April, 9, 1984
I should like to thank you for once again giving me an opportunity to
present certain new information and make some proposals in order to ensure
that the mandatory arms embargo, adopted by Security Council resolution
418 (1977), is effectively implemented. It is a double honour for me to
speak after His Excellency Ambassador Garba of Nigeria for it was at the
1977 World Conference for Action against Apartheid in Lagos, chaired by
General Garba, that it was decided, upon the suggestion of the Special
Committee against Apartheid, to establish the World Campaign which was
formed on March 28, 1979 - some five years ago.(1)
The Pretoria regime, in the midst of its recent public pronouncements about
so-called peace initiatives once again reminded the world last month about
its growing threat to international peace and security by increasing its
At the very outset we should like to share with this Committee some new information of enormous importance for your and our future work.
The Pretoria regime has for several years claimed that it is virtually self-sufficient in the production of arms and ammunition. Most governments appear to believe this. However, the results of our research and investigation now demonstrate clearly, that it is a myth. As the regime has increased its reliance on a wide range of more and more sophisticated equipment it has simultaneously expanded its dependence on imports of foreign military components, equipment and technology. This is confirmed by a second finding that more than half of the total amount spent by ARMSCOR in acquiring military hardware is in fact spent abroad. For example, out of an annual expenditure of R1.62 billion, over R900 million is spent overseas and only about R700 million at home.
These findings dramatically demonstrate that it is much more than a coach and horses that has been driven through resolution 418 (1977). In the result, a solemn decision under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter is being honoured more in the breach than through compliance.
This shows the urgent need especially for the Security Council, this Committee and all Member States, to assume and discharge their international duties faithfully, and not to leave the major burden of monitoring and enforcing the embargo to the World Campaign and anti-apartheid groups and individuals. Whilst we may try to do everything within our limited power we cannot be responsible for the serious erosion of United Nations authority and influence which inevitably comes from undermining the only mandatory decision taken so far by the Security Council against the apartheid regime.
The World Campaign has on several occasions drawn this Committee's attention to developments concerning the large-scale smuggling of arms and ammunition to South Africa from several countries by vessels managed by the Danish Trigon company. We have provided you with extensive information and the Danish Government has also supplied your Committee with official reports.
On March 28, 1984, legal proceedings against one of the accused, 39-year old Peter Gettermann, were concluded in a Copenhagen City Court when he was sentenced to 6 months suspended imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 Danish Kroner for offences involving 22 shipments of arms and ammunition, totalling 6,000 tons, between 1978 and 1980. The World Campaign was shocked at the sentence and I immediately sent a cable to the Danish Foreign Minister urging that the authorities lodge a formal appeal against the sentence "to try and secure a much stronger penalty which would be appropriate to the gravity of the offences". Our request was supported by parliamentary opposition party leaders, some of whom I had the privilege of meeting in Copenhagen on April 1, 1984, whilst on a stop-over for a press conference. On Monday, April 2, 1984, I heard from Copenhagen that the authorities had decided to lodge an official appeal against the sentence and I hope that this Committee will join the World Campaign in thanking the Danish Government for its prompt action. We should also like to express our gratitude to successive governments in Denmark with whom we have been in contact over this and other cases for the courtesy and cooperation extended to us. It should also be noted that the authorities experienced serious difficulties in conducting the Trigon investigations and much of the credit for their successful conclusion is due to exceptional investigative research conducted by newspaper and television journalists as well as individual Danish seamen and their union who all helped to expose the truth. However, the chief offender in this case, after being charged, had absconded to South Africa, taking with him in February 1983, over 5 million Danish Kroner from a secret account in a Spanish bank.
Following our request of March 28, 1984, to your Committee for this hearing, the World Campaign arranged for the Copenhagen Court indictment, including the 22 charges, to be translated into English for the use of this Committee, but I understand from the Danish Government that you have been provided with the relevant information in a recent Note. You will notice that specific details about the vessels involved, the dates of their journeys, cargo particulars, as well as the ports of loading in Europe and unloading in South Africa, are all provided.
The World Campaign made early representations to most of the countries concerned and we have now made follow-up representations with better information. We hope that your Committee will also act urgently to ensure that the concerned governments institute immediate high-level investigations to ascertain all the facts relating to each cargo and take appropriate action against all those within their jurisdiction. A full investigation of all the Trigon cases will reveal the ways and means used by the apartheid regime and its agents to breach the embargo and important lessons can be learnt about additional measures which are necessary to enforce the embargo more strictly. We are certain that the Danish authorities will be prepared to provide all the facts to facilitate follow-up action and we urge your Committee to give these cases urgent priority. As in the past, the World Campaign will keep you informed of new developments and we look forward to your future cooperation.
Illegal Exports
I now wish to draw the attention of the Committee to a current case of considerable importance in the United Kingdom. On Monday, April 2, 1984, seven men appeared at Coventry Magistrates' Court charged with various offences involving the illegal export of arms to South Africa. Four of the men are South African nationals, employees of the apartheid regime's Armaments Corporation, ARMSCOR. One of them, Hendrix Botha, 49, is in fact a South African Colonel and is charged with the illegal export of high-pressure gas cylinders in March 1984. Three other South Africans, Stephanus de Jager, 49; Jacobus Le Grange, 38; and William Meterlerkamp, 41, were all charged with exporting magnetrons in January 1981. The magnetrons involved are apparently essential components for anti-missile radar systems producing the high-power microwaves needed to spot, identify and track fast-moving targets.
The three Englishmen charged are Michael Swann, Derek Salt and Michael Henry Gardiner who were released on bail and due to reappear in court on May 14, 1984.
On April 2, 1984, the South African Foreign Minister recalled his Ambassador in London for consultations about the case. The Ambassador has now returned to the United Kingdom.
It is the first time that senior ARMSCOR officials have been charged anywhere in the world, and when British customs officers complete their investigation in a few weeks and the trial takes place, we may well learn about further charges.
Before coming to this meeting, I have received information to the effect that at a hearing in Coventry some few hours ago, the Court has granted bail of £25,000 each for the ARMSCOR officials and this has been paid by the First Secretary at the South African Embassy who has waived his diplomatic immunity in order to provide surety. The Committee will also be interested to know that the Embassy has provided two flats in Dolphin Square, London, for the four accused and undertaken not to issue them with new travel documents. It is important to note that the customs authorities strenuously opposed bail and said that they feared the four South Africans would abscond and obstruct the course of justice if released from custody and that the goods involved amount to at least £1 million.
In contrast to this case, we would like to draw your attention to one in 1979 involving the smuggling of £2 million worth of plant equipment to make arms and ammunition. The company involved, Worcester-based Redman Heenan, was "concerned about the bad publicity which would accompany a court case" and so escaped prosecution in 1981 in return for a secret payment of penalties amounting to £193,000 to the customs authorities. One of the directors of the company then was Mr. Eldon Griffiths, MP, a former Conservative Minister for Sport who is today the paid advisor to the Police Federation and well-known for his sympathetic attitude to apartheid South Africa. Company officials had been to South Africa to visit an ammunition plant where shells, fuses and rockets were being made and one of them saw how bullets were made with his company's dies.
We have only had recent knowledge about this case and according to our records it is the only one that we know of where a settlement has been agreed by the authorities in return for not proceeding with a prosecution. We do not know if the Committee was informed about this case by the United Kingdom or what further action it took. Clearly, this Committee should establish how many other similar cases there have been and give serious consideration to the implications of such secret arrangements being made for a major breach of the arms embargo.
South African Embassy involvement
In my evidence to your Committee of September 23, 1983, I drew attention to the conviction in October 1982 of three persons in the United Kingdom on charges relating to the illegal export of rifles and machine gun spare parts to South Africa. We have since seen some of the material evidence of that case and in one letter from a South African company, Day Technical Products (Pty) Ltd, dated March 9, 1978, addressed to one of the accused, specific reference is made to the fact that to secure the illegal supplies "the customer would prefer to try and work on a system whereby the Embassy in London is not involved at all or as little as possible". Later, in suggesting arrangements for payment, it stipulates that a Bill of Lading should be "countersigned by an Embassy Official" and goes on to explain: "Merely a name with a specimen signature would be indicated and not that person's connection with the Embassy." Another document, an invoice made out to the same South African company by a British firm, Delta Engineering Co., dated February 8, 1980, for the illegal arms consignments, bears a clear South African Embassy stamp certifying payment of the items listed on March 24, 1980.
Without the advantage of these and other documents and based on more general information, the Chairman of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, Mr. Robert Hughes MP, wrote to Her Majesty's Government about this matter on December 22, 1982. In a reply dated February 15, 1983, Mr. Cranley Onslow, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated: "Our enquiries have revealed that, although there is no conclusive evidence of the embassy's role in the case, there are prima facie grounds for suspecting that the Embassy or members of its staff were involved in transactions for the supply of arms to South Africa in contravention of United Kingdom legislation". It went on to say that "any staff who may have been involved are no longer serving at their Embassy in London" and that the Embassy had been warned "that firm action will be taken whenever we had clear evidence of such misconduct."
In the light of the documents which we have subsequently seen it seems remarkable that the clear evidence of the Embassy's involvement contained both in the letter of March 9, 1978, and the officially recorded payment by the Embassy of the invoice of February 8, 1980, can be considered to amount to "no conclusive evidence" and merely "prima facie grounds" about the Embassy's involvement in the illegal arms deals. We wonder how many other diplomatic missions receive such mild treatment in the face of such overwhelming documentary proof.
The reason we mention this is not just because of the issues involved in this case with the London Embassy but because in the Trigon cases it was the South African Embassy in Paris that was involved. Clearly, this Committee has to give serious attention to the role of the South African diplomatic missions in contravening the laws of the host countries and inducing others to do so. This totally improper use of diplomatic mission requires the sternest possible action and as a minimum, one would at least expect that the respective military attaches be removed.
We do not need much more information to appreciate the central role of the South African Embassy in organising breaches of the mandatory arms embargo. It is because of this that the Anti-Apartheid Movement urged the United Kingdom Government in May 1983 to close down the military attache section of the Embassy but that has not been done. Instead our Movement has been provided with photographs which reveal that when celebrating South Africa's defence forces day, on July 1, 1983, among the guests present at the Embassy was Major-General G.M.G. Swindell, Assistant Chief of British Defence Intelligence, who is the third most senior officer in that section. No doubt the Pretoria regime continues to abuse its diplomatic privilege in London with impunity.
We have just ascertained that at the 4th Bristol International Conference on Remotely Piloted Vehicles, April 9-11, 1984, which opened today, representatives from Kentron who were due to attend have not turned up. It may be that this is because Le Grange and de Jager who are now charged in Coventry are in fact also connected with Kentron. However, among the participants is the Managing Director of National Dynamics based in Pinetown, Natal, Dr. Maitland Reed, who is also a member of the Scientific Committee of the President's Council in South Africa. Your Committee may not know that National Dynamics makes the Eyrie RPV which is marketed abroad via the Federal Republic of Germany in order to disguise its South African origin. This Conference is jointly sponsored by the Royal Aeronautical Society and the University of Bristol.
This case, like so many others, shows the need for the United Kingdom to require entry visas for South African nationals so that it can at least try to prevent the entry of ARMSCOR and other officials into the country. So far, the United Kingdom has rejected our requests and is one of the few countries which continues to extend visa free entry to South Africans.
Secondly, this case once again highlights the importance of enacting measures to prohibit the importation of arms and related material from South Africa.
We have several times drawn the attention of this Committee to the supply of the Plessey AR-3D Air Defence Radar to South Africa by the United Kingdom. At least London has provided substantial replies to representations made by this Committee as well as the World Campaign, even if they are not satisfactory. We should like to refer to the notes verbale dated October 5, 1979, addressed by the Chairman of this Committee to Ireland and the United States followed by reminders dated December 11, 1979, and ask if these two governments have so far provided the Committee with any substantial comments about the involvement of enterprises within their jurisdiction in the Plessey deal. If they have not done so yet it requires urgent follow-up by this Committee.
Falklands/Malvinas Air Base
Our worst fears about the use of the Plessey AR-3D system by South Africa are now revived by the recent discovery that the Ministry of Defence has ordered two such systems for installation in the Falklands/Malvinas air base. Why does the United Kingdom decide to equip its major military base in the South Atlantic with a system that is identical to the one earlier supplied to South Africa on the grounds that it did not constitute a breach of the mandatory arms embargo? We are not the only ones who are puzzled by this and I hope that the Committee will be able to have this clarified by the United Kingdom. It is also pertinent to ask whether today, despite the earlier understanding of the United Kingdom, South Africa is in fact using the AR-3D system as part of its overall defence radar system in breach of that understanding, and if so, what action has been taken or is being contemplated. Or is the situation much more serious and does the choice of identical systems for South Africa and the British base indicate closer coordination and integration of defence arrangements between Pretoria and London in the South Atlantic?
Last November, the World Campaign provided this Committee with details about the advanced VAX computer system which was reportedly being smuggled to the Soviet Union after having been licensed for export to South Africa by the United States. Certain items of this system were intercepted by the United States in West Germany and the remaining containers were impounded by the Swedish authorities after adopting a measure which declared illegal the importation of war material from South Africa. We wonder if the Committee has acted on our suggestion to establish how this military computer system which is apparently forbidden for export to the Soviet Union came to be licensed for delivery to South Africa despite the mandatory arms embargo. We need to know how a system that is of considerable military significance for the Soviet Union so easily becomes a non-military system for South Africa and we hope that this Committee will seek clarification from the United States.
I wish to refer to the detailed and substantial replies provided by the United States to this Committee on May 23, 1979, in response to several points which I had raised earlier. At that time, the United States pointed out that whilst spares for the C-130s were prohibited, those for the L-100s owned by Safair Aviation were not because the latter were supplied for civilian use and that "such sales require the purchaser to certify that the aircraft will not be used for police, military or para-military purposes". The Safair L-100s are now listed among the military inventory by the South African Defence Force and this is confirmed by reputable institutions such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in London. In addition, it was a L-100 that was used to transport the AR-3D system, which was ordered by the South African Defence Force, from the United Kingdom. The Pretoria regime is thus in clear breach of the specific certification given to the United States in the case of the L-100s and the Committee should establish what action the United States has taken against the purchaser. At the very least all spares should be prohibited for the L-100s as well and there is adequate prima facie evidence to suggest that spares provided for the L-100s have been and are being diverted to the C-130s which continue to remain in service despite the embargo on its spares.
When looking today at the substantial answers of the United States in its reply of May 23, 1979, it is with great regret that we notice the extensive relaxation of that embargo which has taken place since 1981. Thus, with a change of Administration the same country has reinterpreted its obligations under the mandatory embargo in such a fundamental manner that it would be true to say that the United States embargo today is in many respects much weaker than that operated by it during the 1960s - long before the mandatory embargo of 1977. That is why it is also important to establish which of the many assurances provided in May 1979 are still valid today.
On September 23, 1983, we drew the attention of the Committee to the existence of an "Agreement relating to Mutual Defence Assistance" between the United States and South Africa based on an exchange of notes dated Washington, November 9, 1951, and registered by the United States on February 12, 1953. We should like to know if you have established the full significance of this Agreement and obtained clarification from the United States particularly in so far as it may cover the supply of military and related material to South Africa.
In relation to the question of spares for items already supplied to South Africa, we have been carrying out some further research and would like to share with you some of our information concerning the Buccaneer aircraft.
Britain authorised the purchase by South Africa of 16 Buccaneer naval aircraft, designated SMK50 (under the 1955 Simonstown Agreement), in order to "safeguard and defend the vital strategic Cape sea-route". They were delivered during 1965-66.
The SMK50s are similar to the Royal Navy's SMK2s, except that they are fitted with two additional Rolls Royce Bristol Siddeley BS605 single-chamber retractable rocket engines in the rear fuselage to improve "hot and high" take-off performance since they were to be operated from the Waterkloof Air Force Base which is almost 5000 feet above sea level.
The 16 South African Buccaneer SMK50 aircraft, references 411 to 426, were fitted with two Rolls Royce RB 168-1A Spey MK 101 turbo fans and two Rolls Royce Bristol BS605 rocket engines.
These aircraft were supplied almost 20 years ago and despite subsequent assurances by the United Kingdom that in keeping with the arms embargo no spares or components are exported to South Africa, and the fact that the Simonstown Agreement was terminated in 1975, the Buccaneers remain operational and are used regularly by the South African Air Force.
On behalf of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, and the World Campaign, permit me to draw attention to two basic facts:
We have addressed this question several times to Her Majesty's Government and urged a high-level investigation to ascertain how the British arms embargo is obviously being violated. The response has always been that the Government is not aware of any violation of the embargo and would investigate if we could provide the details.
We have to ask: How can we possibly have more information than Her Majesty's Government? Is it not true that the only two air forces in the world which operate Buccaneers are Britain and South Africa? Presumably the RAF knows all that there is to know about these aircraft as do the British companies involved in its production and maintenance. In this case, there is not even a third country utilising the same aircraft and through which spares, components and engines can be rerouted to South Africa.
Is it really all that difficult to establish how South Africa obtains the spares and other vital items to keep the Buccaneers flying? Does neither Britain nor Rolls Royce really know how and where the two types of engines are serviced and who supplies South Africa with new engines? And if all this is so difficult for Britain to establish from its own backyard, is it really beyond the capability of Britain's military attache and other representatives in South Africa to ascertain the relevant information? No one can doubt that if the United Kingdom Government attached importance to this case it could not only ascertain the relevant facts but take action to ensure that these aircraft do not continue to be operational, for not even the Pretoria regime claims that it is self-sufficient in maintaining these and other aircraft.
We hope that the Committee will give its attention not only to this aircraft but also to the Mirages, Impalas, Alouettes, Pumas, Transalls and other weapons which continue to operate despite the mandatory arms embargo.
Further cases
In my testimony of September 23, 1983, I mentioned a few cases about which we should like to provide the Committee with further information and ascertain what progress has been made so far.
With regard to the pistols which were reported to have gone to South Africa via Frankfurt, our representations to Bonn resulted in us being informed that there was no violation of the embargo and when we requested further detailed information we were informed in a reply dated February 28, 1984, that "since the investigations are not public" the Foreign Ministry was "not in a position to disclose any facts". Taken together with the letter of September 6, 1983, from Australian Airlines, where they too were unable to provide us with "any information" we are unable to make any further progress with this case.
Concerning the Red Baron case where arms were apparently routed from London to South Africa via Zurich and about which we provided detailed information to the Swiss authorities, we have heard nothing more from the Swiss Government and have reason to believe that the investigations are no longer being proceeded with. We shall contact the Swiss authorities again and will be pleased to hear what, if any information, your Committee has been able to ascertain about this case.
We are also interested to know what response you have had from Israel regarding the detailed information which we provided your Committee last September about E1 A1 Airlines waybill of May 30, 1980, and its transport of arms to South Africa via Israel.
We should also like to know what explanation the Committee has received from Israel about the Remotely Piloted Vehicle of Israeli origin owned by South Africa which was shot down in Maputo Bay on May 30, 1983, and about which we provided some details.
Your Committee will recall our concern at certain aspects of Austrian legislation governing the arms embargo and assurances given us by Dr. Erwin Land, the Austrian Foreign Minister about their intention to "further tighten the prohibitive measures already in force", which we reported to you on September 23, 1983. We have since had several consultations with the Austrian Government and although we are not able to report any specific measure being enacted so far we can assure you that the Government still has the matter under active consideration. We know that the Government shares our concern for early action and we shall be consulting with them again very soon.
Shackleton Reconnaissance Aircraft
You may be aware that South Africa announced last month its intention to finally ground its 7 Shackleton naval reconnaissance aircraft by the end of this year and to stop supplying the United Kingdom and the United States of America with information about maritime and naval traffic around Southern Africa. Pretoria claims that this is due to the arms embargo and is undoubtedly emphasising its importance to Western naval strategy in order to secure new aircraft. It would like to find quick replacements and claims to need eight Nimrods, Atlantics or Orions. We know that it tried to acquire the Nomad and it was as a result of our representations that former Australian Premier Fraser assured us that they would not be supplied to South Africa. Since it is unlikely that any of these aircraft will be provided to South Africa, it is likely to use either the HS-748 or the Israeli Arava for this purpose, or the C-130 failing which the L-100-30 which can also be converted into naval reconnaissance aircraft. South Africa has just ordered one airship from a British company and there are reports that it is considering using it for military purposes. It is vital that the Committee exercises great vigilance to ensure that the embargo is not undermined further and South Africa provided with replacements for the Shackleton aircraft.
I now turn to an issue of substantial current importance, namely, the export of arms and ammunition by South Africa. We know of South Africa's expanding internal armaments industry even if it does depend heavily on imported items. The apartheid regime is facing a serious crisis in its weapons production programme and needs to export items in order to keep its production line functioning. It cannot afford the high cost of locally assembling and making arms, particularly after being deprived of the monopoly arms market it enjoyed in Rhodesia until April 1980 when Zimbabwe was born. During October 1982 it even exhibited some arms at the Defence Fair in Greece until our intervention with the Greek Government which resulted in their removal and expulsion. Since then we have been vigilant and South Africa has not been able to participate in any of the international arms exhibitions until last month's FIDA 84 Exhibition in Santiago, Chile, where it showed a few items.
The Committee should seek clarification from Chile.
During the past year and especially in recent months, ARMSCOR has also been buying expensive advertising space in several defence publications, including the International Defence Review. It claims that its weapons are "Born of Necessity. Tested under Fire".
One of the most publicised South African military weapons, the 155mm gun described as the G5, owes its origin to several countries. The Committee should seek clarification from all the governments concerned and we shall be interested to learn about the outcome.
However, it now becomes a matter of great importance to ensure that one of this Committee's 16 recommendations contained in its September 1980 report is acted upon forthwith to prohibit the importation of arms from South Africa. We are pleased to inform the Committee that the Swedish authorities adopted an Ordinance to Prohibit the Importation of Military Equipment on November 21, 1983, and we are providing you with a copy in case some other governments wish to follow this example. We hope that the other Nordic countries and the Netherlands, which was the first to voice its support for such a measure, will now adopt the necessary measures to be followed by other States. We hope that the Committee can encourage and persuade Member States to act on its recommendations even though we know that they have not been formally adopted by the Security Council. If we deny export markets for apartheid arms we can seriously undermine South Africa's internal armaments programme and make the mandatory embargo much more effective.
Nuclear Collaboration
In no area is external collaboration as grave as in the nuclear field. No one any longer doubts South Africa's nuclear weapons capability. The Report of the United Nations Group of Experts on South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field, of September 9, 1980, and the World Campaign's study South Africa's Nuclear Capability, 1980, provide ample evidence of the danger of an apartheid bomb. Yet Western nuclear collaboration with South Africa continues unabated despite Pretoria's determined refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. After the adoption of the mandatory embargo in 1977, the Norwegian Government specifically called for the imposition of full-scale safeguards which would make all further nuclear collaboration conditional upon South Africa placing all its nuclear installations under international inspection. This is also reflected in recommendation XVI this Committee made in 1980. The apartheid regime refuses to do this and the fault is that of those Western Powers which continue to provide South Africa with vital nuclear technology, equipment and expertise despite its nuclear weapon ambitions.
The Pretoria regime increased its 1983 expenditure on atomic energy research by 54.9 per cent and uranium enrichment costs for 1982-83 were expected to rise by R20 million to R85 million.
The regime no longer even tries to mislead the world about its true intentions. According to an extract from the Johannesburg Home Service broadcast of the State-controlled radio on March 15, 1984, although "it is capable of producing nuclear weapons, South Africa has utilised her nuclear energy strictly for peaceful purposes". It then refers to the agreement due to be signed with Mozambique on the following day and states: "Happily therefore, the omens are good and South Africa does not feel compelled to utilise her nuclear capacity in another direction".
The nuclear threat still remains a major area needing the urgent attention of this Committee and we hope that you will find adequate time to give it due consideration.
During January and February this year I had the privilege and opportunity to visit Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Tanzania and had consultations with Government leaders including their Heads of State and Government, among whom are Patrons of the World Campaign. I was encouraged by their support for the World Campaign and they asked us to intensify our work because, in a very real way, the more effective we are in enforcing the embargo the more we shall succeed in reducing South Africa's aggressive role in the region. The responsibility upon us all is great - but I am certain that we can all do much more - and much better - in the future.
If my memory is correct, this Committee did once decide to examine all national legislation on the arms embargo. I do know that we have called for that on numerous occasions. That still remains an important task and we will be pleased to learn about progress made so far so that we may cooperate in this matter. There are also many other important matters to which I have drawn the attention of the Committee in the past, in order to make the embargo more effective - many of those ideas are still not acted upon.
Operation of the embargo
In reviewing the six and a half years of operation of the mandatory arms embargo and the role of this Committee we are bound to express some regret and disappointment. The mandate and resources of this Committee remain deplorably weak. The Report and 16 recommendations of the Committee submitted to the Security Council in September 1980 have still not been given serious consideration by the Council. This Committee has since then appeared to be largely paralysed and has often not even met for long periods. There was even a long period when it had no Chairman. More recently it has met at times and we are very grateful for the courtesy and cooperation extended to the World Campaign which has been granted several hearings and its written communications have been promptly acknowledged.
However, from outside it does appear as if the Committee has not been able to take any real initiatives in following up cases since September 1980 and does not seem to have even requested governments to respond to allegations brought to its attention for action. It is of course possible that confidential representations have been made but the results of any such initiatives are not publicly known. Certainly, the Committee has not produced any reports of its work since September 1980 and that is a serious setback.
We hope that some of this can be put right soon and we know that you will understand our comments as arising not so much from any wish to be critical but more due to genuine concern that the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa should not only be strictly enforced but that it should be effectively strengthened and reinforced so as to deny all forms of military and nuclear collaboration to the apartheid regime.
On behalf of the World Campaign, I should like to thank you once again for granting me this hearing and enabling me to present the Committee with certain new information. We hope that you will find it useful. As before we wish to assure you of our total support for your important work and wish to assure you of our full cooperation.
I thank you.
(1) Major-General J.N. Garba, then Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid. He had chaired the Lagos Conference in 1977 when he was Commissioner for External Affairs of Nigeria.