April, 10, 1973

I think for the record it is necessary at the outset for us who come from Britain, to condemn the fact that Britain is not participating in this Conference, even as an expert. All the expertise which is available to Her Majesty's Government has been utilised in the past few years and particularly, at this moment of time, in negotiations with our direct enemies: the South African Government, whose Foreign Minister is now in London, preceding his talks with the Secretary-General; and the Portuguese Government, for the celebration of the anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance that Lord Gifford has just mentioned.

The Anti-apartheid Movement is an old organization, in the sense that we were formed in 1959 at a small meeting of some 200 people, and were addressed by President Nyerere, who was then leader of the opposition in Tanganyika. Ever since, both in Britain and in other countries, we have tried to inform people of what is happening in southern Africa, in Rhodesia, or the old Central African Federation, in South Africa, Namibia and, indeed, in the remaining colonial territories, including those British territories which were then engaged in the struggle against colonialism. Many of them are now present here and many of their leaders are today Heads of State.

Over the years, we have had no difficulties whatsoever in taking up the policy of support for the liberation movements, because we were set up in order to support the struggles of the peoples in southern Africa. That policy is the policy of the United Nations today. I hope I will be forgiven if I say a few things which may sound not very helpful or critical, but these are not addressed with any destructive intentions in mind. I do get the feeling that in fact a sense of unreality permeates at organs like these, where old statements are repeated and situations with which we are all familiar are rehashed. If all of us assembled here and all the governments which voted for all the resolutions that have been adopted are really serious, why does this problem persist? Why do we continue to confront the white regimes in southern Africa which are building up a growing alliance with the Western Powers?

While we are concentrating on resolutions, protests and other actions, they are strengthening their links and repressing people more. Therefore, I would like to plead that we pause for a minute and really think about whether we believe what we say when we say that the white regimes are our enemies because they are oppressing the peoples of Africa? Secondly, and even more important, do we believe that those three Great Powers that are not present here are also our enemies?

As I said at the Addis Ababa meetings of the Security Council last year, the question we need to pose for effective action is: on which side are the Western Powers? Are they the friends or the enemies of Africa? I feel that in our exercises, programmes, documents and proposals, we spend too much time, thought and effort to work out tolerable options for our enemies. It should not be the job of those engaged in supporting the struggles of the peoples of Africa against colonialism to work out tolerable options for the Western governments and, even for the South African government itself.

This is where I feel the sense of unreality of which I spoke. We are talking, as our comrades have reminded us, about a real war in southern Africa, one which is as real in South Africa as it is in the rest of southern Africa and the colonial territories. And yet in our proposals and our actions on South Africa we talk of how to exclude it from specific actions. This is a dangerous tendency. While it is important to act on individual issues in special ways so as to get maximum results and have flexibility, at the same time we must not give the impression to people that the South African regime is unshakable and will remain almost forever. What is happening in a great many proposals that are coming out from the Untied Nations and other organs is to create tolerable options based on the assumption that the South African regime is there to stay.

If we in our movements were concerned with producing tolerable options, we would not have done any work at all. We were concerned at the very outset with confronting the British Government and the Western Powers. It is that kind of confrontation that has produced the small results that we have.

I am not competent as an expert or, indeed, as an individual to advise the United Nations what it ought to do, but in terms of British people who support it, who support its policies, who stand outside sports grounds and attempt to stop arms sales to South Africa, these people request the United Nations to implement its resolutions.

It is simple, yet difficult. But if we consider the matter as being very difficult, we end up with working out proposals that tend to take away from the central urgency of the problem. So, in our view, we must show up what our enemies are and, in terms of Western countries, we must not be afraid of a confrontation with them. A confrontation will help to expose their role and is nearer to the reality of the situation that we are now facing.

There is a tendency not only to debate all the issues before us, but also to treat the issue of southern Africa, and South Africa, as a routine issue, as something we talk about year after year and don't take action upon. We must, therefore, tackle South Africa. In 1963 and 1964, the Security Council, the General Assembly and other organs, and governments talked seriously about the prospect of sanctions. We in London sponsored an International Conference on Sanctions, where we assembled experts to discuss the matter. They came to the conclusion that what was lacking was political will. That is what is lacking now, as well.

What has the Security Council done between 1964 and 1973 to move forward? Indeed, we hear very little talk about the possibility of sanctions against South Africa, even though we know that it is South Africa's violation of the mandatory programme of sanctions against Rhodesia which has sabotaged that entire exercise. Therefore we are against the idea that in any strengthening of sanctions against Rhodesia, South Africa should somehow be given special treatment because it is a strong country in that area and should be excluded from considering action against it.

We insist that South Africa is the major enemy of the United Nations, of the Organization of African Unity and indeed, the oppressed peoples of Zimbabwe, and therefore, action should be taken against them. Not only are they breaking United Nations sanctions, but they have also committed a breach of the peace and an act of aggression in sending troops to fight the freedom fighters in Zimbabwe.

One example of the confrontation of which I spoke is the following: We have worked on many issues. The ones that are best known to the world, I should think, are the arms embargo and the campaigns against racist sports teams. The latter campaign dates back to 1959. Over recent years, as a result of public information carried out for a decade and the hard work of small groups of people, we managed to force the Labour Government in Britain to ban the South African cricket tour, against the will of Her Majesty's Government. If we had worked on the basis of producing options for the British Government, we would never have succeeded. We confronted the British Government and the sporting authorities.

The action continued in Australia, where we have been in contact with Australian and New Zealand groups for eight to ten years. We can say that as a result of public actions there, the sports tours were cancelled. Indeed, the political process brought about a new Government in power, which is more committed to the United Nations policies than the previous Government. These things, I suggest, Mr. Chairman, do not happen in isolation. Parenthetically, we have just heard a few hours ago that the New Zealand Government has banned the South African sports team from going to New Zealand.

In not trying to win quick victories by tolerable options, we succeed in actions like this. Therefore, I hope it is recognized that diplomatic action alone cannot succeed. It must operate in alliance with the internal pressures in these countries. Individual people in the major Western countries are making considerable sacrifices to fight their own governments to adopt better policies and they are doing this in support of the policies of the United Nations and of the liberation movements. If they see that the United Nations is speaking with many voices - on the one hand, some say "Boycott South Africa, don't talk to them, no dialogue is possible", and on the other hand, the more senior representatives of the United Nations talk to representatives of that same country - the public does not understand. This is the "unreality" I mentioned earlier.

I would like to sound a kind of warning. There is no issue as great or as serious as that in southern Africa, and yet, at the same time, there is also no issue where action is somehow inversely related to the number of resolutions and discussions that are held. It seems as if the issues we discuss most are the ones in which we are most impotent. I would like to warn that the growth industry of research and experts is one we should not encourage. We should, indeed, divert our attention to growth of action against these regimes rather than research about those regimes. This diversion is a result of this studies-and-expertise approach.

What we need to do is to support those who are taking action. It is here that the credibility of the United Nations is at issue. Where research is necessary, the two criteria should be the following: firstly, do the liberation movements want this research? If we are serious in supporting those in the struggle, we must do the research they need. Secondly, is it the kind of research that can be used effectively by solidarity groups? We in Britain have no research experts, but within weeks we were able to provide information on the number of British corporations involved in South Africa - we provide the research experts with this information and they write long papers about it; meanwhile, we engage in action on the matter.

The response of these countries to the disclosure of the poor wages they were paying Africans was to increase pay. This response is aimed at subverting the anti-apartheid lobby in Britain and the rest of the world.

This is the kind of research we must not encourage at all. We must say that these companies must withdraw from South Africa and Namibia. We must avoid the danger of giving the impression that if companies are operating physically in Namibia, then we must act against them, but if they are operating in South Africa we must not. It is the same British Leyland Company in South Africa that produces the weapons that are used in Namibia to oppress the Namibian people. Therefore, we must not be restricted to territories in such a way as to not be able to see the role of the British Leyland Company in supporting the military machine of our enemies. It is this kind of more flexible thinking in terms of problems that I would like to plead for.

Finally, in my paper, I have drawn attention to the fact that, in my view and the view of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the lines have been drawn in Africa in a way in which they have never been drawn before. The kind of military support that is being given to the South African regime and the way it is used as the pivot for policies towards the rest of Africa, anticipates an almost indefinite stability and security in South Africa. The kind of considerations that have been taken into account for a military alliance of the Western Powers and South Africa, require that that regime remains stable for at least ten years, if not more.

The situation is far more serious than many of us feel. Today, within minutes, Nigeria, Ghana, the Sudan, Somalia can be bombed from within South African borders; what will happen? The United Nations Security Council will perhaps meet in emergency session. It will take four or five days before they even adopt a resolution that every country agrees with. Meanwhile, South Africa will have gotten away with the bombing.

It is this sense of urgency that I think exists in Africa and which we need to inject into the discussions at this Conference. And it is on that basis that we need to take action. Therefore, we plead that the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and other organizations build up an alliance with the liberation movement first. Secondly, and just as important (although not competitive), is the need to build up an alliance with the peoples in the Western countries, because it is those people who are the best allies of the liberation movements and of the Organization of African Unity.

If the United Nations stands behind the liberation struggle in that way, then I believe we can win results. I am particularly grateful to Ambassador Ogbu,⁽¹⁾ Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid, because we have established some working relationship already. He attended a conference of trade unionists in Britain two weeks ago. There we were planning action among trade unionists and we hope that this will be encouraged as well by other committees.

If the United Nations wishes to consult us, they can do so directly. We can communicate directly without being recognized non-governmental organizations. But attendance at too many conferences like this is too expensive for us. What I am pleading for is direct communication rather than a great deal of procedural arrangements, which may exist within the United Nations and through which we have to move before we can get action. I hope those who are experts in the United Nations will give attention to improving the procedures so that we can work together more effectively.

Resolutions of the United Nations are correct; the policy of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity is correct. We must be consistent. We must not look for new solutions because results are not quickly achieved. Above all, we must not be diverted into working out tolerable options either for the South African regime, the Portuguese regime or the illegal Rhodesian regime or their allies, who are not present here. We can only act after we have considered who our enemies are and who our friends are. Our experience in Britain is that Britain is enemy territory and that the British Government is now engaging in an alliance with the Portuguese. Just as we managed to stop the cricket tour, I am sure that the peoples of Britain may act to make it almost impossible for Caetano to come to Britain.

This is not an empty threat. That is our objective. We may not succeed, but we will work for it. If we do succeed, then we would like support - political support from the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and from other governments. It is, therefore, important to realise the urgency of the southern African situation; to believe what we say; and to concentrate on action rather than on too much research, and too many tolerable options.

(1) Edwin Ogebe Ogbu of Nigeria