December 12, 1977(1)
After many years of campaigning we now have a mandatory United Nations arms embargo under Chapter VII of the Charter.(2)
It is an important advance from the voluntary embargo first adopted in 1963. However, as with the voluntary embargo there is the danger that it will not be implemented comprehensively or strictly - and this is made easier because the wording of Security Council resolution 418 leaves it to each Member State to interpret the meaning of what constitutes "arms and related material" and calls merely for the "review" of existing contractual and licensing arrangements with South Africa rather than forbidding them. It further decides that States "shall refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons" rather than forbidding all forms of nuclear collaboration with the Pretoria regime.
The resolution has already been described as "too late and too little". However, if States do decide to implement it comprehensively and strictly it can make a major impact by weakening the South African defence establishment. But that requires committed action by States to ensure that all institutions, particularly corporations, as well as individuals falling within their jurisdiction, are made to comply strictly with the spirit and letter of the resolution.
If the present mandatory decision is applied strictly, then I am convinced that the South African defence forces can be denied any further arms and defence equipment, as well as spare parts and components which will make much of their existing weaponry inefficient and non-operational: that is, provided that nobody sabotages the embargo.
To examine some of the areas which need attention and where loopholes have to be closed it is useful to recount the current situation in relation to external sources of supply to and support for the South African defence establishment.
Arms Exports
South Africa's existing weapons and equipment are mainly of British, United States, West German, Italian and French origin, with France being the major recent supplier of arms.
South Africa has a wide range of sophisticated weapons which need renewal and if the arms suppliers prohibit their export it will hit South Africa quite hard. If France, Italy and other Western arms suppliers in fact cease all sales, that will have a decisive effect because South Africa cannot, despite its claims, make highly sophisticated weapons on its own.
A major question is what do Governments define as arms? Our experience is that even in the case of countries such as Britain, the United States of America and West Germany, all previously committed to the voluntary embargo, the way in which they defined "arms and military equipment" was so narrow that South Africa in fact managed to secure a wide range of equipment from these countries for its armed forces. On the many occasions when we have exposed particular deals the response has been either that the items were not "arms" or that they fell within a "grey area" and could therefore be exported. And the "grey area" is defined unilaterally and is often narrowed or broadened as deemed fit, sometimes because of a change in government, but generally toward "grey area" sales rather than prohibitions.
Thus the South African regime, for example, secured the West German Advokaat Communications system and the British Marconi troposcatter systems. Its Air Force has United States Cessna and Swearingen Merlin aircraft, and the Transall transporters made jointly by West Germany and France. We could produce a long list but our previous statements and documents give more comprehensive and detailed information.
Spares
The second area of importance is that of spares for weapons already supplied to South Africa. Despite claims by several States that they do not sell spares as a result of the voluntary embargo, the problem of definition is ever more acute in this field. Equipment is often exported ostensibly for civilian purposes when it is in fact used for the military: either the equipment is itself considered to be civilian even if ordered by the defence force, or if it is sold to a so-called civilian company in South Africa. This ensures that South Africa obtains all the spares and components it needs, as well as engines for locally assembled aircraft.
Recently, we had reason to believe that South Africa's aging Shackletons had been renewed in Britain. Now this has been confirmed by the Pretoria regime which in its South African Digest of September 30, 1977, discloses that when in 1973 it was decided to recondition a 20-year-old Shackleton the spares could not be refurbished locally so that the Air Force dismantled the aircraft and shipped the spares to Britain. We do not know how many other aircraft have been renewed in this way in Britain or in other Western countries which otherwise claim to have been implementing the arms embargo. We have not so far taken up this matter with the United Kingdom Government but will do so within the next few days and inform you about their explanation.
As in the case of Shackleton, so too with other aircraft which need updated equipment and renewal. South Africa's more modern aircraft are even more dependent and therefore vulnerable to not getting spares and components from abroad. In order to keep them in operation it is vital that South Africa obtains all necessary support equipment. A strict ban on spares and components can therefore cripple most of its sophisticated weapons and security equipment; provided, of course, the countries concerned apply this provision of the Security Council resolution very strictly.
Transfer of Technology
The third area is the internal armaments industry within South Africa which has been constantly expanded since the early 1960s and about which the Security Council should be most concerned. This industry has been developed in close collaboration with many Western companies which have been only too ready to establish subsidiaries there or become associated with local firms so that their technology, know-how and skill may contribute to the South African defence effort.
Today there is virtually no major wholly South African made weapon or defence equipment: the reliance on overseas firms is substantial and in some cases total. Companies which fulfil this need include British Marconi, Plessey, Racal and Rolls Royce; German Telefunken and MAN; French Dassault and Thomson CSF; American Lockheed and Grumman; and Italian Aermacchi.
Many of these firms produce weapons and components locally under licence or patents or simply on the basis of know-how provided by their parent companies. Often expert staff from abroad are sent to South Africa to supervise production in that country and others are recruited for long-term appointments. Despite this clear breach of the embargo there has been no evidence so far of any of the major Western Powers putting an end to this transfer of technology for repression.
Britain has many such subsidiaries in South Africa and on March 22, 1977, a Government Minister was asked in Parliament if something could be done to stop these subsidiaries from undermining the embargo. The companies specifically mentioned included ICI, Plessey and Racal. The Secretary of State for Defence, Dr. Gilbert, stated that "the Government do not have any general powers to interfere with the export of information to South Africa or to prevent firms, by whoever they are owned, from manufacturing any product in that country". He went on to say there would be serious concern if British firms were acting contrary to the spirit of Government policy. Nevertheless, this concern does not seem to make any difference to the actions of the subsidiaries which supply equipment to the South African Defence Force.
We are not aware that any of the Western Powers have stopped their firms from operating in South Africa to undermine the international arms embargo. Indeed, very recently we drew attention to Racal equipment made in South Africa by the British subsidiary being used by the Rhodesian forces in their attacks against Mozambique last year. Following our representations the British Foreign Office confirmed that the Racal equipment had been provided to Rhodesia and sanctions had been violated, but to this date no action whatsoever has been taken against Racal.
Several major international arms firms have substantial interests in South Africa and as a first step the Secretary-General of the United Nations should ask all States to provide details of all patents and licences granted by their firms to South Africa as well as the names of those firms which have subsidiaries, associate relationships and agents in South Africa. It will then be possible, in the light of this information, for us to judge the extent to which this relationship has been put to an end by the governments concerned. It is important that the governments disclose all the available information about the nature and extent of military collaboration between their firms and South Africa as a matter of urgency.
The corporations will not act in support of resolution 418 (1977) unless they become subject to substantial and severe penalties and it is therefore urgent that South Africa's trading partners enact the necessary legislation to secure compliance with the Security Council decision.
Action on this question will be the acid test of commitment to the embargo by the major Western Powers.
We are in the process of compiling a list of Western companies and subsidiaries involved in the South African defence effort and will make it available to the appropriate governments for action. We shall keep the Special Committee and the Secretary-General informed of developments because it is crucial that there is adequate supervision of this aspect by the Committee of the Security Council.(3)
Our investigations in Britain over the past fortnight reveal the large range of British companies which are apparently able to supply South Africa with many items of defence related equipment either directly or via subsidiaries or agents in that country. After further investigation we shall take this matter up with the British Government next month and keep the United Nations informed of developments.
Civil aviation
At the Paris seminar of the Special Committee in April 1975, I drew attention to the role of so-called civilian aircraft in South Africa's military operations. At that time we reported that over 2,000 private aircraft were registered in South Africa: we believe that there are now over 3,000 such aircraft.
This expansion of civil aviation has resulted in a host of different aircraft from most Western countries being exported to South Africa almost without any control. These include Cessna, Bell, Grumman, Robin, Beech, and Piper aircraft, all with agents in South Africa. There has also been an expansion in aircraft repair and servicing, as well as training of technicians and pilots.
The aviation industry also services the South African Air Force (SAAF) in various ways and thus the industry is regarded by the Government as a semi-strategic one which needs to be encouraged. Despite foreign exchange problems the Government wants to see an increase in domestic sales of such aircraft and as an incentive exempts them from both sales tax and import duty.
South African legislation enables the authorities to utilise these aircraft for the defence effort and there are at present at least 13 Air Commando squadrons which form an integral part of the South African Defence Force, equipped with private aircraft.
This sector, of course, includes helicopters which are of obvious strategic importance to South Africa and are being imported in substantial quantities from abroad.
One South African company, Court Helicopters, has converted and rebuilt military helicopters including the Sikorsky S55's. It has even imported several ex-West German Navy/Air Force Sikorsky H34 hulls and converted them locally. These H34's were all part of the final production run which were built for the German forces in the early 1960s. The first hull, a naval version, was delivered in April 1975 and is now operating, after refurbishing in South Africa, and is registered ZS-HGL. Since this is a very recent delivery - in 1975 - there is strong reason to believe that deliveries are continuing and the Security Council should take up this matter immediately.
This is obviously a major loop-hole in the West German embargo, even though the Bonn Government claims to implement a strict arms embargo against South Africa. This loop-hole needs to be sealed. This example also shows the degree to which the South African aviation industry has expanded, as well as the ease with which it is able to purchase ex-military equipment from the major Western Powers.
If the embargo is to be effective, then it is vital that all exports of aircraft and related equipment be banned and that no South African technicians or pilots be trained abroad.
Some related matters also need to be examined. For example, South African aerospace societies, parachute clubs and similar bodies continue to enjoy close relations with international bodies and take part in international competitions.
In 1976 the International Academy of Aviation and Space Medicine held its annual Congress in South Africa and it became known then that the Deputy Surgeon-General of the SAAF, Major Nieuwoudt, had been attached to the Royal Air Force in 1971 when he also obtained a diploma in aviation medicine. Just this one statement, of course, raises the whole question of South African military personnel being seconded to Air Forces abroad as well as the involvement of overseas Air Force and civil aviation personnel connected with aviation medicine who actively collaborate with South African establishments.
All these relationships have to be ended.
Exchange visits
This leads to the question of exchange visits and training facilities provided abroad to South African nationals associated directly or indirectly with the defence establishments. We have exposed a series of such visits to all the major Western countries by South African officials in recent years and this needs to be stopped altogether.
Our representations to several governments lead us to believe that the current policy is to consider "each case on its own merit" and continue this form of collaboration with South Africa rather than banning it totally.
There are also, Mr. Chairman, some other more remarkable visits which seem to take place despite United Nations decisions and have not so far elicited condemnation by the United Nations.
There are official visits by overseas defence staff to South Africa and the most recent example is that of Major General Andrez Rodriguez, second in command of the Paraguayan Armed Forces, who according to the South African Digest of October 21, 1977, arrived on a 10-day visit as guest of the SADF. All these visits have to be ended.
Defence attaches
Several countries still maintain defence attaches in their South African missions and South Africa reciprocates the practice in some cases. The Special Committee against Apartheid has details about the countries concerned. These arrangements must be ended.
Co-operation in the exchange of surveillance and other information
For several decades South Africa had been considered an integral part of the over-all Western defence system and as a result there is long-standing collaboration with certain Western Powers in the exchange of surveillance and other information. The operation of the voluntary embargo has not put an end to this relationship which has in fact expanded in a number of ways. In 1973, South Africa inaugurated its Advokaat naval communication system in Silvermine, built with West German assistance and disclosed that there existed "fixed radio communication" with Whitehall, Buenos Aires, and San Juan. This system monitors the entire South Atlantic and most of the Indian Ocean. There is no evidence that South Africa's collaboration with other Powers in this field has ended.
There is also the question of South Africa obtaining vital information via satellite surveillance of all types in the Southern Hemisphere and the Western Powers must end this form of collaboration as well.
More recently, Mr. Chairman, just before coming here, we have received documentary evidence which shows that the South African embassy in Bonn has arrangements with the Royal Air Force Communications Centre in Rheindahlen, West Germany, whereby military signals from South Africa are transmitted to the Embassy over the RAF military communications network free of charge. These arrangements were made a few years ago by the South African defence headquarters in Pretoria "with the British Ministry of Defence, London".
We have no reason to believe that this form of collaboration has ended and are taking up the matter with the British Government and will inform the United Nations about their explanation. This aspect also requires urgent action on the part of the United Nations Security Council.
NATO codification system and data
Over two years ago, we revealed that the NATO codification system for spares and equipment had been made available to South Africa by several NATO members. Since then we have been campaigning for this system to be withdrawn from South Africa both by writing to all NATO members and also by lobbying at two NATO conferences. We asked that NATO itself should take a joint decision to stop some of its members from supplying NATO data to South Africa. We have not succeeded so far.
However, the United Kingdom informed us early this year that it had decided to cease supplying NATO data to South Africa and that leaves West Germany, France and the United States of America to take a similar position. In the light of resolution 418 (1977) we hope that the Governments concerned will announce very soon not only that they have ceased supplying NATO data of this kind to South Africa but that they will also withdraw the codification system already provided to South Africa.
We also urged that the NATO Ministerial Council heed our demand that no NATO national or international staff be permitted to have contact with any South African officials. After much pressure, and following strong representations at the NATO ministerial meeting in Oslo last year, Secretary General Luns has given us the assurance that the international staff do not have contact with South African officials. Up to now, despite all our representations, we have no such assurances with regard to national staff posted at NATO headquarters.
Seminars, conferences and academic exchanges relating to the military efforts
Because of the growing war situation in South Africa, the authorities have recently placed considerable importance on strategic and defence studies. Various seminars and conferences are organised in South Africa and South Africans participate with considerable ease at international technical, strategic and defence conferences.
International technical conferences and seminars take place in Farnborough and Paris when they organise major air shows there and these side conferences are attended by South African officials. A recent symposium organised in South Africa by the Institute for Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria, in March-April 1977, was attended by a number of international participants including Professor Harold W. Chase of the University of Minnesota, Colonel Phillip P. Katz of Asia-Pacific Defence Forum in Washington, Professor John Erikson, Director of Defence Studies of the University of Edinburgh and Professor Jurgen Schwartz, of the Hochschule der Bundeswehr, Munich.
This is only one example of several such gatherings. Early this month a seminar was organised in London by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, at which a South African gave an account about the current military situation to a private meeting.
Mr. Chairman, all these contacts of academic and military experts with South Africa should be stopped and the Governments in question need to take necessary legislative action to ensure that their nationals do not collaborate with South Africa in this way.
Much of the collaboration at this level involves governmental and semi-official organisations which are within government control. Those which are not under governmental control should be brought under such control. The individuals who collaborate with South Africa in its military effort should be deprived of their nationality should they continue to violate the spirit of the international embargo and visit South Africa for such activities. Visa and other restrictions should be imposed on South African nationals so that some control can be exercised in those cases where South African officials visit the major Western countries.
Mercenaries and other related personnel
Mercenaries and other foreign nationals who intend to help the South African defence establishment should be stopped. As we have already seen in the case of Rhodesia, a large number of mercenaries will also be drawn in to fight on the side of South Africa in the future as the conflict escalates. Today, from the figures that I have there are at least 2,000 foreign personnel in the South African armed forces serving as permanent staff. Most of them are former Royal Navy personnel now attached to the South African Navy. It is crucial that if the weapons used to defend apartheid are to be banned then the persons who actually go out there to take up arms for the Pretoria regime should also be stopped.
Any national who goes to South Africa as a mercenary or to serve in the defence effort, in any way, should be stopped where possible and failing that, should be deprived of his or her nationality.
If there are no penalties then it will become impossible to stem the flow of more and more overseas recruits to the apartheid war. Equally, all those who evade South African military service or desert should be granted unconditional refuge and asylum wherever and whenever they seek it.
Shipping, motor, engineering, chemical and related industries
The shipping, motor, engineering and chemical industries play a central part in the South African defence efforts.
South Africa, as a matter of strategic priority, is placing high importance on developing its shipping and related industries in order to make various naval equipment locally. A number of South African firms have already made vessels for, and provide services to, the South African Navy, including the firms of James Brown and Hamar Ltd., and Dorman Long in Durban and Globe Engineering Works and Maritime Industries Ltd., in Cape Town.
These and other firms in South Africa can at the moment, with local technology and local effort, make hulls for the ships, but the engines are rather more difficult to make locally. And even in those cases where as a result of the expansion of the local motor car industry, they are able to make diesel and petrol engines for small vessels, they still need to import a number of components from abroad. Therefore, once again if the arms embargo is applied strictly in so far as the components are concerned it could severely restrict if not halt altogether the development of the South African naval industry.
The motor car industry, as the Special Committee already knows, is directly involved in supplying the defence forces with transport and other equipment, as well as engines and components for tanks and military vehicles. They also supply the police force with vehicles and where local vehicles are not made they import them. For example, British Leyland Land Rover Kits are imported from the United Kingdom and then assembled in South Africa and supplied to the South African Police Force. These Land Rovers were used in the Soweto massacre last year and representations made to Her Majesty's Government have so far only produced the response from Prime Minister Callaghan that there is no machinery to restrict the export of this equipment. We have therefore failed so far in securing a ban on these exports which help the South African Police in its repression internally. But it is not only British products which make this direct contribution to the South African Police Force.
The area of shipping and related industries is a difficult one to control because of the extensive commercial relations with South Africa. But it is a vital and important area. South Africa's major trading partners have a responsibility to ensure that their so-called normal commercial relations do not operate in such a way as to support the South African defence establishment, and undermine the arms embargo. That is why we ask also for strong economic measures against the apartheid regime, including an end to all investments in South Africa.
Oil embargo
There is some debate in certain quarters as to whether oil is a strategic commodity. But any person with the most elementary information and certainly all South Africans know that oil forms a vital part of the South African defence and police efforts. Oil is an item of strategic and military importance to South Africa, and its police and military forces will not be able to function at all without it.
We are aware of the various proposals which have been made with regard to an oil embargo in relation to supplies reaching Rhodesia. In our view, all oil that goes to South Africa should be stopped because oil is used not only to suppress the South African people, but also to maintain South Africa's illegal occupation in Namibia and to sustain the illegal Smith regime in Salisbury.
A firm commitment on the part of Iran and other oil producing countries, and the major Western Powers where the oil companies are based, could make a decisive impact and seriously undermine the racist regimes in Pretoria and Salisbury - provided of course that there is the political will to take this kind of action.
Nuclear relations
We have, for almost a decade, been calling on the Special Committee and other international forums for the complete cessation of all nuclear collaboration with South Africa. In the early years many people did not pay much attention to the issues which we raised. Today no one doubts - even in Paris, Washington, London or Bonn - that South Africa has nuclear capability and all the evidence points to the fact that this has been made possible as a result of the assistance provided by the major Western Powers in terms of nuclear technology, equipment and material.
Resolution 418 (1977) adopted by the Security Council recently is so weak as to be almost meaningless on the subject, because it does not prohibit all nuclear collaboration with South Africa.
It is my understanding that reluctance of the Western Powers to act on this question is due to their deep involvement in the South African nuclear industry, and also to their expectations to benefit from South Africa's plans to develop enriched uranium within the Republic.
We have been recently told by the British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, that the priority for Western policy at the moment is to persuade South Africa to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. It appears that no action in this field is likely to be taken in the meanwhile. It therefore looks as if in the interim period South Africa can acquire any additional nuclear technology and equipment that it needs in order to perfect its atomic bomb. We feel that top priority should be given to stop South Africa from deploying an apartheid atomic bomb and hence all nuclear collaboration should end forthwith.
South Africa has recruited senior nuclear engineers and physicists for its Atomic Energy Board and these foreign nationals should be urged to resign their positions or be deprived of their nationality.
Up to last year, the British press carried many advertisements to recruit such personnel and we assume that many of them are now operating in South Africa.
The question of South Africa's nuclear capability is an urgent one and requires immediate action.
Arms exports by South Africa
The United Nations has in the main concentrated on an arms embargo governing exports to South Africa. We have, for several years, following our study of the growth of South Africa's internal armament industry, drawn the attention of the Special Committee as well as Member States to the fact that one needs an embargo which also prohibits the import of arms from South Africa. So far, very little has been done in this area, although I am aware of the efforts made in the General Assembly more recently. The Security Council resolution of last month does not control South Africa's exports of armaments.
The evidence that we have so far shows that most of these exports have in the main gone to Rhodesia, but there is also growing evidence that several other countries are interested in buying South African arms and defence equipment. Indeed, in several sectors and particularly that of electronic warfare, there is already growing collaboration between South Africa and various other countries. Thus the embargo should, as we have often called for in the past, cover the import of arms and related defence equipment from South Africa, as well as the export of arms to South Africa.
Mr. Chairman, we have listed 14 areas in which immediate and urgent action is required. Security Council resolution 418 (1977), of 4 November 1977, mainly governs the first two aspects. All the others need immediate and urgent attention.
We hope, therefore, that the Special Committee will collect and publish all the available evidence, much of which we have submitted in the past, and take it up with the Security Council Committee which has just been established. But that is not enough. We need to ask the governments involved in these arms transactions for immediate explanations in the light of such evidence. There should be no delay on the part of these governments simply because a Security Council Committee has now been set up: they must not use the excuse that these discussions should only take place within that Committee. It is the responsibility of the governments concerned to tell world public opinion about these relationships and what they are doing to end them. If this is not done urgently, then we fear that the delay will be used as an opportunity, both by certain governments and certainly by the multinationals, to stockpile even more arms and equipment in South Africa in anticipation of further pressures.
Mr. Chairman, it is therefore a matter of vital importance that public campaigns on the arms embargo must go on and that the Special Committee is in a central position to encourage and sustain these campaigns.
Our commitment and record is clear. We, on our part, since 1960 - and especially from the very day of the Sharpeville massacre, March 21, 1960 - began an arms embargo campaign. We saw that the Saracen armoured cars used at Sharpeville were in fact made in Britain. Our campaigns over three years contributed to the 1963 decision of the Security Council calling for an arms embargo against South Africa.
Mr. Chairman, we are pleased to announce that we have decided to organise a World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa. We intend to compile all the available evidence and to take up the question with the appropriate governments where necessary. We will alert the Special Committee and the Secretary-General to what is happening and our objective is to ensure that the arms embargo is applied comprehensively and strictly.
We have already secured the support of several leading personalities for the World Campaign and we hope that the Special Committee will endorse our efforts.
From the evidence we have submitted today it is clear that the Security Council has to tighten the embargo as well as expand its operation so that the spirit of the decision is in fact carried out.
As the war has escalated in South Africa, various Governments have repeatedly claimed their commitment for peaceful change in southern Africa. It is ironic that these very governments, which appeal to the African States and to the liberation movements to work for peaceful change also happen to be the same Powers which have supplied South Africa with arms, military technology, spares, components and military personnel and facilitated other forms of military collaboration with the apartheid regime. We appeal to these countries - to Britain, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the more recent recruit, Israel, as well as others - to apply a strict and comprehensive arms embargo and dismantle the elaborate arrangements made by their official and semi-official corporations and other institutions in order to support the South African defence efforts. If they take strict action to end this collaboration, it is possible not only to weaken the South African defence forces by denying them further modern equipment but also to cripple a great deal of its existing weaponry (by stopping supply of components and spares which they need vitally).
The South African Government claims that it is 75 per cent self-sufficient in armament. It depends very much on how you compute such figures and what you consider to be armaments. I think it would be true to say that there is no major weapon today about which even West Germany or Britain or France can claim total self-sufficiency, since the whole weapons industry is such a complicated and complex industry. There is a heavy reliance by South Africa on technology from other nations and therefore it can be put in an extremely difficult situation by a strict embargo.
We are rather anxious about the operation of the Security Council embargo although, of course, we welcome it like most members of the United Nations. Our anxiety partly arises as a result of our experience over the operation of the 1963 embargo as well as from what Dr. Owen told us in London last week when we asked whether the British Government will enact legislation in order to implement the resolution just adopted by the Security Council. He told us that Britain has in effect had a mandatory embargo already and that therefore no legislation was required.
In the light of the few examples which I have mentioned today and the other examples which we have given to your Committee in recent years, it is quite clear that there are major loopholes in the British arms embargo. If it is the view of Britain, West Germany and the United States of America that they have to do nothing more to implement the new mandatory resolution, then the decision of last month will be made virtually meaningless. The only value will probably be that Italy and France which have hitherto openly supplied arms to South Africa may stop doing so now but retaining substantial loopholes and continuing to repair and service equipment already supplied to South Africa.
The arms embargo is crucial not only to deprive South Africa of military capability but also to ensure that Rhodesia does not carry out its attacks against independent African States. The most recent attack against Mozambique by Rhodesia was carried out and made possible with the equipment supplied by South Africa and this includes very sophisticated aircraft and bombs. If South Africa is deprived of these weapons then one will make a contribution towards stopping the Rhodesian forces from attacking independent African States in the area as well.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we put a high priority on the arms campaign and will continue our efforts as we have done for 18 years.
Our ability and resources are very limited, particularly when it comes to the question of the arms embargo, when the whole area is surrounded with secrecy and duplicity. But nevertheless we will pursue with the determination we have shown in the past years to continue to expose and challenge those governments and institutions which collaborate with South Africa. Where Governments fail to act, especially as regards companies in their own jurisdiction, we will make the names of the companies known so that the non-aligned nations and other countries can take direct action against the companies which support South Africa in the military area.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, I would like to thank you personally and the Special Committee for the efforts which have been made over the years on the arms embargo, particularly for the very special efforts made by you and the African Group to bring about the Chapter VII decision just adopted by the Security Council last month. We are also extremely grateful to the Special Committee and the Centre against Apartheid for the work which they continue to do and which enables us to carry out the policy of the United Nations among the public in our own countries.
(1) UN document A/AC.115/L.485. The Special Committee transmitted this statement to the Security Council, document S/12514.
(2) By resolution 418 of November 4, 1977, the Security Council decided that "all States shall cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types, including the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, para-military police equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall cease as well the provision of all types of equipment and supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture or maintenance of the aforementioned". It further decided that "all States shall refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons".
(3) The Security Council established a Committee in December 1977 to monitor the arms embargo.