organization completely outside the control of the bosses.

It is of no great advance if management concedes to the workers the right to belong to an organization the control of which is ',shared" by the workers, the bosses and the state. And management must see at every step along the way that the union to which the workers belong is controlled by the workers themselves.

[WPGWU "Registration, Recognition, and Organization: the Case of the Cape Town Stevedores", in South African Labour Bulletin ' Vol. 5, No. 6 & 7, March 1980, p. 68.]

In December 1979, 300 stevedores at Cape Town's Table Bay docks, all members of the WPGWU, demonstrated clearly the ability of unregistered unions to achieve explicit, public recognition of their support amongst the workers. They also demonstrated that TUCSA and "parallel" unions could be fought without recourse to registration via the state's legislation. The walkout occurred after management refused to discuss recognition of the stevedores' non-racial workers' committee, formed under the auspices of WPGWU. Although TUCSA attempted to form a union for black dock workers, it was unanimously rejected by all the workers. Finally, management agreed to the formation of a workers' committee - a victory for independent trade union organization!

On 4 March 1980, the first industry-wide agreement between employers and an unregistered trade union since publication of the Wiehahn report in May 1979 was signed. Representatives of the stevedores' workers' committee and WPGWU officials met with the employers (Cape Town Stevedores Association and the South African Stevedoring Council). A constitution of the stevedores' committee was formally accepted at the meeting and signed by all present. This constitution gives the workers' committee full rights of negotiation over matters affecting the wages and working conditions of the Cape Town stevedores. It allows the committee to invite representatives of their union to meetings with management and gives the WPGWU control of all committee training programmes and facilities.

The African Food and Canning Workers Union (AFCWU) and Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU), like the WPGWU, rejected Wiehahn in its entirety. Pointing to the danger of increased state control in the new legislation, these two sister unions claimed that registration would mean the creation of weak and divided unions. They also objected to the system of provisional registration which afforded state officials absolute discretionary powers to register or deregister unions, and to the stipulation that a non-racial union could only be granted registration by the grace of the minister of manpower utilization. The AFCWU vehemently refused to register under the terms spelled out by the state's new legislation.

At the time of FOSATU's formation, BCC announced their intention to build a new national federation (South African Association of Black Trade Unions, SAABLATU - see above), which never really developed. On the question of registration under the Act, BCC took the stand of allowing individual affiliates to decide for themselves. Still laying stress on the potential for a harmonious relationship between management and workers, BCC unions have almost all decided to apply for registration. In fact, the Transport and Allied Workers Union, a BCC union, was the first union to gain official recognition under the new legislation.

In September 1980, the Black Consultative Committee BCC/CCOBTU) regrouped and changed its name to the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA). With a new constitution and permanent office-bearers, CUSA became the second national federation for black trade unions to operate above ground (after FOSATU). One of its criticisms of FOSATU wag the inclusion of Whites in the top leadership positions; CUSA stresses the critical need to develop black trade union leadership at this stage in the struggle.

In yet another new development within the black trade union movement, a break-away group from BAWU formed the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) in April 1979. Another splinter group from BAWU which formed the National Federation of Black Workers has since formed a working alliance with SAAWU. The latter is a rapidly mushrooming movement at the present time; it has been organizing intensively among the workers of the Eastern Cape and has built up a very strong base amongst the black working class in that important industrial region.

In April 1980 SAAWU declared 1980 the Workers' Year and firmly rejected trade union registration on the basis that Wiehahn and Riekert had not sought the views and recommendations of unregistered trade unions. It has developed very close ties to the East London branch of the AFCWU, and later in April 1980 they issued a joint statement on registration, in which they identified the main reason for refusing to register: such registration would be meaningless until the pass laws, influx control regulations, the Group Areas Act and all other discriminatory pieces of legislation are appealed. "This is the workers' total struggle," said SAAWU general secretary Thozamile Qweta. "We declined to go for registration because we were not fighting for registration."

SAAWU's slogan "There can be no normal unions in an abnormal society" raises a fundamental issue facing black trade unions in South Africa: whether or not to link the economic struggle with the broader struggle against the whole apartheid system. During the last two years, we have seen many examples of strikes where the issue has played a crucial part in the outcome of the particular dispute (see next chapter). The major unions which have embodied the principle of linking the community and work place struggles are SAAWU, AFCWU and WPGWU - the same unions which have consistently refused to apply for registration.

As the memberships of these unions rapidly increase, new unions adhering to similar principles are also emerging. Two in particular - the Motor Assemblies and Components' Workers Union (MACWU) and the Black Municipal Workers Union (BMWU) - were strengthened through prolonged strike actions in 1979 and 1980. They continue to refuse to register under the state's apparatus of legislative control. It is precisely the success of the unregistered trade unions in mobilizing black workers over the past two years which has prompted the regime to attempt to impose stricter control over their activities - as envisaged in the new legislation about to be released at the time of writing.

Following the publication of the new labour legislation in October 1979, black trade unions responded on the basis of their different philosophies and strategies already outlined. The time for debating the issues was over; the majority of black trade unions began to apply for registered status, even if the decision was based on widely differing reasons.

There appeared to be three different ways in which African workers could be brought into the new system of labour relations. Firstly, unregistered African trade unions could apply for registration, remaining a union catering for African workers predominantly. Secondly, registered trade unions (catering previously for either white, coloured or Indian workers) could apply for permission to enrol African members and thus become a "racially mixed" union (TUCSA's current strategy). The third option was for unions representing different racial groups to merge and form one strong "racially mixed" union.

In many cases the third option depended on successfully applying in the second manner. For example, in October 1980 three FOSATU unions decided to merge - the United Automobile and Rubber Workers (UAW) representing African workers, the National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa (NUMARWOSA) representing coloured workers, and the Western Province Motor Assembly Workers Union (WPMWU) catering for white workers. This decision followed a nine-month wait by NUMARWOSA for permission from the government to open its ranks to African members. The new union is expected to have a combined paid up membership of 12,000, strengthening its bargaining position and allowing for non-racial representation of workers in the auto industry. However, at that time also MACWU, the breakaway from the UAW, was forming and from all indications at the time of writing it seems to be threatening UAW's representation of African workers, particularly at the Ford Cortina plant (see Chapter Nine).

It is not necessary for the purposes of this document to list all the applications for registration and subsequent granting of permission. However, by giving a few important cases, the overall trends and intentions of the apartheid regime become evident. All dates given refer to the press reports at the time.

1 October 1979: The amended IC Act went into effect.

22 December 1979: By this time, 25 unions had applied for registration or for permission to merge with trade unions for other "race groups" (8 unregistered African unions applying for registration; 9 unregistered trade unions applying to enrol African members; 3 registered unions applying to enrol coloured members; 3 others desiring to merge; and 2 new unions).

1 January 1980: The first African trade union to be registered in South African labour history - the African Tansport Workers Union, a "parallel" union affiliated to TUCSA. All "parallel" unions had decided to apply for registration. The ATWU was granted registered status first because "its constitution is almost identical to that of the registered white union and thus it complies almost exactly with the IC Act". ATWU was granted full registration, not just provisional status.

3 February 1980: BCC union officials were reportedly getting their records straight so they could apply for registration before the end of February. "We do not want to criticize the dispensation from outside. We have to test the government's sincerity and we have to test the goodwill of the white workers" (Jane Hlongwane, secretary, Steel, Engineering and Allied Workers Union).

18 March 1980: Eight FOSATU unions had begun to apply as non-racial unions and were asking for full registration. They were: Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU); Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CW1U); National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW); Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU); Engineering and Allied Workers Union (AEWL[); Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union (SFAWU); Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union (PWAW1J); and Class and Allied Workers Union (GAWU).

4 April 1980: The second African union was granted registration - the National Union of Engineering, Industrial and Allied Workers Union, also a "paralleF' union.

10 April 1980: Thirteen registered trade unions were granted permission to admit black workers, the department of manpower announced; 28 applications for "racially mixed" status (as opposed to non-racial) had been received since the legislation was introduced.

19 June 1980: Six FOSATU unions were granted permission to apply for registration as non-racial unions.

24 June 1980: The third African union registered under the law - the African Tobacco Workers Union, another "parallel" union affiliated to TUCSA.

9 September 1980: By this time, almost one year after the Act went into effect, the following had occurred: 8 trade unions had been registered, so far only -parallel- unions or black "company" unions had been granted registration (none of the FOSATU or BCC unions); 182 unions now registered under South African labour laws (80 Whites only, 54 Coloured only, 8 African workers only and another 40 "mixed" - either for white, coloured and Asian members or for all four "racial" groups); it is believed that there are at least 20 African or predominantly African unions still unregistered; recently, FOSATU unions were granted permission to apply on a nonracial basis; several African or non-racial unions had decided not to seek registration because of increased government control.

26 September 1980.. After six months of wrangling over constitutions, six FOSATU-affiliated unions reached the final stage of the registration scheme - their applications for government recognition were gazetted last week. This indicated that the Industrial Registrar had approved the unions' constitutions, although rival unions still had the opportunity to lodge objections (the objecting union has to show that it represents more than 50 per cent of the workers before the Registrar can uphold the objection).

11 November 1980: Two unions affiliated to CUSA - the South African Chemical Workers Union and the Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers Union - were granted registration. These became thefirst two members of the independent black trade union movement to be registered. (It was still the case that before this, only "parallel" unions or company unions had been granted registration.)

This was the situation by the end of 1980. Clearly, the regime was in no hurry to grant registration to the more progressive groupings within the independent trade union movement. In fact, wherever possible, attempts to thwart their genuine representation were made, in many cases by encouraging both the formation of in-company unions and their application for registration. They were of course assisted by their co-partners in exploitation, the employers themselves.

As a case in point, the Union of Johannesburg Municipal Workers was granted provisional registration by the government in August 1980. This followed a long and bitter strike by over 10,000 African municipal workers, all members of the Black Municipal Workers Union. The UJMW was formed from the former liaison committee for black monthly-paid workers, with a paid-up membership of only 40 (although its officials stated that 2,000 of the Johannesburg city council's work force of 15,000 had applied to join before it was registered).

BMWU officials described these claims as scandalous and a clear indication that the city council, with the blessing of the state apparatus, was promoting a union that had no workers' support. The IC Amendment Act lays down that registered unions must represent at least 51 per cent of the work force and that membership must be paid up! When representative unions have to wait up to a year for their applications to be considered and yet newly-formed in-company unions are granted provisional registration status almost immediately upon applying, the system has obviously not been "reformed" for the benefit of the majority of black workers and their legitimate unions.

Black workers and their unions were not delaying their demands for recognition, even if they had applied for registration under the new law. If the South African ruling class expected African workers to wait patiently until they were granted registration, they were sadly mistaken. Shop-floor struggles for legitimate recognition of democratically-elected worker bodies continued unabated throughout 1979 and 1980 and employers responded accordingly. In some cases, they hid behind the legislation, preferring to wait until the particular union was granted registration, or else they actively encouraged the formation or registration of an in-company union or one of the "toothless", less troublesome, "parallel" unions. There were, however, a minority of employers who began to realize that unless they recognized the legitimate independent unions supported by the workers themselves, they were headed for increased industrial and political resistance in the future.

It is worthwhile listing some of the agreements won by unregistered unions, in many cases despite the introduction of the Wiehahn report and legislation.

29 August 1979: The Kellogg Company of South Africa became the first company after the publication of the Wiehahn report to announce its formal recognition of an unregistered black trade union - the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union (FOSATU). However, the American motor companies in the Eastern Cape - Ford and General Motors - had given effective recognition to the black UAW in their industry some time before.

4 March 1980: The Engineering and Allied Workers Union (FOSATU) signed its first agreement with an employer -Fargesta Steels (Swedish -owned). This brought the number of agreements between management and unregistered unions affiliated to FOSATU to three (following Smith & Nephew and Kellogg). The preliminary agreement provided for access to company premises once a week as well as office and canteen facilities when required by the union for its purposes. It also recognized the union's responsibility to work for improved conditions of employment and allowed for recognition of shop stewards.

26 March 1980: EAWU (FOSATU) signed an agreement with SKF Engineering, a subsidiary of Swedish-owned SKF (SA).

19 April 1980: NUTW (FOSATU) won a limited form of recognition from a Port Elizabeth company, Industex; the union was granted stop-order facilities.

14 July 1980: Veldspun, a Uitenhage (Eastern Cape) textile company, provisionally recognized the NUTW (FOSATU) after holding a referendum in which workers chose it against a "mixed" TUCSA-affiliated rival. This is unique in recent labour history.

18 July 1980: The Steel, Engineering and Iron Trades Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA) granted stop-order rights (dues cheek-off) to three black unions - MAWU and EAWU (FOSATU) and Steel, Engineering and Allied Workers Union (BCC). SEIFSA had laid down conditions, e.g. the insistence that the unions apply for registration.

17 August 1980: Two Eastern Cape factories, Western Province Preserving and Langeberg Koop, recognized the African Food and Canning Workers Union. This followed strikes over management's refusal to recognize works committees from AFCWU, and represented a significant step because of AFCWU's refusal to register.

21 August 1980: AECI Paints, a subsidiary of the giant South African group, signed a formal recognition agreement with the SA Chemical Workers Union (BCC), which includes the granting of union access and shop stewards. SACWU has applied for registration but it has not yet been granted.

21 August 1980: Rennies Bulk Terminal was in the process of negotiating a recognition agreement with the unregistered Transport and General Workers Union (FOSATU) at Durban Harbour.

27 August 1986. The pulp and paper industry became the second major industry to approve granting of stop-order facilities (a form of limited recognition) to an independent black trade union - the FOSATU affiliate, Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union. Certain conditions were set down, however: that the Union must lodge its constitution with the Industrial Council; it must provide proof that it has applied for registration; it must give a written undertaking that it will apply to join the Industrial Council once it has obtained registration.

24 September 1980: The Food, Beverage and Allied Workers Union (CUSA, formerly BCC affiliate), an unregistered union, was recognized by Premier Milling Group. The union had applied for registration, a condition of the agreement. Two other unions, a TUCSA-affiliate and a F0SATU-affiliate, had also made membership claims and after a third party verified FBAWU's claim, they withdrew.

9 October 1980: MAWU (still unregistered) negotiated an extensive recognition agreement with Tensile Rubber Company Johannesburg, a subsidiary of General Tire Industrial Rubber Products group. It included: full recognition of a shop stewards committee with negotiating rights in all aspects of working conditions, including wages; the right to hold shop steward committee meetings on company time; report-back facilities for shop stewards in the factory itself; guaranteed consultation with the union on retrenchments; health and safety shop stewards who will liaise with management on factory conditions.

5 November 1980: ASSCOM (Associated Chamber of Commerce) made a statement advising employers to negotiate conditionally with representative unregistered unions.

6 November 1980: Barlow Rand group publicly committed itself to negotiating with unregistered trade unions and said it "may even have no option but to allow them some form of recognition-. They still preferred unions to register, but realized that they would have to talk to and perhaps recognize unregistered trade unions until the government makes registration procedures more attractive to black unions. This is the complete antithesis of an earlier statement by this employer (see Chapter Four).

7 November 1980: For the first time, SAAWU won formal recognition from an employer - Chloride (SA), a British-based multinational. SAAWU won 95.2% of votes in a ballot conducted amongst workers. Elections were then to be held for union shop stewards and for general SAAWU committee members within the plant. It is an interim recognition agreement, covering all factory floor relations and participation by SAAWU in Chloride's grievance and disciplinary procedures. This was considered a major breakthrough for SAAWU which has refused to register.

11 November 1980: After a bitter recognition struggle at Toyota Marketing since the beginning of 1978, an agreement was reached with MAWU (FOSATU). About 100 workers went on strike in early November to protest against a management rule that workers had to meet certain quotas or face dismissal. After talks with the union, the company decided to reinstate all workers and offered to recognize MAWU.

15 November 1980: Fatti's and Moni's signed a non-racial recognition agreement with the two unions, AFCWU and F~. This agreement goes a lot further than other accords between companies and unregistered trade unions because it lays down wages and working conditions, rather than simply recording recognition of the union. This agreement applies to the Bellville plant (Cape Town) and also Isando (Johannesburg) and raised the firm's minimum wage to R40 a week. There is no distinction between the two unions, and the agreement provides facilities for the unions and for recognition of a union committee to replace the company's discredited works and liaison committees. The unions had demonstrated overwhelming support at both plants; AFCWU remains adamant against registration.

19 November 1980: The Public Utility Transport Company (PUTCO) signed a union recognition agreement with the Transport and General Workers Union (FOSATU).

12 December 1980: Kellogg South Africa and the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union (FOSATU) signed an agreement which recognized the union's demand for a "living wage" rather than one based on the Poverty Datum Line surveys, etc. Some wages were raised by 60 per cent and the "probationary" wage goes up to R46. Factory operatives begin at a minimum of R50 per week.

18 December 1980: The Federated Chamber of Industries (the top employer association) urged employers to recognize unregistered trade unions representative of workers. They stressed that registration is not an end in itself but in practical terms it is the representativeness of the unions that is the more important issue. In January 1981, M issued guidelines to its 10,000 member companies to adopt a more flexible attitude towards industrial relations and to negotiate with unregistered trade unions, if necessary. ---Bytrying to force them into the system, we give them good reason to keep out of it," advised the FCI.

From October 1979 when the legislation was enacted, right up to the time of writing in early 1981, black and particularly African workers continued their struggle for recognition of the independent trade unions which were created by them to achieve greater control over their labour. Although still fraught with many divisions, the black trade union movement had reached a stage of maturity and development unprecedented in South African history. Employers and the state are increasingly forced to alter their joint ruling class strategies as African workers challenge both the legislation and the conditions of exploitation at factory floor level. As we demonstrate in the next chapter, long and courageous strikes were undertaken in this struggle, and of course many brave men and women made tremendous sacrifices as the regime's repression was directed against these striking workers.