ANC Today

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Volume 4, No. 44, 5-11 November 2004

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THIS WEEK:

* Letter from the President: Let us together honour those who brought hope
* TAC Court Case: Constant legal threats don't help HIV and AIDS fight
* Approaches to Poverty Eradication and Economic Development IV: Bridging the
EU development gaps
* ANC Statement: Finding facts about Zimbabwe

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LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

Let us together honour those who brought hope

Like all others, our struggle imposed many sacrifices on those who chose to
fight for freedom, and on the people as a whole. As we go about our daily work
to build the new South Africa, many among us quietly carry the pain and the
anger occasioned by some of the criminally inhuman things the oppressor did to
perpetuate the apartheid system.

As we negotiated the peaceful resolution of the conflict in our country, we
were very conscious of the fact that if nothing was done to address and assuage
that pain and anger, a terribly destructive conflict would ensue.

For this reason pursuing the strategic goal of peace, stability and national
reconciliation that had always been a central pillar in the policies of our
movement, we decided on the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.

We have also worked and are working in millions of other ways to build a new
South Africa based on a new reality of peace, stability, non-racism and
national reconciliation. The remembrance and celebration of our heroes and
heroines who sacrificed their lives so that all South Africans have the
possibility to live together in conditions of democracy and peace, is a vital
part of the important process on national reconciliation.

Such occasions give the possibility to all our people to celebrate a shared
pantheon of heroes and heroines, and thus begin to develop a common heritage
that emphasises a common destiny rather than a divided past. This is especially
important given that here we speak of patriots who engaged in struggle to
liberate both the oppressed and the oppressor, ever loyal to the vision that
South Africa belongs to all who live in it.

However, our recent experience, when we lost two of our outstanding leaders,
Walter Sisulu and Beyers Naude, showed how far we are from achieving this goal.
I refer here to the fact that so many of our people "discovered" these heroes
only after their death.

It was only when they were no more that those who had known nothing about them
began to ask the question - why were such noble South Africans subjected to the
persecution they were forced to endure! Why did we know so little about them
while they were alive!

And these were towering figures with long records of struggle, who were
celebrated by millions among us as we as other people beyond our borders!
Nevertheless there were some in our country who either did not know them or
associated their names with things negative, only to be surprised at the moment
of their death.

Forty years ago, on the 6th of November, 1964, not long after Walter Sisulu and
his comrades were given life sentences at the Rivonia trial, the apartheid
regime executed six of our liberation fighters, combatants of Umkhonto we
Sizwe. These were Vuyisile Mini, Wilson Kayingo, Zinakile Mkaba, Nolali
Mpentse, Daniel Ndongeni and Samuel Jonas.

The apartheid courts had found them guilty of eliminating one among them who
had turned traitor and then worked for the forces of repression of the
apartheid regime. The oppressors would not tolerate that they should be
deprived of a valued informer. They would not allow the understanding to become
firmly entrenched, that the reward for the betrayal of the democratic struggle
was death.

Fully understanding that the death had occurred not in pursuit of criminal
ends, but for the liberation of all South Africans from a racist tyranny and
the suppression of the apartheid crime against humanity, the peoples of the
world waged a united struggle demanding that the lives of the six patriots
should be spared.

Thirsty for the blood of the patriots, the Pretoria regime refused to listen.
And so our country lost six brave men of conscience that would have been
welcomed in all other countries of the world as outstanding examples of the
nobility of the human soul. The oppressors interred their remains in paupers'
graves.

Despite this act of judicial murder, intended to intimidate our movement and
people into submission to tyranny, victory was won. 30 years after the martyrs
died at the hands of the apartheid hangman, the apartheid regime was defeated.
Though dead, Vuyisile Mini and his comrades had scored the success they sought,
in the interests of all our people and all humanity.

The achievement of the freedom for which they sacrificed their lives gave us
the possibility to exhume their bodies and rebury them with the dignity due to
such heroes of the people. One such place of final rest for these heroes is the
Emlotheni Memorial Park in Port Elizabeth, the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
Municipality.

Exactly 40 years after they were executed, on 6 November 2004, a memorial
service will be held at Emlotheni Memorial Park. Emlotheni had served during
the years of struggle against apartheid as a venue for rallies organised to
mobilise the people further to intensify the struggle. As activists for our
liberation, Vuyisile Mini and others had known this sacred place well. It was
therefore fitting that it should provide their final place of rest.

Emlotheni Memorial Park has become one of our honoured heritage sites. It is a
place open to all to visit, reflect on what happened in the past, and make
silent vows to cherish and defend the freedom we have won, and respect the
memory of those who laid down their lives so that we could gain our liberty.

On many occasions various people in our country have regretted the fact that
some of our citizens tend to stay away from events that celebrate our national
heritage. I speak here of such heritage as our Human Rights Day on 21 March,
our Youth Day on 16 June and Women's Day on 9 August.

Soon after the new national flag was adopted, some others made it a point,
especially on some sports occasions, to carry and display the old flag of
apartheid South Africa. To this day, there are some who will not join in
singing the first two stanzas of our National Anthem.

And yet all these, the National Days and the National Symbols should serve to
unite our people, standing out as emotional moments and icons that speak to the
shared destiny of our diverse but united people. To salute and honour them is
as important a contribution to the nurturing and further entrenchment of the
spirit of national reconciliation as any other activity in which we might
engage.

The ceremony to honour Vuyisile Mini and others will provide an opportunity for
all the people of the Nelson Mandela Metro, black and white, to come together
to say, together, we salute these fallen heroes who laid down their lives so
that all of us can live together and in peace in the new South Africa that is
giving so much hope to all our people.

Those who knew the martyrs, who were moved by their humanity, by the powerful
and melodic singing of Vuyisile Mini, and inspired by their courage even at the
moment of death, will still carry the pain of their death when they should be
alive.

Nevertheless as they gather at Emlotheni, they will not be harbouring any
desire for revenge against those who took away the lives of patriots whose
memories they cherish. They will be proud that these heroes refused the
temptation to betray the cause of freedom in return for miserable lives lived
in the shame of treachery.

Surely, it is not asking too much to say to those whom apartheid sought to
benefit - respect and honour as our common national heroes and heroines all
these who have brought peace to our land, friendship among our people,
reconciliation among those who saw one another as mortal enemies, and hope to
all of us.

Thabo Mbeki

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APPROACHES TO POVERTY ERADICATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IV

Bridging the EU development gaps

A European Union (EU) document posted on its website, and last updated in May
2004, says: "Although the European Union is one of the richest parts of the
world, there are striking internal disparities of income and opportunity
between its regions. The entry of 10 new member countries in May 2004, whose
incomes are well below the EU average, has widened these gaps. Regional policy
transfers resources from affluent to poorer regions. It is both an instrument
of financial solidarity and a powerful force for economic integration."

The same document says: "Inequalities have various causes. They may result from
longstanding handicaps imposed by geographic remoteness or by more recent
social and economic change, or a combination of both. The impact of these
disadvantages is frequently evident in social deprivation, poor quality
schools, higher unemployment and inadequate infrastructures."

It continues: "The EU policy to reduce regional disparities is built on four
structural funds:

* the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), (which assists regions whose
development is lagging behind and those undergoing economic conversion or
experiencing structural difficulties);
* the European Social Fund (ESF), (which mainly provides assistance under the
European employment strategy);
* the section of the EU's common agricultural fund devoted to rural
development, (to help in the development and structural adjustment of rural
areas whose development is lagging behind, by improving the efficiency of their
structures for
* producing, processing and marketing agricultural and forest products);
* financial support for fishing communities as part of the common fisheries
policy (CPF), (to support restructuring in the fisheries sector.)

"The funds will pay out about 213 billion (Euros), or roughly one third of
total EU spending, between 2000 and 2006.

"A further 18 billions (Euros) is allocated to the cohesion fund, set up in
1993 to finance transport and environment infrastructure in member states with
a GDP less than 90% of the Union average at the time (Greece, Ireland, Spain
and Portugal)."

Another EU document says: "Most structural fund assistance is granted in the
form of non-repayable grants or 'direct aid', and to a lesser degree refundable
aid, interest-rate subsidies, guarantees, equity participation, and
participation in venture capital."

To indicate the focused attention of the EU on the challenge of development
within its member states, let us quote from another EU document that discusses
the ERDF. It says:

"As part of its task to promote regional development, the ERDF contributes
towards financing the following measures:

* Productive investment to create and safeguard sustainable jobs;
* Investment in infrastructure which contributes, in regions covered by
Objective 1, to development, structural adjustment and creation and maintenance
of sustainable jobs, or, in all eligible regions, to diversification,
revitalisation, improved access and regeneration of economic sites and
industrial areas suffering from decline, depressed urban areas, rural areas and
areas dependent on fisheries. Such investment may also target the development
of trans-European networks in the areas of transport, telecommunications and
energy in the regions covered by Objective 1;
* Development of the endogenous potential by measures which support local
development and employment initiatives and the activities of small and medium-
sized enterprises; such assistance is aimed at services for enterprises,
transfer of technology, development of financing institutions, direct aid to
investment, provision of local infrastructure, and aid for structures providing
neighbourhood services;
* Investment in education and health (only in the context of Objective 1)."

"Objective 1 promotes the development and structural adjustment of regions
whose development is lagging behind, i.e. whose average per capita GDP is less
than 75% of the European Union average. These regions show a deficit in socio-
economic development in that they have:

* a low level of investment;
* a higher than average unemployment rate;
* lack of services for businesses and individuals; and,
* poor basic infrastructure.

"The Structural Funds support the takeoff of economic activities in these
regions by providing them with the infrastructure they lack, encouraging
investment in businesses and supporting human resource developments appropriate
to the region."

To illustrate the detail entailed in the implementation of the Regional Policy
of the EU, we will cite only one development example, a section of Berlin, the
capital of the Federal Republic of Germany. Of this section the EU says that it
has not been affected by growth and development in the rest of the city. It is
therefore seen as a "negative area".

"Urban waste areas and abandoned production areas or railway sidings give an
impression of disunion, the unrelatedness of isolated fragments or of an
insular situation within the city.

"Population is dwindling; they younger inhabitants are moving out, leaving the
old people behind. Parallel to this situation, foreign immigrants and latter-
day émigrés from the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries are
moving in. The unemployment rate is 50% above the federal average, and one in
four unemployed persons has been out of work for over two years, which is the
definition of long term unemployment. There is a high degree of dependence on
social aid, and the educational level is low. The eligible area is a stage for
radical right-wing groups and has a high crime rate, typical of major cities.

"The economic restructuring that followed re-unification has led to massive
damage in the manufacturing sector: industrial sites were abandoned, and few
plans have been put forward to re-use them as yet. This economic thinning-out
has had an impact on individual commerce and on service and artisan
enterprises, especially since they are under pressure from competition from
large-scale distribution centres."

The foregoing demonstrates the detailed meticulous preparatory work that is
done to ensure that the focus on each development region is correct and
effective. The comments above relate to an area of Berlin with a population of
only about 30,000. This is less than 1% of the population of the city, and 2.3%
of the population falling within an Objective 1 development area.

The EU developmental interventions in Berlin include overcoming labour market
and economic barriers; overcoming habitat and ecological barriers; overcoming
social, ethnic, cultural and communication barriers; and providing technical
assistance to ensure local implementation, monitoring and assessment of the
development programmes.

The US Mission to the European Union has published some documents to assist US
corporations interested to do business within the EU. One of these discusses
the economic programmes that result from the implementation of the Union's
Regional Policy. It makes the following important points:

"Most EU funding is not paid directly by the European Commission to private
beneficiaries, but via the national and regional authorities of the Member
States.

"Structural Fund grants are given to national, regional and local authorities
for, among others, infrastructure and industrial, projects in such areas as
telecommunications, energy, tourism, environment, transport, health, education,
etc.

"Projects most likely to receive (Structural Funds) money are those that
contribute to EU priority objectives: development and structural adjustment of
underdeveloped regions, economic and social conversion of areas facing
structural difficulties, and adaptation and modernisation of policies and
systems of education, training and employment.

"Most Structural Fund projects are assessed/approved by relevant local/regional
authorities."

All studies indicate that the EU Regional Policy is succeeding in its objective
to reduce and eradicate poverty and underdevelopment among the Member States of
the Union.

The Observatory for International Library Programmes (OPIB) has this to say on
this important matter: "For many years, the regional disparities in levels of
development and standards of living - which existed well before the Community
was created - were dealt with entirely by the Member States concerned. There
have been clear improvements since the European Union started trying to reduce
these disparities: average per capita income in the three least prosperous
countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) increased from 68% of the Community
average to 79% in 1999."

An August 2002 study of "The Economic Impact of EU Regional Policy in Objective
1 Regions" confirms that this improvement in the less developed regions of the
EU will continue during the 2002-2006 EU development period. It says:

"The Community objective 1 interventions are expected to have the highest
impact on GDP in Portugal and Greece, where the average yearly level of GDP for
2002-2006 is expected to be 3.5% and 2.4% higher than it would otherwise have
been (without EU development funding).

"In Portugal and Greece the yearly average level of Gross Fixed Capital
Formation throughout the period is respectively 8.9% and 8.1% higher than it
would otherwise have been."

The EU interventions will also help to restructure and modernise the economies
of the less developed regions, reducing their dependence on primary products.
In its 2003 report, "Competitiveness, sustainable development and cohesion in
Europe: from Lisbon to Gothenburg", the EU says: "The Objective 1 programmes
should help the economies of the six most backward regions covered by the study
to catch up and restructure. Industrial production should increase in absolute
terms, with the GDP share of agriculture and the processing of agricultural
products falling and the share of services increasing."

It continues: "The instruments of solidarity, the Structural Funds and the
Cohesion Fund, have a major impact on the competitiveness of regions and
contribute significantly to improving the living conditions of their citizens,
particularly in the poorer regions. About one third of GDP increases in the
worst-off regions is estimated to be attributable to transfers from structural
instruments."

It then goes on to say: "The ex post evaluation of Objective 2 regions (regions
affected by industrial decline, covering 16.3% of the EU population) for the
period 1994-99, which was carried out in 2003, concludes that the Structural
Funds and their national and private co-financing -about EUR 52.3 billion in
total - contributed to the creation of 700,000 jobs (gross), assisted more than
300,000 small and medium enterprises, and provided significant support for
research, technological development, innovation and the promotion of the
information society. The average unemployment rate in these regions declined by
2.1% from 11 to 8.9%, which demonstrates that they performed better than
regions outside Objective 2.8.15 million people (were trained) in the Objective
1 regions."

It adds: "Market forces alone will not result in balanced economic development
across the Union as a whole, and eastern enlargement will double existing
regional disparities in the near future."

Another EU document says: "The dynamic effects of EU membership, coupled with a
vigorous and targeted regional policy, can bring results. The gap between the
richest and poorest regions has narrowed over the years. The case of Ireland is
particularly heartening. Its GDP, which was 64% of the EU average when it
joined 30 years ago, is now one of the highest in the Union."

Correctly, the 2002 study also estimated how much of the development impact
"leaks" out of the development regions in the form of import of goods,
equipment and services from other EU and non-EU countries. It found that "as
expected, the leakage effects are higher from the relatively small open
economies of Greece, Portugal and Ireland.", with the bulk of the "leakage"
being to other EU countries.

The "leakages", as a proportion of the Objective 1 interventions, were 46.4%
for Greece, 41.9% for Portugal and 37.8% for Ireland. This means that to the
extent of these percentages, these countries could not obtain from their own
markets the goods, equipment and services occasioned by the injection of EU
development funds into their economies. This was a reflection of their
relatively low levels of development.

Inspired by the successes it has achieved, the EU is determined to pursue its
Regional Policy despite the challenges posed by its enlargement from 15 to 25
countries.

In its January 2003 "Second progress report on economic and social cohesion",
the EU says: "Once enlargement takes place, disparities are going to widen. The
most up-to-date statistics show that 48 regions in the EU15 (representing 18%
of the population) had a per capita income below 75% of the average Community.
In the EU25, there will be 67 of these regions representing 25% of the
population."

Nevertheless the report says: "When establishing the future budgetary
allocations for economic and social cohesion, the Union will need to take into
account the unprecedented scale of economic and social disparities in an
enlarged Union highlighted in this progress report, and the intensive, long-
term nature of the effort required to reduce them.

"As indicated in the first progress report, many contributions to the debate,
especially at regional level, regard a figure equivalent to 0.45% of EU GDP as
a minimum level for the resources to be allocated to cohesion policy for the
period after 2006."

Properly to understand the EU commitment to its Regional Policy, we should
contrast the 0.45% of EU GDP mentioned in the preceding paragraph with the
equivalent ODA commitments to Africa.

The Summary of the 2004 "Global Development Finance" report of the World Bank
says: "The European Union, the United States and other donors have announced
plans that, if realised, would increase aid to 0.29 percent of industrial
countries' national income by 2006 (from 0.23 percent in 2003)."

The same report also make the two important points that, "Since 2000, the
developing world has been a net exporter of capital to the advanced
economies.Half of the net (increase in) official development assistance (in
2002).reflects debt relief donor agencies, rather than increased resources
provided directly to developing countries."

We must now state some of the main conclusions drawn from the experience of the
implementation of the EU Regional Policy.

* The EU grew out of the West European system of cooperation initiated by the
Marshall Plan, informed by the same strategic political and economic objectives
that inspired that Plan. In addition to the task to defeat "Soviet
expansionism", these included the need to ensure that contradictions among the
European powers did not lead to a Third World War.
* It understood the benefits that derived from that Plan especially with regard
to the irrationality of depending on loans and/or private investment to advance
the underdeveloped regions within the EU to reach their takeoff point.
* It understood that these regions are too poor to generate the savings and
capital they need for their development, and that their levels of poverty and
underdevelopment made it impossible for them to attract significant volumes of
private capital.
* Accordingly, public sector grants constitute the bulk of its development
funds.
* Contrary to arguments about minimal state intervention in the economy of the
underdeveloped regions, it has proceeded on the basis of the critical need for
the state to be involved in the development of these regions.
* This state intervention has entailed detailed "dirigiste" planning and
implementation of comprehensive development programmes, fully accepting the
concept of a developmental state.
* The Regional Policy is succeeding in its central objective of reducing and
eradicating poverty and underdevelopment in the least developed regions within
the EU, ensuring that these regions attain the average GDP level of the EU as a
whole.
* The 15-member EU aimed to achieve this objective in one generation. It
estimates that given its enlargement into 25 countries, it will realise this
goal in two generations.

The Marshall Plan enabled the biggest West European economies to attain their
takeoff points. They were then able to develop with no need for exceptional
external support. They have therefore been able to use the post-Marshall Plan
wealth they are able to generate to develop the less developed EU member
states.

The US and World Bank interventions enabled the Japanese economy to attain its
own takeoff point. It was then able to develop with no need for exceptional
external support. It has therefore been able to use the post-Western
intervention wealth it has generated to sponsor the development of the
economies of the South East Asian countries.

The EU also had to respond to the challenge similar to the one that confronted
Japan, of developing other countries within its "sphere of influence". Largely,
these were its former colonies identified as the ACP countries - the African,
Caribbean and Pacific countries.

Let us therefore next week examine the ACP-EU "Cotonou Agreement" to see the
extent to which the EU has drawn on the successful development model
represented by the Marshall Plan and its own Regional Policy to foster the
development of the ACP countries.

** This is part four in a special series of articles about global approaches to
poverty eradication and economic development. Next week: 'The ACP & the
philosophy of development'.
 More Information:

Part One: Beware of the Natives!
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2004/at41.htm#art1

Part Two: Rescued by the Marshall Plan
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2004/at42.htm#art1

Part Three: The Truth & the Asian Miracle
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2004/ancdocs/anctoday/2004/at43.htm#art1

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TAC COURT CASE

Constant legal threats don't help HIV and AIDS fight

With the Treatment Action Campaign and its legal representative, the AIDS Law
Project, taking the Department of Health to court this week, it is important to
reflect on the impact these legal processes have on the country 's response to
HIV and AIDS.

The latest legal action was aimed at forcing government to publish what the two
organisations call an annexure to the Comprehensive Plan for Management, Care
and Treatment of HIV and AIDS. They claimed these documents contained
timetables for the implementation of the comprehensive plan. The plan,
developed by the Department of Health and adopted by cabinet in November last
year, was made public immediately after it was endorsed, and is available on
the government website.

On 5 October this year, the AIDS Law Project (ALP) wrote to the State Attorney
on behalf of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) indicating that they would no
longer be seeking access to these documents but demanded the department pays
for the legal cost incurred while pursuing this matter.

In this letter, the ALP's Fatima Hassan wrote: "We accept that our client (TAC)
is not entitled to annexes A.1 and A.2 and will no longer be persisting in our
client's claim for an order directing disclosure of these documents."

"Based on what is contained in the answering affidavit deposed to by Dr Chetty
(Acting Director General of the Department of Health), we have advised our
client to accept in good faith that annexes A.1 and A.2 are not the final,
approved and/or adopted 'week by week schedule for the pre-implementation
period' and the 'Detailed Implementation Plan' respectively, but are draft
documents that were not approved by the Department, Minmec [a committee of the
health minister and MECs] and/or Cabinet."

When this development became public information, the TAC responded saying that
the issue of access to these document was not resolved yet. The TAC said in a
statement on 3 November that if these documents did not exist, they would "ask
the court to compel the Minister of Health to develop one.The Operational Plan
cannot be implemented properly without an implementation timetable".

Whichever way this matter could have evolved, the TAC had already resolved that
the court should be used to access these documents or if they did not exist,
the court should order that they be developed.

At face-value, the threatened litigation and legal actions by the two
organisations may appear to be based on a genuine cause to further the
interests of people living with HIV and AIDS. However, they hamper the
Department of Health's efforts to effectively implement the programmes aimed at
preventing HIV infections and mitigating the impact of AIDS.

Over the past few years, the Department of Health at national and provincial
levels has received several letters from both the TAC and ALP demanding
government should take particular policy decisions or provide various kinds of
information. Earlier this year, the two organisations approached each province
demanding a wide range of information to enable them to compile a 35-page
document entitled "TAC/ALP First Monitoring Report of Antiretroviral Roll-out",
which was released in July.

The aim of this exercise, these organisations argued, was "to provide
government and the public generally with an ongoing and accurate assessment of
the programme's implementation, to act as an early warning system for problems,
and to help communicate successes."

This means these organisations would demand information from national and
provincial health departments, synthesise it in one way or another and release
it as an assessment report for the benefit of government.

Whenever these letters of demand are received, government AIDS managers and
officials, who should be at the forefront of service delivery, are called back
to respond to these organisations. In some cases, they have to collate
information that the two organisations have demanded within unilaterally
decided deadlines. In other instances, these officials have to spend hours if
not days discussing the appropriate responses with the department's legal
representatives. They then have to collect the necessary evidence, write a pile
of affidavits and attend lengthy court hearings.

With all the efforts and resources that are invested in pre-court case
processes, none of the several legal threats has ended up in court except for
the case around the use of nevirapine to reduce the risk of mother to child
transmission of HIV, which dragged on for the most part of 2001 into 2002.

Two years after the court ruled that nevirapine should be provided outside of
the designated government research programme, we are still grappling with the
very same questions that this research programme was supposed to answer over a
period of 18 to 24 months.

Some of these questions were:

* What are the best ways of optimising the impact of this intervention and have
HIV-negative and healthy babies at 24 months?
* What is the best infant feeding option that can reduce the risk of HIV
transmission without exposing babies to other major causes of infant mortality
including diarrhoeal diseases and malnutrition? (Whether it is exclusive breast
feeing, infant formula or can mothers mix feed?)
* Would the intervention to reduce mother to child transmission negatively
affect long-term antiretroviral treatment of the mothers and babies when they
progress to a stage when this treatment may be needed?

Nevirapine is one of the main drugs used for long-term treatment of AIDS. Even
prior to the TAC court case, there were concerns about possible development of
resistance to nevirapine when used as a single drug (mono-therapy) for reducing
mother to child transmission of HIV.

An independent judicial system that is fair and able to promote and defend
social and other rights of its citizen is what we all desire. Inspired by the
wrong assumption of these two organisations that everyone but government is
concerned about HIV and AIDS in the country, the Wits University-based ALP
might have an academic desire to test the limits of our constitution and the
law in general in pursuit of their subjective goals as lobby groups.

Some of the questions that this antagonistic tendency and approach to
government and the Department of Health, raises are:

* How does this academic exercise contribute in building the united national
response required to address a major challenge like HIV and AIDS?
* Is this constant threat of litigation not wasting the very limited resources
we have as a country to address various social challenges facing us?
* Is this approach not diverting us from collectively implementing all the
elements of our response including prevention; comprehensive treatment, care
and support; research and surveillance; and promotion of human rights?

In spite of all the challenges, government has focused on ensuring that all the
elements captured in the comprehensive plan are implemented because they are
critical in curbing the spread of HIV infection and reducing the impact of AIDS
on our society.

Campaigns to encourage abstinence and ensure that those in sexual relationships
are faithful to one partner are proceeding well. Distribution of newly branded
male condoms has increased from 33 million to 45 million condoms a month since
June 2003. Funding for female condoms is increasing and sites for voluntary
counselling and testing have doubled from 1,500 in March 2004 to more than
3,000 at the end of September.

The utilisation of the AIDS Helpline, funded by government to provide
information on HIV and AIDS in different languages and refer people to
available services, has increased to 5,000 calls a day.

A total of R7 million is spent on distributing nutritional supplements to those
in need and a campaign to encourage healthy diets, regular exercise and other
healthy habits in the general population is underway.

Drug procurement and distribution is being strengthened and provinces have
secured antiretroviral drugs and other commodities through an interim
procurement process while the main tender is being finalised. Access to
treatment is being extended across the country with 50 of the 53 districts
having at least one service point for management, care and treatment of HIV and
AIDS. The Department has a target of establishing one service point in every
district by March 2004. A total of 102 health facilities have been accredited
to provide a number of services aimed at mitigating the impact of HIV and AIDS
including antiretroviral therapy.

Government's communication and social mobilisation campaign - Khomanani - is
intensifying the dissemination of information on all the elements of the plan,
including the availability of treatment and the need for adherence to treatment
regimen. Efforts are also being made to determine the impact of traditional
medicine in improving the health of people with HIV and AIDS.

The successful implementation of various HIV and AIDS programmes is dependent
on cooperation with various partners and the dedicated efforts of government
officials - the very same individuals who, now and again, have to respond to
the TAC and ALP. The Department of Health is working with many organisations
from different sectors of our society to ensure that the comprehensive plan
achieves its objectives of curbing the spread of HIV infection and
strengthening the health system to ensure that quality health care is provided
to all South Africans, including people living with HIV and AIDS. A strong
health system is necessary to respond to the complex burden of disease and
health challenges facing our country. This includes many cases of trauma and a
high burden of non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, hypertension,
cancer, and infectious diseases including HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria.

As it proceeds with the implementation of this momentous task, the Department
of Health reports, at particular intervals, on the challenges and the progress
being made in implementing the comprehensive plan to cabinet, parliament and to
those who gave the mandate to implement this programme - the people of South
Africa.
 More Information:

Comprehensive Plan for Management, Care and Treatment of HIV and AIDS
http://www.info.gov.za/issues/hiv/careplan19nov03.htm

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ANC STATEMENT

Finding facts about Zimbabwe

A COSATU "fact finding mission" arrived in Zimbabwe on Monday 25 October. This
was after the Government of Zimbabwe had informed COSATU that, "the mission is
not acceptable", and asked that the members of the delegation should be
informed "in time that the mission has been called off." Since then, the fate
of this mission has received saturation media coverage.

In the light of all this, many members of our movement have sought
clarification from the ANC leadership about this whole affair. We have
therefore informed the COSATU leadership that this edition of ANC Today will
carry an article on this affair to respond to the queries of our members and
supporters.

But before we get into the substance of this matter, we must address some
misconceptions that have gained some currency arising from COSATU's "fact
finding mission" to Zimbabwe.

One of these is that in one way or another, the confrontation between COSATU
and the Zimbabwe Government has complicated or would complicate the relations
between the ANC and our Government on one hand, and ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwe
Government on the other. Whether this is a mere prediction or the expression of
a wish, the reality is that COSATU's "fact finding" mission will have no effect
whatsoever on these relations.

Here are some of the public comments made in this regard. 'ZimOnline' said
"There are fears that the COSATU visit could have hardened the ruling ZANU PF's
attitude towards Mbeki's efforts to find a solution to the crisis". Business
Day said "that the row could escalate and undermine government's efforts to
mediate in the political crisis in Zimbabwe".

The Sunday Times said: "A spat between Cosatu and the Zimbabwean government
could be a serious embarrassment for South African President Thabo Mbeki, who
has so far espoused a policy of "quiet diplomacy" with his country's northern
neighbour." The BBC said "the action will cause embarrassment for the South
African government".

Another view that has been peddled around is that this episode reflects
divisions within our movement.

Business Day reported that "Senior African National Congress (ANC) officials
were locked in a meeting all afternoon yesterday, discussing efforts to control
the damage caused by the deportation of a Congress of South African Trade
Unions (Cosatu) delegation visiting Zimbabwe on a fact-finding mission. It also
wants to preempt a possible fallout among the tripartite alliance partners."

There was no such meeting!

The Voice of America reported that, "the incident has exposed a rift within the
ruling party on how the Zimbabwe situation should be handled."

It quoted one Adam Habib of the Human Sciences Research Council as saying:
"There is clearly tension within the ANC itself about whether that ('quiet
diplomacy') is an appropriate strategy. And there have been discussions and
debates within the party itself on that matter. Now I think the ANC is of
course not in a position to publicly chart a different route to government, or
at least to the presidency and foreign affairs, but COSATU is. It has a
relative greater degree of autonomy and it has been very vocal right through
the last two or three years about its opposition to Mugabe and what Mugabe's
been up to."

We would assume that Mr Habib, described as a "political analyst", would know
that as in any other democracy, our Government implements policies decided by
the ruling party, the ANC. However, he chose to pretend that the Government
decides policy for the ANC. This was to make the suggestion that except for its
obligatory loyalty to the Government, which in this instance he reduces to "the
presidency and foreign affairs", the ANC would agree with COSATU "about its
opposition to Mugabe and what Mugabe's been up to".

Mr Habib overreached himself in his effort to peddle the untruth that obviously
serves some people's interests, that our movement is divided about our
relations with Zimbabwe. It is clear that in this case, as with others in the
past, the wish is father to the thought.

But perhaps we should criticise ourselves that we paid no attention to the
predictions about divisions in our movement and so on, made more than a year
ago in 2003 by the privately-owned 'The Financial Gazette' of Zimbabwe. In its
26 June 2003 edition, this journal said:

"President Thabo Mbeki's much criticised delicate foreign policy on Zimbabwe
goes under a litmus test with the powerful and militant Congress of South
African Trade Unions (Cosatu) positioning itself to aggressively push the South
African leader to force President Robert Mugabe, currently balancing on a
political knife-edge, from power and call for an interim government as a
precursor for the ushering in of a new political dispensation.

"The move by the South African labour union, a key ally of the ruling African
National Congress (ANC) during the liberation of the country, was unanimously
agreed on May 28 and 29, at a meeting convened in Johannesburg to actively
support calls by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and other
stakeholders, "for an interim government in Zimbabwe and the drafting of a new
constitution on the basis of which fresh elections should be conducted.

"According to confidential information obtained by this paper, Cosatu's
leadership resolved at their Johannesburg meeting that they would shortly be
sending a fact-finding mission into Zimbabwe comprising of all its affiliates,
before cracking its whip on Mbeki to deal with Zimbabwe's crisis and force a
re-run of Zimbabwe's presidential election. This follows their meeting with the
ZCTU in Johannesburg last month.

"Sources from Johannesburg indicated that Zimbabwe's issue, which had been
simmering under within the ANC's ruling block, could boil over, exposing that
the alliance has not been singing from the same song sheet over efforts to
curtail a long-standing crisis in Zimbabwe.

"President Mbeki has come in for a flak over his silent diplomacy at a time
there has been a chorus for a radical push to effect a regime change in
Zimbabwe...

"The decision by Cosatu, which was taken by its executive committee, is
expected to break the crucial alliance between Mbeki's government and Cosatu.
Cosatu's leadership is intent on taking Mbeki hostage over his quiet diplomacy
on Zimbabwe, which has been widely criticised as ineffective in dealing with
the country's political and economic crisis.

"'Cosatu will lobby the South African government to pressurise President
Mugabe..to accede to the demands by the trade union movement for democracy,
restoration of rule of law and free political activity,' the Cosatu executive
declared in minutes obtained by The Financial Gazette.

"The Cosatu executive said it had a 'historical duty' to help find a solution
to Zimbabwe's problems and ensure democracy and free political activity.

"'The resolution that was taken by Cosatu was a result of our meeting with them
last month. After the meeting that's when they came with that position and I
must say we are very much humbled by their response since we come from the
family of both regional and international labour unions', said Wellington
Chibhebhe, the secretary general of the ZCTU."

The Financial Gazette published this report 16 months ago. We will now comment
on what happened 16 months after the report was published, when COSATU sent the
fact finding mission to Zimbabwe predicted by The Financial Gazette.

On 11 October this year, the General Secretary of COSATU wrote to President
Mugabe. He said "COSATU in its eighth National Congress held in September 2003,
decided to send a fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe". He told President Mugabe
that the mission would arrive in Zimbabwe 14 days from the date of his letter,
"on the week of the 25-29 October 2004. The delegation will consist of at least
one person per each of our 21 affiliated unions plus two officials from the
trade union federation - COSATU."

He said the mission would be hosted by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU). He requested that President Mugabe should "grant an audience to our
delegation", during the period it had fixed for its visit. He also said that
the delegation also wanted to see Zimbabwe Minister of Labour, Paul Mangwana,
and requested that President Mugabe should assist the delegation to meet the
Minister.

He informed President Mugabe that the delegation would also meet "the
leadership of key political formations and major civil society formations", to
gain "a full view of the political and socio economic developments in
Zimbabwe".

He went on to say: "We would appreciate a list of organisations that fall into
this ('key political and civil society') category that you recommend we should
also meet." He wrote that otherwise COSATU was making its own arrangements to
meet "other stakeholders".

He requested President Mugabe to "revert back to us about suitable dates and
times for a meeting". He went further to advise President Mugabe "to direct all
enquiries to our International Relations Secretary, Simon Boshielo in our head
office or alternatively at.(mobile)".

Presumably COSATU expected that President Mugabe, a Head of State, would accept
that the situation in Zimbabwe justified that a South African trade union
federation should send a political fact finding mission, whose fact finding
activities he should facilitate, and with which he should then communicate,
through its International Relations Secretary, to indicate:

* when he would meet the COSATU delegation;
* what arrangements he had made for the delegation to meet the Minister of
Labour; and, which other organisations the delegation should meet.

It is our firm view that under any circumstances, this approach to any Head of
State, including President Mugabe, was astounding. The contempt for a Head of
State, a sovereign government and state it communicates could not have created
a climate conducive to serious discussions. The best that could have been
expected as a response to the letter was no response.

However, the Government of Zimbabwe humbled itself to respond to the letter of
the General Secretary of COSATU. Quite appropriately in the circumstances we
will describe, the respondent was the Permanent Secretary (Director General)
for Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare.

The first point the Permanent Secretary made in his letter is that the ZCTU,
COSATU's counterpart and host, only communicated to the Zimbabwe Minister of
Labour about the then projected COSATU visit, and the programme of the mission,
in a letter dated 19 October 2004. Evidently, the ZCTU indicated that the
COSATU mission would be in Zimbabwe from 24 October, 5 days after the date of
the letter of the ZCTU to its own Minister of Labour.

The Permanent Secretary concluded his letter as follows: "In view of the
foregoing, the mission is not acceptable and COSATU is advised to liaise with
Hon. Mdladlana (the South African Minister of Labour) with a view to revisiting
the original agenda. In order to avoid inconveniencing your members who are
supposed to travel to Harare on Sunday the 24th October 2004, you are kindly
advised to inform them in time that the mission has been called off. By a copy
of this letter the ZCTU Secretary-General is advised of the position."

Much has been made of this advice in the aftermath of the termination of the
stay of the COSATU mission and its transportation out of Zimbabwe back to South
Africa. The central allegation that is made is that this advice, and what then
happened to the COSATU delegation, demonstrated the anti-democratic and
"brutally repressive" nature of the Zimbabwe Government.

Accordingly, all and sundry, from the South African Communist Party to the
Democratic Alliance of Tony Leon, and others in between, have hailed COSATU and
the COSATU fact finding mission as outstanding combatants for the liberation of
the people of Zimbabwe from tyranny.

However, to entrench the culture of truthfulness in the conduct of public
affairs, it is necessary that we indicate some of the contents of the October
21 letter written by the Zimbabwe Permanent Secretary to the General Secretary
of COSATU. He said:

"Let me start by pointing out that.the solidarity arrangement(s) between ZCTU
and COSATU are not in dispute. I wish to draw your attention to the processes
agreed upon by the Social Partners of both Zimbabwe and South Africa in June
2003 in Geneva, Switzerland, with a view to dealing with the political
dimension of Labour in Zimbabwe.

"Mr E. Patel of your organisation's International Relations is fully aware of
what was agreed upon in June 2003. Social Partners in South Africa being
coordinated by Hon M.M.S. Mdladlana, Minister of Labour, agreed to engage their
Zimbabwe counterparts in order to discuss the political element of Labour in
Zimbabwe.

"In line with what was agreed, Hon Mdladlana, in November 2003 invited his
Zimbabwe counterpart together with representatives of ZCTU and EMCOZ to a two-
day meeting in South Africa. Both COSATU and Business South Africa were
involved in the organisation of the planned meeting. The Government of Zimbabwe
was to meet the expenses. However ZCTU refused to proceed to South Africa. As a
result the meeting was called off, notwithstanding getting the invitation
directly from COSATU.

"Accordingly, any proposal by COSATU to visit Zimbabwe on a mission to engage
Zimbabwean stakeholders outside the realm of Employment and Labour should be in
the context of an agreed framework.

"The proposed meeting(s) with ZANU PF and MDC officials (and other
organisations "involved in the political discourse of Zimbabwe") demonstrate
the political nature of the mission to the extent that it has to be within an
agreed framework of dealing with the political dimension of Labour within the
two countries. In view of the foregoing, the mission is not acceptable and
COSATU is advised to liaise with Hon Mdladlana with a view to revisiting the
original agenda."

COSATU decided to ignore this letter. It insisted on its right to visit
Zimbabwe regardless of the wishes of the Government of that country, and the
right of that Government, like any other, to decide which foreigners to admit
into the country.

What all this amounts to is the following:

* During the annual 2003 International Labour Conference in Geneva, the
South African and Zimbabwe social partners - government, employers and labour -
agreed to work together in a Joint Tripartite Commission.
* Among other things, this Commission would address "the political
dimension of labour in Zimbabwe".
* In this context, the Zimbabwe Government reaffirmed its respect for
the right of COSATU to act in solidarity with the ZCTU.
T* he first post-Geneva meeting of the Commission convened by the South
African social partners, and scheduled to take place in South Africa in
November last year, failed to take place because ZCTU refused to attend.
* When the Zimbabwe Government received the letter from the General
Secretary of COSATU, it said that because of the obviously political nature of
COSATU's fact-finding mission, it would be proper that, as visualised in the
Geneva understanding, the mission should be organised through the Joint
Tripartite Commission.
* It therefore advised COSATU to contact the South African coordinator
of the South African social partners, Minister Mdladlana, to use the mechanism
provided by the Joint Commission to arrange COSATU's visit to Zimbabwe.
* In response, COSATU flatly refused to use this agreed mechanism and
afterwards said it was "absolutely right to insist that (it) did not require
government permission to conduct the mission".
* In the circumstance that COSATU refused to use the agreed process to
enable it to engage the political situation in Zimbabwe, thus dismissing any
interaction with the Government of Zimbabwe on this process matter, a
confrontation between COSATU and the Zimbabwe Government became inevitable.

Consistent with what was reported by the "The (Zimbabwe) Financial Gazette" in
June 2003, COSATU has now said that it will "campaign for the restoration of
democracy and for free and fair elections (in Zimbabwe)."

It said it "believes that despite its early forced departure, the mission
achieved its goal". It "congratulate(d) its members in the fact-finding mission
to Zimbabwe for their heroism and commitment." It "thank(ed) all those, in
South Africa and around the world, who have supported the mission and shown
their solidarity."

Among those who showed this solidarity were the SACP, the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the DA.

The SACP said "the South African Communist Party (SACP) is outraged and angered
by the rounding off and expulsion of a COSATU delegation by the Zimbabwean
government from Harare. With this act, it is time now that South Africa's
workers intensify their solidarity with the workers and poor of Zimbabwe and
support for the struggle for the democratisation of Zimbabwe."

The ICFTU said "the ICFTU-AFRO condemns in the strongest possible terms the
expulsion of the COSATU mission. This strong-arm tactic must be viewed in the
light of the deteriorating political situation on the eve of the parliamentary
elections early next year. ICFTU-AFRO is concerned that violence and
intimidation against opposition and the trade union movement is likely to rear
its ugly head bringing into question the fairness of the electoral process."

For the DA, its parliamentary Chief Whip, Douglas Gibson, said, "For once
COSATU is setting a good example. If only President Mbeki and the ANC would
take a leaf out of COSATU's book and adopt a more robust approach, we might
soon see a resolution of the Zimbabwean problem."

In this regard, the Deputy General Secretary of COSATU, Bheki Ntshalintshali,
said: "The ANC and the government have their own ideas on how the Zimbabwean
crisis should be dealt with. However, we do not agree with them."

In another statement, COSATU said, "We accept that the ANC government shares
with COSATU the common goal of restoring democracy in Zimbabwe, but that it is
pursuing a different route from COSATU towards achieving this goal." For these
reasons, COSATU has said it saw no reason and was not obliged to consult either
the ANC or Government about its Zimbabwe project.

Expressing its "own ideas", the ANC and our Government will continue to engage
ZANU PF, the MDC, the Government of Zimbabwe and other representative
organisations of the people of Zimbabwe, as they have done for some years
already.

With no hidden agenda in this regard, we will continue to interact with the
Zimbabwe leadership, our own people and others throughout the world, convinced
that the solution to the problems of Zimbabwe lies in the hands of the people
of Zimbabwe.

Our task is to work honestly and inclusively with all the leaders of Zimbabwe
to support them as they strive to solve these problems, avoiding any action
that might suggest an arrogant superiority on our part, over the people of
Zimbabwe.

We will continue to support the Joint Tripartite Commission formed by the South
African and Zimbabwe social partners in 2003 with the involvement of all three
of our country's trade union federations, and urge the social partners to use
this institution to assist the people of Zimbabwe to overcome their challenges.

We will also continue to work with all representative organisations of our own
people, together to contribute whatever we can to a bright future for Zimbabwe,
consistent with the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe.

We fully support the statement made by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs that
"The South African government accepts that Zimbabwe is an independent,
sovereign state that has an inalienable right to determine and to apply its
immigration legislation as it may deem appropriate and in its own interest."

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