Paper presented to the World Conference for Action against Apartheid, Lagos, August 1977 (1)
The situation in southern Africa has never been more explosive: in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa itself there is a state of war being fought at various levels. The white-power system has never before faced such a serious crisis and it is fighting for its very survival.
But the crisis in southern Africa also represents a serious crisis for Western policy. Southern Africa is now the major item on the world agenda. Whether it be this year's Western summit gathering in London or the subsequent Council meeting of NATO Ministers, or the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, or the discussions of EEC Foreign Ministers, Western political leaders are confronted by the pressing problems arising out of the southern African conflict. The traditional allies of South Africa are being compelled to re-examine their policies and work out a new strategy to protect their interests in that region.
What has brought all this about? To understand that, one has to trace the course of recent history so that the rapidly unfolding events are seen in their total perspective.
(a) End of Portuguese colonialism
The present crisis has in the main been brought about by the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in April 1974 and the new militant mood of the oppressed African majority in southern Africa. It is of course important to note that Portuguese colonialism was brought to an end as a result of the long and heroic struggle of the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, and it is they who also contributed in large measure to bringing about the liberation of the Portuguese people from dictatorship.
The liquidation of Portuguese colonialism transformed the whole southern African situation. The balance-of-power has been changed. The initiative has passed to the African people in a decisive way. The white regimes are on a desperate retreat. Virtually overnight, what were once valuable buffer territories, serving as convenient outposts for the Pretoria regime to keep the African liberation movements at bay, have been transformed into genuine independent States firmly committed to the destruction of apartheid and colonialism in southern Africa.
In early 1974 there was confusion in Pretoria about how to deal with the changes. There was similar confusion in the major Western capitals. But that was because South Africa itself had now become highly vulnerable. The Pretoria regime, being the effective colonial power in Rhodesia and in illegal occupation of Namibia, would have to ultimately cope with the main brunt of the African liberation struggle in all three white-ruled territories: the very heart of the white-power system was seriously at risk.
With the independence of Mozambique in June 1975 South Africa was to face its first real security border with an independent African State. South African troops were promptly dispatched to the border which was heavily patrolled - more and more whites were recruited into the armed forces, the military was set on alert and there was increased tension in the area. However, FRELIMO (Liberation Movement of Mozambique) was able to consolidate its rule and South Africa was unable to destabilise Mozambique.
(b) Threat to Angola
The prospect of Angolan independence due in November 1975 was generally faced with an air of uncertainty. Powerful external forces were determined to subvert its independence. As early as June 6, 1975, we gave evidence to the United Nations Security Council during its debate on Namibia that South Africa was preparing bases in Namibia for attacks against Angola. In drawing attention to the rapid militarisation of Namibia we stated: "The bases which are established in the occupied Territory are not only for the purpose of securing Pretoria's control; they are major bases equipped for attacks against African States to the north." We pointed to information about rocket-launchers being installed in Namibia and directed towards Angola and gave evidence about how for over a year there had been extensive South African preparations for war across the Namibia border. In order to overcome apparent Western disbelief of these preparations we quoted from Pretoria's official publications:
"The South African Army is fully operational in the Caprivi area on an effective low-intensity war footing..."
The same journal went on to describe the border situation in dramatic language:
"The South African Air Force giant C-160 Transall Troop-carrier taxied to a stop.... Hundreds of splendid-looking South African soldiers were perched atop armoured vehicles and trucks. Armed to the teeth, the casual-seeming attitude of the troops belied their obvious state of instant readiness. It was a wonderfully reassuring sight. Here, indeed, were solid men at the front... the message was loud and clear: South Africa's fighting border is in good hands.(2)
For the first time the Pretoria regime openly boasted about its military bases and advanced preparations for war in the region. It also disclosed that among the aircraft used for these operations were the French-West German Transall transporters and French Super-Frelon helicopters.
We pointed out then that the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and the preparations to facilitate attack against neighbouring States "amount to a clear breach of the peace and constitute an act of aggression as well as a threat to international peace within the meaning of the United Nations Charter."
(c) Western veto
There was a resolution before the Security Council to apply a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa but the three Western Powers (the United Kingdom, France and the United States) used their veto power jointly to block such action. They claimed that the situation was not a threat to the peace and did not warrant a mandatory arms embargo.
South Africa was enormously encouraged by this act of open solidarity and Premier Vorster thanked the Western Powers publicly. However, by October 1975 the outside world began to get the first confirmed reports about South African troops having invaded Angola. The subsequent events are now well known.
(d) South African invasion
On February 3, 1977, the South African Defence Headquarters released an official account of its invasion of Angola. The Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, Ambassador Harriman,(3) issued a statement on 24 February in which he said: "The apartheid regime has now publicly confessed that, after a series of incursions into southern Angola, it sent an officer to the UNITA headquarters as early as September 24, 1975, to plan operations against the MPLA. Eighteen instructors and military equipment were sent soon after and the South Africans accompanied UNITA forces in clashes with MPLA forces between Lobito and Nova Lisboa. In mid-October, a squadron of armoured cars and crew were sent to Silva Porto and formed a special combat group. This group participated in attacks on Pereira d'Eca, Rocados, Joao de Almeida, Sa da Bandeira and Mocamedes between 19 and 28 October. They then advanced to Benguela and Lobito. It was only on 4 November that they observed signs of any presence of Cuban personnel, namely, instructors at an MPLA training camp near Benguela." South Africa also disclosed that it had sent a senior officer to the headquarters of FNLA in northern Angola before the FNLA offensive was launched.
It is clear now that there was high-level and intensive preparation for South African incursions and attacks against Angola months before its independence was due in November 1975. The object was to destroy the influence and authority of MPLA. At that time, despite considerable evidence, the Western Powers claimed ignorance of South African intervention in Angola and thus refused to contemplate any action to curb this aggression. It is impossible to accept that these Powers were unaware of the situation, and in any case their intelligence services would have supplied them with the relevant information. The silence and inaction of all the major Western Powers gave South Africa added encouragement to carry out its attacks against Angola.
(e) United States complicity
The official South African account and various reports coming out of Washington since have revealed another factor which is potentially the most dangerous recent development in relation to the southern African conflict, namely, the growing "Americanisation" of that confrontation. It is remarkable that there was such deep United States involvement with the South African forces in their intervention in Angola. It was for other reasons that Congress in Washington refused to vote additional funds to facilitate increased United States involvement in Angola and therefore we were saved from what would otherwise have been a much greater external intervention to destroy the MPLA Government.
All this is history but it is important recent history because the forces which operated then are still operating today. It is important to recognise that the failure of South African policy, its disastrous invasion of Angola and the subsequent retreat have had other repercussions in the major Western capitals as well as in South Africa itself. They have realised the need to be much more careful in future but this in no way reduces the ever-present and growing threat to the peace and security of independent Africa.
(f) Detente with apartheid
There is also another series of events which deserves attention. In October 1974 Premier Vorster made an important policy statement in which he stated that South Africa needed time to show the world the tremendous changes that it could bring about. He asked for "six months to one year" and announced to the world that South Africa would help to 'decolonise' Rhodesia and Namibia. But he went on to warn that unless there was peaceful change in southern Africa and an acceptance of South Africa, and its role, we would face "a catastrophe, too ghastly to contemplate". South Africa desperately needed to buy time in order to adjust to the new situation and therefore gave the impression that it was open to negotiations over Namibia and would put pressure on the Smith regime to reach a "settlement" with the United Kingdom. Several African nationalist leaders were soon released in Rhodesia and various talks took place culminating eventually in the abortive Victoria Falls talks. All these talks, initiated by the United Kingdom and South Africa and supported by other Western Powers, were aimed at trying to "settle" the problem of Rhodesia but not to "solve" it - and that is the crucial difference between their objective and what the African people of Zimbabwe want.
(a) New United States and Western role
Hitherto, southern Africa was considered to be within the United Kingdom's sphere of influence and Western policy was largely governed by what was decided in London. In the aftermath of Angola, the United States became increasingly concerned with southern African problems and Secretary of State Kissinger embarked on a series of shuttle journeys to Africa. With British membership of the EEC there had been increased involvement of certain Western European countries but the Kissinger initiatives changed all that; it is now the United States which is increasingly determining over-all Western policy towards that region.
It is important to recognise what underlying factors are responsible for bringing about these changes and shifts in Western policy and one therefore has to ask why the apparent sudden conversion of the principal allies of apartheid and colonialism in southern Africa to help bring about African freedom in that region and why, if they are genuinely committed to African freedom, do they refuse to support the liberation movements and continue to collaborate with the apartheid system?
(i) Armed Struggle
In Rhodesia the African liberation fighters have intensified their operations and gained control over vast regions: the Smith regime admits to it by mentioning the "breakdown of administration" in the operational areas. Thousands of African people have been uprooted from their homes and herded into concentration camps described as `protected villages' - anyone who dares to move outside these villages or other designated areas at unauthorised times becomes a legitimate target to be shot at, with no questions asked. Meanwhile hundreds more are killed by the Smith regime in the war against "terrorism", including the illegal execution of over 100 known Zimbabweans. The British Government agrees that these executions are illegal but abdicates its legal responsibility and doggedly refuses to declare that they amount to murder. The growing desperation of the Smith regime has also led it to carry out regular attacks against Mozambique and Botswana, with threats of such attacks against Zambia.
With regard to Namibia, SWAPO never took part in Geneva-type talks because its conditions were not met. It has instead prosecuted the liberation struggle with renewed determination despite growing repression by the illegal occupying Power in Namibia. Vast areas of the Territory have been totally militarised by Pretoria and a wide stretch of no-man's land has been cleared along the entire border with Angola as a "free-fire zone". The growing success of the liberation war is being counteracted by additional troop reinforcements, the expansion of military bases, increased reliance on electronic warfare techniques and massive retaliation against and torture of the local population. In addition there are frequent incursions against Angola and Zambia.
In South Africa itself the Soweto crisis of June 1976 and the subsequent nationwide upsurge of resistance effectively undermined Western plans for detente with South Africa so as to ease the world's pressure against apartheid. The people of South Africa demonstrated with considerable heroism, particularly on the part of the young, that their right to freedom could not be compromised simply because that country is considered to be so important to Western security and other interests.
There is no doubt that the major new element in the situation is the growing success of the armed struggle against the white-power system in southern Africa. This was acknowledged in part in the Kissinger speech in Washington, before his final mission to Africa, when he declared that the United States was committed to supporting human rights in South Africa. He also warned that the pace of events in that region was moving so fast that there was the danger that the West would lose control over the process of change.
(ii) Peaceful change
It became clear that the United States wanted to gain control over change in southern Africa. The major problem for the West was that the revolutionary spirit sweeping through Zimbabwe and Namibia might in the process overturn South Africa itself and that, above all, should not be permitted.
Throughout the last two decades it has become clear that whether the question was Portuguese colonialism in Africa, Rhodesia, Namibia or any other matter affecting South Africa's interests, Western policy was based on the primary consideration that South Africa's interests had to be protected and its stability and security preserved; there was to be no confrontation with Pretoria. Accordingly, after the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in April 1974 there were direct negotiations between South Africa and the United Kingdom and other Western Powers aimed at bringing about peaceful change in southern Africa which meant Rhodesia and Namibia. There was considerable talk in Western capitals about the need to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia and self-determination in Namibia since they were both colonial situations: nothing was to be done to destroy apartheid, all that could be hoped for was to persuade Pretoria to make certain changes to ameliorate apartheid and give it a better international image.
The "peaceful change" policy of the major Western Powers rests squarely on working for changes through South Africa as the major regional Power in the area. Thus for any changes to be brought about they have to be acceptable to the Pretoria regime whose cooperation and support are considered vital. Inevitably this means that only those changes will take place which the South African regime will decide upon, in the direction which it decides upon, and at the rate and pace which it considers to be convenient; in other words, all change is to be determined by what will best serve the long-term interest of the apartheid regime.
Hence the world witnessed the remarkable spectacle of the arch-enemy of the African people, Premier Vorster, being projected as Africa's chief peacemaker and bringer of freedom to the oppressed people of Zimbabwe and Namibia. But this illusion could not be successfully sustained in the light of the Angolan adventure and the repeated failure to bring about even a settlement in Rhodesia.
It is a simple truth that no lasting solution or peace can be established in southern Africa as long as the major Western Powers base their policy on preserving the apartheid State. But it is also important to recognise that while Vorster and Smith were publicly talking about peace they were in fact preparing for, and engaging in, war.
When Vorster was being hailed in the Western media as a saviour and man of peace he was in fact preparing for attacks against Angola which were later carried out. South Africa's rapid militarisation and massive defence budgets bear dramatic testimony about its true intentions - and Vorster has warned African States about a "catastrophe, too ghastly to contemplate", should they continue to support the African liberation movements.
In the case of Rhodesia, while the Geneva talks were taking place and Smith had conceded the principle of majority rule "within two years", four new air bases were being built secretly in that country, all strategically situated for attacks against neighbouring African States and fully equipped with underground hangars and workshops. The Smith regime, with its besieged economy, could not have built these facilities so quickly. It is safe to assume South African involvement since it has been reported in the press that Rhodesia was also to be supplied with French-built Mirage fighters by the Pretoria regime.(4)
If the bases were in fact built virtually overnight then there are strong grounds for suspecting a much higher level of external involvement on the part of other Powers as well in Rhodesia's preparations to widen the war.
(b) New United States policy?
The new Carter Administration has expressed its dissatisfaction with previous United States policy towards southern Africa and there is considerable hope in Africa and elsewhere that Washington will play a more positive role in the future. Even the relatively mild way in which it has warned South Africa about the likelihood of no further support at the United Nations, unless there are serious changes forthcoming, has created some concern in Pretoria. This, together with other recent moves, reveals the considerable influence and power that rests in Washington over future developments in southern Africa but it is still too early to detect whether there is likely to be a major departure from the traditional Western policy of collaborating with South Africa.
It is going to become increasingly important to distinguish between resounding speeches and well-presented gestures intended to give the impression of a vigorous anti-apartheid posture and meaningful action in support of the African liberation struggle.
The central objective of South Africa's foreign policy is to create a detente relationship with independent African States and secure their recognition of the apartheid State. As early as August 1968, Foreign Minister Mueller explained its importance: "As the West becomes aware of our fruitful cooperation with other African States, their attitude towards us improves... our relations with the outside world are largely determined by our relations with the African States." More recently, in May 1977, Prime Minister Vorster emphasised this aspect in a speech in the Western Cape when he said that South Africa would never sell itself to the Western world until it had sold itself to Africa - then he added: "But there is a difference between selling ourselves to Africa and selling ourselves out to Africa."
He went on to explain how South Africa had over the years built up relationships with Africa, some of which had lasted, while some had broken down, but "our trade and other relationships have expanded and, even if it is not so easily visible to the world, there is good contact between us and Africa". He claimed that South Africa's right to exist in Africa was now recognised by friend and foe alike and added: "The time will come when Africa will realise that in its own interests it will have to make peace with South Africa."
This confidence is based on the assumption that in the deteriorating international economic situation South African offers of aid and technical assistance as well as food will help to attract certain African States to enter into "normal" relations with South Africa and deny support to the African liberation struggle. By this means the OAU's support for the African liberation struggle can be undermined and the future stability of the apartheid system secured by a highly sophisticated counter-insurgency policy.
But this is not all. The intention behind such aid was spelt out in greater detail in a speech by Premier Vorster in November 1968: "We have a measure of self-interest - and I do not attempt to hide this - in the development and prosperity of Africa, but it is not self-interest alone that motivates us... We have a sense of mission in respect of Africa. In addition, Providence has been very good to us in Africa and we in turn want to return to Africa something of this... This is the spirit that inspires us "and this is the spirit that will conquer Africa".
Much has changed in Africa and the world since 1968 but the need for South Africa to establish close links with African States has never been greater. One of the main reasons why the major Western Powers have become increasingly embarrassed by their collaboration with the apartheid regime has been its exposure and condemnation by the African, non-aligned and other States.
But if the policy of securing an African detente with apartheid does not work then the threat of military attacks and war is intended to secure the submission of independent Africa and if these threats do not work then massive attacks against selected States would enforce their compliance and establish South Africa's dominance. African States which support the liberation struggle would be taught a "lesson" for "playing with fire" as Vorster so often threatened and we would then face the "catastrophe, too ghastly to contemplate" about which he has warned.
(a) Military budget
South Africa knows only too well the destruction and havoc which it is planning in Africa. Following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, the Pretoria regime began to rely more heavily on military power in order to preserve internal security. Over the years it began to develop wider ambitions about becoming a major regional Power and dominating neighbouring independent African States. Every year saw a sharp rise in the defence budget: from 44 million rand during 1960/61, it rose to over 72 million rand in 1961/62; by 1966/67 it reached over 250 million rand and by 1972/73 it had risen by almost 100 million rand to virtually 350 million rand, then in the light of the growing defeat of the Portuguese forces in Africa it was increased to 480 million rand for 1973/74. After the collapse of Portuguese colonialism a 10-year defence programme was compressed into five years and the defence budget for 1974/75 rose to 700 million rand and again the following year to 948 million rand. During the following year, 1976/77, defence expenditure reached the phenomenal figure of 1,407 million rand and the new Defence White Paper estimates yet another sharp increase to 1,711 million rand for the year 1977/78.
Thus, in the period of four years since 1973/74, when the figure stood at 480 million rand it has increased each year by almost that amount so that for 1977/78 it has risen virtually four-fold to 1,711 million rand. This constitutes 19 per cent of State expenditure and is the largest single item in the budget.
(b) Military manpower shortage
After Sharpeville the apartheid regime deliberately created a war psychosis and virtually the entire white population was trained for war against its own people - housewives were organised in pistol clubs and even school children were taught target practice.
The military structure was reorganised together with that of the police force so that they could operate in an integral over-all security role. But South Africa's traditionally all-white defence forces have had to face serious pressures during the 1970s.
As a result of the Portuguese setbacks in its African colonies and the growing threat to the Smith regime, as well as increased resistance within its own borders and in Namibia, South Africa was forced to substantially expand the armed forces. In the one year between 1971/72 and 1972/73 they more than doubled from around 48,000 to over 110,000 and then increased to around 120,000 by 1974/75. The following year, 1975/76 during the Angolan incursions - they were virtually doubled and stood at a total of 201,900. The latest official figure available for 1976/77 is around 224,000.
This vast expansion of the all-white defence forces has placed serious strain on the apartheid economy which is short of white labour. Because of the growing damage to the economy and the increasing number of white casualties suffered by the forces in combat it was decided in 1978 to train special groups of African, Indian and Coloured contingents for border duties. This was a significant break from tradition because of the importance which had always been placed on keeping the armed forces all-white.
(c) Black troops
Today there are a small number of personnel drawn from the "other national groups" as the African, Indian and Coloured people are described, and Defence Minister P.W. Botha considers this to be an important factor in the country's "total national strategy". During the last year an infantry company of Coloured soldiers, of the South African Cape Corps, were deployed in the "operational area".
The bantustans are meant to have their own armies and during the past two years an embryonic defence force and base facilities have been established in the Transkei. The same is intended for the other "homelands" when they are granted "independence". It is not surprising that the basis of training will be "counter-insurgency and it will have its weapons and equipment supplied by the South African defence force."(5)
In Namibia special tribal contingents are being organised and there already exist Ovambo and Kavango battalions which are being steadily increased.
Despite these recent changes the "other national groups" still constitute a very small proportion of the total defence forces. There is still considerable anxiety within official circles about training large sections of the oppressed population in the techniques of war. In the Assembly debate about manpower shortages in April 1977 Defence Minister Botha said that he would not agree to create bigger units manned by "people of colour".
(d) White women recruits
However the problem remains and one attempt to solve it is to increase the number of white women receiving training. After studying the systems existing in overseas countries such as Britain, the United States, Australia and Israel, the Defence Headquarters announced in March 1977 that the number of women to be trained would be trebled at the Army Women College at George.
When the new Defence White Paper was published in March 1977 the authorities announced to the white population that South Africa is at war "whether we like it or not". But the additional intake of several hundred white women and "non-white" recruits is still inadequate to meet the pressing manpower needs of the apartheid forces.
The manpower problem is not just in terms of the total number in service but also the ratio of those in full-time service and those in part-time service - at present the former represents 16.7 per cent and the latter 83.3 per cent of the total number whereas the officially desired ratio is 30.5 per cent and 69.5 per cent respectively. Accordingly, the White Paper explicitly states: "The full-time component cannot cope with the situation, and should already have been expanded to meet present requirements. The number of members of the Permanent Forces and the national service component must indeed be doubled.
Thus it has now been decided to extend the initial compulsory call-up period for white males from 12 months since voluntary methods of securing additional forces have failed.
If the South African armed forces are in such severe crisis at present despite its vast recent expansion then it is inevitable that further intensification of African resistance will place an even more intolerable burden on apartheid's security system.
(e) Apartheid's military strategy
When one examines the nature of South Africa's internal power structure and the fact that it rests on just over 4 million whites out of a total population of over 25 million, and compares the size and scope of the military forces to the need to exercise authority and control over the considerable area within its own boundaries, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that its security forces would be severely stretched by a major confrontation. That is why its senior defence officials make a point of drawing the attention of the white population to the fact that South Africa has a very low "security ceiling". Once control breaks down it would be very difficult to totally regain the initiative.
(f) Growing arsenal
It is precisely because the Pretoria regime is aware of this inherent vulnerability that it concentrates on amassing a wide variety of highly sophisticated military equipment. Whenever there is a crisis and as the feeling of insecurity increases, it responds by purchasing more and better weapons in the hope that they will serve to intimidate and deter the African liberation movements as well as neighbouring African States which may support the freedom struggle.
The growing reliance on a massive and destructive weapons-capability is intended to compensate for the major weakness in terms of manpower. South Africa has therefore assembled an impressive array of military equipment including modern bombs, guns, tanks, armoured cars, missiles, jet interceptors, fighters, bombers, reconnaissance and counter-insurgency aircraft, transporters, helicopters, submarines and fast patrol craft including corvettes.
This enormous arsenal of destructive power is intended to serve as the first line of defence but the existence of such equipment is also used to try and create a second and more reliable form of reinsurance by impressing the major Western Powers about South Africa's defence capability and developing closer military ties with them in order to draw the West further on the side of the apartheid regime. Vast sums are therefore also spent on improving naval ports and installing modern communications systems to monitor the Southern Hemisphere so that South Africa may be considered an attractive and vital Western ally in the region. Major propaganda campaigns are then initiated at huge cost to persuade Western public opinion and Governments that there is a serious Soviet naval threat in the Southern Oceans which can only be adequately countered by relying increasingly on South Africa's defence capability and possibly establishing a formal military pact with it - either by extending NATO's role to the South Atlantic or creating a new alliance for that region.
Despite the fact that South Africa's vast military build-up and its search for meaningful external military support and collaboration is primarily devoted to preserving the apartheid system, it has had relatively little difficulty in securing valuable assistance from the major Western Powers. A cursory examination of the South African military inventory reveals the nature and extent of Western collaboration - its equipment originates from countries which include the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and particularly since the operation of the 1963 United Nations arms embargo, France and Italy. Military collaboration is also being developed recently with Israel.
Following the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960, the Pretoria regime embarked on a major programme of militarisation in order to preserve the apartheid system. The traditional suppliers of arms to South Africa came under severe pressure as a result of domestic and international protests. In August 1963 the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution which called on all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa. In subsequent decisions, the Security Council appealed to all States to comply with the provisions of the August resolution. This resolution of the United Nations has been considered to be one of its most significant actions against apartheid. But, at best the embargo has only been partially successful. It is essentially a voluntary embargo and implemented by individual member States according to their own interpretation of their responsibility - and there exists no effective monitoring system, let alone one which can secure the compliance of individual countries. The gradual erosion of the embargo and the growing threat to world peace in southern Africa have led to repeated calls in the Security Council for a mandatory and binding arms embargo but the resolutions tabled there so far have been defeated by the use of Western triple vetoes.
Prior to the arms embargo decisions of the Security Council, South Africa obtained most of its military equipment from the United Kingdom which was also its military ally through the 1955 Simonstown Naval Agreement. The United Kingdom and the United States of America were among the first to inform the Security Council of their decisions to apply an arms embargo although they imposed various qualifications on its operation at that time. Since then it is France which has replaced the United Kingdom as the major provider of arms to the apartheid regime and there is virtually nothing which the Pretoria regime has not been able to secure from that country. The case of Italy which is the other major violator of the arms embargo, is less well known.
(a) The United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany
The United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany all claim to adhere to the international arms embargo; yet the South African Defence Force is able to secure a wide range of equipment from these countries. This is made possible by the way in which these countries interpret and apply the embargo. In general the Pretoria regime does not any longer obtain most of its major combat equipment from these sources but it is readily supplied with radar, communications and other equipment including aircraft (sometimes described as "civilian" even though purchased by the South African Defence Force) and what is termed "dual purpose" equipment.
For example, several West German firms have helped the South African Defence Force to construct the modern Advokaat naval communications system which is based at Silvermine, near the Simonstown Naval Base. When attention has been drawn to this at the United Nations and elsewhere Bonn has responded with the assertion that it is a "non-military project and therefore does not constitute military cooperation". On the other hand the current South African White Paper describes the vital role of its modern facilities at the Silvermine Centre from where the operational command and control of maritime forces is exercised. It also states: On account of the tremendous speed of current events it is of the utmost importance that our maritime commanders be properly acquainted with any situation that could arise anywhere in our sea areas: this enables them to make quick, but thorough, appreciations and to follow up with naval dispositions.
It is difficult to accept that the Bonn Government is totally ignorant of the role of the Advokaat system particularly since sections of its own defence establishment were directly involved in facilitating the construction of the system for which it expressly authorised the supply of the NATO Codification System for Spares and Equipment.
The United States of America also claims to implement the arms embargo and denies that it supplies aircraft to the South African forces. The August 1976 issue of the South African journal, Wings, reports that the South African Air Force has received an unspecified number of twin engine Swearingen Merlin 4A aircraft from the United States and that its delivery was deliberately not publicised until the order was completed. This information was included in a statement on the operation of the embargo which we made to the United Nations Security Council in March 1977. We now have information from reliable sources that the Merlins form part of number 21 Squadron which is one of the Air Transport Squadrons based at the Grootfontein base in Namibia - the major base for the "operational area". It has also recently become known to us that during May 1976 the United States authorised the export of "aircraft support equipment" valued at over $1 million directly to the South African Air Force. This may be connected to the Merlin deal or represent another military contract.
There are also numerous examples of British violations of the international arms embargo about which detailed information was submitted to the Security Council in March 1977.
(b) France and Italy
As has already been mentioned the two countries which are the most blatant violators of the arms embargo are France and Italy. They not only supply a vast range of aircraft and other equipment to the Pretoria regime but also collaborate to produce them within South Africa.
The role of Italy has not been well publicised but aircraft which it has sold to South Africa include:
These and other Italian aircraft sold to South Africa, and for which licences have been granted to Pretoria for local production, are particularly well suited for counter-insurgency operations. When the Italian Government is confronted with this information it simply denies all knowledge of the sales and licences and claims to implement the embargo fully. This denial was once again repeated in March 1977 following our disclosure at the United Nations of the same information. It is remarkable that Rome persists in repeating its claim to be implementing the arms embargo when hundreds of aircraft of Italian origin form part of the South African Air Force.
The record of France is much better known. The South African Air Force is heavily armed with a wide range of Mirage interceptors and fighters including the modern F-1 as well as Alouette 111 and Super Frelon helicopters, while the Navy has modern French Daphne and Agosta class submarines. There are also French Panhards, Crotale missile systems and a wide variety of guns and ammunition. Licences have been granted to the Pretoria regime to enable it to make much of this equipment locally, including the Mirage F-1.
Following the exposure of French military collaboration there have been several statements made in recent years by French Ministers, usually during visits to African States, announcing each time that Paris would no longer supply certain equipment to South Africa, only to be countered by statements from Pretoria that it does not expect any change in the current level of military relations between the two countries. There is certainly no evidence so far that South Africa is being denied either particular items of military hardware or licences for the local production of such equipment.
A new feature of South Africa's collaboration with overseas countries is the rapidly developing economic and military relationship with Israel following the visit of Premier Vorster to that country. South Africa has obtained Israeli naval patrol boats equipped with Gabriel missiles and plans to make more locally under licence. The Pretoria regime is also showing considerable interest in the Kfir aircraft and it is likely that further Israeli equipment will be supplied to the South African Defence Force in the future.
(c) The role of multinationals
The Pretoria regime has been able to overcome some of the most serious effects of the international arms embargo by obtaining licences for the local production of a wide variety of military equipment. Western Governments have in the main refused to block the transfer of patents, military technology and know-how and investments by their firms which have enthusiastically set up enterprises in South Africa to satisfy the needs of the apartheid regime.
The current Defence White Paper claims that South Africa is now fully self-sufficient in respect of armaments for internal protection and that it "ensures its safety by negotiating licences for more sophisticated and expensive equipment, which, if necessary, could be put into operation in the country". The Defence Force in fact relies an over 1,000 main and sub-contractors for its internal weapons purchases and they in turn are either the subsidiaries of major Western corporations or associated with them in one form or another.
All efforts so far to restrict and stop this form of military collaboration have failed since the major Western countries claim that it is not their policy to limit "normal trade relations" with South Africa.
(i) The Marconi case
During 1976 the Anti-Apartheid Movement organised a major campaign in the United Kingdom after it was revealed that Marconi had contracted to sell the South African Armaments Board £8 million worth of tropospheric scatter communications equipment for use in Namibia and South Africa. There was fierce controversy over the deal and strong efforts were made to get the Government to prohibit it. As a result of a series of manoeuvres by the company, in collaboration with the authorities in Pretoria and London, the export of the equipment was finally authorised.
Marconi went to unusual lengths to impress upon the workers the need to convey to the British Prime Minister the importance of this South African contract which, if jeopardised, could put in danger other deals with the Pretoria regime. It stated in a memorandum that GFC factories (of which Marconi is a part) had during the previous 12 months received orders "principally from the South African Government or its agencies to the value of £100 million and prospects are improving, provided South African confidence in UK manufacturers is not destroyed".
All this was done by Marconi to undermine the anti-apartheid campaign and it went on to claim that the contract in question would provide employment at its Chelmsford plant for 500 people for two years. There was also the likelihood of "further similar contracts to be placed by South Africa to the value of £35 million". At a time of rising unemployment in the United Kingdom, Marconi cleverly played on the fears of its workers in order to ensure that the South African Armaments Board was provided with its needs.
The Marconi memorandum which was produced in a question and answer form had one section which read as follows:
"Does Marconi's trade with South Africa affect its business with other African and Arab Governments? No. It has been suggested by the Anti-Apartheid Movement that this could be the case but it is not so. Marconi is highly regarded by its customers and is currently supplying equipment to countries like Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Oman."
It so happens that the Anti-Apartheid Movement did not in fact suggest the possible damage to Marconi's trade with African and Arab countries at that time - maybe it should have done so. Nevertheless this example shows not only the arrogance and determination with which Marconi continues to serve the interests of the Pretoria regime and its armed forces but the additional claim, by implication that some of its major African and Arab customers have no objection whatsoever to this role. This is a new tactic devised by Marconi which is likely to be utilised as effectively by other multinational corporations in the future to overcome large-scale anti-apartheid protests in their own countries when such exposures in fact threaten military deals with the Pretoria regime.
In view of the Special and important role that Marconi and its parent company, CEC, play in supplying military equipment to South Africa, both from its British factories as well as subsidiaries established within South Africa, and the display of its aggressive determination to provide the Pretoria regime with the tropospheric communications system last year it has qualified itself as a prime target for international campaigns to effectively enforce the arms embargo.
Once information such as this is more widely known it is inevitable that some of Marconi's present customers, as well as of other similar firms which collaborate closely with the South African defence establishment, will examine ways of taking action which will effectively discourage this process of collaboration with apartheid.
(ii) Transfer of Military Technology
There is also a second type of related case where the South African subsidiary of an overseas firm produces equipment which is then used by the illegal Rhodesian regime. Thus, the South African link serves to bolster the illegal Smith regime and international economic sanctions against Rhodesia are effectively undermined. One recent example of this was when Racal "Transcriver" equipment, made by a British subsidiary in South Africa, was captured by the Mozambique authorities following one of the attacks by Rhodesian forces against that country. When all the relevant information was submitted to the British Government we were informed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that there had certainly been a breach of sanctions and that the equipment in question was a type designed, developed and manufactured only in South Africa by Racal, but that Racal in that country claims that it would not be a party to the supply of such equipment to Rhodesia! One wonders by what means Rhodesia secures such equipment, if it is not from the manufacturer in South Africa. Racal and the British Government are silent on this question.
This illustrates the enormous degree to which leading Western companies are directly involved in helping to boost the armed power of the apartheid State and to keep the illegal Smith regime in power, with no effective action by their Governments to put an end to this form of direct support to the racist regimes.
(iii) Action against Companies
It is therefore a matter of vital importance that the major Western Powers are pressed to implement a meaningful arms embargo and put an end to all forms of military collaboration with South Africa by companies based in their countries. They should place a complete ban on the transfer of patents, technology and know-how as well as investment which is used to build up the internal armaments industry. Such collaboration must be forbidden if they are to be taken seriously about their claims to be supporting an arms embargo policy towards the Pretoria and Salisbury regimes.
In the meantime those Governments which are committed to the African liberation struggle should give serious and urgent consideration to what type of unilateral and collective action must be taken against those firms which are the most blatant and persistent offenders. The non-aligned countries hold considerable potential power which can be effectively exercised by denying contracts to those firms which persist in collaborating with the South African military establishment. The matter is urgent because these firms are not only engaged in making South Africa more self-sufficient in defence equipment but are also making it possible for the Pretoria regime to export military hardware to other countries. The demand to end all overseas investments in and loans to South Africa becomes even more important when the full extent of such operations, in terms of direct support for the apartheid military effort is known. Thus an effective freeze on all future investments in South Africa will also limit the growth of internal arms production in that country.
(d) NATO Codification System and South Africa
In July 1975 documentary evidence was released by the Anti-Apartheid Movement which proved that the NATO codification system for spares and equipment had been provided to South Africa. Since then the matter has been taken up persistently with NATO members directly as well as during the last two NATO Ministerial Council meetings in Oslo and London respectively. The official NATO view is that the Codification System is in fact an unclassified and "open" system which can be provided to non-members at the initiative of any individual member of the Alliance. Several countries such as Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada responded favourably to our representations on this issue and stated that they do not provide South Africa with the Codification System. Among these countries which are known to have provided information about the Codification System to the Pretoria regime are the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and West Germany. All these countries respond by claiming that the provision of the System to the South African authorities is not of any military significance - which is also what is claimed by NATO headquarters in Brussels. But we have continued to demand that the Codification System should be withdrawn from South Africa and that its defence forces should not be provided with either classified or unclassified information.
Following the most recent representations made to the London NATO meeting on May 10, 1977, the British Foreign Secretary has now assured us that "Britain no longer supplies NATO codification data to South Africa". This is a welcome development and an important break-through but can only become more meaningful if similar action is taken by the other members of NATO which are directly involved in providing NATO codification data to South Africa. It is of vital importance that those Western Powers which enjoy close military ties with South Africa should end them and certainly not provide facilities and systems devised for NATO to benefit the South African armed forces - by doing this they drag in other members of the Alliance as well as NATO itself into the southern African conflict.
As it is, there are powerful forces in the major Western countries, particularly among the military brass, which are keen to establish a working alliance between NATO and South Africa in order to protect the Cape Sea Route and help to counteract "the growing Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic". Already elaborate proposals have been discussed at a high level to extend NATO's operations around southern Africa either under its own auspices or by creating a new South Atlantic pact which would be composed of certain NATO Powers and South Africa with the possibility of expanding it to include some South American countries as well.
There is a long record of Western nuclear cooperation with South Africa. The United States, France, the United Kingdom and West Germany have all played a major part in helping to develop South Africa's nuclear technology. More recently West German assistance in developing a special uranium enrichment technology, and plans for the installation of a nuclear enrichment plant, and the French supply of nuclear reactors, have received considerable publicity. However, these countries claim that their nuclear collaboration with South Africa does not in any way make a contribution toward the Pretoria regime's establishing its own nuclear capability.
First, it is universally accepted that there is no way in which it is possible to supply nuclear technology and plant for "peaceful purposes" and ensure that it is not utilised for military ends.
Second, it is the South African Premier Vorster who disclosed last year that his country does have nuclear capability and he also pointedly drew attention to the fact that South Africa has not signed the non-proliferation treaty. It has been reported that if South Africa did not already have an atomic bomb it could produce one in two to four years and that this estimate is "the outside range".(6)
South Africa certainly has the means of delivery with the modern aircraft which it has obtained from the major Western Powers.
South Africa's determination to build up a massive destructive capability has already been described and it would not shrink from producing an atomic bomb since it has the necessary technology and other resources to do so.
The growing threat of South Africa to world peace and security is dramatically and frighteningly increased with this development. Those who have collaborated with the Pretoria regime to help create an atomic Frankenstein in Africa bear a heavy responsibility.
From all this it becomes clear that what we face in southern Africa today is the biggest single threat to world peace. Yet the major Western Powers persist in their claim that the Pretoria regime does not threaten the peace. One wonders what else apartheid South Africa has to do before these Powers concede that it does constitute a grave threat to the peace and security of Africa and the world.
It is useful to list the grounds upon which it can conclusively be determined that the policies of the Pretoria regime in southern Africa constitutes a grave threat to the peace within the meaning of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter:
From this no objective person can escape the conclusion that South Africa presents the single greatest threat to world peace.
It is not just that South Africa presents a threat to world peace; we have now reached the stage where it is the military collaboration of the major Western Powers with South Africa which constitutes a threat to peace.
The Lagos Conference has the solemn responsibility and duty to adopt a programme of action to help bring about the end of the apartheid system in South Africa. Full support must be given to the African liberation struggle and all collaboration with apartheid must be ended.
(1) United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents, Conf.7, November 1977
(2). South African Digest, June 21, 1974
(3) Leslie O. Harriman of Nigeria
(4) Guardian, London, April 28, 1977