12. STATE REPRESSION

In all capitalist countries, the state maintains and promotes 'order' through whatever means necessary to protect the interests of the capitalist class and its ability to extract maximum profits from the collective labour-power of the proletariat. The 'means necessary' vary historically, depending on the specific conditions of national oppression and class conflict and the organized strength of opposition forces. Except in revolutionary situations, we know that the state has the monopoly of organized force at its disposal; the legal system and the police-military apparatus are the institutional weapons employed under ,normal' conditions of capitalist society.

South Africa is certainly no exception to this general rule. Its uniqueness rests with the extraordinary 'means necessary' to impose order on the majority of the people who are virtual prisoners in their own country. Insofar as Apartheid is an extreme variant of capitalist society, it is not difficult to appreciate why the ruling class requires special forms of repression to attempt to destroy the revolutionary organizations of the oppressed masses within.

The exaggerated conditions of exploitation characteristic of Apartheid mean that the 'rule of law' in itself is often insufficient. The entire system of Apartheid - forced labour, poverty wages, pass laws, bantustans, destruction of family life - is geared towards the production of wealth upon which South African capitalism depends. Non-racial and political trade unionism obviously threatens this system insofar as the effective organization of Black workers challenges the social basis of exploitation, that is, the capitalist- worker relationship.

Yet, as we have seen, there is no law in South Africa to prevent the formation of African trade unions and coordinating bodies representing the interests of organized and unorganized Black workers. SACTU, and its affiliated unions, have always been perfectly legal in the strict sense of the term. ¹ Legislation preventing this does not exist for one simple reason - it would not be effective. No law, no matter how comprehensive or carefully formulated, could prevent African, Coloured and Indian workers from organizing to protect their common class interests. Rather, the repression conducted by the South African state against workers' organizations has been more refined and subtle in its operations. In sum, SACTU is legal, but its activities and objectives are illegal. Therefore, SACTU activists are subject to the 'rule of law' relevant to political offences against the state and the rule of physical force employed by the massive machinery of administrative repression consisting of labour bureaux, police and the military. And, although never codified in writing, the rule of capital accumulation under capitalism is the motive force behind all these social institutions.

As with other groups in the Congress Alliance, repression against SACTU was cumulative and increasingly severe between the years 1955 to 1964. Instead of banning the organization, as was done in the case of the African National Congress and the South African Congress of Democrats, the strategy with SACTU was that of systematic victimization and the elimination of individuals. As we shall see, the organization was virtually forced to go underground and into exile as a result of the heavy repression carried out between 1962 and 1964.

Banning of individual trade union leaders, followed by house arrests, banishment to remote areas, detention without trial, torture and execution - these were the 'means necessary' to the state in curbing the revolutionary activities of SACTU and the workers' movement. The purpose of this chapter is to outline this chronology of repression, a story which is largely unknown to the international community.

Such an account cannot possibly pay tribute to the countless individuals who sacrificed so much during these years. Emphasis on victimization of individuals, especially in the early 1960s, is not intended to elevate any person(s) above the workers' movement as a whole. Biographical information is considered important, however, to show the degree of dedication and commitment made by SACTU activists as their contribution to the heritage of struggle for freedom in South Africa.

In many cases, it is difficult and unnecessary to separate repression on strict political (ANC) and trade union (SACTU) lines. Indeed, this underscores the close working relationship within the Congress Alliance before and after the banning of the ANC in 1960. After the State of Emergency, SACTU's limited 'legality' allowed it to play a greater political role as an organizational cover for ex-ANC persons as well as continue its historical role in the class struggle.

The Treason Trial(1956-1961)

4.00 a.m., 5 December 1956: Nazi-like raids throughout South Africa signalled the beginning of the infamous Treason Trial which interfered with the political and personal lives of many Congressites throughout the next four years. One hundred and fifty-six persons were rounded up, flown to Johannesburg in military aircraft and taken to the Fort for imprisonment. The charge was High Treason and the goal of the state was to smash the Congress Alliance and the nationwide political movement that had emerged since the Congress of the People and the signing of the Freedom Charter in June of the previous year. ²

After periodic releases of groups of defendants over the first two years, a final group of thirty, consisting of the most easily identified leaders of the Congresses, remained on trial until 29 March 1961. On that day, Justice Rumpff interrupted the proceedings and stated, 'You are found not guilty and discharged. You may go.' Among this final group were Leon Levy and Leslie Massina, banned President and General Secretary of SACTU respectively.

The charge of treason against the original 156 defendants - many of whom had not been directly involved in the political struggle since the 1940s and many who were rank-and-file workers - was essentially based on the state's zealous desire to prove that the ANC and the Congress Alliance called for a violent overthrow of South Africa in order to establish a 'Communist' society based on the principles laid down in the Freedom Charter. Within a few months, it had become clear to all that the trial was a farce from the point of view of the Crown's evidence and its willingness to lie, distort documents and generally resort to any means necessary to prove the charge. Skilful defence attorneys (including some of the defendants themselves) destroyed the credibility of the Crown's arguments and on numerous occasions reduced the state witnesses to the appearance of the imbeciles that they were.

Massive raids had been carried out during the fifteen months between the Congress of the People and the December 1956 arrests. Local and national offices of the Congresses as well as the private homes of individual defendants had been raided; thousands of documents were seized and subsequently used as 'evidence' of High Treason. Among these documents were many official minutes of SACTU-NEC and MC meetings, the 1955 and 1956 Conference reports, leaflets, trade union lectures and correspondence. The Crown attempted to make the most of this documentation to prove that SACTU as part of the Alliance was involved in an internationally-orchestrated conspiracy to establish a 'Communist' South Africa.

If the state's real intent was to remove Congress leaders from the streets and thus divide the leaders from the masses, this strategy, with certain important exceptions, also failed. Never in the history of the movement had there been such an excellent opportunity for progressive South Africans of all races and walks of life to assemble together in one location for such a protracted period. Even the courtroom itself became the venue for political meetings and strategy sessions; it also allowed many of the defendants to fully appreciate for the first time the courtroom procedures associated with political trials. ³

The Trial did, however, create certain serious problems for the day-to-day work of the Congress Movement and SACTU in particular. Leaders were in large part prevented from maintaining constant contact with the workers they represented. This put tremendous strains on the new organization, but it also served to heighten political awareness and create stronger structures through the co-option of new cadre taken from their respective unions to become full-time functionaries for SACTU Local Committee and Head Office routines. For example, Uriah Maleka, Viola Hashe, Edmund Cindi and John Gaetsewe became full-time SACTU workers in Johannesburg during this period and all four were soon nationally recognized trade union leaders. Phyllis Altman, a SACTU typist beforehand, became Assistant General Secretary during the early months of the Trial and remained in this position until her banning in September 1963. In most cases, co-optation involved giving up regular employment and poverty wages in the factories for SACTU work and no income at all; Yet there was never a lack of volunteers in these critical months of 1957.

This recruitment process was essential if SACTU was to become a viable trade union coordinating body. The Treason Trial arrests hit the eighteen-month-old organization hard; the following twenty-three national and local leaders were tied up in courtroom procedures for many months and years.

Johannesburg: Leon Levy (Pres.); Leshe Massina (Gen. Sec.); P. Beyleveld (TWIU); A. Mahlangu (A-FCWU);
C. Sibande (Vice-Pres.); R. Press (TWIU); M. W. Shope (A-LC1)WU); J. Nkadimeng (National Organizer); N. Sejake (I & SWU)
Cape Town: A. Sibeko (SAR & HWU); B. Turok (MWU); J. Busa (A-TWIU)
Port Elizabeth: W.. Mkwayi (A-TWIU); C. Mayekiso (A-TWIU); S. Damons (FCWU); F. Baard (FCWU); C. Jasson (TWIU)
Durban: K. Moonsamy (DWU); B.Nair (SATW1J); M. P. Naicker (Natal AWU); S. Dlamini (A-TWIU); P. Mei (A-TWU); V. S. M. Pillay (SACTU-NEC).

Six of these persons sat on the National Executive Committee at the time of the arrests and many more were on executives of local committees and key organizers in industries strategic to SACTU organizing campaigns.

At the local committee level, SACTU detainees from Durban and Cape Town have commented on the shortage of full-time personnel during this period; on the other hand, Archie Sibeko and Stephen Diamini both recall an increase in political consciousness among workers with the arrest of their leaders. As Dlamini says,'. . . we were all convinced that we were on the right track'.

The heaviest blow came during the early weeks of the Trial in January 1967. Leon Levy and Leslie Massina were banned (a) under the Riotous Assemblies Act from leaving the magisterial district of Johannesburg for allegedly 'promoting hostility between Europeans and Non-Europeans', and (b) under the Suppression of Communism Act from attending gatherings that could be defined as 'furthering the aims of Communism'. These five-year bans were issued against SACTU's highest ranking officers one day prior to a change in their bail conditions which would have allowed them to attend meetings essential to trade union work. SACTU and other progressive organizations protested against this obvious attempt to cripple the work by confining the national officials to Johannesburg. The charge of promoting interracial 'hostility' was especially disgusting given SACTU's commitment to non-racial workers' unity. African laundry workers carried out work stoppages but with no effect. ⁴

During the Trial years, the Head Office routine consisted of SACTU defendants spending their free time (usually afternoons) at the factories talking to workers and attending to correspondence in the evenings. Aside from keeping very long hours, there were times when the Treason Trialists could not contribute properly to strike situations. As Ronnie Press has described this period, 'nothing could be done in a logical way'. This points again to the importance of the co-optations of new SACTU leaders.

Ronnie Press (TWIU) was himself the next victim of banning orders. A progressive White South African, he had become Secretary of the registered textile union in 1956, after finding it impossible for political reasons to gain employment in his chosen profession of chemistry. His Congress involvement and the Treason Trial arrest led the Government to issue the first ban in January 1957 preventing attendance at social gatherings. As Secretary of a registered union he was not initially banned from trade union work. This more severe restriction came in June 1957 when Press was flying back and forth between the Johannesburg courtroom and Durban to assist in a strike of Indian workers against the Philip Frame textile magnate. The second banning order restricting his movement to Johannesburg was personally presented at the Drill Hall courtroom on 24 June 1957.

Returning to the Trial itself, a good portion of the contents of SACTU documents confiscated during heavy raids on 27 September 1955 was produced as evidence in support of the charge of treason. This material consisted of the following types of information: SACTU lectures headed, 'Teaching that the workers are Oppressed by the Bourgeois or Capitalist Class'; discussions and leaflets on May Day; affiliation to the WFTU; opposition to the Nationalist Party's Apartheid labour legislation, endorsements of the Freedom Charter and support for the Congress Alliance. In addition, many excerpts from lectures and speeches which condemned the capitalist mode of production in general and the South African system of racial capitalism in particular were included among the materials presented by the Crown. An example is the SACTU statement, 'We have often heard that the African people are not ripe enough for trade unions. They are, however, ripe enough to be used as labour power and to be exploited,' and'. . . all workers have a right to share in the wealth of this country of ours . . .'. ⁵

With this type of material, the Crown argued the case for treason. Obviously SACTU documents, with emphasis on working class emancipation and proletarian internationalism, were highpoints in the state's grandiose design to prove its claim of 'Communist' conspiracy and social change through violent revolution. The state failed miserably in this respect, and the Judge in dismissing the remaining group of defendants pointed out that the ANC had proven the reverse - that its entire history had been committed to non-violent action against Apartheid. SACTU as an organization had little direct involvement in the Trial. Annual national conferences regularly passed resolutions condemning the continuation of the Trial and the personal hardship it brought to many defendants and their families .⁶ The masses were encouraged to strengthen and continue the 'We Stand By Our Leaders' campaign and to contribute financially to the Defence Fund. Letters were sent by Leslie Massina to international trade union federations asking for financial assistance for court costs; the British TUC contributed £500, the WFTU, £400, and the ICFTU, £250.

In sum, the overall outcome of the Treason Trial was positive for SACTU and the movement in general. Despite difficulties in maintaining the trade union work in some centres owing to the loss of key organizers, SACTU was able to bring in new functionaries and utilize the heightened political consciousness of the people to advantage in its organizing drives. Although the Trial dragged on for over fifty months, it was soon overshadowed by the more militant mass campaigns of the late 1950s. The state had realized by this time that more repressive measures would be necessary to defeat the people. Regarding the original charge of treason and Communist conspiracy, the state was forced to concede that the Freedom Charter was nothing more than a basic document of democratic rights.

The State of emergency (1960)

Faced with the increased militancy of the people, the state abandoned all pretence of the 'rule of law' and instead chose to deal with the Congress Movement outside the courtroom. Under the Unlawful Organizations Act introduced in 1960, the government banned the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) on 8 April of that year. One week earlier, on 30 March, the government had declared a State of Emergency which gave it broad and sweeping powers to act against alleged subversion. The Emergency lasted for a period of five months and was officially lifted at the end of August. On the first day following the Emergency declaration, all original Treason Trialists were rearrested and many were detained for the entire five months.

The most immediate cause of these actions was the outrage, at home and abroad, associated with the massacres of Africans at Sharpeville and Langa townships on 21 March 1960. An ANC campaign against the pass laws scheduled for the end of March had been pre-empted by the PAC who called for demonstrations on that date. It was only in the areas of the Southern Transvaal (Sharpeville) and the Western Cape (Langa) that the people responded in large numbers. Following the PAC leaders' directives, people congregated in front of police stations to carry out non-violent pass-destroying protests and then volunteer themselves for arrest.

In Sharpeville, a contingent of young, trigger-happy White policemen opened fire, and in a short space of time, 69 Africans had been killed and another 180 wounded, many shot in the back. At Langa, a thousand miles away, a crowd of 10,000 people was ordered to disperse in three minutes. Failing to hear and heed this demand, the crowd was first baton charged and then came the 'order to fire'. Two Africans were killed and 49 injured. That evening violence spread throughout the township, which was essentially a 'bachelor's quarters' for African male workers whose families had been forcibly removed under Influx Control regulations. More deaths were recorded by the following morning.

These are the events usually associated with the banning of the political movements and the declaration of the Emergency. Yet it is important to point out that the preceding year had witnessed the emergence of mass militancy at the rank-and-file level beyond previous experience. Women's campaigns against passes, beer-halls and other forms of oppression, particularly in Durban and Natal, had reached revolutionary proportions.

The important role SACTU assumed in this period has not been properly appreciated in the literature dealing with the pre-Emergency period. As part of the Congress campaign against passes, SACTU called for National Workers Conferences to be held in all major centres on 28 February 1959. The response throughout the country was one of the greatest ever to a SACTU campaign for an end to poverty wages and political oppression.

In Durban, a record attendance of 4,000 people gathered for two days, demanding general strike action, boycotts and political defiance. In Pietermaritzburg, meetings drew 3,000. The Port Elizabeth Local Committee reported 'one of the most successful meetings ever held in our area', and Pretoria drew 600 workers 'which is outstanding for this area'. Two equally successful meetings in the Transvaal attracted 2,000 workers, and in Cape Town, at a well attended and emotionally charged rally, SACTU militant Archie Sibeko personally escorted the Special Branch from the hall. Such an act was not uncommon at SACTU and Congress meetings, but it could only be carried out with mass support from the people rising up against police harassment. As SACTU reported, the Workers Conferences 'gave a jolt to the Government and capitalists of South Africa'. ⁷

From the end of March, hundreds of SACTU leaders and rank-and-file workers were among the thousands of people detained without trial during the Emergency. Many full-time functionaries were kept in prison for the entire five month period. Those militants who escaped detention were forced to go underground (as was the case for Archie Sibeko and Stephen Dlamini) or leave the country to continue the work in exile. Moses Mabhida and Wilton Mkwayi left South Africa at this time to become SACTU's overseas representatives responsible for promoting and coordinating international solidarity work. Thus, the crisis was to test once more the strength of the organization between the months of April and August.

In Johannesburg, Head Office was largely depleted of full-time personnel with the re-arrest of Levy and Massina and the departure of Phyllis Altman to Swaziland during the Emergency. Anticipating such a crisis, the Management Committee had previously agreed to follow the model used earlier by the Indian Congress in India; that is, the appointment of one person to be solely responsible for managing the affairs of the organization. Bob Hepple, son of Labour Party politician and SACTU supporter Alex Hepple, assumed this gigantic task and was ably assisted by Don Mateman (TWIU) who became Acting General Secretary. Another volunteer, Shanti Naidoo, became a fulltime office worker during this period; from a historically political Indian family in South Africa, Shanti had also worked for the SAIC and the COD on a regular basis prior to the Emergency. ⁸ Another trade union leader to assist Head Office was Rita Ndzanga.

As was the case in the early months of the Treason Trial, leaders were co-opted from affiliated unions and the factories. In addition to Mateman, Mark Shope (A-LCDWU) became a full-time functionary and NEC member during this period. Within a matter of days a new Management Committee formed and met daily to monitor the national situation and attempt to maintain the on-going work of a trade union coordinating body. This new Committee was itself reduced to only three members with a new wave of arrests on the day the ANC was outlawed. Six more members had been recruited by June.

The determination of SACTU comrades was equal to the challenge, and during the Emergency the organization not only survived but scored some of its most crowning achievements. In May 1960 largely through the initiative of Billy Nair (Durban), the £1-a-Day campaign was given greater momentum with the preparation and presentation of wage demand memoranda to the employers organizations. Leaflets were also issued by the Wits and Durban Local Committees to tell workers that their unions were still legal and to encourage them to renew wage demands on the bosses and campaign for an end to the Emergency.⁹

Local committees struggled to keep their offices open. In Pietermaritzburg, SACTU leader Harry Gwala reported in September that 'every single functionary and a large number of our leading members were detained'. Similarly, the ANC-SACTU stronghold of Port Elizabeth was largely decimated by the arrests. In both cases, new unions organized before the Emergency ceased to function properly throughout most of 1960. In the Western Cape, workers took to the streets in strike action following the Langa massacre and trade union leaders were arrested as elsewhere.10 The strength of the Food and Canning Workers Union stood out again, however, as a threatened strike by these workers forced the release of their General Secretary, Liz Abrahams. In Durban, veteran ANC-SACTU militant, Memory Vakalisa, terminated his employment to work full-time as a SACTU organizer but was then arrested for the duration of the Emergency. Eric Mtshali joined the Local Committee in July, and later became a SACTU organizer in Pinetown, Natal. A woman worker from the local tea factory left her job to do secretarial work in the Durban office.

The SACTU Fifth Annual National Conference, postponed from April to October, praised these valiant efforts of SACTU volunteers during the Emergency period:

We announce with the greatest possible pride that the period April 1959 to October 1960 has been the period of our greatest achievement. We have grown in stature both nationally and internationally. Through our consistent £1-a Day Campaign, we have forced the entire country to recognize the need for wage increases.... Our membership figure is the highest it has been in the five years of our existence ...

The courageous way in which our comrades in jail have carried on and the manner in which our Congress has continued its work despite the State of Emergency shows that the Government cannot succeed in its desperate attempt to suppress the people. It is not the Government which is 'teaching the people a lesson'; but increasingly it is the workers and the people who are demonstrating that the just cause for which they fight is invincible.

The official lifting of the Emergency did not bring an end to the harassment of SACTU leaders, however. Raids of offices continued in the weeks that followed and workers were intimidated with police searches as they entered trade union offices. Three more trade unionists were banned from trade union work, and four SACTU activists from Port Elizabeth (Alven Bennie, Melville Fletcher, Eddie Heynes and William Kupe) where charged with 'incitement to strike' speeches dating back to the 1958 national Stay-At-Home. Also, many workers detained without trial during the Emergency faced victimization by their bosses after release from jail in August.

The mention above of SACTU's international support refers in part to the massive letter-writing campaign conducted during the Emergency. Solidarity messages and protests to the South African regime poured into South Africa as the international community had been outraged by the news of the Sharpeville and Langa massacres in March. In fact, the Secretariat's Report to the 1960 Conference made the following claim:

We know . . . that it was this campaign of ours, together with the pressure exerted by all democrats both inside and outside South Africa which forced the Government to end the State of Emergency.

SACTU 'Beats The Ban' (1961)

The acquittal and release of Treason Trialists on Wednesday, 29 March 196 1, after over four years of harassment, was a victory for not only the defendants but the oppressed people of South Africa as a whole. Outside the Pretoria courtroom, crowds sang and danced in the streets, amidst a furious contingent of South African police. The 'Treason Trial bus' was about to make its final trip to Johannesburg, marking the end of one phase of repression . . . and, for some, the beginning of another.

When Leon Levy and Leslie Massina walked into the Johannesburg SACTU office, they were met with jubilant victory cries from rank-and-file workers who had packed the premises. Brandy was consumed from ordinary coffee cups in case the Special Branch decided to make one of their frequent, unannounced visits. Everyone talked about the acquittals and there was a general enthusiasm in the air as SACTU's Sixth Annual Conference would convene in Durban in two days time. The Conference in Durban would highlight SACTU's increased support and influence, reflected by a membership strength of 53,000 workers in fifty-one affiliated unions. The militancy and vitality of the Durban Local Committee made Natal an excellent venue for the meetings, especially as the local organizers had promised that for the first time representatives from farm workers would attend the SACTU proceedings. Also planned was a mass rally to commemorate the Sharpeville and Langa shootings of March 1960.

Back at Head Office, the phone rang. An ally at the office of the Johannesburg Star asked to speak to Phyllis Altman: 'Have you heard that the government has banned all SACTU meetings for three months, effective midnight on March 30th?' The celebration ended abruptly as the Management Committee went elsewhere to convene an emergency meeting to deal with this crisis and to protect the banned persons in attendance. Never a willing subject to such intimidation, the SACTU leadership decided to proceed with the Conference and to begin one day earlier than planned to 'beat the ban'. Durban was contacted by phone and the Local Committee immediately began to organize transport for workers throughout Natal, particularly from Pietermaritzburg.

Phyllis Altman caught the 6.00 a.m. Thursday plane to Durban, carrying with her the bundles of correspondence and documents rapidly put together the night before. Transvaal delegates, travelling for 15 hours in private cars and by train, arrived at 11.00 p.m. after the evening proceedings had almost ended; a few of the Cape Town delegates, making the longest journey on the least expensive transport, did not arrive until after the ban had gone into effect.

The Conference agenda and normal business procedures were scrapped, and instead the pre-midnight session consisted mostly of angry speeches made by SACTU activists. Speeches were translated from 'Cape Dutch' to English to Zulu. Liz Abrahams (FCWU), who spoke with a combined English-Afrikaans dialect shouted, 'Tell the filthy Boers that we stand on our rights.' The Special Branch had ringed the Textile Workers' Hall and at times were told to 'shut up' by angry Natal workers. At five minutes to midnight, the Conference ended abruptly. Rowley Arenstein, Durban Congressite lawyer, had been called to ensure that no victimization occurred. At midnight, the SB raided the Conference. To avoid the arrest of out-of-town delegates who were planning to sleep on the floor of the hall, taxis were summoned, and ironically, Arenstein managed to arrange a loan from the SB detectives to cover the expense. Needless to say, the Conference reconvened at a different setting within a few hours.

Such was the defiant response of SACTU delegates to the state's direct reprisal against SACTU for the Treason Trial verdict. The 1961 Conference, although 'chaotic, like a mad country dance', defeated yet another attempt by the Apartheid regime to silence the workers' movement. All delegates agreed that the 'Beat the Ban' Conference had been 'a great success'. ¹¹

The three-month ban issued by the Minister of Justice Vorster under the Suppression of Communism Act definitely affected SACTU's ability to organize mass public rallies, which had become very effective in the previous two years. But the ban in no way forced SACTU to forgo its major responsibilities to the workers. In fact, it served as a reinforcement of the 1959 Conference decision to organize factory committees at the point of production and to establish a solid corps of shop stewards within the workplace to carry out SACTU programmes.

Nor did the ban prevent SACTU from continuing to mobilize workers for Congress campaigns. An All-In Conference in Pietermaritzburg earlier in March, organized primarily by ex-ANC members and fellow Congressites, called for a multi-racial convention to challenge the South African Republic proclaimed early in 1961 and speak for all the oppressed people and progressive groups within Apartheid society. The Conference called for a nation-wide Stay-At Home on 29-31 May, and SACTU played its part in assuring workers' participation in this protest. Despite massive intimidation in a state of siege atmosphere, and the passage of special legislation allowing for 12day detentions without trial, ¹² the Stay-At-Home was considered a general success throughout the country.

As during the Emergency, SACTU devoted much of its energies towards informing the international community on the state of affairs at home and calling on trade unions in particular to step up the boycott and embargo of all things South African. A letter to the WFTU dated 13 May 1961 reviewed the internal conditions: an increase in the mass arrests of persons for pass-law violations (1,300 arrests in a two-day period); the mobilization of Army reserves in preparation for the end of May Stay-At-Home; a ban on meetings of all political groups until 26 June; and raids on the private residences of Africans, Coloureds and Indians. The SACTU letter concluded, 'It is obvious ... that the Government is preparing for a show-down, and now more than ever before we need the concrete support of our fellow trade unionists throughout the world.' This situation in all likelihood prompted the WFTU decision to sponsor the formation of the International Solidarity Committee discussed in the previous chapter.

The international community answered SACTU's requests with a seriousness never before experienced. Trade unions in Commonwealth countries in particular, aware of South Africa's withdrawal from that body, sent strongly-worded letters of protest against the arbitrary and fascist-like banning of SACTU meetings. Australian, Canadian and British unions never previously in contact with SACTU responded in large numbers. For the first time, the British TUC openly stood with SACTU brothers and sisters in the struggle. Additional workers bodies from Trinidad and Tobago, India, Burma, Ireland, France, the United States, Ghana, Hungary, Japan, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Gambia and many other countries expressed similar solidarity. Inside South Africa, the Congress of Democrats, the National Union of Distributive Workers (NUDW) and even the Liberal Party attacked the Government for its blatant repression. ¹³

Exiled SACTU activists to this day strongly believe that this 1961 expression of international solidarity was the decisive factor that prevented the regime from extending the ban on meetings beyond the end of June and banning the organization altogether. There is also the possibility that the state feared that a simultaneous banning of all Congress Alliance groups would create an uncontrollable underground movement. Stephen Dlamini, for example, believes the strategy was 'to let us surface again after three months and then trace our people back to the nest of the movement'. ¹⁴ In any event, trade unionists throughout the world, then and especially now, should realize that their collective actions do have the intended effect and are greatly respected by the oppressed workers of South Africa.

However, in hindsight, this three-month ban was but the prelude to the period of the most brutal repression against SACTU. The strategy of the state was vicious in its simplicity; by victimizing SACTU individuals through 'security' legislation and physical force the organization could be broken without being legally banned. Indications of this strategy date back to the mid-1950s, but by late 1961 the methods became more refined and effective.

Before, during and after the meetings-ban, arrests and bannings of SACTU organizers increased. The entire year of 1961 was, in essence, an undeclared State of Emergency'. In February, Melville Fletcher was banned in Durban at precisely the time he was gaining workers' support in a bid to oust the reactionary leadership in the registered Garment Workers Union. In May, Vuyisile Mini and Alven Bennie were arrested for their involvement in an important Bay Transport Co. bus strike in Port Elizabeth. Billy Nair was arrested in June and charged with 'incitement to strike' during the May Stay-At-Home;¹⁵ three hours after the arrest he was given a five-year banning order preventing movement outside Durban magisterial district and not allowing him to enter any factory, African location, hostel or village. Trade union work under these restrictions was virtually impossible. The progressive Durban lawyer. Rowley Arenstein, also banned, was not allowed to handle Nair's defence.

After the meetings-ban expired on 30 June, it was re-imposed on the Kimberley Domestic Workers Union in September, when the Union attempted to get a wage determination for grossly underpaid African domestic servants. The official reason given by the Kimberley magistrate was that 'poor lighting (in the hall) might lead to riots'. In Cape Town, Zollie Malindi (Garage Workers Union), Tofie Bardien (Executive member of the CPC and leader of the Taxi Drivers and Owners Association) and Archie Sibeko received five-year banning orders under the Suppression of Communism Act.

Nor were SACTU affiliated unions exempt from Security police harassment. In December 1961 a raid on the SAR & HWU office resulted in the seizure of individual membership cards and subsequent intimidation of workers for their union membership through threats of dismissal and actual transfers to lower paying jobs. Here again, the attack was directed against SACTU in that the transport workers were one of the strategic sectors being organized by SACTU's National Organizing Committees. Among many international trade union protests, the General Secretary of the Australian Railways Union, a Mr O'Brien, reacted as follows:

This Union, together with others, views with concern the intimidation practiced by your Government through the Security Police. An elementary knowledge of history should demonstrate ... that the workers will continue to organize and unions will continue to prosper. You should realize in some countries prior to World War II those trade unions were forced underground. Despite this, they continued to function actively and in World War II those trade unionists who had been denied their citizenship rights under the Nazi regime played a memorable role in the success of Democracy over Fascism. We are surprised to think that this most recent lesson of history has been lost on your Government. While you may obtain some immediate advantage by the persecution of the railway workers concerned, you can be assured that the ultimate advantage will be for the organized working class movement. ¹⁶

The absurdity of life under Apartheid society never ceases to create comical as well as tragic situations. One such comical incident occurred during the tension of 1961, when SACTU leaders prepared for the worst by disguising their personal identities, moving the office to different locations and avoiding sleeping at home whenever possible. Phyllis Altman, Mark Shope, Don Mateman and Leon Levy, all assuming disguises, planned to meet one morning at the Johannesburg water tower to discuss the current state of affairs. Afterwards, they walked together down a Johannesburg street, only to confront four equally disguised Special Branch detectives walking in the opposite direction. Each group immediately recognized the other, and all eight broke into hilarious laughter before proceeding along their respective paths. Life histories are full of such fortuitous events, but a few months later such an incident might have produced a more tragic ending.

Massive Repression (1962-1964)

The banning of the ANC forced a reassessment of the viability of a nonviolent programme against the Apartheid system. On 16 December 1961 the first acts of sabotage were conducted by Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) - 'The Spear of the Nation' - the military wing of the ANC formed one month earlier. For the next eighteen months, at least 150 incidents of sabotage were carried out throughout South Africa. After nearly fifty years of non-violence and passive resistance to oppression, the historical inevitability of this new stage of struggle was described in an MK proclamation: 'The people's patience is not endless. The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices -submit or fight. That time has now come in South Africa.'

The massive counter-action mounted by the regime effectively weakened the leadership of the Congress Movement and smashed the organizational structures of the groups within it. The repression against the political organizations - the ANC, the SAIC, the SACOD (banned in 1962) and the CPC - is a story well covered in the existing literature.

The story of repression against SACTU, strangely enough, is one of the most important yet least known aspects of this period. Why this is the case is a matter of speculation to a large extent. Perhaps a tendency for outside observers to romanticize guerrilla warfare, coupled with a tendency to regard the trade union struggle as subordinate to the political struggle (and thus to see SACTU as a branch of the ANC rather than an equal partner in the Congress Alliance) partially explains this gap in our total knowledge of the struggle. Whatever the reason(s), the repression directed against SACTU and the oppressed Black working class is essential to our understanding of the South African system. It is equally vital in the international anti-imperialist struggle against that system.

The close relationship between groups in the Congress Alliance meant that with the banning of the ANC in 1960, there would necessarily be a greater merging of actors and organizations over a broader range of activity. Many SACTU militants became active members of MK units engaged in sabotage against property, not people. On the other hand, SACTU as an organization functioned as a 'legal' political platform for ex-ANC members. In Natal, for example, SACTU organized Workers and Peasants Conferences and a Natal Rural Areas Committee emerged in the early 1960s to mobilize rural and urban masses; inevitably the speakers would be ex-ANC and SACTU activists. Stephen Dlamini recalls these meetings attracting more enthusiasm than earlier ANC Branch meetings and rallies.

The explanation for this popularity is simple: SACTU continued to represent the workers' interests and aspirations. The greater open involvement in the political arena was not a change in policy, as the SACTU Constitution testifies, but merely reflected a change in the real conditions that obtained in the country. In sum, SACTU pressed on with its broad and numerous campaigns to increase wages, improve working conditions and struggle against all forms of political oppression. This is why the Government could not relax after the banning of the political movements: new and more effective means of systematic repression directed simultaneously against individuals and organizations had to be found.

Between 1962 and 1964, the South African regime enacted some of the most vicious legislation known to modern world history. The 'rule of law' became the 'rule of punishment'. A proper appreciation of the degree of repression in these years requires a summary of the new legislation - the General Law Amendment Act (GLAA), No. 76, 1962 (Sabotage Act); the GLAA, No. 37, 1963; and the GLAA, No. 96, 1965.

The Sabotage Act stands out as the most important piece of legislation in that it modifies, covers loopholes and supplements the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), the Public Safety Act (1953), the Criminal Procedure Act (1955, and as amended) and the Unlawful Organizations Act (1960). In addition to being comprehensive, Section 21 of the Act introduces, defines (albeit vaguely) and prohibits 6 sabotage'. The sweeping definition is worth quoting in full:

A person commits sabotage if he injures, damages, destroys, renders useless or unserviceable, puts out of action, obstructs or tampers with, pollutes, contaminates or endangers any of the following:

1. the health or safety of the public;
2. the maintenance of law and order;
3. any water supply;
4. the supply or distribution at any place of light, power, fuel, foodstuffs or water, or of sanitary, medical or fire extinguishing services;
5. any postal, telephone or telegraph services or installations, or radio transmitting, broadcasting or receiving services or installations;
6. the free movements of any traffic on land, at sea or in the air; and
7. any property, whether movable or immovable, of any person or of the state.

The penalty for sabotage, as for treason, is death by hanging, and if the court decides against the death penalty it must impose a minimum sentence of no less than five years' imprisonment.

Contrary to conventional procedure, a person charged with sabotage is not assumed innocent, but rather must prove that innocence. To be more specific, the defendant must show that what he/she did 'objectively regarded was not calculated and that such an offence was not committed with intent:

1. to cause or promote general dislocation, disturbance or disorder;
2. to cripple or seriously prejudice any industry or undertaking - or industries or undertakings generally or the production or distribution of commodities or foodstuffs at any place;
3. to seriously hamper or to deter any person from assisting in the maintenance of order;
4. to cause, encourage or further an insurrection or forcible resistance to the Government;
5. to further or encourage the achievement of any political aim, including the bringing about of any social or economic change in the Republic;
6. to cause serious bodily injury to or seriously endanger the safety of any person;
7. to cause substantial financial loss to any person or to the state;
8. to cause, encourage or further feelings of hostility between different sections of the population of the Republic;
9. to seriously interrupt the supply or distribution at any place of light, power, fuel or water, or of sanitary, medical or fire extinguishing services; or
10. to embarrass the administration of the affairs of the state.

Other inroads on traditional legal procedures included the denial of a preparatory examination, a South African procedure whereby the accused is made fully aware of the charges against him/her. Also, a person acquitted on a charge of sabotage might be tried again on any other charge arising out of the acts alleged in respect of the charge of sabotage, another reversal of traditional procedure. Juveniles (under the age of 18) could be charged with sabotage unlike the case of other criminal offences. Finally, the Attorney-General was given total power to determine whether or not a person is to be so charged.

Before continuing with the other equally draconian measures of the Sabotage Act, let us pause to consider the implications of the above. Normal trade union activity obviously becomes a potential criminal offence. The right to strike is effectively denied as such action would 4cause financial loss' to employers, 'encourage hostility' between employers and workers and would 'bring about social or economic change'. Could any trade union organizer or worker effectively discharge these onuses? Of course not. Even to write a slogan on a wall could lead to a charge of sabotage, whereas outside this Act it would be a minor offence.

SACTU, representing primarily African workers, had long been accustomed to the prohibition of strikes against Africans under the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953. The penalty under that Act was R1,000 (£500) and a maximum of three years' imprisonment. African workers, however, had always boycotted this legislation and strikes continued to occur regardless of the penalties. Now with the Sabotage Act the stakes would be higher: hanging was to be the punishment for struggling to end poverty wages and anti-Black worker legislation.

In May 1962 SACTU promptly wrote a letter to TUCSA asking the latter to unite in opposition to the Sabotage Act, pointing out that only broad opposition could prevent its enactment. Instead, a TUCSA delegation consisting of the President, General Secretary and four Executive members went, cap in hand, to the Minister of Justice to plead its case for exemption for registered unions. The TUC managed to get a promise of a 'safeguard' in the legislation and left the meeting without voicing any opposition to the Act in principle. The TUC later stated that another meeting was to be arranged to discuss the Act in respect of 'African unions which were acceptable to the TUC'. SACTU correctly charged that TUCSA opportunistically 'sold the trade union movement down the river', by 'allying itself with the fascist regime to break the militant African trade unions and win over a few tame African "welfare societies" into its ranks'." One might also note the extreme paternalism made explicit in TUCSA's belief that it had a right to decide on the 'acceptability' of an African trade union.

But, as many political observers pointed out at the time, TUCSA's 'safeguard was completely worthless. Aside from the TUC ignoring the interests of the majority of South African workers - the Africans - the charge of sabotage could still be brought against any registered union or group of workers within such a union which failed to comply with the complicated machinery laid down in the IC Act (1956) regarding strike action. Furthermore, by implication, all industries could be defined as 'essential industries' according to the vague working of the Act. In any case, no legal protection would exist for any worker or trade unionist going on to company property or on a picket line. Thus, Section 21 effectively denied all trade union, political and civil rights of South African workers. And of the many coordinating bodies only SACTU objected.

The Sabotage Act also filled loopholes in earlier legislation passed in previous decades. Since 1950, under the Suppression Act, the Minister of Justice had the power to suppress newspapers; this power was used to ban The Guardian, Advance and the Clarion. There was no law, however, to prevent these papers of the Congress Alliance from reappearing under new titles, which in fact they did successfully. The new Act made this virtually impossible by requiring the banned newspaper to forfeit a sum of R20,000 (£ 10,000) whenever the banning order was issued. This meant that economic strangulation would silence progressive papers as they could not come up with this amount of money to cover each potential banning. A Publications and Entertainments Bill, passed in 1963, complemented this provision by broadening the scope of 'undesirable' publications.

Section 2 of the Sabotage Act also widened the powers of the State President to ban organizations. Specifically, he can ban 'any organization that carries on directly or indirectly any of the activities of an unlawful organization'. The primary purpose of this was to legally equate the MK with the ANC, and Poqo (the PAC military wing) with the PAC. But it also raised a number of related questions. Is it legal, for example, for the second organization to carry out activities of the banned organization, even if those activities in themselves were perfectly legal? In other words, could SACTU be banned for opposing the pass laws, a campaign historically associated with the ANC?

We shall see below how this dilemma worked itself out in practice.

The Sabotage Act also gave sweeping powers to the Minister of Justice regarding the treatment of individuals over a broad range of behaviour. First, since 1950, the Minister had been able to ban trade unionists who were 'Communists' by statutory definition (although not necessarily so in fact) from all trade union activity. As we have seen, at least fifty progressive trade unionists of all races were banned as 'statutory Communists' by 1954.

The new Act further allowed the Minister to order any person 'in respect of whom any prohibition' has been served under the Suppression Act, not to become an office-bearer, officer or member of any organization without the Minister's consent. In other words, a person prevented from gatherings in, say, 1956, could automatically be prevented from being a member, etc., of any organization in 1962. Even those never convicted of 'statutory communism' could now be victimized.

The meaning of this provision was made clear on 28 December 1962 with the issuance of Government Gazette Extraordinary Proclamation No. 408. Thirty-six organizations, including SACTU, were listed and the following groups of persons prevented from being officers, office bearers or members of these organizations:

1. 432 persons previously 'listed' under the Suppression of Communism Act;

2. any person who, whether in (a) or not, has been banned by the Minister of Justice from attending meetings; and

3. any person, whether in (a) or (b) or not, who was a member of the banned South African Congress of Democrats.

In addition to the fact that these three groups of persons could not belong to the thirty-six named organizations, they also could not belong to any organization which:

1. is in any manner affiliated to or a subsidiary of any of the thirty-six organizations which promotes or furthers any activity which promotes the objects of these organizations; and

2. which in any manner propagates, defends, attacks, criticizes or discusses any form of State of any principle or policy of the Government of the State or which in any manner undermines the authority of the Government of the State. ¹⁸

In short, all members and officers of all remaining Congress Alliance groups were effectively silenced with this proclamation issued under the Sabotage Act of 1962 (hereafter, this is referred to as the 'Blanket Bans').

A second and similar extraordinary proclamation in 1963 prohibited all persons in these categories from 'becoming or continuing to be office-bearers, officers, members or active supporters of any organization which in any manner compiled, published or disseminated any newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, book, handbill, or poster, or which assisted in doing so'.19 On the basis of this order, Spark, the successor to New Age (banned in November 1962) was forced to suspend publication on 28 March 1963.

Returning to the Sabotage Act, the Minister of Justice was empowered to place any 'statutory Communist' or person engaging in activities 'furthering communism' under up to 24-hour house arrest. Restrictions on movement from a designated place and on intercourse with other persons could be as severe as dictated by the Minister. This internment without trial gave the Nationalist Government absolute power over every South African citizen.

The definition of 'gatherings' was also made more specific. In the past, courts had ruled that gatherings had to have a'common purpose', for example, a trade union meeting. This necessity was eliminated in the 1962 Act making, in theory, a visit to the theatre a possible gathering if the Minister so determined. Furthermore, anyone previously dealt with under the Suppression Act could be ordered to report to the police at specified times and provide information on changes of address or employment. Failure to fulfil these obligations could lead to imprisonment from one to ten years.

Another provision of the Act made it an offence, punishable by up to three years' imprisonment, to reproduce, in any way, a statement or speech of a person banned from gatherings. In this way, banned SACTU executive officers could no longer prepare statements to be read at conferences or other meetings.

Previous to this, it had been common practice at Congress meetings to play tape recorded messages from banned leaders. One such meeting held in one of the lecture rooms at the Johannesburg Public Library produced yet another farcical situation that could only occur in South Africa. While playing the second of four speeches prepared by banned Communist Party members, a 'posse' of about fifteen Special Branch detectives broke into the hall, rushed to the front of the room and promptly arrested the tape recorder. One perspiring policeman, flanked on all sides by his cohorts, carried the old-fashioned heavy recorder towards the back door amidst the jeers and catcalls of those in attendance. One Congress woman shouted, "twenty thousand voices will rise in their place".'²⁰

Another provision prohibited the possession of any banned publication, and again violation carried with it a possible three-year sentence. Finally, an amendment to the Criminal Code, introduced by this Act, made it easier to convict a person for leaving South Africa without a passport. Previous difficulties in proving that the person actually left the country were overcome by allowing any document which suggested departure to serve as prima facie evidence if it was certified by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs as of foreign origin.

The next Act directly affecting SACTU leaders and other progressives was the GLAA No. 37 of 1963. A commissioned officer of the police might, without warrant, arrest or cause to be arrested anyone suspected of committing or intending to commit sabotage or any offence under the Suppression Act, or who might have information regarding same. Such a person could be detained for interrogation until he/she satisfactorily answered all questions. At the end of 90 days, the order would lapse, but the person could be re-arrested and re-detained and this process could be repeated indefinitely. Except for a weekly visit from a magistrate, no visitors would be allowed and only the Minister of Justice could authorize the person's release. Detainees lost all normal privileges of witnesses and accused; that is, the police were given absolute power to demand answers to their questions. An amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act in 1964 allowed confessions to the police to be admissible as evidence in the courts. This sanctioned the common practice of solitary confinement and police brutality being used to force a confession, with no possibility of challenge in the courtroom as the victim would not be personally present. In other cases, confessions were simply invented.

Finally, the GLAA No. 96, of 1965, extended the 90-day detention period to 180 days, with the same general conditions as stated above in effect.

SACTU correctly identified all of this repressive legislation as directed in general and in particular against non-racial trade unionism. Workers Unity (February-October 1962) stated,

(the Sabotage Act) ... closes every avenue of legal expression for the people of South Africa. The Act also constitutes a grave threat to the trade union movement. It renders nearly all trade union activity illegal and will strip the militant trade unions of practically all their remaining officials and leaders. Trade Union publications will become virtually impossible. Strike action and other universally accepted procedures of workers' action may be visited by the death penalty. Such is the price of apartheid.

Various SACTU leaders spoke at rallies pointing out to workers that all power had been given over to the Minister of Justice and the police. Don Mateman (General Secretary, TWIU) spelled out the implications of the Act for registered textile workers: 'If we were to go on strike for higher wages while the employers were busy filling a government order for army blankets, it would be called sabotage. The vagueness of the clause that refers to "embarrassing the administration of the Government" will inhibit all legal collective action on the part of trade unions.'

Aside from the protests of international trade union centres, the only non-SACTU trade union to openly oppose the Sabotage Act was the National Union of Distributive Workers (NUDW). Speaking as much against TUCSA opportunism as the legislation itself, the NUDW commented:

... when democracy is threatened, the trade unions cannot stand by idly and concern themselves only with those aspects of legislation which affect them directly. The trade unions also have a duty to make their voices heard on the subject of civil liberties and the rule of law, and when a Government invests a Minister of Justice with powers which will enable him to stifle all opposition to it, then assurances to registered trade unions are insufficient to preserve democracy.

The statement went on to point that the TUC SA-negotiated 'safeguard' for registered unions had no effect on the Government's main intention of intimidating African workers with 'statutory sabotage' - a flagrant disregard of the ILO Convention on Freedom of Association. The NUDW concluded,'The General Law Amendment Bill ... should be rejected in toto by the democratic trade union movement.'

Also to protest against the Sabotage Act were the unions represented at the Job Reservation Conference held in Cape Town in June 1962. Again, TUCSA had no official delegation at this important Conference and FOFATUSA never issued a public statement or took any action against the Sabotage Act.

SACTU predictions of massive victimization and persecution with the implementation of these laws were soon proven correct. The Blanket Bans Proclamation came into effect on 1 February 1963. By 28-29 March 1964, at the time of the Ninth Annual National Conference, no less than forty-five SACTU officials and members had been banned, removed from office and in most cases confined to magisterial districts. Many more were detained without charge under the 90-day detentions for various lengths of time. The following tables provide the names of these SACTU victims; behind each name is a story of individual sacrifice and suffering in the cause of the workers' struggle.

SA CUT Leaders Banned After 1 February 1963

These lists are not exhaustive but reflect the documentation available at this time.

These tables show that the majority of victimized trade union leaders were Africans; some were veterans, such as J. C. Tsele (25 years) and V. Hashe (17 years), and many others were young recruits to the work of SACTU. It is important to keep in mind that the banned persons were never charged or convicted of any crime against the state, and the detainees were swept off the streets simply because it was believed that they might have had information concerning the commission of unspecified acts. They were all democratically-elected trade union leaders prevented from carrying out the interests of their members.

Including SACTU leaders, at least 102 persons were banned under the Sabotage Act of 1962. In December 1963 the progressive monthly, Forward, gave comprehensive statistics on the 90-day detentions. Over 500 persons had been detained and confined to their cells for twenty three hours a day. Many had been detained for their second 90-day period, and at least two had been detained for over 180 days.

Additional arrests and harassment of SACTU Local Committees and affiliated unions occurred regularly throughout these years. In 1962, the entire executive of the Kimberley African General Workers Union was arrested for holding a meeting without permission'. In Cape Town, Archie Sibeko (although banned) and other comrades were continuously in and out of jail as a result of underground ANC and SACTU organizing. In Johannesburg, SACTU organizers were frequently arrested for trespassing on mine company property and for distributing 'illegal' leaflets to railway workers. In Durban, the Local Committee maintained its high level of activity through the recruitment of young workers trained by veterans Billy Nair, Stephen Dlamini and Memory Vakalisa. Workers continued to pour into SACTU offices despite the fact that the SB detectives made daily visits to take the names and addresses of everyone involved with SACTU. A January 1963 raid on the Durban office was conducted with no warrant and documents were seized at will.

The October 1962 conference of the Metal Workers Union (SACTU) in Johannesburg lost all of its documents to a police raid. Eight months later in Cape Town, the Food and Canning Workers Union office was raided and correspondence searched for names of Management Committee and Branch officials. In Parliament, the Minister of Labour justified the raid as in the interests of anti-subversive activities, yet in actual fact only legitimate trade union correspondence was found. These raids were obviously being conducted in association with the 90-day detentions sweeping the country. For example, Lily Diedrichs (FCWU, Port Elizabeth) was banned shortly after the raid in Cape Town. The SACTU 1963 Conference was attended by no less than sixteen SB detectives, armed with a search warrant authorizing the confiscation of any and all papers. Organizing meetings with farm and mine workers were surrounded by lorry-loads of police armed with Sten guns.

The heaviest repression, however, occurred in the ANC-SACTU stronghold of Port Elizabeth. In November 1962 fifty-two persons were arrested and detained for lengthy questioning regarding sabotage activities in the area. Alven Bennie was later re-arrested for failing to report to the local police (as per his banning order) on the same morning he was arrested by the Special Branch. Brutality and intimidation were the order of the day in the Eastern Cape: Caleb Mayekiso, one of SACTU's most outstanding organizers, was told by the policeman: 'I am an outstanding expert at thrashing a dog if it offends me.' Four months later, while interrogating Sampson Ntunja, police threatened to 'fix up' Mayekiso, Vuyisile Mini and Mountain Ngyungwana, and proudly boasted of their desire that SACTU would soon be outlawed.

On 2 February 1963, the day following the Blanket Bans order, the Port Elizabeth magistrate banned under the Riotous Assemblies Act a SACTU meeting called to agitate for the forty-hour week, R2-a-day wages, and the repeal of the colour-bar and Job Reservation on the grounds that such a meeting would 'endanger the public peace'. By October of that year, workers entering the Local Committee office were threatened with 90-day detentions simply because of their interest in SACTU.

All of these specific cases, taken together, prove that SACTU was a major target of government repression due to its persistence in advancing the struggle of oppressed Black workers. SACTU's press releases ranged from moods of militant optimism to cautious concern through these tense months. One of its most bitter attacks on these 'Nuremburg measures' deserves lengthy quotation:

Does he (Minister Vorster) believe that by sealing off these (house arrested) people in their homes or flats he will make Apartheid workable and just? Does he think that the non-White workers will now abandon their struggle for living wages and their opposition to Job Reservations and all discriminatory laws?

Does he think that if these few courageous voices are no longer heard, the people will abandon their struggle for a truly democratic South Africa with equal rights for all? Does he think that Bantustans will come into existence with no voice to say 'NO'?

And when he has turned South African life into one vast unfunny game of rugby with every non-Nationalist citizen 'marked' by a member of the Special Branch, what then? Apartheid will be as unworkable and as unjust ...

Mr Vorster has yet to learn that not even gas chambers or concentration camps can kill ideas. Nor can they defeat the will of an oppressed people to freedom. ²¹

This statement and others like it were dispatched to trade unions throughout the world, with the result that international solidarity with SACTU was expressed from all corners of the globe. Trade unions in the capitalist world increasingly responded with principled criticism of the Sabotage Act, the Blanket Bans and the 90-day detentions. British TUC and ICI7TU statements correctly accused the Apartheid regime of destroying all forms of legitimate trade union activities, and specific communiques were sent to the government calling for the withdrawal of banning orders against SACTU leaders. ²²

British, Australian and Canadian trade unions distinguished themselves in supporting SACTU. The Waterside Workers Federation (Australia) took action by 'blacking' cargoes of fish, carbide and asbestos from South Africa; this union also pushed for the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) to endorse a general ban against the handling of all South African imports and the provision of financial assistance to SACTU whenever possible.

In Canada, the United Electrical and Machine Tool Workers of America (UE) branches contributed money to assist SACTU and its paper, Workers Unity. A statement regarding the Sabotage Act said, 1... (the Act) violates every concept of human justice, substituting savagery for civilization and fascist concentration camps for human rights.' Other Canadian unions to offer support were the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers of Canada, the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers and the Vancouver Civic Employees Union.

In England, Scotland and Ireland, unions responded either individually or through their association with the Movement for Colonial Freedom (mentioned in Chapter 11). The MC17 publication, Solidarity, regularly reported the details of victimization against SACTU and Congress leaders to its nineteen union contacts representing three and one half million workers. And in Europe, dockers in Denmark and Sweden sent telegrams and letters to SACTU Head Office reporting their decision to refuse the off-loading of South African ships. These are but a few of the examples of international solidarity that testify to the respect SACTU had developed amongst the workers of the world by 1964.

A major reason for this respect rests on the fact that SACTU never failed to focus its energies and concerns on the needs of the workers it represented. Despite bannings, detentions, torture, and ideological attacks on SACTU by Radio South Africa, the African workers in particular continued to turn to SACTU for assistance. SACTU had proven to these workers that it had none of the paternalism and opportunism characteristic of other coordinating bodies in South Africa. SACTU also stood with the African workers in the most severe periods of repression.

In 1962, the total number of Africans convicted under the pass laws and influx control regulations increased to more than 3 84,500. Africans were being forcibly removed from the Western Cape area as the regime was attempting to perfect its system of migrant labour and bantustan 'homelands'. SACTU regarded the victimization of its leaders as merely a part of the overall and systematic attack on the entire Black population. Even in the darkest hour of victimization against SACTU leaders in 1963, the organization devoted its energies to mobilizing opposition to the Bantu Law Amendment Bill that would soon become law.

There can be no greater tribute to SACTU's total dedication to the emancipation of Black workers from White supremacy and class exploitation than its ability to proclaim at the 1964 Annual National Conference:

The trade union movement lives in the hearts of the workers. In February 1964, within days of the 24-hour house arrest of our General Secretary (John Gaetsewe), the deportation of our Assistant General Secretary (Eddie Davoren) and the banning of another five officials, three new unions affiliated to SACTU. What greater expression of confidence could the workers have given us. ²³

Yet, the objective realities of oppression and the necessity to convert to new methods of underground activity were now apparent to all. The final paragraphs of the 1964 Conference Report capture the mood of the day and the shape of the future:

The future for SACTU is grim. Our loyal and devoted officials are suffering privations in every city in South Africa, unable to find employment anywhere since their bans, hounded and watched by the police, confined and restricted -punished with such severity because they dared to organize their fellow workers. Official after official is banned and we are carrying on in the face of such difficulties that it is like trying to swim against a tidal wave.

But SACTU is not doomed and can never be. Let this be absolutely clear. A trade union is not the Secretary in the office, but the workers in the factory; in the workshop; on the mines and on the farms. A trade union lives for as long as there are workers in it, and it is because of this that SACTU and its affiliated unions can never die. To those many thousands of workers who support SACTU we say:

Make very factory, every workshop, every mine, every farm a trade union fortress.

You are the trade union. See that your factory committee meets and that your boss knows that you represent the workers.

If your Secretary is banned and you cannot go to the office with your complaints and those of your fellow workers, take them up yourself - speak to the boss. He knows that for good relationships in the factory he must listen to the complaints and difficulties of his workers and he will listen to you. Your unions are legal. Do not be intimidated or frightened. There is nothing to stop you from getting together with your fellow workers.

NOTES

1. The exception was registered, 'mixed' unions that were forced under the IC Act of 1956 to separate into 'racial branches', which they did.

2. The story of the Treason Trial has been told by many authorities and will not be repeated here in any detail. See Lionel Forman and E. S. Sachs, The South African Treason Trial, John Calder, London, 1957, and M. Benson, op. cit.

3. Mary Benson summarizes some of the ludicrous incidents occurring during the Trial: 'There was the day that the prosecution solemnly pushed a motorcycle into the front of the Court to prove that it was possible for him (a policeman) to have sat on it at an outdoor meeting and taken verbatim notes, that he had not just gone home and written up only what he could remember. But he failed miserably, and the motorcycle was taken away. There were the two placards, "Soup without Meat and "Soup with Meat" seized by the police in their raid on the Congress of the People and handed in as exhibits for a charge of High Treason,'op. cit., p. 99. Other defendants tell of the state's expert witness on 'communism' being tricked by the defence counsel, V. Berrange, into identifying his own writings as an example of the 'communism' he proposed to know so well.
   An example of the role that banned people continued to play was that of Eli Weinberg, celebrated political photographer. During the Trial, he arranged a location, complete with tiered seating, to photograph all 156 Treason Trialists. A few moments before the photo was to be taken, Weinberg was told that the park that had been chosen could not be used because:'You're not going to bring all those "Kaffirs" in this park.' Alternatively, four photos of smaller groupings of defendants were taken and then made into a montage, resulting in the famous Treason Trial photograph published throughout the world. Over 1,000 copies were sold in South Africa alone.

4. The lengthy bans on SACTU's highest ranking officers led some SACTU leaders in other centres to feel that new officers should be elected at subsequent annual conferences. Rightly or wrongly, this was never done.

5. Chairman's Address, Inaugural Conference, March 1955. During the Trial SACTU denied affiliation to the WFTU, arguing that while the organization had applied for affiliation it was never able to afford the fees. This position was taken with full knowledge of how such an affiliation might have been used in the context of the state's attempt to prove treason and destroy the Congress Movement. Despite subsequent confusion created by this purely 'paper argument', the close relationship between SACTU and the WFTU never changed, at that time or in later years.

6. Veteran activist, E. P. Moretsele, died as a defendant during the Trial, and Lawrence Nkosi was dismissed from the Trial due to poor health. He later died of tuberculosis in 1962 at the age of 43. During the last five years of his life, he was frequently interrogated by Special Branch detectives, and the poverty of his family prevented them from travelling from the Transvaal to Natal to visit him during these years.

7. SACTU, Fifth Annual Conference Report, October 1960.

8. Shanti Naidoo returned to assist SACTU during the heavier repression of 1963.

9. During these months, one Government Minister - Paul Sauer - was quickly brought back into line by his Nationalist peers when he publicly stated that wage increases to African workers might be necessary as a 'concession'. SACTU expressed its awareness of the dangers of accepting concessions: 'We must constantly guard against the danger of getting small reforms for the price of our freedom. And, on the other hand, we now have the opportunity of taking advantage of the fight among the bosses to drive home our demands.'

10. Edward Ramsdale says that the Langa massacres shocked many Coloureds and Indians into the realization that they must stand together with their African brothers and sisters. A Relief Committee, organized by Coloureds and Indians, countered attempts to starve African workers in Langa into submission. Organizers, assisted in many cases by Indian shopkeepers, would manage to purchase all the bread from delivery trucks before they entered the 'White areas', and this food would then be distributed amongst the Africans. Interview, Edward Ramsdale.

11. Interviews, Phyllis Altman and Stephen Diamini.

12. The General Law Amendment Act, No. 39, of 196 1; this Act was a predecessor to the 90- and 180-day detention Acts described below.

13. The NUDW leadership had for many years supported the principles and objects of SACTU, although its membership could never be swayed to affiliate to SACTU. Throughout most of the decade under investigation, the NUDW opposed the SATUC's 'colour bar' policy and remained unaffiliated to any coordinating body.

14. Interview, Stephen Dlamini.

15. The GLAA, No. 39 (196 1) had amended the Riotous Assemblies Act to make it an offence to encourage or promote the assembly or attendance of a prohibited meeting, in this case the Stay-At-Home.

16. Quoted in Workers Unity, February-October 1962, p. 14.

17. SACTU President's Statement, 1 June 1962.

18. Among the thirty-six organizations, in addition to SACTU, were the Federation of South African Women, the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses, the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress and the South African Peace Council.

19. Quoted in Laws Affecting .... op. cit. These two proclamations relieved the state of listing individuals as such in separate orders.

20. Interview, Phyllis Altman.

21. New Age, 22 November 1962.

22. Despite their previous difficulty in supporting SACTU's political trade unionism, it had apparently become clear that of all the coordinating bodies in South Africa, only SA CUT had stood up to confront the regime and represent the interests of all workers.

23. Report, Ninth Annual National Conference, 23-24 March 1964. Eddie Davoren had been brought in to replace Phyllis Altman following her banning in late 1963.

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