| Cote d'Ivoire crisis
presents challenge to African leadership
On the
25th and 26th of this month, January, President Laurent Gbagbo of Cote
d'Ivoire and leaders of other Ivorian political formations, leaders of
the various rebel groups in that country, the leadership of the UN, the
AU, EU, ECOWAS, the President of the French Republic, as well as representatives
of the international donor community, met in Paris to discuss the situation
in the Cote d'Ivoire.
This followed a meeting at Linas-Marcoussis, France,
of representatives of the Ivorian government and political parties, as
well as all the rebel groups operating in the Cote d'Ivoire, convened
by the French government.
The Marcoussis meeting agreed on a government of national
reconciliation, with Laurent Gbagbo remaining as the President. It agreed
that a new prime minister would be appointed, which President Bagbo did.
The new Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, would then proceed to constitute
the inclusive government required by the Marcoussis agreement. This new
government would include the various political parties as well as the
rebel groups.
Being keenly interested to see the Core d'Ivoire return
to a situation of peace, stability, national unity and development, all
the non-Ivorian participants at the Paris meeting expressed their support
for the Marcoussis agreement. Many among these pledged material support
to the Cote d'Ivoire, to support its social and economic recovery.
The problem however, is that people have taken to the
streets of Abidjan, the capital of the Cote d'Ivoire, to express their
opposition to the Marcoussis agreement, which as we have said, was arrived
at by an inclusive collective of Ivorian leaders, including the rebels.
This is despite the fact that all the participants at
the Marcoussis meeting had agreed to attend and negotiate an agreement,
when the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, visited the Cote
d'Ivoire to discuss this matter with all those concerned.
As we write this letter, it appears that the hostility
of the Abidjan demonstrators to France, the convenor of the Marcoussis
and Paris meetings, has reached such intensity that French citizens in
the Cote d'Ivoire have felt obliged to return home.
The denunciation of France has also been accompanied
by calls by the Abidjan demonstrators that the United States should intervene
to facilitate the resolution of the Ivorian crisis.
These goings-on suggest that we are still some distance
away from resolving this crisis. The longer this persists, the worse the
situation will become both for the Cote d'Ivoire and its West African
neighbours. This also means that it will be more difficult to find a solution.
All this makes an important statement about our continent
and its institutions, such as ECOWAS and the African Union. As Africans,
we must openly admit the reality that we have failed to help the Ivorians
to end the crisis in their country.
It was precisely because of this African failure that
France made a military, political and diplomatic intervention to help
move the Cote d' Ivoire towards peace. And yet the crisis in this sister
African country has thrown up precisely the sort of challenges that require
African solutions.
From its independence in 1960, the Cote d'Ivoire was
an island of peace, stability and development. It avoided the experience
of its neighbours and other countries in West Africa and the rest of our
continent of military coups.
This gave it the possibility to attend to the challenge
of economic development and the improvement of the lives of the people,
relying significantly on its raw coffee and cocoa exports.
From 1904 it became part of French West Africa, having
been subjugated as the French colony of Cote d'Ivoire in 1893. In 1947
the French-controlled area to the north, which had been added to the Cote
d'Ivoire in 1932, was separated, to form the present state of Burkina
Faso, at that time called Upper Volta.
The significance of this is that it meant that, naturally,
the post-1947 Cote d'Ivoire would have a significant section of its population
that would be linked to the population now settled beyond its northern
border as Burkinabe. At the same time, this northern section of the population
was, and is, Moslem, whereas the population in the southern part of the
country is Christian.
In addition, the higher level of economic development
of the Cote d'Ivoire relative to its poorer northern neighbour, would
inevitably draw more Burkinabe across the colonial border into a Cote
d'Ivoire that, anyway, was home to people who were kith and kin.
The pull of the Cote d'Ivoire resulted in large numbers
of people from Burkina Faso and other countries of West Africa migrating
to that country. These include Malians, Ghanaians, Nigerians, Senegalese,
Guineans and Liberians. With a total population of about 16 million, some
estimates have suggested that 40 percent of the population resident in
the Cote d'Ivoire comes from these neighbouring countries.
From independence in 1960 to 1993 when he died, Felix
Houphouet-Boigny was President of the Cote d'Ivoire, having served in
the French parliament from 1946 as the elected representative of the Cote
d'Ivoire, at that time defined as an overseas territory in the French
Union. Throughout the years of his Presidency, Houphouet-Boigny encouraged
the acceptance of the notion that all Africans resident in the Cote d'Ivoire
should be accepted as Ivorians.
Accordingly, during these years, whatever the social
and other differentiation among these Africans resident in the Cote d'Ivoire,
the issue of the presence of the immigrant Africans in this country did
not become a matter of political contest and conflict.
At the same time, the country succeeded to manage the
competing interests of the various domestic ethnic groups that constitute
the Ivorian population. This, taken together with the acceptance of foreign
Africans, added to the p restige of the Cote d'Ivoire as a truly African
island of stability and African solidarity.
However, after the death of the founding President,
the situation began to change for the worse. Domestic ethnic tensions
began to raise their ugly head. Xenophobia inserted itself forcefully
into the national political discourse.
The delicate balances built by the political class since
independence began to unravel. The very legitimacy and acceptability of
the leadership of this class was questioned, based in part, on the gap
that had developed between this class and other sections of society in
terms of the standard of living and the accumulation of wealth.
Questions arose about the very legitimacy of the political
order that had evolved during the period of independence. Reflecting these
growing tensions, during 1990, the people engaged in strike action and
student unrest to get their voice heard.
Among other things, the political class responded by
abandoning the construct of a one-party state, allowing the emergence
of multi-party politics. The country achieved a relatively smooth transition
from the period of its founding President, to the period of his successor,
the former Speaker of Parliament, President Henri Konan Bedie.
However, in the end, the centre could not hold. At Christmas
1999, General Robert Guei seized power from the elected government of
President Bedie by coup d'etat. Among other things, these developments
posed questions about the relationship between the Cote d'Ivoire and France,
the former colonial power, which had military forces based in Abidjan.
During the same year that the OAU had finally decided
not to recognise governments that seized power by force, the Ivorian military
took a route that the Cote d'Ivoire had avoided for 39 years. A bubble
had burst.
Since then, the Cote d'Ivoire has been caught in a downward
slide away from the peace, stability and development that had characterised
its evolution as an independent African state.
The military coup was followed by elections in 2000
that created more problems, even as these elections sought to return the
country to democracy and stability. The elections were followed by the
outbreak of an armed rebellion in 2002, which challenged the outcome of
the election and exacerbated the divisions that had compromised the elections.
The armed rebellion was followed by negotiations between
the government and the rebels in 2002, which emphasised that the divisions
among the negotiators were irreconcilable, and that the neighbouring regional
facilitators of these negotiations had serious limitations with regard
to their capacity to help the Ivorians to resolve their problems.
The negotiations in the African capital city of Lome,
in Togo, were followed by negotiations and an agreement arrived at in
Marcoussis and Paris in France in 2003, underlining the better capacity
of the former colonial power, surpassing the ability of the now independent
Africans, to help solve the problems of the formerly colonised.
This has led to the evident rejection by the masses
in Abidjan of the Marcoussis agreement, which brought together the political
class of the Cote d'Ivoire and those who took up arms against it, so that,
together, they could take the first steps to return their country to its
previous position as a truly African island of stability and African solidarity.
Africa has embarked on a new path towards its rebirth.
This is the meaning of the African Union and its socio-economic programme,
NEPAD. That rebirth means that we have to address, successfully, the critical
issues of democracy, peace, stability, national unity, good-neighbourliness,
social progress and African dignity and solidarity.
Our failure in the Cote d'Ivoire constitutes an immense
and urgent challenge both to the African leadership and the African masses
to respond to the task we have set ourselves to transform the 21st century
into an African Century, ensuring that the people govern and not those
who use guns to impose their will on the people.
This will require that we address directly, together
with the leaders and the people of the Cote d'Ivoire, their obligation
to respect the imperatives that face the peoples of Africa. This will
necessitate that, together with them, we recall the example they set when
they took decisions to ensure that neither their future nor the future
of Africa would be compromised by submission to reactionary instincts
of tribalism and xenophobia.
It will require that as a continent, we take the necessary
decisive steps to demonstrate to ourselves, including our Ivorian brothers
and sisters, that we were serious in our intent, when we established the
African Union and launched its continental programme for the upliftment
of the African masses, NEPAD.
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