The South African attacks on Harare, Lusaka and Gaborone, early on the morning of Monday, 19 May, Commonwealth capitals we had visited in the course of our work along with others in the region, once more reminded us of the other dimension of the Government's strategy - its determination to force its immediate neighbours to submit to South Africa's economic and political domination of the region. In its dealings with surrounding states. the South African Government has wielded the stick of military and economic sanctions to bend neighbouring nations to its will.
This, the external face of apartheid, is of importance in defending the system and in holding at bay pressure from the international community for ending it.
South Africa's intimidation of its neighbours has rested upon a persistent campaign of destabilization and economic disruption; many of its neighbours have suffered as a result. Military pressure takes many forms. It involves aid (through the supply of materials, training and supporting military action) for dissident movements. It includes action within neighbouring countries. like bombings and other acts of sabotage, as well as independent military action, involving air strikes and commando raids; and sometimes it takes the form of well-planned incursions.
Undoubtedly, Angola and Mozambique have borne the brunt of Pretoria's military aggression, in all its varieties, in the region. Namibia. which should have long ago become a sovereign and independent state, not only remains firmly occupied by South Africa but must mutely witness the use of its territory as a springboard and forward position for Pretoria's military campaigns against surrounding countries, especially Angola.
Several states have entered into 'non-aggression pacts' or security agreements with South Africa in an attempt to stave off further attacks; the Lusaka Accord of February 1984 with Angola and the Nkomati Accord of March 1984 with Mozambique are the best known of these. South Africa violated both these Accords from the very outset, giving the region further proof that it could not be trusted to honour even solemn Treaty obligations.
In March 1984, Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa. Under it, Mozambique undertook to ensure that its territory would not be used for attacks against South Africa while South Africa for its part agreed to terminate forthwith all assistance to the MNR. It has since become abundantly clear that South Africa never intended to honour its commitments. On its own admission, it has continued to support the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). In the end result, Mozambique's expectations from the Accord have not materialized. The war continues and with it the loss of lives and the mounting destruction of Mozambique's economy.
Lesotho, a country landlocked by South Africa, has suffered two major attacks; the first in December 1983 and the second only last December, besides numerous violations of its territorial integrity. Botswana was attacked in June last year and again in May 1986 along with Zambia and Zimbabwe at a time when we were in South Africa itself in pursuit of a peaceful settlement. We have alluded elsewhere to the implications for our work of these attacks.
But South Africa's punitive power is economic as well as military. Despite protestations to the contrary, South Africa not only believes in the principle of sanctions but has consistently applied them to its neighbours. This economic coercion is largely covert, since the Government likes to pretend to the world that it opposes economic boycotts. Clearly, it has no desire for the international community to follow suit.
Nevertheless, the evidence is clear. The destruction of crucial transport links in Mozambique and Angola by dissident movements receiving support from South Africa has aggravated the dependence of the countries in the region on South Africa's transport network. This gives South Africa enormous power to exercise economic pressure on these countries, which it has not hesitated to use for political ends. For example, in 1980-8i South Africa withdrew locomotives loaned to Zimbabwe. From time to time Botswana has experienced delays in securing railway wagons vital for its beef exports. Zimbabwe, for example, has had to incur heavy costs by stationing troops to guard a vital transport corridor through Mozambique.
Beginning in the mid-1970s but especially since 1980, South Africa has sought to disrupt and destroy the alternative transport networks and port opportunities opened to the landlocked countries of the region with the independence of Angola and Mozambique and the formation of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The aim has been to drive regional trade through the more expensive transportation routes of South Africa.
Other economic pressures have included the destruction of power lines and oil installations, ratcheting up the cost of fuel and transport; the destruction of houses, schools, factories and equipment; and the exploitation of those countries which act as exporters of cheap labour to South African mines, industry and agriculture. For example, the remittances of migrant workers have come to be a major source of revenue for the Government of Mozambique, and this link has been manipulated by the South Africans to cause considerable economic dislocation. South Africa has reduced Mozambican migrant workers by some 6o per cent since independence, and has terminated the preferential gold agreement under which a portion of the wages of migrant workers was remitted to the Government in gold at a fixed rate.
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are worst placed to escape from dependence on South Africa. Such is the degree of their dependence on the South African economy that only sheer political will has enabled them to avoid full absorption into the apartheid economy. Here too the regime has exploited the vulnerability of these countries in furtherance of its regional objective.
The cost of South Africa's 'total strategy', in terms of human life, is incalculable, although some estimate the loss of life at 100,000, and those made homeless at one million. But the grave impact of these destabilization policies on SAD CC economies - through lower revenues from exports, tourism and transport; from lower output and reduced capacity; from the waste of social and economic investment and the increasing diversion of resources into defence - can be calculated. The total cost to those nine countries is estimated at over US$10 billion in the period 1980-i984. That huge sum far exceeds the total foreign assistance received by SADCC, and is equivalent to about one third of all Member States' export earnings during that period. Some argue that this growing burden may well be of the order of US$4 or 5 billion a year for the SADCC region as a whole.
It is the reality of this dependence which led Botswana's Vice-President Peter Mmusi to observe in January that 'The abolition of apartheid could be the greatest single contribution which could be made to the economic development of the region.' This is the reason why countries whose economies are intertwined with that of South Africa, and who inevitably remain vulnerable, none the less regard the imposition of economic sanctions on South Africa as the sole remaining instrument for effective change in the absence of serious negotiations by the South African Government with genuine black leaders.
Front-Line leaders have repeatedly called on the international community to take just that course; and they have done so in the conviction that, in the prevailing circumstances, it is the only peaceful resort which will shorten the agony unleashed on the region by apartheid over so many decades.
Nobody who cares for the future of a free and non-racial South Africa, rich in resources and productive in its trade and commerce, would wish to see the destruction of its economic and industrial base. Yet that will be the consequence if the continuing failure to dismantle apartheid and peacefully negotiate a political settlement is allowed to run in parallel with an external policy of conflict and destruction, involving the whole sub-continent.
Apartheid South Africa poses a wide threat well beyond its borders.
Our work in South Africa has been a moving personal experience for every one of us. We arrived in the country when there was carnage in Alexandra. On the day of our final departure from Cape Town, Crossroads was on fire and a pall of smoke hung in the sky. We saw a country in upheaval and witnessed great human suffering. Even as we write, the killings continue.
Each of us pondered at length the invitation to serve on the Group. It was clear that our task would be immensely difficult. Its success would depend, ultimately, on the good faith of the South African Government and on the co-operation of all significant sections of South African society. It was only because we were persuaded that, whatever the odds, this was a task worth attempting that we accepted. In the course of our successive visits to South Africa, and on becoming better acquainted with the effects of apartheid and the scale of the country's antagonisms, there could be little doubt that the alternative to a negotiated solution would be appalling chaos, bloodshed and destruction. We are concerned that the South African Government's rejection, in effect, of our negotiating concept compounded by its armed aggression against Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe makes those dangers more imminent and the prospect of negotiations more difficult.
With members from diverse national and political backgrounds, we possessed particular advantages. We believe we acquired the confidence and trust of all the principal black leaders and organizations within the country, as well as the liberation movements outside. We were able to travel freely throughout South Africa, to visit black townships normally not accessible to outsiders and to talk to a diverse spectrum of opinion including opposition parties, trade unions, church leaders, businessmen, women's groups and civil rights activists. In extensive discussions with the State President and many of his Ministers, we also gained valuable insights into the Government's own thinking and future plans. The range of contacts we made, enabling us to understand the complexities of the situation, was probably unique; the frankness and the openness of the discussions unlikely to be replicated in the near future. We, therefore, permit ourselves some broader reflections.
Our mandate was to foster a process of negotiation across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government. It is our considered view that, despite appearances and statements to the contrary) the South African Government is not yet ready to negotiate such a future - except on its own terms. Those terms, both in regard to objectives and modalities, fall far short of reasonable black expectations and well accepted democratic norms and principles.
The objectives of any negotiations, as Commonwealth leaders agreed at Nassau, and as all the non-white people of South Africa as well as increasing numbers of whites demand, would be the dismantling of the apartheid system and the erection of the structures of democracy in South Africa. We rejected as impractical the suggestion that the whole complex web of apartheid legislation be repealed as a prelude to negotiation; we were concerned to ensure, however, that there should be a firm and unambiguous commitment by the Government to ending apartheid in order to provide integrity to the negotiating agenda and the negotiating process - as well as specific and meaningful steps taken to that end. It needs to be remembered that apartheid goes beyond institutionalized racial discrimination and economic exploitation; it is primarily a means of keeping ultimate political and economic power in the hands of the white minority. Any reservations by the Government about dismantling apartheid would inevitably and understandably be viewed by the vast majority as a ploy for perpetuating white power in a new guise, a willingness to change its form but not abandon its substance.
The Government told us categorically that it was prepared to contemplate negotiations with a completely open agenda, where everything would be on the table. However, as we have pointed out elsewhere, in some respects, the open agenda appeared to be circumscribed. Nevertheless, for the purposes of our discussions we gave the South African Government the benefit of the doubt in our minds. In the Government's thinking, there were a number of non-negotiables; for example, the concept of group rights - the very basis of the apartheid system - was sacrosanct; the 'homelands' created in furtherance of that concept would not disappear, but be reinforced with the emergence of an 'independent' KwaNdebele; the principle of one man one vote in a unitary state was beyond the realm of possibility; the Population Registration Act would continue; and the present Tricameral Constitution which institutionalises racism must be the vehicle for future constitutional reform.
From these and other recent developments, we draw the conclusion that while the Government claims to be ready to negotiate, it is in truth not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future. Its programme of reform does not end apartheid, but seeks to give it a less inhuman face. Its quest is power-sharing, but without surrendering overall white control.
In regard to the modalities of negotiation, the Government's position has a considerable element of wishful thinking. The Government is willing and ready to negotiate with 'responsible' leaders; if only violence and 'intimidation' would abate, these leaders would be ready to come to the negotiating table to strike a deal. Although we were never told by the Government who these 'responsible' leaders might be - indeed, the Government assured us it would not prescribe or limit the people's choice it could be inferred that prominent among them would be the 'homelands' leaders whom the Government repeatedly urged us to see. With the exception of Chief Buthelezi, the 'homeland' leaders have no real political standing or following and would not, in our view, be credible parties in a negotiation to resolve South Africa's deepening crisis. It is not for us to prescribe or advise who the parties to a genuine negotiation might be; but we noted as significant the Government's allergy to our proposal that they should be the 'true', 'authentic' or 'acknowledged' leaders of the people.
Negotiations leading to fundamental political change and the erection of democratic structures will only be possible if the South African Government is prepared to deal with leaders of the people's choosing rather than with puppets of its own creation. President Botha's recent statements expressing his determination to 'break' the ANC bode ill for the country's future. There can be no negotiated settlement in South Africa without the ANC; the breadth of its support is incontestable; and this support is growing. Among the many striking figures whom we met in the course of our work, Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo stand out. Their reasonableness, absence of rancour and readiness to find negotiated solutions which, while creating genuine democratic structures would still give the whites a feeling of security and participation, impressed us deeply. If the Government finds itself unable to talk with men like Mandela and Tambo, then the future of South Africa is bleak indeed.
The Government made it clear that it did not regard the ANC as the only other party to negotiations. We agree, but would emphasize that the ANC is a necessary party. The Government itself acknowledges this, if only by blaming the ANC for most of the violence. The open identification with the ANC through banners and songs, in funerals and in churches throughout the country, despite the risks involved, supports the widely-held belief that if an election were held today on the basis of universal franchise the ANC would win it. Whatever the truth of that assertion, we none the less recognize that black political opinion is not monolithic. If, therefore, the Government is serious about negotiations, it must create conditions in which free political activity becomes possible, and political parties and leaders are able to function effectively and test the extent of their popular support. Tragically, the whole thrust of Government policy has been to thwart such legitimate leadership from emerging and destroy it where it does. Even nonviolent organizations like the UDF have been subjected to harassment and persecution.
Behind these attitudes lurks a deeper truth. After more than 18 months of persistent unrest, upheaval, and killings unprecedented in the country's history, the Government believes that it can contain the situation indefinitely by use of force. We were repeatedly told by Ministers that the Government had deployed only a fraction of the power at its disposal. Although the Government's confidence may be valid in the short term, but at great human cost, it is plainly misplaced in the longer term. South Africa is predominantly a country of black people. To believe that they can be indefinitely suppressed is an act of self-delusion.
By pandering to right-wing anxieties and demands, the Government fortifies them, compounding its own problems and losing whatever initiative it may have possessed. It is also in danger of falling between two stools. Its promises of reform have created anxiety among certain sections of its supporters and contributed to a growing white backlash; yet the reforms themselves have made little impact on black attitudes or aspirations - save to confirm the Government's implacable resistance to significant change.
While right-wing opposition cannot be ignored, it would be fatal to give it a veto. Indeed, we gained the impression that white opinion as a whole may be ahead of the Government in significant respects, ready to respond positively if given a bold lead.
We are left with the impression of a divided Government. Yet even the more enlightened Ministers whom we met seem to be out of touch with the mood in the black townships, the rising tide of anger and impatience within them, and the extent of black mobilization. And so, of course, are the great generality of white South Africans - only some ten per cent of whom, we were told, have ever seen conditions in a township.
Put in the most simple way, the blacks have had enough of apartheid. They are no longer prepared to submit to its oppression, discrimination and exploitation. They can no longer stomach being treated as aliens in their own country. They have confidence not merely in the justice of their cause, but in the inevitability of their victory. Unlike the earlier periods of unrest and Government attempts to stamp out protest, there has been during the last 18 months no outflow of black refugees from South Africa. The strength of black convictions is now matched by a readiness to die for those convictions. They will, therefore, sustain their struggle, whatever the cost.
The campaign against collaborators, and the ruthless elimination of agents of white authority, will continue. More and more black townships will be rendered ungovernable, and the process of creating popular structures of self-government within them will gather momentum. The number of street and area committees will increase and their functions will progressively enlarge.
The writ of the Government will be increasingly circumscribed. Inter-black rivalry and violence, partly encouraged and fomented by the Government, will grow, making the task of negotiating a settlement even more difficult. Political upheaval and social unrest will accelerate the flight of capital and professional skills and the economy's downward spiral.
Amidst all this gloom the quality of the country's black leaders shines through. Their achievement in bringing about popular and trade union mobilization in the face of huge odds commands respect. Their idealism, their genuine sense of non-racialism, and their -readiness not only to forget but to forgive, compel admiration. These are precious assets which a new South Africa will need; they may be lost altogether if the Government continues to shrink from taking the necessary political decisions with a sense of urgency. The options are diminishing by the day.
The Government faces difficult choices. Its obduracy and intransigence wrecked the Commonwealth's initiative, but the issues themselves will not go away, nor can they be bombed out of existence. It is not sanctions which will destroy the country but the persistence of apartheid and the Government's failure to engage in fundamental political reform.
In our Report we have addressed in turn the five steps which the Nassau Accord called on the authorities in Pretoria to take 'in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency'. They, and our conclusions with regard to them, are as follows:
We have examined the Government's 'programme of reform' and have been forced to conclude that at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid.
Although the state of emergency was technically lifted, the substantive powers remain broadly in force under the ordinary laws of the land which, even now, are being further strengthened in this direction.
Nelson Mandela and other political leaders remain in prison.
Political freedom is far from being established; if anything, it is being more rigorously curtailed. The ANC and other political parties remain banned.
The cycle of violence and counter-violence has spiralled and there is no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government.
Overall, the concrete and adequate progress looked for in the Nassau Accord towards the objectives of 'dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa' has not materialized.
Indeed, in recent weeks the Government would appear to have moved consciously away from any realistic negotiating process. It is not just their communications with us which have indicated a hardening of attitude. The same message has been clear in the State President's speech in May, the bombing of three neighbouring Commonwealth countries even while we were in discussion with senior Ministers, the denigration and smearing of the ANC, the retreat from the earlier readiness to accept 'suspension' as opposed to 'renunciation' of violence, the seeking of greater security powers for the police and military on top of the massive powers they already have, the renewed determination to suppress public meetings and free speech and to harass black leaders, and not least the more recent raids on Angolan ports.
For all the people of South Africa and of the sub-region as a whole, the
certain prospect is of an even sharper decline into
violence and bloodshed with all its attendant human costs. A racial
conflagration with frightening implications threatens. The uncoordinated
violence of today could become in the not too distant future a major armed
conflict spilling well beyond South Africa's borders. In such circumstances the
entire economic fabric of the country would indeed be destroyed. Up to now those
responsible for the armed resistance in South Africa have shown great regard for
innocent lives. Unless the cycle of violence is broken, full-fledged guerrilla
warfare as practised in other parts of the world, in which 'soft' civilian
targets become prime targets in a reign of terror and counter-terror, may come
to pass. In the absence of significant moves to break the cycle of violence we
see the prospect as inevitable and that in the very foreseeable future.
What can be done? What remaining influence does the international community have? What can major states do to help avert an otherwise inevitable disaster? There may be no course available that can guarantee a significantly more peaceful solution. But against the background in which ever-increasing violence will be a certainty, the question of further measures immediately springs to mind. As the Nassau Accord makes clear, Commonwealth Heads of Government have agreed that, in the event of adequate progress not having been made in South Africa within a period of six months, they would consider further measures.
While we are not determining the nature or extent of any measures which might be adopted, or their effectiveness, we point to the fact that the Government of South Africa has itself used economic measures against its neighbours and that such measures are patently instruments of its own national policy.
We are convinced that the South African Government is concerned about the adoption of effective economic measures against it. If it comes to the conclusion that it would always remain protected from such measures, the process of change in South Africa is unlikely to increase in momentum and the descent into violence would be accelerated. In these circumstances, the cost in lives may have to be counted in millions.
From the point of view of the black leadership, the course now taken by the world community will have the greatest significance. That leadership has already come to the view that diplomatic persuasion has not and will not move the South African Government sufficiently. If it also comes to believe that the world community will never exercise sufficient effective pressure through other measures in support of their cause, they will have only one option remaining: that of ever-increasing violence. Once decisions involving greater violence are made on both sides, they carry an inevitability of their own and are difficult, if not impossible, to reverse, except as a result of exhaustion through prolonged conflict.
The question in front of Heads of Government is in our view clear. It is not whether such measures will compel change; it is already the case that their absence and Pretoria's belief that they need not be feared, defers change. Is the Commonwealth to stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral? Or will it take concerted action of an effective kind? Such action may offer the last opportunity to avert what could be the worst bloodbath since the Second World War.
We hope that this Report will assist the Commonwealth and the wider international community - in helping all the people of South Africa save themselves from that awesome tragedy.
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
London SW1Y 5HX
13 December 1985
Dear Mr. State President,
We are writing on behalf of the seven-member Group established by Commonwealth Heads of Government pursuant to their Nassau 'Accord on Southern Africa'. You may recall that the text of the Accord together with the composition of our Group was transmitted at the request of the Commonwealth Secretary-General to your Government on 25 November by the diplomatic representatives of Australia, Britain and Canada. The Accord constitutes the broad mandate under which we are working.
We have today concluded our first meeting in London. We are anxious to get down to business as quickly as possible in a spirit of helpfulness and with the co-operation of all the parties concerned, working quietly and essentially in non-public ways. We therefore attach the utmost importance to visiting South Africa for consultations with your Government and all who are in a position to contribute to the achievement of our objective. This we perceive as being essential for encouraging and facilitating the process of political dialogue envisaged in the Accord.
Consistent with our purpose, we would need while in South Africa to meet with the Government, with the true representatives of the black population as well as with others whose views would be relevant to such a process. In our discussions we will seek to clarify attitudes towards beginning the dialogue envisaged and to elicit views on ways of advancing it.
We have noted with appreciation the statement by your Foreign Minister, The Hon. Pik Botha, on 26 November. Since it is our clear wish that our first contacts should if possible be with your Government we would very much hope that a visit along the lines outlined above could be arranged at the earliest possible date, preferably before the end of January, 1986.
Yours sincerely,
Malcolm Fraser Olusegun Obasanjo
Co-Chairman Co-Chairman
HE Mr. P. W. Botha,
State President,
Republic of South Africa
****
Union Buildings
Pretoria
24 December 1985
Gentlemen
I acknowledge your letter of 13 December 1985 as conveyed to the Department of Foreign Affairs by the Ambassadors of Canada, United Kingdom and Australia on 16 December 1985.
I am encouraged by your positive reaction to the statement issued by my Minister of Foreign Affairs on 26 November 1985 setting out the South African Government's attitude with regard to the Commonwealth initiative.
I am prepared to approach this initiative constructively. 1 hope that you will be equally constructive in your approach. The Commonwealth Group can do incalculable harm if it sees itself as a pressure group charged with the task of extracting concessions from the Government and generally engaged in prescribing solutions to problems which are the sole concern of South Africans.
If, on the other hand, it wants to be informed of the situation in South Africa and confines itself to promoting peaceful political dialogue and, moreover, can be seen to be unbiased in this respect, it could serve a useful purpose. I agree that a suspension of violence is a requirement for dialogue. I would hope, therefore, that the Commonwealth Group will discourage violence and avoid action or comment which might be seen or interpreted as encouragement to those promoting or supporting violence.
To ensure that there is no misunderstanding concerning the policies and objectives of my Government, let me state that we are determined to proceed with our reform programme which has already reached an advanced stage, whatever the obstacles we have to contend with; and we want to get moving with the negotiations. The sooner this can be done the better, for this is the key to the solution of our problems. Our political programme provides for power sharing, subject only to the protection of the rights of all minorities, and we are reconciled to the eventual disappearance of white domination. All our communities must have a fair say in Government and this is what we shall be striving to achieve in the course of the negotiations. It presages the end of racial discrimination. But we need the co-operation of all our communities in constructing an alternative system of Government for South Africa. I trust that the Group will ensure that it does nothing which might impede the creation of a climate conducive to such co-operation.
You are welcome to visit South Africa and to consult with my Government and the representatives of the various population groups on the basis of the foregoing considerations. The modalities and timing can be arranged to our mutual satisfaction at functional level in the course of January 1986.
Yours sincerely
P. W. BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Mr Malcolm Fraser
General Olusegun Obasanjo
Co-Chairmen
Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group
LONDON
The following statement lists the meetings we had in the course of our work. Not listed are many of the people with whom we met both formally and informally within and outside South Africa. There were others whom we were unable to meet by reason of their absence from South Africa or unavoidable commitments elsewhere; and there were a few who declined our approaches.
Our work generated much interest in South Africa and beyond, and we received a steady flow of petitions and communications. To the many individuals and groups, too numerous to mention here by name, who made their views known to us we express our gratitude.
We owe a special debt to the three Commonwealth Ambassadors in South Africa - Australia, Britain and Canada - and members of their Missions, for their advice and practical assistance in facilitating our work in South Africa. Our thanks are also due to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs for the assistance and courtesies extended to us.
Formal Meetings of the Group
The Group convened in formal session on five occasions at Marlborough House, the Commonwealth Secretariat Headquarters in London, as follows:
At these meetings the Group undertook consultations with senior officials of the South African Government on several occasions; and benefited from the submissions of numerous experts on South African affairs.
Preliminary Visit to South Africa (Undertaken By Mr. Malcolm Fraser and General Olusegun Obasanjo, the Co-Chairmen, and Dame Nita Barrow)
Sunday, 16 February - Cape Town
Monday, 17 February - Cape Town
Tuesday, 18 February - Cape Town
Wednesday, 19 February - Johannesburg
Thursday, 20 February - Johannesburg - Visit to Soweto
Friday, 21 February - Johannesburg and Cape Town
* The Group sometimes divided to undertake different assignments, in subgroups or individually. These assignments are indicated by a single asterisk for the remainder of Annex III
Saturday, 22 February - Port Elizabeth
Visit to Neighbouring States
Sunday, 23 February - Maseru, Lesotho
Monday, 24 February - Maseru, Lesotho and Gaborone, Botswana
Tuesday, 25 February - Gaborone, Botswana and Harare, Zimbabwe
Thursday, 27 February - Lusaka, Zambia
First Visit of the Full Group to South Africa
Sunday, 2 March - Cape Town
Monday, 3 March - Cape Town
Tuesday, 4 March - Cape Town
Wednesday, 5 March - Port Elizabeth* and the Midlands region
Thursday, 6 March - Johannesburg and Pretoria
Friday, 7 March - Johannesburg
Saturday, 8 March - Johannesburg
Sunday, 9 March - Johannesburg
Monday, 10 March - Johannesburg and Durban
Tuesday, 11 March - Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town
Wednesday, 12 March - Cape Town
Thursday, 13 March - Cape Town
Visit by General 0basanjo, and Mr. Malecela to Front-line States and Nigeria
Tuesday, 1 April - Lagos, Nigeria
Thursday, 3 April - Harare, Zimbabwe and Lusaka, Zambia
Meeting of the Group in London
Wednesday, 30 April
Second Visit by the Group to South Africa and Zambia
Thursday, 13 May - Cape Town
Friday, 16 May - Cape Town and Lusaka
Saturday, 17 May - Lusaka, Zambia
Sunday, 18 May - Johannesburg
Monday, 19 May - Cape Town
Other Visits and Meetings
In addition to its formal meetings in London, its visits to South Africa and the Front-Line States, members of the Group both jointly and individually undertook a series of consultations in Southern Africa, Nigeria and Tanzania, the United States and Europe. As individuals they also had occasional meetings in the course of their work with Commonwealth Heads of Government and Ministers of the seven countries responsible for their appointment to the Group.
TO: NOMZAMO WINNIE MANDELA
802 BLACK VILLAGE
BRANDFORT
NOTICE IN TERMS OF SECTION 21 OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, 1982 (ACT 74 OF 1982)
Under and by virtue of the powers vested in me by section 21 of the Internal Security Act, 1982 (Act 74 of 1982), I hereby order you for the period from 2 July 1983 to 30 June 1988, both dates inclusive, to report to the officer in charge of the Brandfort Police Station, on every Monday between 06h00-and 18h00: Provided that if such Monday falls on a public holiday, you shall report on the following day not being a public holiday.
Given under my hand at Cape Town this i8th day of June 1983.
L. LE GRANGE
MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER
Note: The Magistrate, Brandfort, has in terms of section 21 of Act 74 of 1982 been empowered to authorize exceptions to the prohibitions contained in this notice.
TO: NOMZAMO WINNIE MANDELA
802 BLACK VILLAGE
BRANDFORT
NOTICE IN TERMS OF SECTION 19(I)(a) OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, 1982 (ACT 74 OF 1982)
Under and by virtue of the powers vested in me by section 19(I)(a) of the Internal Security Act, 1982 (Act 74 of 1982), I hereby prohibit you for the period from 2 July 1983 to 30 June 1988, both dates inclusive, from -
Given under my hand at Cape Town this 18th day of June 1983.
L. LE GRANGE
MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER
Note: (1) The Magistrate, Brandfort, has in terms of section 19(I) of Act 74 of 1982 been empowered to authorize exceptions to the prohibitions contained in this notice.
(2) In terms of section 25(2) of the said Act you may, at any time within a period of fourteen days as from the date on which this notice is delivered or tendered to you, make written representations to the Minister of Law and Order relating to the prohibitions contained in this notice and you may also, within the said period submit in writing any other information relating to the circumstances of your case. You may also, in terms of section 38(4) of the Act, apply in writing to the Board of Review to present oral evidence before the Board of Review. The address of the Board of Review is: The Secretary of the Board of Review, Private Bag X655, PRETORIA, 0001.
STATEMENT IN TERMS OF SECTION 25(1) OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, 1982 (ACT 74 OF 1982)
Given under my hand at Cape Town this 18th day of June 1983.
L. LE GRANGE
MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER
TO: NOMZAMO WINNIE MANDELA
802 BLACK VILLAGE
BRANDFORT
NOTICE IN TERMS OF SECTION 20(a) OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, 1982 (ACT 74 OF 1982)
Under and by virtue of the powers vested in me by section 20(a) of the Internal Security Act, 1982 (Act 74 of 1982), I hereby prohibit you for the period from 2 JUly 1983 to 30 June 1988, both dates inclusive, from attending within the Republic of South Africa -
Given under my hand at Cape Town this i8th day of June 1983.
L. LE GRANGE
MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER
Note: (1) The Magistrate, Brandfort, has in terms of section 20 of Act 74 of 1982 been empowered to authorize exceptions to the prohibitions contained in this notice.
(2) In terms of section 25(2) of the said Act you may, at any time within a period of fourteen days as from the date on which this notice is delivered or tendered to you, make written representations to the Minister of Law and Order relating to the prohibitions contained in this notice and you may also, within the said period, submit in writing any other information relating to the circumstances of your case. You may also, in terms of section 38(4) of the Act, apply in writing to the Board of Review to present oral evidence before the Board of Review. The address of the Board of Review is: The Secretary of the Board of Review, Private Bag X655, Pretoria, 0001.
STATEMENT IN TERMS OF SECTION 25(1) OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, 1982 (ACT 74 OF 1982)
I am satisfied that the said NOMZAMO WINNIE MANDELAis likely to propagate or promote activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of law and order.
Given under my hand at Cape Town this 18th day of June 1983.
L. LE GRANGE
MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER
Annexure B
TO: KOMZAMO WINNIE MANDELA
BRANDFORT
NOTICE IN TERMS OF SECTION 24 OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, 1982 (ACT 74 OF 1982)
I hereby, in terms of section 24 of the Internal Security Act, 1982 -
'(i) being within any of the following magisterial districts, namely Johannesburg and Roodepoort';
Signed at Cape Town this 20th day of December 1985.
L. LE GRANGE
MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER
Constitutional Goal
'The Government's general constitutional goal is, while maintaining security, stability and self-determination for each group, to give all the country's people a say in decision-making that affects their interests. This applies to all the population communities of South Africa.' (25 January 1985)
Undivided South Africa
'I thus finally confirm that my Party and I are committed to the principle of a united South Africa, one citizenship and a universal franchise within structures chosen by South Africans . . .' (30 September 1985) 'The over-riding common denominator is our mutual interest in each other's freedom and well-being. Our peace and prosperity is indivisible.' (15 August 1985)
'We accept an undivided Republic of South Africa where all regions and communities within its boundaries form part of the South African state, with the right to participate in institutions to be negotiated collectively.' (31 January 1985)
Democracy
'In the constitutional field I want to stress that the Government is resolved to pursue peaceful and democratic solutions that satisfy the requirements of fairness and justice.' (25 January 1985)
'We believe in democratic institutions of government.' (15 August 1985)
'Solutions must be democratic, but in this regard I wish to join the ranks of other leaders who agree that solutions are not to be found in clichéd models although they could include elements of known models.' (30 September 1985)
'We believe that a democratic system of government, which must accommodate all legitimate political aspirations of all the South African communities, must be negotiated.' (31 January 1986)
Apartheid
'If apartheid means
then the South African Government shares in the rejection of the concept.' (30 September 1985)
'We have outgrown the outdated colonial system of paternalism as well as the outdated concept of apartheid.' (31 January 1986)
Power-Sharing
'My Government stated clearly that all groups and communities within the geographical area of this state must obtain representation to the highest level without domination of the one over the other. Therefore I do not understand why the Government is time and again still expected to say that it is prepared to share its decision-making power with other communities. It is accepted National Party Policy . (30 September 1985)
'The peoples of the Republic of South Africa form one nation. But our nation is a nation of minorities. Given the multi-cultural nature of South African society, this of necessity implies participation by all communities; the sharing of power between these communities; but also the devolution of power as far as possible; and the protection of minority rights, without one group dominating another.' (31 January 1986)
Participation in Government
'Now let me say explicitly that 1 believe in participation of all the South African communities on matters of common concern. I believe there should exist structures to reach this goal of co-responsibility and participation.' (15 August 1985)
'It is evident that units will have to be recognized on a geographical and group basis. This obviously also includes the black urban communities who for constitutional purposes, are recognized as political entities. Each such unit should have autonomy on matters that only affect that unit, while the units on central level should jointly manage matters of mutual concern.' (30 September 1985)
'All South Africans must be placed in a position where they can participate in government through their elected representatives.' (31 January 1986)
No Domination
'We are committed to co-operative co-existence ... But this is possible only within a system in which there is no domination of one population group over another, which in turn requires self-determination for each group over its own affairs and joint responsibility for and co-operation on common interests.' (25 January 1985)
'But I know for a fact that most leaders in their own right in South Africa and reasonable South Africans will not accept the principle of one-man-one-vote in a unitary system. That would lead to domination of one over the others and it would lead to chaos.' (15 August 1985)
Protection of Minorities
'We believe in the protection of minorities.' (15 August 1985)
'Any constitutional dispensation will have to take into consideration the multi-cultural nature of the composition of our population in this country, and that any dispensation will have to ensure that one group is not placed in a position where it can dominate other groups. The protection of minority groups will thus have to be ensured.' (30 September 1985)
'We are involved in the mutual pursuance of both equal rights for individuals and security for each group. The ways in which the fundamental rights of individuals and groups ... can be protected, are therefore an essential element of the Government's agenda for constitutional reform.' (30 September 1985)
'We believe in the sovereignty of the law as the basis for the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals as well as groups. We believe in the sanctity and indivisibility of law and the just application thereof.' (31 January 1986)
'There can be no peace, freedom and democracy without law. Any future system must conform with the requirements of a civilized legal order, and must ensure access to the courts and equality before the law.' (31 January 1986)
'We believe that human dignity, life, liberty and property of all must be protected, regardless of colour, race, creed or religion.'(31 January 1986)
National States
'Co-operation with the independent states within the multilateral dispensation will, in line with the current trend, be further extended as a level at which the governments concerned are given a say regarding actions by the RSA that affect them, and vice versa.' (25 January 1985)
'The Government respects the decision of the four states that previously formed part of the Republic, to take independence. As a result of the large degree of interdependence between the independent states and the Republic, the Government nevertheless acknowledges the possibility of co-operation with these states in an overall framework.' (30 September 1985)
'Independence will remain the goal in the case of the self-governing states, but since the Government does not intend forcing this on anyone, there will be increasing co-operation with self-governing national states within collective structures.' (25 January 1985)
'Should any of the black National States therefore prefer not to accept independence, such states or communities will remain a part of the South African nation, are South African citizens and should be accommodated within political institutions within the boundaries of the Republic of South Africa.' (15 August 1985)
'The Republic of South Africa forms one state. It is an explicit implication of the Government's view that independence will not be forced on the self-governing regions and that they form part of the Republic until they should decide to become independent.' (30 September 1985)
Urban Blacks
'It has been decided to treat such (black) communities for constitutional purposes as entities which in their own right . . . must be given political participations and a say at higher levels.' (25 January 1985)
'I admit that the acceptance by my Government of the permanence of black communities in urban areas outside the National States means that a solution will have to be found for their legitimate rights.' (15 August 1985)
Citizenship
'We must consequently accept the South African citizenship of those black persons who lost their citizenship because of the independence of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, but who permanently reside in South Africa.' (i11 September 1985)
'The South African Government is prepared to negotiate with these four Governments about restoring the South African citizenship of members of the black communities residing within the borders of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, who lost their citizenship as a result of independence. We propose that this be done on the basis of dual citizenship . . .' (30 September 1985)
'We accept one citizenship for all South Africans, implying equal treatment and opportunities.' (31 January 1986)
Overall Framework
'To avoid unnecessary fragmentation at the constitutional level the Government has decided that, in the longer term, efforts should be made to co-operate on matters of common interest within the same overall framework with the various political entities that find themselves within the South African context.' (25 January 1985)
Negotiation
'It is necessary that the existing mechanisms for negotiation be improved and that the process of negotiation be substantially extended. 1 have therefore decided to establish an informal, non-statutory forum ... to create a favourable basis for negotiations aimed at arriving at mutually acceptable development steps in the constitutional field.' (25 January 1985)
'It is my considered opinion that any future constitutional dispensation providing for participation by all South African citizens should be negotiated.' (15 August 1985)
'I say it would be wrong to be prescriptive as to structures within which participation will have to take place in future.' (15 August 1985)
'It is the conviction of the Government that the structures in which this co-operation will take place, must be the result of negotiation with the leaders of all the communities.' (30 September 1985)
If the need exists among the leaders of black communities to participate within the President's Council ... I am willing to reconsider the structuring and the functions of the President's Council to make provision for their participation.' (30 September 1985)
National Statutory Council
'I now wish to announce that I intend to negotiate the establishment of a national statutory council which will meet under my chairmanship.
I propose that this council should consist of representatives of the South African Government, representatives of the Governments of the self-governing National States, as well as leaders of other black communities and interest groups.
Pending the creation of constitutional structures jointly to be agreed upon for our multi-cultural society, this council should consider and advise on matters of common concern, including proposed legislation of such matters.
This council can meet under the chairmanship of the State President as often as needed.' (31 January 1986)
Norms and Values
Consequently, in the interest of South Africa and our various population groups, I want to spell out emphatically certain important principles which are not negotiable.
Firstly, whatever negotiated solutions we can produce will have to be implemented by Parliament since negotiated reform must be implemented constitutionally. This includes the possibility of general elections or a referendum, in the case of drastic deviation from already accepted policies.
Secondly, the Government subscribes to certain fundamental norms and values by which it will be guided throughout the process of negotiation in the belief that a negotiated settlement is only possible within the parameters of these norms and values.
It will also be guided by these norms and values while it continues to govern the country as a civilized state.
These norms and values include the following which will have to be entrenched in any new dispensation:
This means that a democratic dispensation of government which must accommodate the legitimate political aspirations of all South Africa's communities must be designed and implemented.
Such a dispensation must take cognizance of and reflect the multicultural nature of the South African society and must provide for visible and effective protection of minority groups and the rights against domination and for self-determination for such groups and communities.
South Africa is a country of minorities and a multi-cultural society. Its diversity is a fact that must be accepted.
The Government is committed to devise such democratic solutions in co-operation with South Africans who are also committed to peaceful and democratic solutions and who reject violence as a means of achieving political goals.
In this respect it is the Government's conviction that only purposeful broadening of democracy of the South African society at large and accompanying socio-economic reform can ensure lasting peace and stability.
Firstly, on the personal and individual level which also implies respect for and the protection of the human dignity, life and property of all.
Secondly, liberty on the group and community level which implies respect for and the promotion and protection of the right to self-determination of population groups and peoples.
Thirdly, liberty on the state and national level to safeguard the integrity and freedom of the country and to secure the protection of our citizens through the application of civilized standards of justice, order and security.
True democracy for the Republic of South Africa and all its peoples, individually and collectively, must recognize each of these components of freedom since the absence of such recognition will diminish, not increase, the freedom of our peoples.